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ABSTRACT
This research aims to evaluate the attempts of Anglo-Saxon feminists to elaborate 
a new practice for the natural sciences. It focuses on biology, a discipline which extends 
beyond the realm of social science, and on which basis feminist critics have undertaken to 
reform the norms of scientific practice and to recast scientific epistemology. The central 
question of this research is: Is a feminist science of biology possible, both 
epistemologically and as a social practice? If so, what would it be like; and under what 
kind of practical conditions?
The arguments of this thesis are developed in three steps. The first part consists of an 
analytical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the feminist critiques and 
suggestions to reform the scientific norms of biological research, including what many of 
them see as ’context-bound scientific canons’ such as ’objectivity’. These criticisms thus 
range from theory choice to the very epistemological foundations of biology which are 
all conceived of as contributing to the development of spurious explanations of women’s 
biology and behaviours. This first part more specifically highlights the paradox entailed 
by the need for feminists to justify their new epistemology on the basis of frameworks bor­
rowed from a sociology of knowledge that emphasizes a (de)constructionist or a relativist 
stance on the legitimation of scientific knowledge, while, at the same time, they are forced 
to argue that feminist biology is ’better’ and ’truer’ from all points of view. I suggest that 
feminist science could be vindicated without resorting to the constraints of a local, 
context-bound stance on rationality and epistemology which appears hardly congenial to the 
resolution of the current scientific divergences between feminist and ’mainstream’ 
biologists.
The second part investigates the contribution of sociologists of knowledge and 
philosophers, focusing more specifically on Habermas, Hesse, and Gellner. It aims at 
shedding light on the particularities of both the ontologies and social norms and values that
distinguish the epistemologies of the social and natural sciences. It is believed that these 
aspects need to be discussed more fully in order to elicit the models of explanations used 
in biology and the criteria of validation that feminists could not dispense with in their 
projects of implementing the practice and knowledge produced by feminist biologists. Then, 
upon an examination of the epistemological issues raised in biology per se and of the 
scientific critique advanced by radical scientists and ’dialectical biologists’, it is suggested 
that it is mainly because of the hybrid cognitive nature of the life sciences that a chasm 
between feminist discourse about science and feminist practice of biology emerged. In other 
words, the strong reliance of biological mode of enquiry on both the values and ontology 
predicating critical theory and interpretive studies, and the more pragmatic values (and 
methodological commitments) rooted in the instrumental/empirical sciences, might explain 
why discrepancies progressively emerged between the theoretical elaboration of a feminist 
science (mainly inspired by reflections about the social sciences) and the actual practical 
implementations carried out by feminist biologists. A comparison between those two levels 
of feminist science (i.e. discourse and practice) will enable us to test this hypothesis.
The third part of the thesis analyses interviews of mainstream biologists and two case 
studies of practising feminist biologists. First, it shows the points of convergence and 
rupture between the norms of practice in conventional biology and in feminist biology. 
Secondly, it highlights the originality of the actual contribution that feminists have made 
in the domain of biology both sociologically and scientifically (i.e. epistemologically, 
methodologically, conceptually). Thirdly, it discerns the gaps and continuity between 
feminist theory and feminist practice of science. It also suggests, however, that the 
resistance of mainstream biologists to the feminist critiques and concrete projects of biology 
in the past decade remain partlv political (i.e. hostility to feminism) and normative (i.e. 
according to institutionally acceptable scientific rules). For, while the idea of a feminist 
biology derives fruitfully some original conceptual tools and designs of enquiry from the 
social sciences (especially in the areas human biology and clinically-oriented research), one
can as yet recognize that the epistemological conditions and methodological norms of 
production biological knowledge nevertheless constitute the shared framework of both 
feminist and mainstream researchers in most areas of biology. Hence, the shift of recent 
feminist critics of science (such as Harding and Longino), from an 
epistemologically-oriented critique of scientific knowledge to a critique in terms of theory 
building and ideological assumptions, may appear as more fruitful in the institutional 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem and Research Goals
This research endeavours to evaluate the attempts of Anglo-Saxon feminists to 
enunciate a new scientific practice for the natural sciences. It focuses on biology, a 
discipline which extends beyond — so it seems -  the realm of the social sciences. It is from 
biology that feminist critics have set out to develop a new approach to scientific research, 
comprising methodological and theoretical changes in scientific research conventions, and 
not least, a reformulation of scientific epistemology itself. Complementing, or perhaps 
preceding these changes, feminists also aim to reform the gendered division of scientific 
labour and the organization of scientific activity. Therefore, it must be stressed from the 
outset that any evaluation of both the feminist critiques of biology proposed in theory by 
social scientists and other critics, and the actual attempts of practising biologists to 
implement concrete projects of ’feminist biology’ must appeal to several sociological 
arguments rather than to epistemological or scientific analyses alone\
As this thesis will demonstrate, there are diverse critical tendencies in the feminist 
challenge of science but all of them ultimately call into question the ideological and 
political structure of the whole social system from which science is derived and acquires 
its credibility. It must be borne in mind also that in the feminist critiques of scientific 
knowledge more generally, the target has usually been the macro-structure of science, such 
as its ’patriarchal ideology’, its ’androcentric culture’ and the ’rational ethos’ of scientists, 
rather than the micro-aspects of decision-making in the laboratory as such.
Feminists have built their main critiques of biology on the basis of a sociology of 
scientific knowledge. The standpoint of a sociology of knowledge assumes that both the 
epistemological tenets of the scientific enterprise and the specific assumptions underlying
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scientific theories are socially embedded. For feminists therefore, epistemological canons 
and scientific theories arc in fact the reflections of social norms (or ideologies) which arc 
not universally true but rather bound to change.
For feminists, the canons and theories of the natural sciences mirror patriarchal 
interests and androcentric world-views. In biology especially, theoretical assumptions reflect 
the patterns of social relations characteristic of the patriarchal, male-centred system of 
social life. For feminists it is first and foremost — if not exclusively — biological theories 
about women that arc male-centred (and biased). The dichotomy between culture and nature 
in the explanation of sexual dimorphism and the ’reduction* of women’s behaviours to 
biological causes are paramount examples of concepts and social norms that impregnate 
biological theories with male biases. Once publicized more widely outside the scientific 
circles, these theories maintain, via their ideological authority, the oppression of women 
within the family, the health care system, the labour market and back again into the 
scientific organization itself. Moreover, even the norms of method according to which those 
theories are tested and believed to be true and objective reflect ideological and political 
biases. Hence, it is spurious to think that theory and methodoloev arc universal and bias- 
free. Rather, they constitute ’context-bound’ norms, derived from the social system 
dominated by men. In brief, the central argument of feminists is that patriarchal and 
androcentric beliefs and representations of nature loom large in both the production and 
legitimation of biological theories about women and about the differences between the 
sexes.
A crucial question feminist philosophers and critics of science have therefore started 
addressing is: why is it that, in spite of their questionable universality and their adverse 
impact on the ways society treats women, these theories still remain largely uncriticized? 
Also, on what grounds are we to justify feminist biological theories as ’better’ or ’truer’ 
alternatives to ’patriarchal’ and ’male-biased’ theories, if we assume that knowledge is 
’ideological’ and context-bound?
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A great number of feminists have argued that should changes in social norms and 
ideology congenial to feminist movements arise, then the emancipation of women and their 
full participation in decision-making ought to occur. This would in turn favour, as part of 
wide-ranging societal transformations, a new kind of science based on feminist thought and 
women’s social practice and values including the ’normalisation* of women’s experiences 
as questions relevant to a new research agenda. In such a ’world’, theories produced by 
feminist scientists would ultimately be accepted as legitimate and the hitherto ’unorthodox’ 
methods underlying them would be deemed epistemologically acceptable.
A major problem with the standpoint of these feminists however, is that it treats 
current natural science as totally patriarchal and hence, that it must be totally eradicated. 
Another problem concerns the adequacy of ’feminine yalues’ to replace scientific cum 
patriarchal yalues in the production of ’better’ and ’truer’ knowledge. Feminist authors treat 
’feminine yalues’ (or ’feminine practice’) as a vague concept encompassing diverse forms 
of ’personal inclinations’ and aspects of social practice. I would suggest that ’feminine 
values’ need to be differentiated on sociological, political, and epistemological grounds if 
they are to be of any use in the analysis of scientific knowledge production and more 
importantly, in the implementation of concrete projects of feminist biology. A closer 
investigation of the socio-political and epistemological aspects of the production of 
biological knowledge is therefore needed in order to illuminate the strengths and limitations 
of feminist theories of science as a platform for the implementation of concrete and viable 
projects of feminist biology.
It is my first contention that a more ’detached’ examination of epistemology and the 
process of theory-building in biological science would help to spell out more adequately 
which aspects of ’traditional’ biology are worth retaining in the actual projects of feminist 
biology. This should be done co-jointly with an examination of the socio-political factors 
favouring/hindering the institutional legitimacy of projects being advanced by feminist 
biologists. Secondly 1 shall argue that, from the point of view of cognition, aspects relative
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to the political awareness of scientists, their ’common-sense* experiences, their social 
interests, their ’emotional inclinations’ and lastly, their professional power of negotiation 
are relevant to scientific production but only in some areas of biological research and 
subjects of study and not necessarily in others. Nevertheless, many feminist theoreticians 
tend to apply their ’socio-political’ analysis of science and the thesis of a ’feminine’ 
practice of biology to a cognitive process that I consider far more complex and far less 
’common-sensical ’ than they assume it to be. These are the conclusions that I shall draw 
from a review of the feminist literature on biology and science in Part I of the thesis. These 
conclusions will be buttressed in Part II by an epistemological analysis, and in Part HI by 
our empirical fieldwork.
One should want to stress at this point that the collective role of women in the 
constitution of a feminist science remains empirically and theoretically problematic. Women 
do not form a homogeneous group in terms of social interests or political militancy in spite 
of sharing substantially the living experiences of a dominated group within patriarchy 
(Harding 1986a; Halberg 1989). Even though feminist theories of science generally consider 
women as key agents in the transformation of scientific practice, the empirical evidence 
mustered in this connection is tenuous. The ’feminine’ values that could infiltrate science 
and might transform it are manifold, and the increasing number of women in science is, in 
the same vein, likely to converted in different ways. One of the ways the feminine values 
have actually been converted is contrary to feminist goals. Because women are usually 
’clean’ and meticulous manual workers, several have been assigned -  or have even 
preferred — to do the ’technical’ rather than the ’intellectual’ work in the laboratory, instead 
of ’emancipating’ themselves from the status q u o  in the gender segregation of laboratory 
work.
In this thesis we shall deal with the question of ’feminine values’ and the impact 
of women’s presence in biology as a problematic aspect of the notion of feminist biology. 
But the central issue this thesis will address concerns the problems that feminists have had
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in synthesizing their criticisms of science on the one hand, and the practical conditions of 
implementation of projects of ’feminist biology* on the other. Feminist theoreticians have 
hitherto devised rather unsatisfactory models of feminist science and have not reached a 
consensus on the aim and scope of their critiques (see Harding 1986b, 1989; Hawkesworth 
1989; Schiebinger 1987). Feminist philosophers, social scientists and biologists who have 
contributed to a critique of biology as yet do not agree if their criticisms are merely 
political and organizational (as in the works of a majority of historians and science 
educationalists), or if they announce a new theoretical and methodological approach which 
might involve a re-evaluation of the epistemological foundations of natural science proper. 
The examination of two of the few existing cases of feminist biological practice in Part m  
of this thesis should help to shed light on this question and assess the ’potential for action’ 
of theories of science advanced by feminist theoreticians.
Feminist approaches to scientific knowledge 
and the issue of ’feminine values’
There are various tendencies in feminist studies of science covering historiographies 
of women in science and education, political analyses of the scientific structure with respect 
to gender, and critiques of scientific epistemology.
Regarding epistemology, Sandra Harding distinguishes three avenues that feminists 
may consider as forming a feminist sociology of scientific knowledge: feminist empiricism, 
the feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism (1983,1986b). She claims that the first 
two constitute concrete research practices currently adopted by feminists. Both challenge 
the conventional nature of scientific ’objectivity’ by voicing their feminist orientation, but 
retain the powerful insight of what may be called a ’critical realism grounded in social 
experiences’ (1989,1990). Postmodernism however, poses problems. While in the other two 
feminist epistemologies, the standards of objectivity and the realist stance on knowledge 
are preserved, in postmodernism, in contrast, relativism of bodies of knowledge is invoked,
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and the absence of any ’Archimedean’ point of view precludes the possibility of validating 
any beliefs at the expense of others. The cognitive aim of postmodernism is critical and 
self-reflexive rather than instrumental. According to Harding, postmodernism is essential 
because it helps to deter the fetichism of formal categories of epistemology and 
methodology which are likely to obstruct the use of appropriate tools and relevant evidence 
for certain research problems as they did in the early struggles for the development of 
women’s studies, and stifle a more comprehensive understanding of social reality (Harding 
1987a). Also, postmodernism may be seen as a ’safety net’ for feminist research, lest 
feminists themselves unwarrantedly reproduce classist, racist, and sexist theorizing (Harding 
1986a, 1987a).
Harding’s point of view was appropriated by Hawkesworth (1989) but she stressed 
that she did not approve of a total dismissal of rationality and critical realism. She argues 
that what she calls the ’feminist critical epistemology’, must preserve at least some ’quasi­
uni versai’ standards of inquiry and validation, as these standards must be invoked if 
feminists "are to make a successful assault upon erroneous misogynist claims" 
(Hawkesworth 1990, 423).
Hawkesworth also maintains that psychological or ’functional’ analyses (i.e. those 
which claim the potential of ’feminine values’ to replace ’masculine’ scientific norms) 
cannot be substituted for epistemological discussions in feminism. In discussing 
epistemology, one ought to focus on the ’known’ rather than the ’knower’, and on the 
nature of knowledge and validity claims rather than human (read: male versus female) 
motivations. Having said that, she does not dispute the utility of conducting investigations 
into ’motivations’, for these may at least reveal some of the ’sources of errors’ that affect 
our conceptions and perceptions of the world (1990). For this reason, Hawkesworth 
indicates that ’feminine values’ can contribute to change theory-building in science but 
cannot be substituted for standards of objectivity, logical inference and rational 
argumentation.
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Schiebinger (1987) and H. Rose (1983,1986,1987) among others, grapple with the 
question of how to articulate the feminine values (i.e. the attitudes towards people and 
nature and the predispositions ascribed to women as a social group) and feminist action (i.e. 
the militancy and concrete courses of action of feminists).
Upon a re-reading of the role of women in the history of science, Schiebinger sees 
the ’feminine* and the ’feminist’ articulated in different ways throughout history. She is 
reluctant to associate the two in any rigid way. She prefers to see their interplay as 
grounded in practice and to investigate it by means of individual historical cases rather than 
invoke a general theory to explain it. On the other hand. Rose definitely claims the prime 
importance of feminist thought and action in the elaboration of a feminist, ’women-centred’ 
biology. She does not dispute the import of feminine values in the development of a new 
practice for the natural sciences but she gives a crucial importance to the role of catalyst 
played by the feminist ’vanguard’ of the women’s movement.
Ultimately however, the articulation of feminine values and feminist programmes 
of action underlies theoretical flaws similar to those involved in the development of a 
Marxist praxis of the working class. Feminist theoreticians tend to respond dogmatically 
to ’incoherences’ in the traditional practices of women scientists rather than recast their 
theory of scientific knowledge on different epistemological grounds. It is hoped that the 
analytical examination of Parts I and II of this thesis and the empirical fieldwork of Part 
in will shed some light on the problems incurred by feminist theory in relation to the issues 
exposed above.
Although there are very few feminists who pursue biological research proper (all of 
whom are women), it is fundamental to assess their actual scientific production at this stage 
of the development of feminist thought about science. Moreover, since feminist thought is 
by definition oriented towards action, it is important to evaluate how feminist theory and 
action relate to each other in terms of both political struggles and cognitive conditions of 
scientific knowledge in the natural sciences.
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Plan and Method of Research
This thesis will argue that the feminist criticisms of biology concerning both the 
scientific and the organizational aspects of biological science deserve credit, however they 
fall short of mapping out a fully-fledged and viable project of feminist biological practice. 
Feminist theory underestimates the epistemological bases that current ’patriarchal’ biology 
provides for the legitimacy of concrete projects of feminist biology.
It seems particularly worthwhile at this point to define what is meant by 
’epistemology’ in order to give an idea of the type of discussion we shall address in this 
thesis. Epistemology is defined as a general theory of knowledge which predicates the 
criteria of valid knowledge and the (methodological) procedures which help to distinguish 
why some scientific theories are ’truer’ than others, or between valid and non-valid theories 
(Dancy 1985; Gellner 1959, 1964, 1974, 1982; Habermas 1974, 1976, 1979, 1984; Hesse 
1974,1980a, 1980b; Lakatos 1970; Popper 1959,1969,1972; Toulmin 1972). With respect 
to natural science, the epistemological issue of validity (and ’truth’) is closely connected 
to the ontological issue of the character of nature (or ’reality’) and the practical conditions 
enabling humans to acquire knowledge of it.
In modem epistemological debates, the main question is not so much to do with 
rationalism versus empiricism but more to do with the scope of, and interplay between, 
social influences and causal determinism of reality on our representations and 
interpretations of ’facts’. In this context the notion of epistemological canons refers to those 
’hard core’ tenets (or conditions of possibility of knowledge) that are not local or ascribed 
to any social agents in particular but represent ’quasi-universai’ constraints on validity- 
claims in knowledge, the ’mega-level’ of social and empirical constraints on human 
knowledge.
This thesis does not dispute the idea that epistemology is partly rooted in the history 
of human thought and socially entrenched thereof. The idea implied is that ’epistemological
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canons* are not always locally-specific norms of production and validation of knowledge. 
These ’canons’ or ’mega-norms’ seem to transcend any social ascription, and the 
historiography of modem natural science makes us argue for the existence of such ouasi- 
universal ’norms of epistemology’. This view borrows from the arguments of Hesse about 
’scientific logical inferences’, the ’network model of theories’, and the ’pragmatic criterion’ 
(1974,1980a), and those of Gellner about ’cognitive selectors’, empiricism, and experiences 
of the senses that we shall discuss more thoroughly in chapter 3.
With respect to biology, epistemology indicates how ’theory-building’ ought to be 
ideally conceptualized, and which methods and techniques of enquiry ideally ought to be 
used in the ’discovery’ and ’validation’ of knowledge about living organisms, human beings 
and ’lower forms’ of life.
Therefore the first objective of this research is to highlight the limitations (and 
contradictions) of feminist theoretical and critical writings. Although some of the so­
ciological arguments of feminists concerning the domination of men and patriarchs over 
biology are justified, a total neglect of issues more specific to the epistemology of the 
empirico-analytical sciences and of biology is misguided. The working out of a viable 
theory of scientific knowledge and defence of a ’feminist method’ applicable to the natural 
sciences as a whole, and particularly to biology must confront these issues more 
systematically. For these reasons, the projects of feminist biology devised by feminist 
theorists do not appear very convincing and there remains serious doubts about the 
possibility of implementing them. Also, by being overly provocative and critical, feminist 
theoretical discourse has tended to arouse resistance on the part of mainstream biologists 
and as a consequence, has undercut the scientific credibility that certain feminist biological 
theories would have received otherwise.
However, this thesis does not imply that all the feminist biological theories and 
explanations about women’s biology are not scientifically and epistemologically sound. 
Indeed several new theories, concepts and explanations developed by feminist biologists are
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grounded in the epistemological canons governing the justification of scientific results in 
the empirico-analytical sciences, such as the canons of critical realism and the criteria of 
empirical falsificationism. As such, the historiographical evidence reviewed and the 
empirical material mustered in this research show that some feminist biological theories 
may well be vindicated within the very confines of ’mainstream biology*. Indeed, the 
beliefs of practising feminist biologists in various degrees of critical realism, and their 
apparent adherence to the Poppeiian empiricist falsificationist theory of scientific 
knowledge constitute important anchors of legitimacy for their undertakings. Feminist 
biologists do not seem to avoid these ’ultimate rules’ of scientific practice but rather stand 
by them, disregarding feminist critics and theoreticians.
I therefore believe that an empirical study of the practice and works of feminist 
biologists would help to clarify the scope and ’true nature’ of feminists’ contribution to 
biological science. Only in this way can we appraise satisfactorily the weight of political 
and organizational reasons (e.g. political hostility, institutional orthodoxy) on the one hand, 
and of scientific norms of practice on the other, ruling against the idea of a feminist 
biology. In brief we shall look for explanations of whv feminist bioloev has so far had an 
extremelv limited response, both politicallv and scientificallv. from within the communitv 
of biologists. It is hoped that the field studies will also help to shed light on the issue of 
’feminine values’ and women’s participation in the development of a feminist biology, by 
qualifying the weight they should be accorded within a sociological theory of scientific 
knowledge. This will be done by exploring whether the gender variable affects the 
discourse of biologists on matters related to feminism in biology.
As mentioned earlier, the present project will be carried out in three steps. First, 
there will be an analytical assessment of the strong and weak points of the feminist 
critiques and attempts to reformulate scientific epistemology as a basis for new, less male- 
biased norms of scientific practice in biology. Chapter 1 deals with the particular criticisms 
of biology which feminists have advanced and chapter 2 examines more generally their
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theories of the structure and aims of the scientific institution, the scientific method and its 
epistemological ’foundations*, and their suggestions for the construction of a new ’feminist’ 
science practice.
This critical review will be followed, in Part II of the thesis, by an exploration of 
the conditions of possibility of the proiect(s) of feminist biology as enunciated in the 
feminist literature surveyed in Part I. Chapter 3 includes a discussion of the differences in 
the epistemologies of the human (and social), and natural sciences emphasizing the 
specificity, methodological and theoretical, of biology. Chapter 4 is an overview of the 
scientific debates and social controversies which biological research has produced. It 
examines, as a case in point, the scientific project of Radical Scientists and the Dialectics 
of Biology Group. On the basis of this discussion, this thesis argues that feminists must 
first define more strictly the scope of their critiques. Secondly, they must make a stand on 
the legitimacy of the new body of knowledge they produced, in accordance with their aims 
of denouncing ’patriarchal biology’ on the one hand, and of justifying ’feminist biology’ 
as being a ’better’, ’truer’ form of knowledge on the other.
Part ni of the thesis investigates the oral and written material documenting the 
points of convergence and divergence between feminist theory, mainstream discourses about 
biology and feminist practice of biology. In chapter 6, an analysis of interviews with prac­
tising British male and female biologists will be presented and contrasted with the critiques 
of feminists theoreticians. We shall survey mainly the following themes: opinions about 
organizational issues of research work, especially in light of the integration of women; the 
scientific relevance of the debate between holism and reductionism in biology and of the 
feminist critiques of reductionist theories of womens’ biology, behaviour and ’disorders’; 
the potential role of women as a group in biological practice; and the impact of feminism 
on biological research. As noted before, the last two issues are problematic in a sociological 
theory of scientific knowledge, and we must therefore aim at documenting them in the 
present research.
20
Two case studies of feminist biologists were conducted in order to highlight further 
the clashes between the theory and the practice of feminist biology. The first case study, 
presented in chapter 7, is about the British zoologist Lynda Birke who is unique among 
British feminists in that she is actually engaged in biological research and makes a strong 
case for the idea of feminist biology. The second case study, detailed in chapter 8, is on 
the Canadian-based Groupe de Recherche-Action en Biologie du Travail or GRABIT 
(Group for Research-Action in Biology and Work). GRABIT represents, from an 
institutional perspective, the most developed form of feminist biological practice, which 
makes it a highly relevant case history. These interviews and case studies will aid in 
comparing the discourse and practice of mainstream biologists and feminist biologists. It 
is hoped that the results will provide elements for a much needed substantive appraisal of 
the contribution of feminism to biology.
Socioloev of Knowledge. Epistemoloev. 
and Feminist Bioloev: Theoretical 
Preliminaries
One could rightly argue that the socioloev of knowledge has, over the past thirty 
years, narrowed the boundaries separating the diverse areas of study it has traditionally 
dealt with (Barnes 1974; Gurvitch 1966; Merton 1959; Wolff 1957; Abercrombie 1980; 
Law 1986; Schütz 1962). These include the studies of religion, common sense and popular 
beliefs, political ideologies and scientific knowledge. On the other hand, one may contend 
that the socioloev of scientific knowledge has not become an integrated area of study as 
such, for it may be divided into several branches of study depending on what sociologists 
focus their attention on.
For instance, one may decide to focus on the importance of the dominant ideology, 
culture of the time or scientific heritage on the acceptance of new scientific knowledge. 
This type of approach is typical of the field of the history of science from which
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sociologists borrow heavily and to which, in turn, they contribute theoretically (Mendelsohn 
1977).
In contrast, one may decide to question the epistemological canons of science 
separately from the sociological factors. This type of investigation has more to do with the 
philosophy of science and what has come to be 'the internal approach* to scientific 
knowledge — as opposed to the 'external approach' stressing the social embeddedness of 
all knowledge (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983; Hull 1988).
Since the early sixties, there has been a great deal of effort to try to link the 
epistemological questions with the concerns of the sociology of scientific knowledge. These 
attempts aimed to 'salvage* the ideals of rationality and 'true* knowledge. The works of 
Habermas emerge as an attempt to remove the cognitive scepticism inherited from the 
Frankfurt School (Habermas 1970,1974,1976). Those of Popper (Popper 1957,1959,1969, 
1972) can be seen as an attempt to overturn the epistemological vacuum left by the failure 
of Logical Positivism to ground 'true* knowledge in universal, hard core foundations. 
Although these philosophers represent two different traditions, one more rationalist, the 
other more empiricist, both epitomize the refusal to give in to the scepticism voiced in the 
epistemological perspectives of cognitive relativism, Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the 
phenomenologists, and postmodernism.
One must acknowledge that the difficulties of surmounting the problem of cognitive 
relativism has unsurprisingly given more clout to a 'strong programme* in the sociology of 
science (Barnes 1974; Barnes and Bloor 1982; Bloor 1976). The 'strong programme* has 
inspired several 'contextual* studies of scientific practice at a micro-level (Collins 1985; 
Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983; Law 1986). In these studies, the construction of scientific 
facts guides the research designs, and the 'traditional* concerns of epistemology are 
considered irrelevant. These studies illustrate that the negotiations over the meanings and 
accuracy of experimental or observational evidence are in fact the core of scientific 
practice, and that what scientists believe to be the search for 'independent* empirical
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evidence of theories is simply not what they suppose it to be.
The ’strong programme’ also seems to have spurred an increased number of 
ethnomethodology-inspired analyses of laboratory work (mainly oriented towards 
conversational analysis) (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Lynch 1982,1988; Woolgar 1982). This 
new tradition in the sociology of science has produced many well-documented studies, very 
rich in empirical content, and dealing with the observable aspects of science at a 
micro-level. It posits that science ought to be observed via the ways scientists work, 
communicate and abide by the ’norms’ of production in the scientific institution, and that 
sociologists should not take for granted what scientists perceive as being the rules they 
pretend to be complying with.
There has rarely been an attempt to relate these micro-features of scientific practice 
to the cultural and historical context in which specific scientific activities evolve and 
’survive’ (Harré 1983; Chalmers 1988; Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel 1981). In such studies the 
impact of political and institutional negotiations on the production of scientific knowledge 
seems to be overstated at the expense of an examination of the epistemological conditions 
which might also have contributed to the success and ’progress’ of modem science as a 
form of knowledge (Hollis and Lukes 1982; Chalmers 1988; Manicas and Rosenberg 1988; 
Hesse 1980a, 1980b; Sayers 1985; Hull 1989), or a ’moral order’ as Harré (1983, 1986) 
would advance.
Likewise, science has been studied as ’a system of organized knowledge’ or ’Big 
Science’, operating and legitimating itself in close relationship with other systems like 
industry, the welfare state, defence and warfare, medicalization (Bernal 1939; Habermas 
1970, 1978; Rose and Rose 1969, 1976a; Sklair 1973). I believe that an understanding of 
the reasons why it has gained so much stature as a form of knowledge might gain from 
analyses focusing on other levels of the scientific practice. Some ’hard-core’, ’mega-level’ 
criteria relating to epistemology, or even to a ’moral order of rational conventions’ seem 
to have played a role in the production and legitimation of scientific knowledge which
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strictly local, socially specific and sociologically identifiable variables do not explain 
satisfactorily (Habermas 1974, 1976, 1984; Hesse 1974, 1980a; Gellner 1974, 1982; Harré 
1983, 1986; Hawkesworth 1989).
Over the past thirty years, the sociology of scientific knowledge has been largely 
influenced by the Kuhnian outlook and the notion that scientiAc statements and inferences 
are empirically underdetermined. That is to say, the evidence provided to prove a scientific 
hypothesis never really covers all the possible evidence, for the main reason that theoretical 
choices always limit the pool of observable facts considered relevant for the explanation 
of the problems at hand. According to Kuhn, science always builds on a system of 
techniques, concepts and instruments, within which a finite series of experiments is 
accounted for, thus providing an artificially constructed terrain of empirical, observable and 
testable evidence (Kuhn 1970a, 1970b). But there is a caveat. Firstly, Kuhn’s fails to get 
rid of the idea of ’progress’ within a paradigm, and second, to theorize the actual 
translations — rather than incommensurability -  between paradigms.
Decades later, it is not unreasonable to say that the works in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge still reflect the difficulties in coming to terms with the intellectual 
heritage of contemporary, post-positivism epistemology. But I would contend that, in spite 
of the ineluctability of the social and historical embeddedness of all forms of knowledge, 
one does not necessarily have to succumb to the ideas of Kuhn’s ’incommensurability’ (see 
Hesse 1974; 1980a; Bernstein 1983), cognitive relativism (see Hollis and Lukes 1982; S. 
Sayers 1985), or Feyerabend’s anarchistic perspective (Lakatos 1970; Hairé 1983). This 
research partakes to such a tradition.
On the basis of a sociology of scientific knowledge inspired by Kuhn, the Marxist 
theory of ideology (itself elaborated by the Frankfurt School), the relativist or context- 
bound analyses of knowledge, and postmodernism, feminist critics of science have 
endeavoured to eradicate the androcentric and patriarchal assumptions and inferences 
entering the scientific process of theory-building. Feminists have assumed that certain
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inferences developed about the causes of womens* biology, behaviour and social 
achievements are considered valid only because they stem from facts which are value-laden 
in favour of males (i.e. androcentric values) and patriarchy (i.e. the values supporting the 
systematic domination of males over females in society) (Fisher 1980; Hubbard 1979; 
Merchant 1982; Harding and Hintikka 1983; Fee 1983; Keller 1985; Rose 1983, 1985). 
They argue that the validity of these inferences underwrites the constraints of a patriarchal 
system where empirical counter-evidence can hardly exist and, consequently, alternative 
theories cannot readily be supported. Several feminists (Fee 1983, 1985; Birke 1986; 
Brighton Women and Science Group 1980) have even advanced that a full recognition of 
the feminist criticisms might be impossible in the present patriarchal context.
It is my contention that the majority of feminists have been mistaken in rejecting 
more traditional canons of objectivity and rationality in the design of a new science. This 
problem was foreseen by many feminist theoreticians (Keller 1982, 1987b; Longino and 
Doell 1983; Fee 1985; Rosser 1985) and is now central in their discussions about 
epistemology and scientific knowledge (Longino 1987, 1989; Harding 1986a, 1987a, 1989; 
Saarinen 1988; Alcoff 1987; Hawkesworth 1989). Certainly, the adoption of a postmodern, 
’deconstructionist’ outlook on science, inspired by the archaeology of knowledge of 
Foucault (1970, 1972, 1980) whereby systems of knowledge are conceived of as ’regimes 
of truth’ or political discourses, was favourable to the goal of unveiling dominant, pat­
riarchal ideologies pervading scientific theories about women. However, deconstructionism 
hardly provides a conception of validity coherent with the avowed claims of feminists who 
regard patriarchal biology as flawed from an ’Archimedean’ point of view. It is no suiprise 
that several feminists are now struggling with the problems of validity and truth-claims in 
science and the justification of their critiques of biological theories and projects of feminist 
biology (Longino 1987, 1989; Rosser 1987, 1988b; Harding 1987a, 1987b, 1989; Mura 
1989; Birke 1986; Birke and Vines 1987).
In brief, feminists may have dismissed analyses of rationality too hastily, for the
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problem of relativism now lies bare in their hands and this undercuts their claim that 
’feminist biology* is ’better’, ’truer’ and ’closer to reality’ than traditional biology.
One of the arguments of this thesis points to the relative absence of the works of 
Habermas and Hesse in the writings of feminist theories of scientific knowledge. These two 
authors have developed insights into relativism and rationality which represent an 
improvement on the positions of the Frankfurt School, Kuhn, Foucault, and the ’Strong 
Programme’. They have made seminal clarifications between the epistemologies of the 
natural and the social sciences and given more clout to the notion of rationality and 
continuity in the history of modem science, while not disputing the social and historical 
embeddedness of human knowledge. They also have indirectly helped to illuminate the 
specific problems of biological knowledge which feminist theoreticians have started 
addressing but as yet, seem to have left largely unresolved. In this last analysis, it seems 
unfortunate from a theoretical point of view, although not very surprising from a political 
or ’dogmatic’ perspective, that Anglo-Saxon feminists have systematically overlooked such 
’established’, yet prescient works.
For example, feminist theorists rarely distinguish among diverse scientific subject 
matters and between the epistemological conditions lending themselves to the various 
methods and models of explanation specific of the natural sciences, and those of the human 
(and social) sciences. An examination of the feminist critiques of biological knowledge 
shows that hermeneutic questions (dealing with human subjects and patterns of behaviour) 
and the pragmatic or instrumental criterion of the empirico-analytical sciences (dealing with 
non-intentional objects and organisms such as levels of hormones or physiological make­
ups) always are at the heart of these critical reflections. In this light, it is not surprising that 
the main target of feminist critics of the natural sciences has been biology, for it lies at the 
juncture of the living and the non-living, the human and the non-human, the social and the 
physical sciences. I should suggest that the critiques of feminists with regard to natural 
science in general, and biology in particular, only partly justify their attempts to build a
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’new’ feminist biology on grounds provided by a discussion of a sociology of the social 
sciences. One must locate the biological questions addressed by feminists within a larger 
epistemological debate in order to appreciate the real scope of projects of feminist biology. 
Only then should one contemplate the originality of feminists’ contribution to the 
development of biological science, and assess the weight of the ’extra scientific’ opposition 
that feminists have activated from ’mainstream biologists’.
The feminist critiques of science and projects of biology may well be taken as 
examples for a sociology of scientific systems, thereby shedding some light on the political 
and institutional reasons why feminists have had a rather limited impact on the biological 
sciences compared with a more significant one in the social sciences. But I contend that 
important epistemological problems also prevail in relation to the feminist positions on 
biology and empirical science more generally. Hence, there may well be important 
’scientific’ reasons why biologists do not accept the feminist critiques as valid, or the 
feminist projects of biology as possible. This is why this thesis examines the types of 
scientific problems addressed by both mainstream and feminist biologists. By comparing 
them we shall identify the areas where feminist approaches to biological practice both 
diverge from and converge with mainstream biology, and the areas where there seems to 
be predominantly political and institutional constraints hindering a dialogue and fruitful 
exchange.
In short, it is necessary that the strengths and weaknesses of discourses about 
’feminist biology’ be evaluated from a sociological viewpoint and upon an epistemological 
investigation of the current practical problems and controversies involved in the practice 
of empirical science and hermeneutic studies, for there lies the core of the problematic 
question of valid knowledge in human biology -  and feminist biology more particularly. 
I contend that the strength of ’feminist biology’ should be sought in the actual empirical 
research of feminist biologists rather than in the theoretical works of feminist critics. As 
the results of the empirical studies conducted in this research will suggest, the strength of
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feminist biology is rooted in the defence of specific women-centred research interests (and 
anti-patriarchal ideology) in the areas of bio-behavioural and health studies. It does not 
reside in the creation of a new epistemology, but in the constitution of new conceptual and, 
to a lesser extent, methodological tenets for biology. Having said that, feminists biologists 
have in their actual practice struggled courageously to defend the use of the interview 
techniques and interpretive methods in biological and clinical research. They also have 
integrated conceptual categories relating specifically to female biology and the social 
conditions of women into models of explanation of women’s health and women’s biology. 
Inspired by feminist sociological theories and employing methods of investigation 
developed in the social sciences, feminist biologists have presented new biological findings 
applicable not only to women but also to men. This will be made clearer in the case studies 
of the British biologist Lynda Birke and of the Canadian-based ’Research-Action Group in 
Biology and Work’.
To summarize, this thesis argues that the feminist criticisms of biology have been 
central in the constitution of new research designs and a specifically feminist research 
agenda in biology. Feminist biologists have come to ask original research questions, by 
focusing on certain techniques of investigation and analytical concepts which have been 
omitted in the development of biology as a ’hard science’. As a result they have provided 
new types of data on, and biological explanations of, human behaviours, ’disorders’ and 
ailments. They have not totally restated the criteria of validation of biological knowledge, 
but only stressed the genuine role of human subjectivities (of women’s in particular) as part 
of the evidence relevant to the process of enquiry in human biology. Hence they only have 
had a minor or residual role in the implantation of a non-positivist, socially reflexive, 
epistemology for the natural sciences.
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Endnotes
1) I deliberately excluded from my study the issues of bio-medical technologies for 
two main reasons. First, I believed that the problems of *in vitro* fertilization and new 
reproductive technologies are linked primarily to the medical profession and its social 
power and less so to biology. Second, although the political aspects in NTR are very 
relevant from the point of view of sociology, this should not lead us to neglect the 
’cognitive* aspects of biology from the point of view of a sociology of knowledge. Hence, 
I preferred to concentrate on biological issues where politics is not immediately problematic 




THE BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ADDRESSED BY FEMINISTS: 
ON THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN ACTION
The common thread amongst feminist criticisms of biology is the attempt to show 
how biology has mis-represented women and to correct these representations in favour of 
a more accurate understanding of woman’s biology, social behaviour and social 
opportunities with a view to women’s emancipation from patriarchal domination.
The evolution of sex differentiation has always been a question of importance in the 
life sciences. As a consequence, the biological theories concerned with the problem of 
human action and evolution have been the main targets of feminists. More importantly, 
since science is extremely influential as an ideology, feminists have decided to address 
biological theories more particularly because these theories are fertile grounds for a 
scientific sanctioning of the idea of woman as the ’second sex’ or as the ’feeble sex’, and 
therefore for reinforcing the patriarchal order.
The feminist criticisms of biological theories can be traced back to the turn of the 
century in the fields of social medicine and psychology (Rosenberg 1982; Sayers 1982; 
Harrison 1981)\ In the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties, studies in anthropology gave 
the feminist criticisms a second wind by challenging patriarchal ideas about the ’female 
nature’ which had dominated that field. The empirical works of Mead and Benedict (in 
Rosenberg 1982) and those more theoretical works of de Beauvoir (Beauvoir 1949) are 
paramount in this respect. The feminist criticisms of science were given their impetus via 
feminist anthropology in the 1970s. At that time feminist scholars systematically engaged 
in debunking the ’male dominance’ and other ’male-centred’ theories of the social 
organization of primates and hominids, and those about the evolution of the human race 
(Fisher 1980; Haraway 1978; Hrdy 1981; Hubbard 1979; Leibowitz 1975; Reiter 1975;
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Slocum 1975; Tanner and Zihlman, 1976; Zihlman 1978).
In the same vein, feminists vehemently rebutted natural selection theories of male 
aggressiveness and female passivity propounded in E.O. Wilson’s sociobiology. In the 
1970s, Wilson, a renowned ethologist from Harvard, produced a grand theory, a synthesis 
of biological and environmental causes explaining the present social structure in human 
societies through sex-typed patterns of behaviour among animals, which he called ’the 
modem synthesis’ of sociobiology (1975). Feminists and a great many biologists rejected 
the spurious theorizing and the sexist overtones of Wilson’s human sociobiology. His socio­
biology (to be differentiated from mainstream animal sociobiology) soon became 
popularized by the media. For feminists and critics of science, it was important to expose 
the scientific flaws in Wilson’s thesis and to reject it from its inception, lest it should 
sanction, on ’pseudo-scientific’ grounds, the patriarchal power structure and acts like rape, 
social violence, and discrimination against women.
During the late 1970s, feminists more directly addressed the flaws of biological 
explanations of sex differences. Their critique has since covered theories of fetal develop­
ment, hormones-linked behaviour, physiology, and brain functions. By this time, feminists 
had realized that not only "bad science" needed to be revised on feminist premises, but also 
"science as usual" — its metaphors, its epistemological basis, and its institutional functio­
ning.
Thus, primatology, sociobiology and theories of sexual differentiation are the main 
areas addressed by feminist critics of biological knowledge. Let us examine in detail their 
arguments and assess them from two perspectives, from that of ideology and that of scienti­
fic epistemology.
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Primatology. Evolution Theory and Anthropology: 
Unveiling Androcentric and Patriarchal 
Representations in Biology
In 1975, a collection of critical essays entitled Towards an Anthrotx)logy of Women 
(Reiter 1975) examined the roots and development of inequality between the sexes. Aware 
of the "potential for a double-male bias in anthropological accounts" influencing both social 
facts and scientific thought, these essays provided, among other things, new evidence and 
interpretations in primatology and evolutionary theory. As feminists, as primatologists and 
as anthropologists, the authors had three goals: they needed to revise "male" explanations 
such as those based on the notions of male dominance and "Man the Hunter"; they needed 
to increase the numbers of studies on female specimens; and they needed to cultivate a 
scientific consciousness congenial to an anthropology of the whole of "human kind", 
including both males and females as full-fledged subjects. Recognition of the diversity 
among species and cultures was also important.
Feminist primatologists and anthropologists have given rational re-interpretations 
(i.e. following the rules of logical inference) of old or more recent anthropological and 
paleontological evidence whose content does not trivialize, undermine or deprecate the roles 
of females. These have become part of current anthropological and piimatological theori­
zing, in the continuation of the work of several scientists of both sexes (Fisher 1980; Hrdy 
1981; Slocum 1975; Leibowitz 1975). By comparison, although he himself acknowledged 
and pointed out different instances where male-dominated social organizations of primates 
do not exist, Wilson did not feel compelled to revise the universality of male dominance 
altogether.
Therefore, the unearthing of male biases in the research questions being asked and 
in the assumptions guiding the interpretation of data, in addition to an acknowledgement 
of the relative absence, or trivialisation, of data on female subjects formed a critical 
framework on the basis of which feminists endeavoured to shed new light on the flaws
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plaguing primate and evolutionary theories relating to the sexes (Fisher 1980; Hubbard 
1979; Haraway 1978; Reiter 1975; Slocum 1975). I shall give some examples.
Leibowitz (1975) mustered data on diverse species of primates in order to disprove 
the theory relating sexual dimorphism^ to sex roles, a theory which traditionally supports 
male-dominance interpretations of mating behaviour. In her essay, she shows that 
Orangutans exhibit a marked degree of sexual dimorphism (e.g., males can weigh twice 
as much as females); yet males are rarely involved in aggressive interactions, while the 
females which are uninterested in mating can reject males without difficulty. These 
observations contrast with plains-living baboons, a species that also is highly dimorphic, 
but presents strong evidence for male aggressiveness. Leibowitz does not disagree with the 
study of De Vore’s and Washburn, a common reference on the subject, indicating that the 
male-dominance model seems to apply appropriately to baboons. Among plains-living 
baboons, males are usually leaders and protectors of the group, while females are mainly 
nurturers and sexually receptive to the males competing successfully for mating. She 
stresses, however, that the forest-living baboons display sex-role patterns which differ from 
plains-living baboons. Within the former groups, old females can lead the group. Female 
baboons can initiate intercourse with various males, and are not necessarily sexually 
passive. Males may change from one group to the other, and are also often seen as the first 
to escape if danger is imminent, leaving females by themselves and encumbered with 
infants. Leibowitz concludes that traditional explanations of primates’ sexual roles are 
flawed on two grounds: on the choice of baboons to represent a universal model of sexual 
roles, and on the neglect of the influence of environmental conditions on patterns of sexual 
behaviour developed among primates, which may vary within the species.
Fisher (1980) goes even further in her criticism. She gives various instances where 
"patriarchal" interpretations have crept into evolution theorizing. She questions, for 
example, the use of terms like "possession of females", "dominance in intercourse", or 
"undersexed males". Why, she asks, have primatologists used such wording to describe
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facts which do not necessarily lend themselves to this kind of interpretation? Discussing
the notion "mounting", for instance, she says
’Mounting’ is the male-oriented but not always accurate term of biology. The male 
chimpanzee sometimes stands behind the female, clasping her round the waist; 
othertimes he squats, with his buttocks barely clearing the ground. Gorillas have 
been observed to sit with the female before them, a position which George Schaller 
describes as seated in his lap, though to a woman observer the female gorilla might 
well appear to be on top, with her partner underneath. (1980, 13)
This kind of male bias, Fisher holds, has led to a systematic undervaluation of the
role of females in human evolution and in the development of cultural artifacts. She
emphasizes that male-centredness and modem patriarchal interpretations do not have their
place in studies of primates and hominids. She gives plenty of evidence on which she can
base her counter-interpretation of male dominance. On this account, she agrees with Slocum
(1975) who severely criticizes the concept of "Man the Hunter", developed again by
Washburn in the 1960s. It seems legitimate, Slocum writes, to start from the premise that
male hominids were mainly protectors, while females were nurturers. Indeed, as she notes,
the female-child bond is probably the only truly universal pattern in primates and hominids’
social organization. However, it is preposterous to infer that male hunters were solely
responsible for the evolution of communicative signs and codes, and for the development
of artifacts such as tools and small weapons.
Like Fisher, and also Tanner & Zihlman (1976), Slocum proposes that women
gatherers and caretakers were more likely than male hunters to have developed skills,
customs, and tools reflecting a genuine evolution of the human species. The reason is that
females were the individuals mainly responsible for passing these skills, customs and tools
to their offspring. Secondly, these authors indicate that gathering and hunting small animals,
activities usually performed by the females, have been known to have provided
approximately eighty percent of the food supply of the community. Why, then, pay so much
attention to "big game hunting" as the motor of hominid evolution? Only a systematic male
bias could have forced the anthropological evidence to fit a theory such as "man the
hunter"; in general, evidence indeed appears more congenial to a theory emphasizing the
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role of women gatherers and nurturers in the early evolution of the human species, its lan­
guage and culture.
More generally, Slocum contends that anthropological evidence neither guides the 
formulation of evolutionary theories, nor validates them. She contends that it is how the 
questions are being asked which determines and limits the array of possible answers. For 
her, it seems, evolution theory of hominids is a short-hand for a self-fulfilling androcentric 
and patriarchal prophecy.
For her part, Hrdy (1981) argues that feminist theories emphasizing the positive role 
of females in evolution do not go beyond the conventional assumptions of a division of 
labour. Hrdy aims at providing evidence for the idea that females too have evolved by 
being competitive, socially involved and sexually assertive individuals like the males. But 
her rationale is not shared by all feminists, who would instead try to deter any new 
attempts to revive the ideas of dominance and aggressiveness in evolution theory^.
The impact of the feminist criticisms of primatology, evolution theory and 
anthropology has transgressed the simple unearthing of male-biased metaphors. Feminists 
were also led to address the controversial questions of how scientific changes occur; and 
on which kind of epistemological foundations might a new, ’better’ science be built.
Tanner & Zihlman (Tanner and Zihlman 1976; Zihlman 1978) suggested that a 
reconceptualization of anthropological evidence on the basis of feminist views ought to be 
juxtaposed with any strict biological determinism which emphasizes men’s achievements 
in evolution at the expense of women’s roles. Their criticisms have thus led to a complete 
revision of the conventional biological approach towards cultural and sexual evolution.
Slocum went even further. She highlighted that the inheritance of male-centred 
knowledge relating to the evolution of hominids was partly due to the "underdetermination 
of evidence" in scientific theorizing, implying that the procedures of validation of scientific 
theories themselves are imperfect. But by the same token, she raised a major problem for 
’feminist’ scientists: on which basis would they justify their own scientific theories if
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empirical evidence is not sufficient to prove them right?
Donna Haraway (1978,1981) is representative of those feminist authors who have 
developed these two types of critical reflection to their logical extreme. She is widely 
quoted in feminist literature about primatology and biological science in general. Her views 
thus deserve special attention in order to assess the sociological, methodological, and 
epistemological problems associated with the elaboration of a feminist biology.
In a series of articles on animal sociology and primate behaviour (1978), Haraway 
examines the work of C.R. Carpenter (anthropologist of the 1930s) showing that his thesis 
of sexual roles reinforces the notions of "dominance pattern" and "patriarchal authority" in 
biology. She contends that animal sociology has built on the assumption of "the union of 
the political and the physiological", yet without questioning such a premise nor claiming 
any clear evidence to support its empirical accuracy. According to Haraway, the union of 
the political and the physiological epitomizes the vindication of a male bodv oolitic within 
the science of animal sociology. She propounds the view that, as its challenger, a female 
body politic could only be vindicated by means of a critical insight (like Marxism or that 
of the Frankfurt School) into primatology, animal sociology, and sociobiology, leading to 
a complete rethinking of the basic patriarchal categories relating to sex-economies.
Haraway goes even further in her reflection on the reconstruction of biological 
theories, sometimes extending her conclusions to the whole area of scientific epistemology. 
In her article, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The Genesis of Biological Theory" (1981), 
she contends that the power of naming and speaking of well-known scientists has become 
paramount in the production and legitimation of social beliefs and scientific knowledge. She 
argues that biology is a body of "tales about origins, about genesis, and about nature"; that 
it consists of "rhetorical strategies". Therefore, she claims that "the contest to set the terms 
of speech" must become the impetus for "feminist struggles in natural science" (ibid., 471), 
and the platform on which feminist biology will build its legitimacy. This is why Haraway 
urges feminists to articulate their position to construct a feminist world, despite the obvious
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difficulties in doing so from within a science dominated by males.
According to Haraway, it is no surprise that feminists have been so preoccupied 
with language. Hitherto, they have had to resort to a scientific language permeated with a 
patriarchal voice which has very successfully subordinated the reality to its own discourse 
and terminology. The dichotomization between the concepts of nature and culture, for 
instance, or other "totalitarian objects", such as "the gene", were all elaborated within a 
patriarchal science. These have left the patriarchal order untouched with no room for more 
flexible explanations of sex and gender constitution involving culture, whereby the concept 
of ’female biology* would not necessarily equate ’women’s social destiny’. As a result, 
Haraway strongly urges feminists to find a new voice and fight the patriarchal world, its 
language and its interpretations.
Yet Haraway warns against the anarchy occasioned by different voices. She 
therefore explores the sort of epistemological foundations which a feminist science would 
require in order to be seen as a science of truths rather than just as another voice, whose 
claims to authority would be discursive or simply political. She therefore urges feminists 
to construct a theory of representations warding off the epistemological vacuum^ induced 
by relativist and language-focused approaches to knowledge.
By doing so, however, Haraway seems, in the end, to undermine all she has been 
saying against patriarchal biology. In other words, she seems to say that her feminist 
discourse is not more justified than old patriarchal theories in primatology, hominid 
evolution, and animal sociobiology. Also, I should like to suggest here that the kind of 
strong phenomenological and constructionist theory of knowledge which a feminist like 
Haraway propounds can only be sustainable within a context allowing for the co-existence 
of diverse bodies of knowledge. On the other hand, if these bodies of knowledge become 
conflictual, and when a time comes when they must reject co-existence, then 
phenomenology fails to justify changes and replacements of old knowledge by new 
knowledge on the basis that the former was flawed with ’errors’ and the latter is ’true*, for
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everything is assumed to be ’true’ within its own context. If feminist critics of biology aim 
at rejecting patriarchal knowledge because it is flawed or simply ’untrue*, then a 
phenomenological theory of knowledge is epistemologically inadequate to justify that.
I should also like to point out that the ’biological* questions addressed by feminists, 
evolution theories and studies in animal behaviour as it were, have a lot in common with 
the interrogations characteristic of the social sciences. These ’biological’ questions concern 
themselves with human beings (or human-like beings) whose ontology is indeed rather 
remote from that of the inanimate objects or micro-organisms central to the physical 
sciences and modem biology. Unlike the social sciences however, biology is not always 
concerned with culture and history: in fact, it primarily deals with the empirical evidence 
of non-intentional organic matter. Hence, the clarification one can make at this point: 
feminist primatology and anthropology are not necessarily biology but more specifically 
sub-sets of bio-behavioural studies.
Let us now look at the feminist critiques of sociobiology and test whether the above 
argument holds. Sociobiology uniquely tries to merge a biology of micro-organisms (genes) 
with the ontology of human beings, endeavouring to use modem evolutionary theory to an 
understanding of human behaviours. Thus, the feminist critiques in this case might 
announce a slightly different standpoint on scientific theory, methodology, and 
epistemology.
Sociobiologv Criticized
The criticisms and defences of sociobiology can be classified into four types of 
disputes. First, disputes focus on the propaganda overtones of sociobiology, leaving behind 
its heuristic values. In fact, the kind of sociobiology developed by Wilson (1975, 1978), 
Tiger and Fox (1978), and Barash (in Haraway 1981) bears a distant resemblance to the 
careful reflections of the King’s College Sociobiology Group (1982). Albury (1980) is one
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of many critics who insists that Wilsonian sociobiology hypotheses are formulated in a way 
that they can easily be used to support the beliefs in the aggressiveness, sexual promiscuity, 
and dominance of the males over the females, especially among the lay public. 
Sociobiologists and other apologists of sociobiology (in Caplan 1978), or philosophers such 
as A. Rosenberg (1980), and Ruse (1978, 1981, 1987, 1988), however, defend the 
Wilsonian hypotheses on the grounds that they are legitimate scientific conjectures and 
hence refutable as such.
The second dispute concerns the importance allocated to environmental factors and 
to genetic factors in the explanation of an organism’s behaviours. For instance, Albury 
(1980) and Guille-Escuret (1985) refute the allegations of Wilson, Ruse and Dawkins (1976, 
1986): while the latter stress that sociobiology accounts for environmental factors in its 
explanation of behaviour, the former argue that the whole undertaking of sociobiologists 
would indeed become meaningless if it were not for its total commitment to the idea of a 
genetic determinism of behaviour.
The validity of Wilson’s or Dawkins’s sociobiology as an explanation of human 
behaviour is severely attacked by radical scientists, such as Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 
(1984), but also the feminists Birke (Birke 1984c; Birke and Best 1980a: Birke and 
Silvertown 1984), Bleier (1984), Lowe (1978), Hubbard (Hubbard 1979, 1982; Lowe and 
Hubbard 1983), and the members of the Brighton Women and Science Group (1980). They 
reject the idea that DNA is the sole and direct source of human phenotypes and 
behaviours. For these authors, who are all trained biologists, genetic determinism is wrong 
in general: it is a sheer simplification of the complex processes involved between the 
genetic release of biochemical substances, and the cellular, physiological, anatomical, and 
neurological development of the whole organism in its environment, all of which are yet 
to be understood^.
The third and fourth types of dispute fostered by Wilsonian sociobiology are 
precisely about the analytical and methodological flaws in its theory-building. As Bateson
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(1986), Guille-Escuret (1985) and Hampe and Morgan (1988) note, sociobiological theory 
places causal models of sub-cellular events and intentional models of human action on an 
equal footing. This logic of analysis is highly simplistic and not even excusable on grounds 
of parsimony.
On the methodological level, the truth-claim of scientific theories like sociobiology 
remains highly uncertain in light of the empirical under-determination of piimatological 
theorizing about sexual behaviour. As shown previously, several feminists have challenged 
the interpretations of white male primatologists in relation to primates and hominids’ 
behaviour. Feminist critics of sociobiology have, in turn, questioned if it is sound to infer 
human action from models of animal behaviour, and to draw quasi-definite conclusions on 
the basis of very scanty (and highly contradictory) piimatological and anthropological 
evidence (Bleier 1984; Lowe 1978; Lowe and Hubbard 1983).
Let us thus turn to the works of Ruth Bleier who has devoted a large part of her 
feminist reflection to an analysis of the flaws of Wilsonian sociobiology. Her works are 
largely quoted in feminist literature, and they provide a sound basis for a discussion of the 
specific contribution of feminists to this area of biological thought. More specifically, such 
an examination will highlight the new problems arising from the feminist attempt to 
elaborate a new research programme in human biology, a strong environmentalist approach, 
replacing that of biological determinism.
In her book Science and Gender. A Critique of Bioloev and its Theories on Women. 
Bleier says that animal sociobiologv. as a field of study, has provided useful insights for 
an understanding of the social behaviours of animals. As for the human sociobiologv 
developed by Wilson however, she argues that it is "deeply flawed as a science 
conceptually, methodologically, and logically" (1984, 16) and invokes several reasons for 
this. First, she contends that the basic premise of Wilsonian sociobiology, that human 
behaviour has evolved through adaptation based on Darwinian natural selection of adaptive 
behaviours now encoded in our genes, is totally spurious. For, in general, sociobiologists.
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like a majority of geneticists, agree that it is not possible to link any specific behaviour to 
any specific genetic configuration, and that what the presence of a gene indicates is only 
a * biological potential "for" human behaviour* and nothing more precise than that! For 
Bleier, therefore, Wilsonian human sociobiology is just another "elaborate mythology of 
women’s biological inferiority [introduced] as an elaborate explanation of their subordinate 
position in the culture of Western civilizations" (1984, vii).
Bleier contends that even though, in principle, sociobiologists like Barash and 
Dawkins believe that culture and learning play a role in the shaping of behaviour, in prac­
tice they do not acknowledge any extra-genetic influence on behaviour. She writes:
But what is really at issue in Sociobiological theory is not the physical capacity for 
behaviour that biology provides but rather the genetic encoding of the entire range 
of complex human behaviours and characteristics that are expressed in a nearly 
infinite variety of ways by different individuals and cultures and often not expressed 
at all, such as altruism, loyalty, dominance, competitiveness, aggressivity. (1984,17)
This logic gives rise to unwarranted generalizations about the presumed innate female and
male differences in reproductive strategies and human roles. For instance, according to
Wilsonian sociobiology, the maximization of selected male genes operates quite differently
from that of female genes, and this explains why males and females have different
reproductive and mating strategies: the males are "naturally" promiscuous because they aim
at frequent inseminations, while the females are more choosy because they must look for
mates that will be willing to protect their offspring. Bleier opposes this logic which, she
contends, rests on gross psychology and on a spurious theory of genetic determinism of
human behaviour. Bleier also points out that the characters selected as empirical evidence
are simply those of the upper/middle class white Anglo-Saxon scientists who consider male
aggressivity, competitiveness, and selfishness to be typical of human societies. By and
large, she argues that the logic of human sociobiology is circular: once traits are selected,
a "gene for" this trait is sought, and then used to feed-back the logic of genetic determi­
nism®.
Human sociobiology, Bleier contends, does not relate to any sound empirical
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evidence; there are no specific behavioural traits in hominids which leave fossil records;
hence, no specific proof of genetic encoding of these is possible. Sociobiologists must
resort to animal observation in order to make for the missing pieces of evidence of the
biological evolution of human behaviour. Bleier therefore claims that:
Sociobiologists attempt to reconstruct evolutionary theory by inventing plausible 
stories that attempt to show how a particular behavior or social interaction in 
humans or other species could have or would have been adaptive and therefore 
favoured by natural selection and genetically carried through subsequent generations. 
Basically, the aim is to establish the biological ’innateness* and inevitability of 
present-day human behaviours and forms of social organization. (1984, 22)
Bleier finally underlines theoretically flawed deterministic stances on the 
development of the embryo embodied in Wilsonian sociobiology. Drawing from the works 
of Ruth Hubbard, Bleier stresses that protein synthesis in the embryo "is not determined by 
the gene alone but is also a consequence of the environment in which the molecule finds 
itse lf (ibid., 43). She continues by stressing that in human behaviour the environment in 
question is manifold: from the physiological milieu, essential in the development of the 
foetus and its brain, to the learning (cultural) environment. Bleier concludes her demonstra­
tion by reiterating that, notwithstanding all the other scientific flaws, human sociobiology 
remains invalid first and foremost because human behaviour is the result of the manifold 
interaction between biology and the environment. She writes:
Behaviors are the products of the brain’s functioning in interaction with the external 
world, and the innumerable patterns of social behaviours, relationships, and organi­
zation that characterize human societies have evolved through cultural transmission 
within specific historical contexts. (1984, 46)
Thus, the feminist critiques of human sociobiology reveal an element which was not 
stressed as much in primatology and anthropology. By rejecting crude biological 
determinism, they raise the importance of the environment, organic and social, in the study 
of biology in general -  and human biology in particular. They do not wish to dispense with 
biological factors altogether, however; they maintain that both the biological and the social 
environments must be taken into account in feminist biology. But this is not an easy 
undertaking, for dealing with the concepts of biology and culture simultaneously involves
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the articulation of two different levels of analysis, causal and historical, and as a result, two 
different epistemological traditions. The next section will highlight some of these 
difficulties.
Before we close this section however, let us present briefly the points feminists have 
raised against the Wilsonian sociobiology, and see the evolution of feminist thinking about 
biology since the first studies in primatology.
First, feminists have claimed that human sociobiology is preposterous in inferring 
human behaviour from animal models. The sources and motivations of men and women’s 
patterns of behaviour, temperament and mating are more complex than sociobiologists want 
to show (Lowe 1978; Lowe and Hubbard 1983).
Secondly, variations within the sexes, races, species are much wider than variations 
between those same groups (Lowe 1978). So, feminists contend, why invest so much time 
studying the genetic variation of some sex-related differences instead of other types of 
variations? This bias in the agenda of biological research can only be explained by the 
vested interests of dominant groups within the scientific institution (Bleier 1984, 1985b, 
1988a; Brighton Women and Science Group 1980; Rose and Rose 1976c, 1976d).
Thirdly, as far as behaviour and women’s social achievements are concerned, recent 
historical studies carried out by feminist historians show that culture has constrained 
women much more than their biology may have done (Hubbard 1979; Sayers 1982; 
Merchant 1982; Jordanova 1980).
Fourthly, feminists oppose the idea of changes to that of biological destiny which 
human sociobiology induces. They suggest that human biological science should build upon 
the humanist ideas of a full realization of human potential and a possible transformation of 
the social order (Bleier 1978; Brighton Women and Science Group 1980; Hubbard 1979; 
Lowe, 1978: Sayers 1982).
Finally, I should like to draw attention to two aspects in the feminist critiques of 
sociobiology which will bear heavily on their strategy to elaborate a new approach to
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biology.
First, feminists do not agree on, or discuss thoroughly, the role of language in the 
production of knowledge. As shown earlier, Haraway for example, saw science as mere 
story-telling. But Bleier does not, for her part, and as the next section will show more 
clearly, think that language has such power over scientific knowledge (1984,1988a, 1988b). 
She assumes that reality is constructed by language only to a certain extent She believes 
in the existence of some hard-core facts independent of our power to name them. But she 
also warns against those sociobiologists "who play loose with language", and infer from 
evolutionary genetics and scanty evidence that, for example, women have an innate 
inclination to child care.
Secondly, several feminists who maintain that environment influences biology, go 
so far as to say that it is impossible to distinguish the impact of biology from that of the 
environment on behaviour (Lowe 1978, 1983; Bleier 1984). But this argument gives rise 
to an epistemological *catch-22*. Feminists obviously try to justify their own discourse 
about biology and environment on the ground that they could effectively discern the effects 
of environmental factors from the effects of genes in behavioural development. Bleier 
indeed argues that:
With increasing sophistication of conceptualization and the equipment available to 
make scientific observations ... increasing knowledge is gained about the influence 
of prenatal and early post-natal environment and learning in the determination even 
of the kinds of behaviours in birds and mammals that previously were called in­
stincts and thought to be entirely genetically programmed and not learned from 
others. (Bleier 1984, 44)
My point here is not to suggest that it is easy to differentiate the impact of the 
environment from that of biology — particularly in studies of behaviour. I am just 
highlighting a contradiction in the discourse of feminists who seem to dispense too hastily 
with the possibility of analyzing these factors separately, in favour of a rhetoric of 
anti-biological determinism.
The next section will highlight the practical problems and theoretical contradictions 
which the argument of the inseparability of biological from environmental factors must
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confront. It will suggest that feminist biologists cannot logically (or epistemologically) 
support this central argument of the feminist critiques of biological science, for it is 
incompatible with the rules of justification of knowledge in the empirico-analytical sciences, 
those by which they would otherwise continue to abide in the construction of feminist 
biology per se.
Feminist Approaches to Biology: the Difficult Integration 
of Environment and History in the Genesis of 
Sex/sender Patterns of Behaviour
A brief review of feminist criticisms of biological explanations of sex differences 
in behaviour will help to underline the importance which an holistic approach has had in 
the elaboration of a feminist approach replacing that of current biological determinism, or 
reductionism.
During the nineteenth century and right into the twentieth, scientific explanations 
of sex variations in social roles have been based on biological determinism. According to 
feminists, this type of research reinforced the ideology of male superiority, without 
questioning the impact of culture and the rigid social stratification of gender roles on 
women’s behaviour (Merchant 1982; Rosenberg 1982; Sayers 1982).
Shields (1982) for instance, points to the variabilitv hvpothesis which stated that 
males are more likely than females to vary from the norm in both physical and mental 
traits, thus safeguarding the ideology of the superior intellect of the male. In the early 
19(X)s however, a number of scholars showed that the environmental factors might have 
impeded the full realization of women’s biological and intellectual potential. Nevertheless, 
as Shields points out, history has shown that patriarchal theories do not lose their credibility 
easily. For, even when ’stronger’ rational arguments were raised against them, which could 
explain both old and new evidence, patriarchal theories were safeguarded by adducing ad 
hoc propositions^.
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At the turn of the twentieth century, several women scholars involved in research 
on sex differences in medicine, public health, and psychology began questioning 
bio-determinist theories. Rosenberg (1982) shows that theories paying more attention to 
social psychology and the influence of life styles and social pressure in the genesis of 
sex-typed behaviours and biological ailments stirred much interest from both within and 
without academia. She also suggests that the women scholars involved in that research were 
probably doubly motivated since it was of utmost importance, for them as women, to 
demonstrate that they could fulfil academic standards in addition to introducing a new 
scientific approach to human biology.
Over the past twenty years, a great many feminists applied themselves to removing 
the spectre of dimorphism, or rigid sex dichotomies. Sayers (1982) for instance, a psycholo­
gist, urged feminists to look at "woman’s destiny" not in terms of biological predispositions 
alone, but also from the standpoint of history and human agency.
For feminist biologists, this meant a denunciation of biological reductionism instead 
and a systematic increase in emphasis on the study of environmental causes. In the late 
1970s, several feminist biologists disengaged radically from any kind of research resting 
on a separation of biology and environment; but there have been some disagreements 
among these authors. Some supported a complete withdrawal from research on the causes 
of sex differences for both political and scientific reasons, like Lowe (1978). Other authors 
simply warned against making scientific short-cuts in explanations of sex-related dif­
ferences, like Lambert (1978) or Baker (1980). Let us examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of these arguments with a view to the practical implementation of an original 
feminist approach to biology.
Lambert, a researcher in biology, defended the view that "especially in the case of 
higher mental functions, a precise separation of the biological bases into those which are 
intrinsic in origin and those which are not mav be an unrealistic goal" (Lambert 1978, 105; 
my emphasis). She also contended that at present, when a strong biological reductionist
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view dominates the whole discipline, the definition of "the biological" definitely undercuts 
the feminist movement. She therefore urges feminists to develop a framework of biology 
in terms of a relationship between the organism and its environment. In brief, Lambert did 
not argue that biology should be dismissed altogether in the explanation of sex-gender 
variations in behaviour. She simply suggested that researchers avoid a biological reductio­
nist stance on human behaviour.
Baker (1980), another researcher, however illustrated the practical difficulties and 
theoretical controversies relating to an approach combining biology and environment. She 
propounded the idea of a bio-environmental approach through her research experience in 
clinical paediatrics. In her view, the influence of hormones on "gender roles and behaviour" 
bears on "patterns of behaviour" identified in children exposed to abnormal pre-natal 
hormonal environments during pregnancy (Baker 1980)*. But, she continues, the hormonal 
influence does not bear on "gender identity", that is on whether a child perceives itself as 
a boy or a girl in congruence with its sex. Hence childrens’ gender identity is linked to 
gender-rearing (in accordance with their biological sex) which may frequently clash with 
their "patterns of behaviour". As a result. Baker believes that biologists ought to 
collaborate with anthropologists, and the two disciplines ought to discuss their findings in 
order to create a deeper understanding of human behaviour.
On the other hand, feminists could argue that Baker’s findings rest on a 
questionable "gender-typed" classification of comportments, which would not necessarily 
gain from anthropological studies unless these are effected from a feminist point of view 
(Messing 1983a). Also, if Baker’s approach manifests the beginning of an environmentalist 
approach to biology and behaviour, it seems to do so without really instauring a framework 
combining biology and environment factors. In the last analysis, therefore. Baker does not 
reject the idea that the role of biological and environmental factors can be distinguished in 
an explanation of human behaviour.
A major criticism levelled in recent feminist works argues that a truly
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non-reductionist approach to biology should do more than merely adduce sociological or 
anthropological findings to biological explanations: it should totally integrate them (Lowe 
1983; Bleier 1988a; Birke 1986; Birke and Vines 1987; Rose 1982a, 1982b). Let us first 
examine the position of Lowe who propounded the idea of a holistic approach to sex-gender 
differences in behaviour, and then discuss the strengths and shortcomings of her suggestion 
for the elaboration of a viable feminist biology.
The works of Lowe, an American chemist strongly committed to feminism, display 
a strong holistic approach in which environmental and biological factors of sex-gender 
differences should not be severed but rather, should coalesce. While she writes that these 
factors cannot, or should not, be separated (Lowe 1978); at other times, she examines the 
role which external conditions have effected on the development of women’s biological 
characteristics (Lowe 1983). She therefore seems to contradict herself, implying that she 
has made a separation, at least analytically, between two levels of factors, biological and 
environmental. Let me demonstrate the point briefly.
In her article of 1978, in which she dealt with genetics and its influence on 
behaviour, Lowe suggested that to "distinguish" genetic and environmental factors in human 
behaviour is "insurmountable". Surprisingly enough, she also underlined, in the same article, 
the existence of experimental evidence showing that the impact of genetic factors varies 
with the environment, thus drawing the line between these two levels of factors. Lowe later 
gave extensive evidence demonstrating that "a great many aspects of biological function, 
including body size and strength, hormone levels and possibly brain development can be 
altered considerably by changes in the environment" (ibid., 41). She also contended that 
even though biological propensities exist and can be identified as such to some extent, 
conversely one "cannot separate" the contributions of biology and culture in behavioural 
differences. Lowe discussed findings on the existence and development of sex differences 
in strength and physical performance, height, intellectual abilities, hormones and typical 
behaviour, and offered the theory that women’s biology can develop in a variety of ways.
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She said that "much of this difference in strength is the result of society’s encouraging the 
average man to be more active than the average woman" (ibid., 44) Thus, she concluded, 
as women become less confined to sex-typed activities and begin to do the same jobs and 
tasks as men, the idea that women’s biology is their destiny will progressively wither.
There is a series of problems here. First, the demonstration of Lowe hinges on a 
definition of the environment which is quite extensive. This brings about a confusion as to 
what preciselv constitutes the environment. Lowe does not specify whether it is social 
(outside of the body) or biological (inside of the body). Even though this may be congruent 
with her claim never to separate biology from environment, the result is that her concept 
either lacks utility as an analytical tool, or conceals her anti-reductionist rhetoric.
In my opinion Lowe posits a conceptual separation between biology and envi­
ronment although she does not explicitly acknowledge it. She says.
Hormonal contributions to behaviour depend in part on the level of hormones at 
a particular moment, which are themselves determined by a person’s past 
interactions with the social environment and in part on the details of the current 
social environment. It is not possible to abstract behaviour from its social context, 
(ibid., 54)
She also clearly speaks in terms of the social constraints as separable, both empirically and 
analytically, from biological potential, such as women’s musculature, anatomy, and intellect.
Interestingly enough, Lowe often speaks cautiously when it comes to criticizing 
scientific results. She will, for instance, speak in terms of a notion of "it remains to be 
established" (referring to sex-gender dimorphism in height), or of "what is being measured 
is not at all clear" (IQ tests) or "highly uncertain" (probes and tests on brain lateralization). 
Consequently, it is not clear whether she means that it is only a question of time before we 
find more definite results, or if she is implving that the absence of any conclusive evidence 
proves that it is logically impossible to arrive at answers on sex-typed behaviours. What 
is clear is that she states that it is impossible to separate biological facts from 
environmental factors: "Biology", she writes, "does affect human behaviour, but the 
examples I have discussed make it clear that there is no wav to separate the contributions
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biology and culture make to behavioural differences” (ibid., 54). If Lowe implies that there
is no scientific procedures (logical, experimental) which could help distinguish biology from
culture, then her view is logically self-deceptive. But if she implies that there should be a
guiding principle to help us get out of rigid bio-determinism, then she might have given
feminists a sound orientation for a new research agenda in biology.
Finally, the contradictions in Lowe’s critique seem to be totally defused in the
concluding part of her essay of 1983, where she urges feminists to:
Examine the question of the possible existence of biologically based sex differences 
... but only in response to the claims of biological determinists who say that ... 
knowledge of these provides a guide to social policy and to the limits of possible 
social change, (ibid., 56)
In my view, this makes it clearer that her critique is primarily oriented against the political
abuse of reductionist biology, and is much less devastating vis-à-vis the analytical potential
of experimental research for biology.
The kind of clarification that has just been made in relation to the theoretical
contradictions implied by the arguments for a holistic approach also stand for the recent
works of Bleier (1988a) and Birke (Birke 1986; Birke and Vines 1987). It is my view that
such an accumulation of methodological and theoretical incoherences might have seriously
undermined the construction of a feminist biology. But I do not want to pass in silence the
important fact that, even though feminists use the same methodological categories and
canons of scientific justification as conventional biologists, in contrast to the latter, they
indeed use them more critically when it comes to testing biological explanations of human
behaviour. I should refer to Part III of this thesis for a substantive comparative study of the
scientific discourses of mainstream biologists and of the feminist zoologist Lynda Birke in
this connection.
In one of her latest criticisms’, Bleier goes over the numerous scientific flaws in 
recent studies about "the biological basis in the brain of presumed gender differences in 
cognitive abilities or in hemispheric lateralization of cognitive processes" (Bleier 1988a, 
93). Recent brain lateralization theory assumes that males process information
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predominantly with the right hemisphere, while females use both hemispheres more 
symmetrically. But as Bleier points out, several studies have shown that brain lateralization 
theory of sex differences is based on poor statistical significance of results, conflicting 
results or failures of replication, poor experimental design, lack of sufficient controls for 
variables, and lack of consensus on the definition of spatial ability*®. Her own replication 
of these results shows no evidence of a sex-typed function of the splenium in the corpus 
callosum. She argues that even "if there were gender-associated differences in hemispheric 
lateralization of visuospatial function, [conversely] there is no evidence of a correlation 
between hemispheric lateralization and visuospatial ability" (ibid., 94).
From what has been shown, one may conclude that, from the point of view of 
epistemology, Bleier does not reject empirical evidence as a source of scientific proof. 
Indeed, as she writes, "usually quite a few different assumptions can be made, all of which 
can be justified though only some may turn out to be correct" (ibid., 101).
I would suggest that no matter how the real interplay between biology and the 
environment impedes on distinguishing their distinctive contribution to the development of 
human behaviour, this does not deny the right to understand them more clearly: it is indeed 
the mandate of all scientific endeavours, including that of feminist biologists.
My understanding of Bleier’s work on brain lateralization theory of sex differences 
is that she endeavours to justify her claim on both counter-experimental results, to which 
she must obviously give some credibility, and a feminist critical stance on biological 
reductionist theory, analysis, and interpretation. I would contend that while she argues for 
a rejection of crude biological reductionism as a theory (especially as a model of 
explanation of intellectual abilities and human behaviours), she does not convincingly 
discard experimental reductionism as a methodological tool for the testing of explanations 
of (at least some) human behaviours. Methodological reductionism is precisely the kind of 
scientific commitment which feminist biologists have retained in order to elaborate a viable, 
theoretically original ’feminist biology’.
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We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the arguments of some feminist 
biologists and philosophers who have proposed "milder" solutions to the eradication of 
sexist biology, that is to say, solutions which lie within the current epistemological frame­
work of biology and yet reveal original theoretical thinking about human biology. We will 
give some evidence that the radical critiques of feminists did not have to enter the dire 
straits of theoretical incoherences, methodological impracticalities, or epistemological 
vacuousness in order to lay the foundations for a biology more congenial to the fair treat­
ment of women in science and in society.
Feminist Criticisms of the Norms of 
Research Practice in Biologv
Several feminist biologists have criticized biological theories about women from a 
less radical standpoint on scientific epistemology. In the main these feminists argue that the 
scientific enterprise as a whole is not to be dismissed. Yet these authors hold that a reform 
of science must arise and produce changes within the institution as such, that is, the 
organization and culture of scientific work in order to integrate women as fully-fledged 
participants. These reforms should help to alter the authoritarian attitudes of men towards 
the work of women colleagues and to eradicate the prejudices of scientists in relation to 
"woman" as a subject of study.
The American embryologist Fausto-Sterling (1985, 1987) maintains (like the 
majority of feminists) that a great many scientific theories do not so much fit the results 
of experiments but fit instead the cultural schemas of what nature "is supposed to be". As 
a case in point she reviews a study of 1981 by the renowned doctor Bruce Carlson" on the 
subject of the development of embryos; she points out that the categories used to interpret 
results are loaded with androcentrism". Fausto-Sterling suggests that a feminist, 
woman-centred, approach would have produced "a narrative that treats female sexual 
differentiation as requiring as much investigation and explanation as male sexual differen-
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nation” (1987, 66).
Referring to her own research experience in the area of embryo development, 
Fausto-Sterling demonstrates that according to mainstream "androcentric” accounts, 
testosterone (the hormone associated with males) is of the utmost importance in the devel­
opment of both male and female embryos. These accounts state that male ducts "develop” 
while female ducts "regress”, or as Carlson himself puts it, "develop along female lines in 
the absence of other modifying influences” (Fausto-Sterling 1987, 65). Fausto-Sterling 
remarks that the androcentric ideas of a presence-or-absence-of-maleness (i.e., that 
something is added to an embryo to make it male and that the female represents some 
natural ground state), are widespread in developmental biology.
Fausto-Sterling shows that some recent studies have built on the idea of a positive 
role for oestrogen (the hormone associated with females) in embryo development'^. These 
studies indicate that a female-oriented perspective has begun to infiltrate thinking on 
biology, even though there is still a great lack of understanding of oestrogen’s role in 
female development.
Hence, while she acknowledges the power of science to objectify a non-universal 
(i.e., male-oriented) understanding of gender and nature, Fausto-Sterling reiterates that 
feminist biology does not have to dispense with the conventional scientific procedures of 
experimentation. She simply warns against using uncritically male-loaded categories and 
control probes. In brief, she believes that feminist biology, as a woman-centred research 
agenda and an approach critical of male biases, can take place without renouncing the 
conventional canons of empirical validation in the experimental sciences. She writes.
The activities of scientists are self-deluding and self-correcting; they are 
at once potentially progressive and retrogressive. What we must do in 
writing about them is to shuttle back and forth along the strands of 
meaning in order to gain more complex and accurate understandings of 
the processes involved (1987, 74-75).
As she also stated in her well-known book The Myths of Gender (1985), science cannot be
completely divorced from the values of the society in which it is produced. Once biases in
53
experimental designs and interpretation of results are removed however, in most cases sex 
differences are obliterated*^.
The views of Fausto-Sterling lead us to those of Messing, a Canadian geneticist, 
whose "research-action” work in occupational health has led her, and her research group, 
to develop an original approach to woman’s biology and work. In Part HI of this thesis, a 
case study of Messing’s group, GRABIT, will discuss the difficulties and successes it has 
encountered in introducing such a new approach. Let us briefly indicate how Messing’s 
views on feminist biology challenge both the political organization of research and the 
conventions in theory-building, while they remain relatively ’conventional’ as far as canons 
of scientific epistemology are concerned.
Messing is especially aware of the institutionalization of a certain type of culture 
among biologists. She indicates that it has borne heavily on the maintenance of sexist 
prejudices in both the division of labour (in science and in society in general), and in the 
scientific approach itself, in biology and occupational health (Messing 1983a). According 
to her own research experience, topics like occupational risks affecting menstrual cramps 
or pregnancy are less likely to be carried out compared to research more akin to the 
interests of the (male) sponsors and employers. She also reports that information about 
human health and behaviour is, in general, based solely on male samples or with inadequate 
control groups. She points out that the rationale of selecting all-male samples for reason 
of ’uniformity’ has the effect of excluding research on females altogether*^. Finally, as 
Messing contends, feminists have justly criticized studies in which women are used as sub- 
iects but are treated very casually, this occurring frequently (especially in medical research 
and in tests of reproductive technologies)*®.
Messing also maintains that patriarchal biases still pervade biological research, 
because it allows a systematic dismissal of useful information on the grounds that the points 
of view of scientists are the only guarantees of objective knowledge. A feminist approach, 
she argues, would use methods of investigation congenial to "listening” to what patients and
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workers have to say, an aspect fundamental for research on women workers* health 
(Messing 1990a).
In short. Messing, is very critical of how science uses its influence, social prestige, 
and self-perceived superiority in order to support flawed results in biological research about 
sex variations, class, and race. Yet in spite of her strong critical perspective of the concepts 
and methodology used in biological research, she does not dispute the scientific value of 
the experimental methods and hypothetico-deductive thinking.
This section will close with a discussion of the views of the American philosopher 
Longino and biologist Doell. Like Fausto-Sterling and Messing, Longino and Doell support 
the idea that feminists "do not have to choose between correcting bad science or rejecting 
the entire scientific enterprise" (Longino and Doell 1983, 208). Rather, feminists must 
immediately embark on a criticism of the institutional setting of scientific work and its 
impact on the research agenda of biology. They claim that the operations of bias in 
scientific thought are complex and need to be taken as they are, and as they are alone, not 
as a facile excuse for condemning science as a whole. What is most interesting in their 
work is that they distinguish, among diverse areas of biology, where the feminist critics 
could contribute most, and where their arguments have, relatively-speaking, failed.
Longino and Doell published an article, widely cited in the feminist literature 
about science, on analysis and reasoning in two areas of biology: evolutionary studies and 
hormonal studies (1983). In this article, they criticize science for being permeated with 
androcentric biases in its representations of women’s body and behaviour. Like other femi­
nist biologists, they focus on the selection of questions, data, and hypotheses. But they 
concentrate more specifically on the "distance" between evidence and hypotheses, on "the 
logical notion of being more or less directly consequential" (ibid., 210).
Longino and Doell do not overlook the fact that scientists make up for missing 
links between evidence and theory by enforcing their explanatory ideals. But they also 
believe that certain scientific procedures ought nevertheless to be secured. They claim these
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are among our best guarantees against error. Having said that however, they endeavour to 
show that the distance between evidence and hypotheses differs depending on the nature 
of the biological question at hand. This implies that conventional procedures of scientific 
proof loose credibility depending on the types of biological subject being studied. They take 
the example of hormonal studies to prove their point.
As they explain, there are different types of hormonal studies of sexual 
differentiation which do not encompass the same range or "distance" between evidence and 
theory. They single out three types of studies: anatomy and physiology, temperament and 
behaviour, and effects on cognition; they then compare these types of studies. Across these 
three areas of study, the data available is not consistent, ranging from simple measurements 
of hormonal levels in the body, to animal experiments where typical sexual behaviours 
(mounting, mating posture, female receptivity) are induced by injection of male or female 
hormones, to behaviour of humans with hormonal imbalances or defects. In anatomy for 
instance, studies of hormonally caused genitalia differences in humans are more 
straightforward than the other two types. When male fetuses are castrated they clearly 
develop a female appearance. In physiology, however, the physiological effects of this kind 
of intervention are not clearly identified, and Longino and Doell note the general agreement 
among biologists that further analysis is needed to see how they unfold. Finally, the link 
between levels of hormones and differential cognitive potentials is not clear at all, and 
controversies on the subject continue, as will be shown below.
In the main, Longino and Doell aim to demonstrate that the interpretation of the 
empirical link observed in the first type of study seems quite conclusive, while it remains 
blurred in the other two types of studies. Thus, in the last two types of studies, theorizing 
is likely to build on logical inferences which are not totally warranted. The relation between 
data and hypotheses becomes more complex and blurred in studies attempting to link 
hormonal levels with behaviour patterns. Despite these difficulties, Longino and Doell have 
noted the wide diffusion of studies on the subject, the findings of which being highly
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controversial, and the research design, not entirely rigorous*^. As Longino and Doell 
demonstrate, in these studies the identification of typical behaviour may have been 
influenced by the observer’s expectations, the classificatory judgments of which may be 
biased in one way or another. In addition, the early environmental factors which may have 
shaped gender role behaviours of children are not taken into account.
Longino and Doell also contend, like many feminists, that to resort to research 
on non-human mammalian species in order to understand human behaviour is contentious; 
it rests on the controversial premise of a continuity of behavioural phenomena throughout 
the species. But more specifically, they argue that since human situations are highly 
interactive, human dispositions cannot be exclusively associated with prenatal or neo-natal 
hormonal levels. They maintain that inference of causation in these cases is presumptuous, 
worst of all if drawn from animal modelling. Longino and Doell thus conclude that: "the 
considerable distance between evidence and hypotheses regarding the hormonal 
determination of behavioral sex differences contrasts sharply with the close fit between the 
two in the case of anatomical sexual differentiation" (ibid., 222). This leaves a great gap 
in explanations of human behaviour, a gap to be filled in ultimately by "the preconceived 
ideas and values of the researcher" (ibid.).
But, ask Longino and Doell, does this imply that the entire physiological project 
itself is intrinsically sexist? To their mind, the answer to this question should be qualified. 
On the one hand, such a project actually is, in current circumstances, a sexist project, 
displayed first and foremost through its descriptions of gender-dimorphic behaviours. This 
type of problems can be corrected by choosing less value-laden terms which still emphasize 
gender dichotomies (e.g., the term "tomboy" to describe the behaviour of girls); and by 
developing "cross-cultural study and a more sophisticated vocabulary for the description 
and classification of behavior [which] might help to avoid the barbarisms of ethnocentrism" 
(ibid., 224-25)^®. Therefore Longino and Doell believe that theoretically it is possible to 
minimize the biases and augment the description of genuine bio-behavioural differences.
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They even suggest that it could be possible to find physiological correlates to these theoreti­
cal differences. As a result, and if their argument holds, it allows for a feminist practice of 
biology to improve and refine the agenda of physiological enquiry using the conventional 
canons of scientific epistemology.
Longino and Doell conclude their article by attempting to define what an 
appropriate feminist response to masculine bias in science might be. First, they suggest that 
androcentric assumptions must be recognised, and then replaced by more cogent, less sexist, 
premises and interpretations. In their view, a sound feminist response to androcentric scien­
ce would have to search for additional determinants of behaviour. Secondly, they encourage 
feminists to look for and eradicate the sexist motivations of some research programmes. 
Finally, they close their discussion by urging feminists to commit themselves to a rational 
debate:
It is not necessary for us to turn our backs on science as a whole or to 
condemn it as an enterprise. In a number of ways, the logical structure 
of science itself provides opportunities for the expression of the creative 
and self-conscious sensibility that has characterized recent feminist 
attempts to transform the sciences, (ibid., 227)
In brief, for Longino and Doell, and also for Fausto-Sterling and Messing, feminist 
responses to current biology must be tactical, articulating their criticisms, but also avoiding 
the hostility (or total indifference) of the scientific milieu. Thus, in the end, neither could 
they nor should they totally avoid abiding by the established canons of epistemology in the 
empirico-analytical sciences.
Summary: What Have the Feminists Critiques 
of Biology Shown?
To sum up the findings of this first chapter, let us start with the fact that feminists 
have been interested in the science of biology for two main reasons. First, biology is at the 
heart of a definition of nature in contrast to culture, and socio-historically it has rested at 
the heart of a genesis of the gender structure of society. Secondly, biology has tended to
58
define human behaviour and its development from within the confines of fixed categories 
of sex, race and class: hence it has become a powerful ally of the status quo.
It should be clear at this point that the bulk of the feminist criticisms of biology 
revolve around the themes of evolution, sociobiology and biological theories of sex/gender 
differences in health and behaviour. It is thus a small area of biology which is sub­
stantively at stake in the feminist literature. It is also noteworthy that these questions are 
those which, from the perspective of a sociology of knowledge, have always been most 
controversial in the life sciences^’.
Feminists have singled out the presence of male biases in hypotheses, otherwise 
left unnoticed in biological research. They claim that male-centred and male-dominance 
biases pervade biology for the same reasons they pervade science and society in general: 
first, because of the dearth of evidence, but ultimately because of the epistemological 
principle of the empirical underdetermination of scientific inferences; and, secondly, 
because of the power of the male-dominated scientific establishment to filter out 
"woman-centred" and "feminist" questions and hypotheses.
Male-biased assumptions have also survived for more trivial methodological 
reasons, that is to say, ’bad’ science. Feminists often stress the inadequacy of the samples 
being used in biological research. As they emphasize, male-only samples should not be 
deemed as universal, or as the sole reference of normality. In addition, animal models 
should not be used to represent accurately patterns of human actions and behaviour.
Male biases have, however, been maintained on far less obvious caveats. Eminent 
biologists, as well as radical scientists and feminists, have criticized the theoretical 
limitations of biological (and genetic) determinism and of its meta-theoretical premise, 
biological reductionism (i.e., reducing higher-level phenomena like biological functions and 
human behaviour to explanations in terms of lower-level elements such as genes, 
molecules, hormones). Biological forms, they argue, are evolutive: they are not fixed, they 
change and interact with the conditions in the environment. Biological reductionism
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provides useful models of explanation of certain phenomena, but it does not reach a com­
plete and true understanding of living objects.
Feminists have finally urged a change in the authoritarian discourse of current 
biology; they urge that it be more open to counter-evidence, contrasting points of view, and 
social criticism. In this light, several feminist biologists and epistemologists emphasize the 
"method of listening" as a way of evaluating their own observation and interpretive 
frameworks. Yet in this regard, feminists may have reached an epistemological paradox. 
For the majority of their counter-arguments still resort to the established canons of 
justification to prove themselves right.
The next chapter will examine the suggestions of feminist biologists, sociologists 
and philosophers of science in order to integrate the feminist criticisms of biology into a 
general framework of feminist science. It will be shown, as this chapter has suggested, that 
feminist critics of science have reached an epistemological impasse which could, however, 
be avoided. For their critiques do not invite logically to an ’epistemological revolution*, but 
rather to the renewal of biological research upon feminist theoretical advances and, to a 
certain extent also, upon a greater attention to the ’biological* evidence gained from 
observation of the life and work of women.
Endnotes
1) Several early non-scholarly scientific contributions by women are cited in Alic 
(1986), Gosztonyi-Ainley (1986), and Schiebinger (1987) for instance.
2) Sexual dimorphism is defined as the constant differences between males and 
females beyond the basic functions of sexual organs. See Winchester (1969).
3) See, for instance, Bleier (1978, 1984); and Birke (1984c). Hubbard (1979), for 
her part, contested the whole sociobiological endeavour. Interview of Ruth Hubbard, by the 
author, Cambridge, Massachussets, 8 May 1989.
4) Indeed, Haraway does not agree with feminists who hold a quasi-Marxist view 
of knowledge. She does not believe that women could develop a knowledge, a better 
science, encompassing both the view of a dominant and the dominated discourse on the
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sole ground of their objective location as dominated minorities. Her reason, however, for 
not subscribing to their arguments seems purely intuitive. She writes:
I find this feminist approach promising but not fully convincing. That 
argument must wait. > ^ a t becomes clear, however, is that feminists have 
now entered the debates on the nature and power of scientific knowledge 
with authority: we do have something to say. The only remaining
problem is what, and here we are speaking in many voices. (1981, 481)
5) Moreover, as several sociobiologists cautiously have contended, the 
"gene-centred" logic in behaviour studies should not be confounded with gene-deterministic 
hypotheses (Bateson 1982; 1986; Hampe & Morgan 1988). For if, in evolutionary genetics, 
one is justified in saying that the organism and its behaviour ("the vehicle") are there to 
protect the DNA ("the replicator") transmitted to offspring; on the other hand, it is not the 
DNA which is selected and has a universal function of survival, it is the characters (and 
behaviours) of the organism which are selected.
6) This is also the argument put forward by Gould and Lowentin (1979).
7) The same rationale applies to the discipline of craniometry, which supported the 
superiority of the male intellect on the basis that men’s skulls (read: brains) are on average 
bigger than those of women. Unfortunately, it was soon discovered that the average skull 
of blacks was bigger that than of whites, hence shattering the white male-dominance logic 
of craniometry. See Katz (1988), Sayers (1982), and Gould (1985).
8) Baker studies the following discordant populations of children: CAH girls 
(congenital adrenal hyperplasia), TF subjects (testicular feminization), Reifinstein’s 
syndrome subjects. Turner’s syndrome subjects, and subjects whose mothers underwent 
hormonal treatment (surplus of progesterone or surplus of oestrogen) during pregnancy.
9) Ruth Bleier, considered by many feminists to be a pioneer and leader among 
feminist scientists, died on January 4,1988. See J. Walzer and L. Gordon, 1988. "A Decade 
of feminist critiques in the natural sciences: an address by Ruth Bleier", Signs, 14, 1 
(Autumn): 182-85.
10) Bleier quotes the research by N. Geschwind and P. Behan ("Left-handedness: 
association with immune disease, migraine, and developmental learning disorder. In Procee­
dings of National Academv of Sciences 79, 1982) about testosterone restricting the 
development of the left hemisphere of the brain of males "in utero". This study is based on 
trials on 507 fetal brains, and concludes that there is actually no statistical difference bet­
ween the sexes. Bleier also criticizes a study of C. de Lacoste-Utamsing and R. Holloway 
on corpus callosum: "Sexual dimorphism in the human corpus callosum". Science 216 
(1982), which examined a substance which connects the brain hemispheres, and suggested 
that the female brain is less well lateralized than the male brain for visuospatial functions.
11) Bruce M. Carlson, Pattern’s Foundations of Embrvologv (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1981).
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12) In his study Carlson measures the effect of "male" hormones alone, in a 
fashion which makes the reader think that "female" hormones are not important in embryo 
development. Indeed, feminist biologists have often opposed the usage of the term "male" 
and "female" hormones because this fosters the idea that testosterone is exclusively found 
in males, while oestrogen and progesterone are exclusively found in females. Such 
dichotomy of male/female nature fosters the idea of hormonally induced sex and gender 
differences. See, for instance, the critiques in Sapiro (1985).
13) These studies have shown that the presence of oestrogen in the embryo milieu 
changes males into females (in fish), that males may be immersed in oestrogen and 
progesterone in placenta (in mammalians), and that brain cells can convert testosterone into 
oestrogen (in male rodents).Fausto-Sterling quotes Ursula Mittwoch, Genetics of Sex 
Differentiation (New York: Academic Press, 1973); J.D. Wilson et al., "The Hormonal 
control of sexual development". Science 211 (1981); R.W. Coy and B.S. McEwen, eds.. 
Sexual Differentiation of the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).
14) It is recognized however, that Fausto-Sterling does not readily undertake an 
examination of the reasons why science has, for so long, been such a male ghetto and 
promoted a male-centred research agenda. See, for instance, S. Rosser, "Book Review", 
Signs 12 (Winter 1987): 402-5.
15) Messing also cites examples of samples used in cancer research in industry, 
in research into heart disease, and in studies of mating behaviour.
16) A prime example of this would be research conducted with placebo pill: the 
result effected was pregnancy for many poor women participating in the study. See also the 
works of R. Duelli-Klein (with R. Arditti and S. Minden) Test- Tube Women: What Future 
for Motherhood? (London: Pandora, 1984); and "What’s ’new’ about the ’new’ 
reproductive technologies?" In Man-Made Women. How Reproductive Technologies Affect 
Women. G. Corea et al. (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
17) The study of Anke Erhrardt and Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, "Effects of Pre-Natal 
Sex Hormones on Gender-related Behavior", Science 211 (1981) is cited as a case in point.
18) They indeed maintain that language alone does not create the object; it might, 
however, misdescribe it, even to the point of occasionally obscuring reality. Their position 
is thereby less radical than that of Haraway (presented in this chapter), for example.
19) See chapter 4 for more detail about these controversies.
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CHAPTER 2
FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE ELABORATION OF A 
NEW SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE IN BIOLOGY
Feminist criticisms of biology have spurred the elaboration of a feminist alternative 
research programme not only in the social sciences, but for science as a whole.
A question which looms large in that connection is: What needs to be changed in 
scientific practice for it to be more congenial to non-sexist, * truer* biological theories? Do 
we merely need organizational adjustments in schools and higher education? Or is it 
necessary (in order to introduce these adjustments) to raise women’s consciousness of patri­
archal biases in society and knowledge at large? And what if more profound changes in the 
rules of scientific method were the prime conditions for the development of a feminist 
biology?
Mainly inspired by schools of thought arising from a post-positivism sociology of - 
knowledge, feminist theoreticians and epistemologists started asking the far-reaching 
question: Do we need a feminist epistemology to vindicate a feminist, non-sexist, and 
non-patriarchal science? Do we need a feminist society? (Fee 1983,1985; Flax 1983,1987; 
Harding 1986b; Harding and Hintikka 1983; Keller 1982, 1985; H. Rose 1983, 1985)^
Hitherto in this thesis, we have seen the reasons feminists isolate as a rationale for 
changing certain theoretical categories, hypotheses, and research designs in the practice of 
biology. These reasons seemed to be justified and legitimate. But I have also highlighted 
some contradictions and practical problems with which feminists have been confronted in 
the elaboration of their new research programmes. First, their critique of a realist 
epistemology for science was not congruent with how they viewed the validation of their 
own biological theories. Secondly, feminists seemed to maintain that in studies of biology 
and behaviour, (patriarchal) biological determinism could be rejected on empirical grounds;
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but they could only contend that their own holistic approach should be taken for granted - 
- for no better reason than that there is no conclusive evidence for biological reductionism! 
This last argument indeed sounds more argumentative than strictly empirically-grounded; 
it resembles a kind of "negative endorser" theory.
This chapter will thus try to shed some light on the gaps between the aims of 
feminist critics of biology and their suggestions for the implantation of new norms of 
scientific practice, including a rethinking of its epistemological premises. It will argue that 
these theoretical suggestions do not render total justice to feminist biology and its potential 
as a ’better’ science. Rather, the epistemological canons of the empirico-analytical sciences 
as formulated in critical realism seem to serve more satisfactorily the purposes of concrete 
projects of feminist biology.
The first two sections will deal with the intellectual legacy of phenomenology, 
discussing, first, the Marxist feminist view on epistemology and, secondly, the feminist 
psycho-sociological insights into the scientific system. The last section will examine, and 
endeavour to explain (in light of the aims and scope of feminist projects of science) the 
unfolding of recent debates within feminism in relation to the epistemological categories 
of objectivity, subjectivity, and values.
Within these three tendencies of feminist theories of scientific knowledge, the 
problematic role of women in the elaboration of a feminist biology is being discussed. We 
shall note, for instance, that the role of women and of ’feminine values’ is always being 
articulated in combination with the ’vanguard’ programme of action of feminists and 
political consciousness-raising. Also, the articulation of the ’feminine’ and the ’feminist’ 
is emphasized more or less strongly by the feminist authors working within these diverse 
traditions.
The notion of ’feminine values’, however, recovers diverse sociological components 
of social action that need to be distinguished. These components may reflect, for instance, 
the objective social interests of women (in relation to the health system or the household
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for example). Or they may correspond to the ’caring* and ’loving inclinations’ of women 
as a social group. Or else they may mirror the professional interests women are likely to 
defend within the scientific institution. More importantly, the point to make with respect 
to ’feminine’ and ’feminist’ values is whether the social ’motives’ they represent can 
satisfactorily replace epistemological ’guidelines’ in the construction of a science less sexist 
and more conducive to a complete understanding of women’s biology and health.
I would suggest that feminist attempts to build a "better" science incorrectly claim 
new epistemological credentials. However, "feminist biology" might rightly appropriate the 
status of original and anti-conventional discourse about human biology. As shown in 
chapter 1, the specificity of feminist biology seems to rest on the following tenets: a 
distinctive research agenda for human biology; a set of alternative theories about 
sex-gender differentiation and behaviours; and the usage of certain techniques of data 
collection (boirowed from the human and social sciences) complementing, though not 
replacing, conventional methods of investigation and validation in biology.
The Legacv of Marxist Phenomenologv in 
Feminist Critiques of Science
Several feminists have argued that if the canons of scientific epistemology had been 
’thought out’ via the social practice of women, that is, on the basis of feminine ’emotional 
inclinations’ towards, and ’empathy’ for, people and their personal experiences, these 
canons would have secured the grounds for a "better", less sexist, racist or classist, science. 
In order to become a reality today, the constitution of such a ’feminist epistemology’ 
would, however, necessitate a certain degree of political awareness and militancy on the 
part of women scientists, a process involving the assistance of a ’feminist vanguard’ of 
women in science. This view on scientific changes seems to have been profoundly 
influenced by the Marxist theory of knowledge, whereby the location of actors within the 
social structure gives them a different "worldview" of social life (Gramsci 1985; Larrain
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1983; Mannheim 1936, 1952).
According to early Marxist feminist writings about science (Arditti 1980; Hubbard 
1979; Lowe and Hubbard 1983; H. Rose 1983, 1985), a "feminist” science based on 
"feminine" values would be better, because historically, women’s social role and practice 
have not been conducive to the domination of nature and social control, but rather to a 
respectful and caring attitude towards the natural environment and human beings. A 
feminist science would also be truer because, as a dominated group, women might attain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the world (Hartsock 1983; Harding 1983).
The Marxist-inspired project of a feminist science is fully described in the works 
of the social scientist Hilary Rose (H. Rose 1983, 1985, 1986; Rose and Hanmer 1976; 
Rose and Rose 1976a, 1976b, 1976c, 1976d). Rose looks at science from the perspective 
of a social practice taking shape as part of a social totality. In this view, science is seen as 
an ideological weapon for the maintenance of the social order of Capital, patriarchy and the 
white race. In contrast, feminist science would rest on the ideology of the socially 
dominated practice of women.
As Rose argues, women occupy a dominated position in society, both ideologically 
and materially. Ideologically, reproductive labour is undervalued; productive labour is more 
highly regarded. Feminist Marxists stress that reproductive labour generates a totally distinct 
type of social relations, which is, nevertheless, most important for the maintenance of 
society. Reproductive labour involves caring for the people, nurturing children, unselfish 
patterns of behaviour and love. Productive labour, in contrast, fosters control over human 
and material resources, a control enforced by coercive organizations of social relations. The 
social relations generated by productive labour are, in their current form, diametrically 
opposed to the values of love and emancipation (H. Rose 1983, 1985).
Relative to science, more specifically. Rose suggests that the history of women’s 
social practice under capitalism reveals why the act of any woman appropriating scientific 
practice has been regarded as a contradiction. She holds that, under capitalism, any woman
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would find that "her involvement with the abstraction of scientific practice as it has 
developed under capitalism and patriarchy, on one hand, is in painful contradiction with her 
caring labor on the other" (1983, 87).
Rose therefore proposes a new feminist epistemoloev for science, integrating manual 
and intellectual labour, by means of "caring for" and "feeling for" the objects being studied. 
She also posits that a feminist methodologv would seek to bring together the subjective and 
the objective. Feminist epistemology, she claims, involves a reintegration of the "hand, 
brain, and heart" for the natural sciences (H. Rose 1983). Such an epistemology, she 
maintains, has already provided science with the existing feminist critiques of biology and 
medicine, which have in turn brought about "a more complete materialism, a truer 
knowledge" (ibid., 72). But the entrenchment of ’feminine values’ within scientific norms 
of practice would most surely need the active participation of a feminist vanguard. For only 
militant action could sustain the difficult challenge of implanting ’values’ and a ’style of 
practice’ traditionally alien to science. Finally, this double process of activating ’feminine 
values’ and ’feminist politics’ would generate the ’feminist standpoint’ on knowledge, 
whose product, far from being biased, would be a ’more complete’ understanding of human 
life.
Thus, according to Marxist feminism^, feminine practice is more likely than male 
practice to reach true knowledge. By reason of their location within the social structure of 
patriarchy, women as a group might have a more encompassing vision of the world, and, 
as reproductive labourers, hold a more caring attitude towards social relations and relations 
of knowledge between knower and the objects and people to be known.
This point of view is more fully developed by Arditti, a feminist Marxist biologist. 
Arditti defends a project of feminist science in which she accords women a major role 
(1980). She contends that the potential of feminism to develop a "truly humane science" 
rests on the fact that "women are more generally in touch with their feelings" (ibid., 364). 
Therefore, a feminist perspective would give "the prevalent mode of science" human
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concerns. Feminist science would provide a ’’special form of knowing” avoiding the 
traditional division between intellect and emotions. It could ”rc-legitimize the intuitive ap­
proach” which is being consistently undervalued in current science (ibid., 364-66). For 
Arditti however, while both men and women scientists may be committed to the conversion 
of science from prevalent norms to a liberating and healthy activitv. yet, it is the women 
who are more likely to be at the forefront of this project because they are more in touch 
with the values of love and respect.
The idea of a better science embracing humanist goals was, in early feminist 
writings about science, taken on to justify the union of feminine subjectivity and scientific 
objectivity as the epistemological foundation of feminist science. The works of some 
feminist epistemologists and historians of science (Keller 1983, 1985; Merchant 1982; 
Oakley 1981) illustrate this tendency. If the idea of subjectivity has a legitimate place in 
the philosophy and the sociology of science; for both epistemological and ethical reasons, 
however, its importance within the scientific process as a whole is highly questionable. 
Even within feminist epistemology and the history of science, many authors are reticent to 
accord a central role to subjectivity, let alone ’’emotions”, in the development of a 
non-patriarchal and non-sexist science. This is true even though they may acknowledge the 
utility of interactive methods for certain research questions (in human studies for instance) 
(Kirkup 1986; Koblitz 1987; Jaggar 1989; Hawkesworth 1989; Mura 1989; Stacey 1988; 
Tronto 1989)^.
Since the roles of feminine subjectivities and emotions in the development of a 
’’better” scientific process is far from settled, the role of women in the elaboration of a 
feminist science is also problematic. The idea that women as a group can foster a new 
scientific approach is counteracted by the evidence that feminists (scientists and non-scien­
tists), more than women scientists, have been at the forefront of reforms in the research 
programmes of biology in the interests of women. It is, in fact, noteworthy that several 
women biologists do not actually identify with all or even some aspects of the so-called
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"feminine practice", but rather seem to endorse "masculine" attitudes of intellectual 
authority and competition.
The Marxist feminist biochemist Hubbard, for example, does not agree totally with 
the idea that women’s main contribution to science is their "feminine" attitudes towards 
nature and people. Her point of view suggests, rather, that women, as a group, because they 
have been the victims of sexist science and medical malpractice, have an objective interest 
in a feminist reform of biology (Lowe and Hubbard 1983). Also, she does not necessarily 
give women a prominent role in the social and ethical reforms of scientific practice. She 
seems to argue that it is mainly social critics, feminists included, who will, and ought to, 
participate in the process of changing science for the benefit of all. More substantively, 
Hubbard subscribes to a Marxist view on biology which reinstates a less rigid view of 
explanations about "nature", a total (yet self-reflecting) dedication to human welfare, and 
opens up scientific thinking to a full re-examination of its assumptions and procedures of 
research.
In her introduction to H. Rose and S. Rose’s collection of essays in Ideologv in/of 
the Natural Sciences (Hubbard 1980), Hubbard develops her argument for a new science 
on three pivotal issues relating to traditional science. First, scientific language endows 
knowledge with depersonalization, and reifies the idea that science and scientists are free 
from political biases. Secondly, science treats reality as decontextualized facts rather than 
as something taking its full identity within a context. Such a view implies that current 
"scientific methodology" only permits the capture of natural phenomena which are repeatab­
le and measurable. It cannot deal with unique occurrences, or with interactive systems (see 
also Hubbard 1982). Thirdly, in the present social climate, science "is flawed with 
arrogance": scientists try to enforce uncriticallv their framework onto objects and 
phenomena even though it is improper to describe the reality under study in all its 
complexity (Hubbard 1980).
According to Hubbard, science has, for centuries, built on these three pivotal norms.
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Conversely, in a scientific practice reformed on Marxist feminist bases, scientists would be 
led to conceive of "nature" as a complex system of interactive parts, a conception which 
constitutes the most accurate picture of life from which models of explanation can be 
developed (ibid.). (Such a conception also implies that ’women’s biology is not their 
destiny’.)
Therefore, Hubbard continues, in order to solve the problems of science, we need 
more than simply to ward off the negative results of science from within; we need also to 
criticize it from outside; we urgently need to "redefine what science is about and how to 
do it less wastefuUy, and more healthily and humanely" (ibid., xxv); and, as far as scientists 
are concerned, to "redefine science and its methodologies out of a full awareness of the 
ideological components that are implicit in it" (ibid., xxvi).
In her discussion of biology and women, more particularly (Hubbard 1979; Lowe 
and Hubbard 1983), Hubbard opposes the naturalistic fallacy of biological determinations, 
in favour of a more holistic approach. She says, "there is no such thing as human biology 
in the pure ... what we think of women’s biology is a political construct, not a scientific 
one" (Lowe and Hubbard 1983, 6). Secondly, she posits that if women themselves were 
to ask biological questions, they would likely obtain more reliable information about 
women’s biology than that which conventional biology has thus far produced. She believes 
that, in spite of the economic and political constraints imposed on women and feminists by 
the patriarchal system, it is possible for women to ask the questions that are of interest to 
them.
Hubbard thus clearly gives a prominent role to women in the re-evaluation of 
traditional explanations of women’s biology and behaviour. She does so however, assuming 
women’s personal interests in, and immediate knowledge of, their own bodies and malaises, 
and without giving too much weight to the idea of intrinsic ’feminine values’. For these 
reasons women would reinstate a more ’woman-friendly’, and less sexist biological 
programme of research about sex and behaviour. But she also accords, with regard to the
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implementation of these profound reforms, a role of leadership to feminist and other 
socially-involved groups. In the elaboration of a new type of biology, one must confront, 
she contends, political and economic interest groups. So, she does not conceive of feminist 
biology as purely rooted in women’s subjectivities; she would rather argue, in the main, for 
a Marxist feminist biology committed to tackling the political and rational debates lying 
ahead -  regarding research approaches, ethical problems, and social interests in science.
Hubbard’s substantive critique of scientific activity in a capitalist and patriarchal 
society appears to have been taken on by several feminist authors who have studied the 
relationship between science as a proto-universal epistemology and science as a power 
system vested with men’s interests. The writings of Fee (1983, 1985) arc illuminating in 
that respect for they illustrate the scope of the feminist projects of science, and display 
clearly the amplitude of their theoretical shortcomings. Let us look briefly at Fee’s 
arguments in order to highlight the problems which current feminist theoreticians are trying 
to resolve (or to avoid) in the elaboration of a feminist biology.
Like Rose and Arditti, Fee believes that "there is something unfeminine about 
science" (Fee 1983). For her, masculinity is an incomplete and distorted form of humanity. 
She claims that the issue for feminists is not making women more scientific but rather 
making science less masculine and thus more completely human. Science must indeed be 
transformed to permit the acceptance of women within it, but more importantly to 
"conceptualize new kinds of relationships between human beings and the natural world, by 
overcoming an alienation between culture and nature" (ibid., 15).
The core of Fee’s thesis lies in her discussion of the notion of objectivity. She 
concurs with Hubbard’s analysis, holding that the notion of scientific objectivity is suffi­
ciently vague to hide its real political purpose and to keep its legitimacy under the guise 
of epistemological virtues. She contends that science is permeated by social values, more 
precisely, masculine values.
Fee concentrates, in the main, on the negative political effects of pseudo-objectivity
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and she does not, therefore, examine further the types of reforms suggested in Hubbard’s 
earlier works and which required development. By the same token. Fee avoids substantive 
analysis of the question which, in my view, is crucial for feminist biology: Is it, episte- 
mologically, absolutely necessary to change the scientific rules of proof or any other 
methodological categories in order to have a feminist science?
For example, part of Fee’s discussion on objectivity concerns the relationship 
between thinking and feeling, and between values and objectivity. First, Fee says that the 
absence of feeling and emotion in science is the direct result of the domination and political 
authority of men. This is, in my view, at best sketchy, at worst presumptuous.
Secondly, she analyses "emotions" and "social values" as if they were co-extensive 
epistemological categories. We must underline that "emotions" are simply "felt". If they can 
be raised as evidence to support observation and cognitive judgements, they are not 
debatable as such: they simply "are" or "are not". In contrast, "values" are cognitive 
categories assuming the roles of either premises or conclusions in the process of 
knowledge; thus, they can be rationally discussed as such^. Fee distinguishes neither 
between values which predicate cognitive judgments, nor between values which predicate 
judgments of social ethics. While she urges scientists to recognize the existence of values 
in science, she does not even commence examining the basic practicalities of how the social 
resolution of ethical and social issues, and the procedures of scientific research, could be 
organized for the sake of a democratization and an amelioration of decision-making process 
in science. From a sociological point of view, values entering model-building seem far less 
conflictual than values related to ethics, even from the perspective of feminist critiques of 
science. In fact, feminists do not seem so much to challenge the idea of a pragmatic, 
instrumental type of knowledge (referring primarily to instrumentally-oriented cognitive 
judgments), as the abuse of instrumental knowledge (referring primarily to matters of 
politics and social ethics) in areas like human biology, pharmacology, psychology, and 
industrial "progress". (See chapters 3 and 4.)
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Indeed, in spite of all her criticisms. Fee maintains that science should not be rejec­
ted wholesale; she states that rationality, critical evaluation, and empirical testing must be 
preserved. She does not explain, however, why she suddenly takes this point of view. For 
her, there is only one way to preserve the promise of scientific progress: it is to base 
science on individual creativity, stimulated by, but also ultimately subjected to, the con­
straints of community consensus through a set of recognized procedures (Fee 1983). In my 
opinion, this statement demonstrates at least two key things: first that Fee cannot really 
provide any new basis from which to develop a feminist epistemology; and, secondly, that 
she starts from a shaky theoretical basis to assess workable solutions to the problem of 
democratizing science^.
Scientific research is oriented by dominant social groups, and a majority of scientists 
would acknowledge this. But this does not prohibit them from thinking that the method 
itself will prevent errors supplanting truths. (See chapter 6). In her critique of scientific 
objectivity. Fee is right in pointing out this fact. It may be argued, however, that she 
overstates her views, and criticizes the abuse of scientific rationality in other spheres of 
social activity, rather than the epistemological utility of rationality. In other words, she 
focuses on the ’abuse’ of science rather than on its ’use’. She also coalesces political and 
epistemological questions into that of "values", an inexcusable adumbration at the expense 
of a sound analysis of science as a rational process. She does so, risking the fact that her 
critical argument will not even be taken seriously by self-critical biologists.
It is my contention that, like other Marxist feminists. Fee does not investigate if 
some useful components of the scientific method should be kept. She also does not explore 
either how a social consensus on scientific validity could be reached. Fee’s view of a femi­
nist science remains merely a "negative-endorser" project of science^. In other words, once 
Fee has pointed out the basic sexist flaws in scientific practice, especially its current use 
of objectivity for ideological (patriarchal) purposes, she does not try to discuss either 
substantively or more comprehensively the epistemological and practical implications of her
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approach to science.
True, Fee claims that what she has developed appears more as a feminist critique 
than as a feminist project of science. She indicates that "there is no way of imagining in 
advance, a fully articulated scientific theory" (1983, 22). Yet she holds that "we are, 
however, free to play with ideas and to consider the criteria that a feminist science should 
fulfil" (ibid.)".
At this point, while it is necessary to argue the case for the entrance of women 
into the scientific professions as presendy constituted, it is also important to push 
the epistemological critique of science to the point where we can begin to construct 
a clear vision of alternate ways of creating knowledge.... Overcoming the dualisms 
that feminists have identified as being associated with sexual dichotomies, such as 
the subject/ object relation, may offer the prospect of a radically transformed 
science, one that is as yet only faintly visible as a possibility for the future, (ibid., 
24-25)
Let us summarize the foregoing arguments in this section. The Marxist view of the 
’socio-epistemological* problematic of relations of values and facts has enabled feminists 
to produce a powerful critique of the patriarchal ideology prevailing in biology. 
Accordingly, feminist science would neither hide, nor renounce its political aims on behalf 
of women, but on the contrary, would work with a full awareness of its political biases. By 
overstating the issue of social values, more especially in terms of masculine versus feminine 
values, in science however, feminists were bound to face serious problems in building a 
new scientific method. By seeing the role of scientific values strictly in terms of ideological 
weapons for patriarchy or, in contrast, of moral and ethical prerogatives of women and 
’feminine inclinations’, they too hastily dismissed the valuable role some values also play 
in the development of procedures and methods of validation in the empirico-analytical 
sciences, for the benefit of both feminist and conventional biologies.
Finally, as will be argued in chapter 4, an examination of biological epistemology 
tends to show that, as biology concerns itself with life in general, the values entering its 
model-building have been, as in the social sciences, more directly subjected to social 
debates than the values entering model-building in the physical sciences*. In contrast.
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biology has remained closer to the physical sciences, both experimentally and with respect 
to the logic of scientific proof entrenched within critical realism. As I shall develop these 
two points in a further chapter, new light may be shed on the reasons why feminists, 
borrowing their views on biology mainly from critical social theory, have had troubles 
justifying themselves within the confines of experimental biology.
Historv of Science. Psvcho-socioloev of Science, 
and the Impact of Institutional Changes
Several feminist historians, sociologists, and practising scientists have suggested that 
it is the social setting and the historical weight of androcentric representations of scientists 
which are the deep-seated reasons for the relative absence, poorer performance and lower 
status achievement of women in science. They have tried to demonstrate that in school 
science (Bentley and Watts 1986; Kahle, 1985; Kelly 1985; Small, Whyte and Kelly 1982), 
in higher education (Brighton Women and Science Group 1980; Kahle 1985; Rossiter 1982; 
Rosser 1985), and in professional circles (Koblitz 1987; Reskin 1978; Outram 1987; 
Rosenberg 1982; Simeone 1987; Widnall 1988), the conditions of the learning, and the 
performance, of science were unfavourable to females’. These authors seem, therefore, to 
adhere to a theory of knowledge that Harding has rightly called ’feminist empiricism’. For 
they do not assume that the sexist flaws of current science lie in its epistemological ’norms’ 
or methodological tools. Rather they consider as their main subject of investigation the 
prejudices pervading theory-building and research agendas, whose infiltration, they 
hypothesize, is primarily due to an institutional imbalance of power between men and 
women scientists at both micro and macro- levels of decision-making.
The bulk of recent feminist reflections on science rests on the concept of science 
as an educational and professional system inseparable from a more general division of 
labour, itself maintained through representations of gendered roles. According to a great 
many feminist historians of science, the scientific culture and infrastructure have greatly
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contributed to maintain the image of scientist as being male, and scientific work as being 
more suited to the aptitudes of men. These are proposed to explain the proletarianization 
of women in science, their exclusion as full-fledged scientists, and their relative absence 
from science*®.
Some feminists, however, also explain that these historical processes underwrite the 
idea that feminine practice (whether conscious or not, repressed or not) is totally different 
from masculine practice. This implies that womens' approach to nature, people and 
knowledge, is intrinsically distinct from that of men. The association of males with scienti­
fic activity can be inteipreted as either a conscious political process excluding females, or 
on the basis that, more implicitly, the scientific method and model-building take their 
deeper roots in the male psvcho-cognitive pattern (Flax 1983; J. Harding 1986; Keller 1982, 
1985; Sayers 1987). These two processes combined might explain more fully why, 
historically, women have achieved less impressively in science than men.
Thus, this perspective on the problem of women in science addresses head on the 
deep roots cum social origins of scientific epistemology, a contrast with the avenues 
explored by the authors referred to previously in this section. In fact, this perspective sets 
itself the task of testing the theoretical underpinnings of the 'feminist standpoint' on 
scientific knowledge against the micro-structure of scientific practice, an enterprise which 
contrasts, this time, with that of the exploration of the macro-levels of science characteristic 
of Marxist-inspired feminist studies.
According to the feminist authors subscribing to this view, the values entrenched 
in scientific knowledge are not universal. They are, in fact, co-extensive with male 
cognitive psychology. Scientific endeavour is shaped in accordance with men's goals, 
desires and representations of nature and the social world. These are, in the main, to 
dominate, predict, and control nature (and women); to conceive of people and nature as 
objects; and to elaborate models of explanation as mechanistic metaphors. Such "cognitive" 
values and interests are indeed closer to the typical psychological development of boys than
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of girls, the former detaching themselves from their parents earlier and with less emotional 
turmoil. As adults, males are more inclined to sever emotion and reason, to distance their 
own identity from that of other people, and to become more aggressive. Females, on the 
other hand, have more difficulty separating their own identity from that of others, and also 
to separate emotions from reason. The female pattern of psychological development is said 
to induce the contradictions women must experience when they attend science classes, 
undertake experiments, try to learn abstract concepts, and strive to advance in science. 
These contradictions are exacerbated by social upbringing, role expectations, and the 
settings of science education and scientific work.
Thus, according to this argument, the ’exclusion* of women from science has less 
to do with women’s nature than with the phenomenological genesis of scientific knowledge. 
Given the historical backgrounds of our societies, the genesis of scientific knowledge has 
partaken of the socio-psychological dichotomies male/ female, objectivity/ subjectivity, 
rationality/ emotivity.
Phenomenology as the study of "forms of life" has, indeed, been very influential 
for feminist literature about knowledge". Phenomenology states the ’dependence’ of our 
mental representations of nature and reality on the ’relative’ systems of beliefs in which 
they take place (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Schütz 1962). Since phenomenology posits 
a relativist stance on belief systems, it justifies, as an epistemology, the existence of 
alternative "worldviews": all beliefs are true within their own contexts. The works of 
Glennon (1979), Spender (1980, 1983), and Stanley and Wise (1983), for instance, were 
strongly committed to phenomenology. However, as other feminists have argued, 
phenomenology somehow undercuts the political rationale of feminist critics of science: for 
it undermines the real, objective, existence of a social structure which oppresses women 
(Currie and Kazi 1987).
The feminist arguments in favour of a phenomenological insight into female 
psycho-sociology and female experiences have been criticized in recent works of feminist
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educators, historians of science and epistemologists. The issue raised by these authors was 
whether feminist scientists and critics of science, in their attempts to alter scientific 
knowledge in favour of a more equitable treatment of women, should be mainly concerned 
with substantive theory-building in political and sociological studies of school science 
education and the scientific professions, or if they should proceed by examining 
epistemological matters. Let us look at some of these studies in order to highlight the 
directions they have taken, and why.
An important part of the literature about women in science has paid particular 
attention to the evolution of women’s consciousness of covert sexist biases in science^^ 
Several of these studies assign a major role to teachers and professors of science in the 
transformation of the science curriculum, the image of scientists, and the consciousness-rai­
sing of students (Andersen 1987; Bentley and Watts 1986; Kahle 1985; Kelly 1985; 
Schuster and Van Dyne 1984; Rosser 1985). Others endeavour to document how, 
historically, the scientific institution has systematically undermined the role of women in 
science (Ginzberg 1987; Hearn 1982; Koblitz 1987; Merchant 1982; Outram 1987; 
Rosenberg 1982; Rossiter 1982).
The strategy described in Schuster & Van Dyne (1984), for example, primarily 
concerns the liberal arts, but it is widely quoted in feminist literature about science. They 
describe the introduction of feminist theory-building in the human sciences in a six-step 
strategy of consciousness-raising of women students. In their view, the emergence of 
women’s studies programmes in the curriculum should spur the inclusion of women’s 
experiences not only as problems on their own, but as a relevant basis for a new 
understanding of social affairs. Schuster and Van Dyne acknowledge several sources of 
resistance to such transformation. These are the weight of invisible paradigms on the belief 
that science is neutral and universal; the students themselves, who might not have 
experienced the adverse effects of sexism, or who might believe that an equal opportunities 
movement would suffice to balance the previous absence of women from prestigious posi-
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dons in social life; the multicultural realities which could impede a project embracing 
women’s experiences as a whole; and the loss of old certainties in favour of a plurality of 
accounts of history and society.
Although Schuster and Van Dyne’s account may appear legitimate for the social 
sciences, one may also wish to ask if it could be applied directly to biological science.
Andersen (1987) remarks that feminist transformations in science have already borne 
fruit in disciplines where interpretative methods are used. In these areas, she argues, femi­
nist critiques will be fruitful inasmuch as they make a breach in the hegemony of science, 
and replace it with a pluralistic view, inclusive of women’s subjective experiences. In the 
case of science and technology, however, she says that the main contribution of "a feminist 
view of science" is still to come. She suggests that, mainly, feminism will continue to 
repudiate the cultural dualisms associated with masculinity and feminity which have per­
meated scientific thought and discourse. Andersen, thus, believes that "it is impossible... 
to move directly from the male-centred curriculum to [a] ’transformation’ of that curriculum 
in favour of a co-educational one — without passing through some form of women’s 
studies" (ibid., 226)^ .^ Her position lends itself to the tenets of a project of feminist biology 
presented earlier, via the works of biologists, such as Fausto-Sterling, Messing and 
Hubbard. That is to say, she is very critical of prejudices governing the selection of 
scientific data and the formulation of research problems. Still, she seems to lean towards 
a realist epistemology which would give us at least some minimal guarantee that ’feminist 
biology’ provides ’better’ and ’truer’ explanations than ’patriarchal science’.
Rosser (1985) takes a much more radical view of a feminist science curriculum. 
Adapting Schuster and Van Dyne’s framework, she is fully aware that women scientists are, 
in general, oblivious to the implicit sexist biases in science, and argues that unless women 
scientist’s personal lives are directly concerned with feminist issues, they would be 
unlikely to generate changes in teaching science or in research*^. She maintains however, 
that real changes in the science curriculum might well involve more than that. These
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changes would imply a recognition by women, of the rigidity and inaccuracies of knowle­
dge about women, and of the male biases concealed in the notions of objectivity, rationality 
and dominance; they would also focus on the importance of introducing feminine attributes 
expressed via their subjectivities, feelings, and caring attitudes into science; and, finally, the 
possibility for more than one way of practising science to co-exist with that presently 
normative.
Similarly, Bentley and Watts (1986) have argued that the nature of normal science 
is masculine because it reflects male values such as rationality, logic, objectification, and 
quantification. For them, female values are holistic, co-operative, amenable to diverse forms 
of knowledge, qualitative, and as such, they adumbrate the unification of the intellect with 
emotions. Bentley and Watts also believe that a feminine practice of science would not only 
produce a better, more humane and more self-conscious, scientific practice, but they also 
believe it would generate a superior method and a more comprehensive epistemology for 
scientific knowledge.
In contrast, Jaeger (1987), for example, severely criticizes authors such as Bentley 
and Watts. First, she argues that if feminists think women can create a new science based 
on feminine values cum ’emotional inclinations’ towards nature and human beings, they 
must initially thoroughly investigate the relation between emotion and cognition in the 
thinking subject. But they fail to do so. For that reason, Jaeger contends feminist 
epistemology can be rejected as an alternative theory of knowledge.
Jaeger also highlights the confusion between the social and the natural sciences 
created by feminist theories of knowledge (ibid.). She suggests that ’feminine values’ cum 
’life experiences’ might be relevant in understanding the subject matters of the social 
sciences (i.e., human and gendered experiences). She also argues, however, that these values 
are rather useless in understanding the object matters of the natural sciences (i.e., inanimate 
objects). Finally, she contends that "traditional science" already subscribes to some of the 
principles advanced by feminists, such as, uncertainty about our explanations of nature.
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inability to completely control natural events experimentally, recognition of biases in 
observation, and the holistic view of nature and reality^^.
The only aspect of science on which Jaeger’s critique converges with that of 
feminists is in the realm of school education. She maintains that school science must be 
altered in order to be more congenial to girls, that is to say, to sustain their curiosity, to 
develop their skills, and to meet their expectations^**. But in the last analysis, Jaeger does 
not believe that the root of the problem of women’s low participation in science lies in the 
fact that the "nature” of science is intrinsically "masculine".
Like some feminist historians (Koblitz 1987; Outram 1987) and educators (Kirkup 
1986), Jaeger is more inclined to withdraw from the traditional view of a feminist science 
based on feminine values. Likewise, Outram (1987) suggests to feminists that they concen­
trate on the history of the professionalization of science rather than on philosophy. She 
argues that the institution, more than the deep-rooted assumptions of scientific episte­
mology, has precluded the full participation of women in science. Historical accounts in­
deed show that in the past, numbers of women used to be involved in scientific work, but 
only as assistants to their relatives (Alic 1986; Gostzinyi-Ainley 1986; Rosenberg 1982; 
Schiebinger 1987); these accounts alternatively show that a great many, as far back as a 
century ago, proceeded to higher education, although mainly in women’s colleges (Rossiter 
1982; Cott 1986; Delamont 1989). Thus these accounts indicate that the professionalization 
of science was far more favourable to men; the best jobs became a male preserve, and 
tenured positions were almost inobtainable for women. The sole career niches available to 
women were the assistantships, temporary fellowships, and research positions in less presti­
gious research areas such as home economics and botany.
Finally, Koblitz (1987) also opposes the feminist thesis positing that women were 
prevented from working as scientists mainly because the scientific method is inherently 
male* .^ She maintains that "the feminist question in science" should be "concerned less with 
any abstract concept of gender than with overt and covert sexual discrimination, social
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expectations and the socio-political atmosphere" (Koblitz 1987, 403). She judges the idea 
of a feminist epistemology based on feminine values as shortsighted, even caricatural. She 
also indicates that feminists have been wrong in thinking that the "feminine" insight, as it 
might be used in some areas of biology, could be generalized to the whole of science. She 
finally maintains that recourse to intuition and "quasi mystical" scientific insights is not a 
female preserve, but relatively common in stories about renowned scientists, both male and 
female^*.
As previously discussed, the standpoint on feminine values and scientific objectivity 
held by some feminists is at best controversial, at worst shaky. Recent debates among 
feminists indeed show that they have reoriented their reflections and works from the 
perspective of an original contribution to scientific epistemology, to a more pragmatic 
reform, yet original in its theory-building, of biological knowledge about women. The last 
section of this chapter will show that recent feminist reflections on science have indeed 
shifted from the question of a new epistemology to the question of new research agendas. 
At the turn of the 1980s, feminine practice was posited as able to engender new 
methodological and epistemological rules. Ten years later however, realizing that this 
argument was empirically and theoretically unsustainable, several feminists are now 
undertaking to redefine the parameters of a feminist project for the natural sciences.
'The Science Question in Feminism’: A Question of 
Method or a New Research Agenda?
Feminist reflection about science has made a major shift over the last years: instead 
of focusing on methodology or epistemology, it has concentrated its efforts in exploring 
science as a gender-system (or culture) which excludes women scientists and questions of 
interest for women. The works of Keller and Harding, two authors frequently quoted in 
feminist critiques about science, are two prime examples. It is suggested that this recent 
shift in feminism may increase the credibility of feminist attempts to change biology from
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within, and avoid the epistemological pitfalls which have somehow undermined the 
credibility of legitimate sociological concerns defended in projects of feminist biology.
Let us first give an example of the kind of arguments which has left feminist critics 
with unresolved epistemological questions relating to the validity of feminist biological 
theories. The essays of Rosser, a zoologist, illustrate well the predicament with which 
feminists have been confronted.
In a recent article (1988b), Rosser addresses the legitimacy problem involved in the 
full realization of feminist science. She questions whether "good science" could ever be 
value-free, least of all gender-free. She contends that traditional biology has been justly 
criticized for its reductionist and patriarchal approach; and she subscribes to a holistic 
approach in which biology and environment will posit the inclusion of cultural factors in 
explanations of women’s behaviour and aptitudes. With all these arguments, we would 
concur. She also claims, with other feminist biologists, that "we can never know whether 
or not there are real biological differences between males and females because we can 
never separate the biological from the environmental" (ibid., 16). This argument, as 
discussed earlier, is questionable. Finally, Rosser holds that science is, ultimately, 
value-laden; therefore, she is forced to admit that even a potential feminist science is 
value-laden (ibid.). But this does not necessarily mean, as Rosser may incorrectly conclude, 
that it is impossible to legitimize feminist science on the ground that it is truer than any 
other kind of science.
In our view Rosser’s argument is symptomatic of the relativist stance on knowledge 
underlying feminist theories of knowledge inherited from the phenomenological tradition. 
According to these theories, the inescapable role of values in the construction of knowledge 
implies that any type of knowledge, science included, is context-bound, rather than 
universal, and that it can only be judged according to the cultural norms of the society 
which nurtured it (Barnes 1974; Barnes and Bloor 1982; Bloor 1976; Mulkay 1979). The 
flaw in some feminist theories of knowledge, is to feel compelled to reject scientific
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validity altogether (on the ground that science is ultimately value-laden), instead of 
exploring social norms and epistemological rules which may justify it within our present 
scientific context
Keller’s view of science is not primarily inimical to scientific endeavour and the 
epistemological features of objectivity and reason. Her arguments focus mainly on these 
features as they have been culturally and institutionally associated with men and dissociated 
from women (Keller 1985, 1987b). This would explain why women have found it more 
difficult to obtain scientific jobs than men, and why they seemed to have performed less 
well in mathematics and science (1982). In the feminist literature, Keller seems to 
adumbrate the progressive disentanglement of the "feminine" and the "feminist" arguments 
in feminist theories of science (Keller 1983, 1987a)*’. She distinguishes these two argu­
ments, but maintains that both criss-cross the whole gender svstem of science.
The gender system of science encompasses the following social processes: education 
and psychological development, the workplace, decision-making about research agendas, 
and finally the socio-historical construction of epistemological assumptions and the rules 
of scientific method (1987b).
In her article "Feminism and Science" (1982), Keller contended that feminists should
I»
pay particular attention to the historical unfolding of objective knowledge, male psychologi­
cal development, and the ideologies of power and domination. She suggested that 
knowledge in general, and science in particular, serve two gods: on the one hand, power 
and transcendence over nature, on the other hand, a certain view of domination, namely the 
male dominating the female. According to Keller, the view that knowledge could arise from 
a "conversing" between scientific thought and nature has always been undermined by this 
two-fold process (see also Merchant 1982). Drawing from the object-relation theory of 
Winnicott and Klein (see also Flax 1983; J. Sayers 1985) Keller tried to buttress the idea 
that women might have developed a different attitude towards objectivity, the relations 
between nature, society, and science, because they prefer the understanding side of science
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rather than its impulse to control. In this connection, Keller wrote: "In the historical effort 
feminists can bring a whole new range of sensitivities, leading to an equally new 
consciousness of the potentialities lying latent in the scientific project" (1982, 602). She 
concluded that feminist critiques must extend to the foundations of scientific thought and 
distinguish "the objective effort from the objective illusion" which, in the current state of 
science, are features that "belie its claim to universality" (ibid., 594). She summarized her 
view as follows:
In short, rather than abandon the quintessentially human effort to understand the 
world in rational terms, we need to refine that effort. To do this, we need to add to 
the familiar methods of rational and empirical inquiry the additional process of 
critical self-reflection, (ibid.)
In 1983, Keller wrote Life and Work of Barbara McClintock. about the eminent 
biologist who won a Nobel Prize in the 1980s. It is undoubtedly this book which spurred 
controversies and confrontation among feminists about the "feminine" and the "feminist", 
in which one of Keller’s contentions was that "love and feeling" were typical of 
McClintock’s practice and of her scientific reputation. As a result, many feminists believed 
she was giving empirical evidence for a feminist epistemology based on feminine practice.
Keller has clarified her point of view in recent works (1987a, 1987b). She stressed 
that feminist science does not aim to replace science completely, but only to render explicit 
the masculine ideology shaping the scientific understanding of nature and objects in general. 
Shying away from the idea of a "feminine science", Keller started arguing more 
emphatically for a "feminist science" as the standpoint from which a critique of scientific 
scrutiny -  qua androcentric — might be conducted. She stressed that the aim of feminist 
science is to uncover the masculine biases which still remain in science, through the 
"terminology" describing nature and women, and through the patriarchal interests it 
implicitly defends^.
In "The Gender Science System" (1987b) Keller maintained that the story of 
McClintock is a prima facie case of how the science system treats women. McClintock 
was seen as a marginal woman and an eccentric scientist: her scientific work was received
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reluctantly. The way in which McClintock’s work was "re-habilitated” by the 
science-system also illustrates the way feminism is treated by scientists. Keller pointed out 
that feminists were among the first to view McClintock*s work and approach to biology as 
sound; but it was only in retrospect, after McClintock’s "jumping-gene theory" was finally 
considered of prime importance by traditional biologists, that her "style" of practising 
science was finally recognized as valid by the scientific establishment.
In short, Keller does not pretend that the feminine ethos is epistemologically 
qualified as an alternative scientific approach. She merely argues that the feminine relation 
to objects and women’s marginal position within the science-system might both have helped 
to produce certain cognitive patterns which could capture more adequately certain 
experiences in the natural world — as in the case of McClintock. She considers feminist 
science as a critical theory rather than as a comprehensive alternative to current norms of 
scientific practice. Feminist science is a systematic appeal to the fusion of beliefs and 
cognition, facts and values, evidence and subjectivity, all of which should, ultimately, help 
to dissolve the dichotomy feminine practice/ science practice which has historically shaped 
the practice of science and excluded women.
The question at issue, finally, has to do with the meaning of science. 
Although we may now see that science does not simply ’mirror* nature, to say 
instead that it mirrors culture (or ’interests’) is to make a mockery of the 
commitment to the pursuit of the reliable knowledge that lies at the core of 
scientists’ work. It is also to deny the manifest (at times even life-threatening) suc­
cesses of science. Until we can articulate an adequate response to the question of 
how nature interacts with culture in the production of scientific knowledge, working 
scientists will continue to find their more traditional mind-sets more comfortable, 
more adequate. (1987a, 90)
I should like to close this chapter by going over the works of the philosopher 
Harding, a central figure in feminist epistemology. Harding also adumbrates a shift within 
"the feminist question about science", however, in her case, she proceeds from claims about 
a feminist methodology and epistemology to claims about a feminist research agenda. As 
she stressed in her most recent writings (1989, 1990), both ’feminist empiricism* and the 
’feminist standpoint’ emphasize the need for empirical enquiry and theoretical reflexivity
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in the process of knowledge. These two avenues have now paved the way for the 
enunciation of a ’feminist science*: a process whereby the adequacy of analytical tools and 
relevancy of research questions would have to be constantly questioned and revised. As 
such, therefore, Harding is far from renouncing the usefulness of canons of validation 
provided by critical realism. Let us provide here some details.
In 1983, Harding (in Harding and Hintikka) discussed the project of feminist 
epistemology on the basis of a criticism of the three traditions of empiricism, functionalism 
or relativism, and Marxism. In her view the main lacuna in empiricism and relativism is 
their inability to correct their own errors: empiricism does not acknowledge the social 
values involved in thought and representation; relativism does not distinguish "true" from 
"false", nor "bad" from "good" beliefs. As for Marxism, she indicated that it had overlooked 
the sex/gender system in its account of objective contradictions within society. At that stage 
in her reflection about science, however, Harding was still exploring the barriers to the 
emergence of a feminist science; she was not addressing the substantive problems related 
to the viability of a possible feminist epistemology.
In 1986, Harding became more specific. She acknowledged the valuable 
contributions of feminist empiricism and feminist Marxism ("the feminist standpoint"); she 
gave credit, for example, to the works of Doell and Longino as representing feminist empi­
ricism. In contrast to feminist empiricists however, she suggested that current science is not 
merely "bad science", but rather "science as usual" and must, as such, be subjected to more 
profound changes. She did not believe that science could be reformed by means of the 
same methodological rules as traditional science. Harding instead proposed to lay the 
foundations of feminist science in "unstable categories" of analysis such as "gender", "anti 
racism", "anti sexism" (1986a).
In other writings (1986b), she held that "feminist epistemology" must challenge 
male-dominated science by replacing traditional canons of truth by a constant questioning 
of its old certainties. Harding further posited that feminist epistemology must reject the
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three following premises: masculinity-affirming division of labour, assignment of gender 
identities to human infants, and asymmetric meanings of masculinity and feminity in gender 
symbols (or "gender totemism"). In brief, Harding rejected any fixed totalizing theory in 
favour of a multiple system theory. She advanced the idea of a feminist perspective based 
on "unstable categories". As science is facing unique dilemmas, Harding held, the 
framework of "unstable categories" ought to be given a chance as a replacement of 
traditional science.
One might wish, at this point, to question whether Harding was really trying to 
construct a new epistemology, amenable to a workable feminist science, or if, like other 
feminists, she only set out to criticize some theories?^^ The answer to this question emerges 
in her last writings.
In more recent essays, Harding (1987a, 1987b) goes so far as to refute the idea of 
a new feminist methodology. Instead, she accords credit to the more traditional contri­
butions of feminists to science, namely the social sciences. As she notes, these contributions 
arose mainly from qualitative studies and from conceptual innovations in theory-building: 
the qualitative methods have permitted us to centre our attention on women’s personal 
experiences, which have, in feedback, generated new data and research questions. The 
distinctive contribution of feminist science is therefore the "gathering of evidence in 
different ways" (1987a, 25). The originality of feminist science does not lie, initially, in the 
elaboration of a new methodology or a new epistemology; its originality is mainly 
expressed under the form a "distinctive research agenda". Harding writes: "Feminist 
research is distinctive in its focus on gender as a variable and an analytic category, and its 
critical stance toward gender" (ibid., 29).
Several clarifications could be made in relation to Harding’s reflection about 
epistemology. First, Harding did not, in the final analysis, reject feminist empiricism, and, 
in this sense, her position is closer to that of Longino and Doell than she herself claims. 
As a result, she might well have dismissed prematurely the Popperian epistemology as
88
applied to biology and the natural sciences; Popper himself proposed to make a distinction 
between the "worlds" of the critical attitude and argumentative language, and that of 
empirical statements^. For these reasons we contend that feminist science, as described by 
Harding in particular and feminists in general, is not a new scientific epistemology (for it 
still relies on the Popperian critical realist epistemology), but, rather, that it represents a 
distinctive research agenda.
In a similar vein, Longino has tried to define feminist science as "process oriented" 
rather than "content oriented" (Longino 1987). She believes that feminist science is basical­
ly a process of criticism rather than a theory-building framework; it is "practice rather than 
content". She thus makes an appeal not for a "feminist science" in the first place, but rather 
for "doing science as a feminist" (ibid., 53. See also Longino 1989). Taking criticisms of 
biology as an example, she holds that one of her aims as a feminist critic of science has 
been to draw attention to the influence of culture on human behaviour. This would suggest 
that feminist science can successfully alter scientific knowledge when it is basically 
concerned with the reconceptualization of, for instance, human behaviour and gender. 
However, while I concur that feminist science essentially is a critical outlook on 
gender-related theories, I do believe that it may also be content-oriented, as a review of 
certain feminist contributions to primatology and evolution has shown.
I should like, finally, to highlight a flaw in the feminist reflection about science 
stemming from a generalization of feminist criticisms of biology directed toward the whole 
of scientific epistemology. I suggest, in this connection, that as long as feminists will not 
distinguish between the various teleological genres which constitute the various types of 
biological explanations; or will not distinguish between the "world" of rational explanation 
and the "world" of sense-datum^^, subjective experience and emotions, the feminist 
challenge to biology will not be taken seriously by practising biologists or epistemologists.
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Conclusion
I have endeavoured to show that if it might prove intellectually sound to try to 
translate the norms of feminine practice as norms for scientific research^, the former cannot 
replace the latter altogether, least of all as the canons of a ’new* scientific epistemology. 
It may be reasonable to contend that some norms and skills can be adapted directly from 
the family context, for instance, to the functioning of a research team; but it does not seem 
reasonable to maintain that all specific norms of science could be so translated. Therein lies 
the limitation to an application of the "caring approach" to scientific research. I believe, 
along with philosophers as diverse as Popper, Habermas, and Hesse, that scientific 
knowledge is demarcated from common sense, intuition, empathy, emotion; science rests 
on a rational method of logical inferences by which explanatory statements can be assessed 
or challenged upon empirical evidence.
I have propounded the idea that feminist projects of biology have, until recently, 
been devised on the basis of unfortunate confusions between ’feminine inclinations’ (moral 
and emotional) and epistemological canons of justification. I would now suggest that these 
confusions might have taken place partlv because of the dual status of biological 
explanations (which Longino & Doell have tried to expound in their article of 1983). That 
is, biology may sometimes features aspects resembling those of behavioural inquests and 
the hermeneutic method, and at other times, aspects more similar to those of physics, 
chemistry, and the empirico-analytical sciences.
I should however stress that feminist theoreticians were right in two respects: first, 
that the "empirical underdetermination of scientific theories" is the condition of possibility 
for their critiques of male-biased biology; secondly, that feminine subjectivity (as rooted 
in women’s shared experiences of life as a social group) may be conceived of as a platform 
for conceptually original theory-building in human biology, including the formulation of 
research questions, the elaboration of observational designs, and the interpretation of results.
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The reason for this, I would suggest, is two-fold. First, the validation of scientific 
explanations in biology does not respond to only one set of canons, but to a two-tiered set 
of epistemological values which do not equally fit the diverse types of phenomena explored 
in behavioural studies and in the physical sciences. There are models of explanation which 
seem specific to biology, in which the background knowledge and underlying values that 
enter theory-building (relating to lower organisms but more particularly to higher 
organisms) are more directly influenced by ideologies about the social order than it is the 
case in physics or chemistry by comparison. Secondly, there are rational norms of 
explanation (such as coherence and empirical inferences) which scientists cannot dispense 
with in science, primarily because they are the guidelines which precisely distinguish error 
from falsehood and inadequate from acceptable assumptions in theory-building. In 
observation-based disciplines however, such as human and social studies and parts of 
biology, these guidelines are difficult to comply with, primarily because of the ontological 
character of the subject matters in these fields of studies. This constitutes, I would suggest, 
the epistemological and sociological context that has nurtured the clash between patriarchal 
and feminist theories in some areas of biology, and might also give rise to a fully-fledged 
feminist biology within the confines of mainstream human biology and critical realism. We 
shall refer to Habermas and Hesse to illustrate this point in the next chapter.
Biology involves itself with both the epistemological controversies of the social 
sciences and the technical power endowed to the physical sciences. This dual nature of 
biology is a common feature in its history, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4. I have 
suggested that the type of epistemological and methodological issues feminists have 
addressed is not very remote from those that one may find in the history of biology. Causal 
models of explanation and structural determinism are epistemological categories that even 
the ’softer’ disciplines of biology have relied on, only perhaps with more caution and 
sophistication. We shall refer to Gellner to argue this point further.
In short, the epistemological problematic created by the peculiar status of biological
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explanations seems to substantially contribute to the clash between establishment biology 
and feminist critiques of biology. On the other hand, this also renders possible the 
vindication of projects of ’feminist biology’ from within the confines of this science and 
without effecting drastic changes in the basic canons of scientific justification. Chapters 3 
and 4 will explore the epistemological and historical features linked to the practice of 
biology, bearing in mind the central question of this thesis: what are the epistemological 
and sociological conditions of possibility for constructing a ’feminist biology’ as such.
Endnotes
1) For a critical review of these epistemological issues in feminist theory, see 
Hawkesworth (1989).
2) Marxist feminism is not a homogeneous body of theory. The relationship between 
class and gender is not analyzed in the same way by radical or culturalist Marxists, for 
instance. (See Oakley 1982; Mitchell and Oakley 1986; Moi 1987; Walby 1990.) It is 
reasonable to think however, that as critics of science, Marxist feminists share roughly the 
same views in their analysis of the patriarchal system of science.
3) Kirkup (1986) and Stacey (1988) highlighted the limitations of a feminist 
epistemology based on "feminine" values for the social sciences, arguing that this 
perspective posits the use of methods of observation and interaction which would, in fact, 
serve inadequately research on certain types of problems. For instance, a feminist approach 
oriented towards the cooperation and sharing of experiences between the observer and the 
observed appears rather inappropriate if the observer has to accommodate with subjects who 
are either unwilling to cooperate, or who might conceivably be dishonest in their responses.
4) I am borrowing the argument from the analyses of Habermas, Hesse and Gellner 
which are discussed in chapter 3.
5) For instance. Fee points out that the production of knowledge, instead of being 
dissociated from its social uses, should be construed as an act of prime social responsibility. 
A solution in terms of more social responsibility of scientists presupposes a complicated 
process, the principles of which Fee does not even theoretically discuss. This issue about 
modem science has been debated for a protracted period of time (See Barnes 1985; 
Medawar 1985; Passmore 1978; Ravetz 1971).
6) This notion is borrowed from Gellner (1974).
7) In my view, this is, at best, an inconsistent, at worst, an indefensible argument.
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It is inconsistent, because Fee has just argued that one should replace the spurious 
objectivity of science by social values such as "non-domination", "non-exploitation", 
"respect of nature", and "social responsibility" (in Fee 1983). It is indefensible, because it 
is o ^  for a feminist committed to the social responsibility of scientists to suggest the 
consideration of "criteria of science" by "playing" with ideas. It seems, indeed, an inapprop­
riate method of solving a serious problem, especially for someone who so strenuously 
criticized the very casualness with which scientists currently handle their social res­
ponsibility.
8) This is not to say that the physical sciences have never faced internal debates in 
relation to theory-building. In fact, several biologists interviewed for this research suggested 
that theoretical physics, for example, is heavily speculative, the epitome of scientific 
imagination, while parts of biology, such as molecular biology, do not so much rely on 
interpretive power. See chapter 6. 1 would suggest that the values predicating theories in 
physics have been far less frequently directly subjected to social and political issues 
compared to those of biology and human studies. See the historical accounts in Capra 
(1983), and Mendelsohn (1977), and the epistemological essays of Hesse (1980a) and Gould 
(1985).
9) Renowned scientists such as Lonsdale (1970) have also deplored the traditional 
upbringing of girls as not conducive to science and technology-oriented activities (See also 
Haber 1979; Richter 1982; J. Harding 1986).
10) See, for the field of biology in particular, Abir-Am (1982a, 1982b), Murphy 
(1980), and Rossiter (1982).
11) The importance of both consciousness-raising, and the role of subjective 
experiences as research insights, are certainly among the most typical features of a 
phenomenological feminist theory of knowledge. See British Sociological Association 1987; 
Glennon 1979; Jaggar and Bordo 1989; Oakley 1981; Sabrosky 1979; Spender 1980,1983; 
Stanley and Wise 1983).
12) The slogan "the personal is political" and the rise of "consciousness-raising" 
groups for women are important features of this concern of feminists.
13) Unsurprisingly, Andersen’s examples in this case are drawn from the life scien­
ces, namely the subjects related to sexual differences in behaviour, evolution, reproductive 
technologies, and women’s health (Andersen 1987).
14) In this connection, Simeone’s small-scale study with academic women (twenty 
respondents) (1987), for instance, shows that only a few women disengage totally with 
feminism in a rather hostile way, while equal numbers respond either positively, without 
any qualification, or else with some reservations as to whether they would call themselves 
feminists. Overall, the majority of women was described as seeking the reconstitution of 
the career model of academia according to a full integration to women’s culture and social 
position. These women are typically "doing research on women-related topics, forming 
alliances with female colleagues and students, becoming involved with women’s concerns 
on campus, and playing a nontraditional role with respect to marriage and family" (ibid.,
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97). They will also, more characteristically than other women, identify overtly with 
feminism. Given the sample of Simeone however, this tends to more accurately reflect the 
situation of social science scholars rather than natural scientists. See the results of the 
present study in chapter 6 for a comparison with Simeone’s conclusions.
15) Although Jaeger appears more knowledgeable as to the complexities of the 
scientific processes of discovery and justification, she seems, in my view, to neglect the 
existence of gaps between the principles and the actual practice of science, gaps which 
feminists, for their part, have tended to overstate.
16) The Nobel Prize winner, Lonsdale (Lonsdale 1970) also spoke along these lines 
as early as the initial years of the 1970s.
17) In this regard, the views of Fausto-Sterling and of Messing, for example, are 
symptomatic of a malaise among feminist biologists and critics of science. They contend 
that it is unsound (if not even dangerous) to think that "feminine" social practice is 
co-extensive with "feminist" science. They persist, however, in attributing a central role to 
women in the genesis of a feminist science, and also to denouncing the hierarchical 
structure of science in favour of a more cooperative, "woman-friendly" working milieu. 
Interviews with A. Fausto-Sterling (Montreal, May 23,1989); and of K. Messing (Montreal, 
May 31, 1989) by the author. See also the essays of the neurophysiologist Donna Mergler 
"Les différentes attitudes développées par les femmes de science dans leur travail" in 
Cahiers de I’ACFAS. no. 22 (Montreal: ACFAS/ Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1983), 
and "La science au masculin: réflexions d’une scientifique sur ’A l’école des sciences’" 
in Resources for Feminist Research 15, 3 (November 1983).
18) See, for example, the positions of some eminent biologists. In Chargaff 1978; 
Luria 1985; Watson 1968; Olby 1974.
19) This is reflected in the debates surrounding her book on Barbara McClintock 
(Keller 1983) at the Joint Conference of the British Society for the History of Science and 
the History of Science Society (BSHS/HSS) held in July 1988 in Manchester, where Keller 
was asked to defend her point of view on feminist science. See BSHS/HSS Proceedings 
(1988).
20) In "Women Scientists and Feminist Critics of Science" (1987a), Keller expresses 
how she experienced a shift from mind-set as a woman scientist to mind set as a feminist 
critic. There are three major steps in that shift: they are, an identification with the women’s 
movement; recourse to psychoanalysis, that is, to the ideas that "the personal is political" 
and that beliefs have an influence on other forms of cognition; and finally, an integration 
of one’s experience of motherhood and scientific work. Keller indicates that only 
subsequent to such a shift of mind-sets "did it become possible to raise the questions in 
what I came to think of as their proper form — as questions not about the remaking of 
science from the perspective of ’women’s vision and creativity’ but about the simultaneous 
remaking of our conceptions of men, women, and science" (ibid., 89).
21) Walby (1990) also questions Harding’s views on the same lines.
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22) Popper (1972) distinguishes "three worlds" in epistemology: the world of 
sense-datum and experiences, the world of theory and ideas, and the ’social’ world in which 
ideas about reality are transmitted, discussed and challenged.
23) Longino has adopted a more pragmatic position (as noted in chapter 1). She 
recently reiterated her perspective on feminist science and epistemology (Longino 1987, 
1989), stating that, in the first instance, one always needs to choose some descriptive point 
of view about objects: this is a necessary condition for cognitive statements. Critical 
discussion, as necessary as it might be in the "progress of knowledge", does not provide 
any operational framework or structure which describes or explains objects. The critical 
standpoint only helps to choose (among cognitive goals or descriptions of events) which 
are to be accepted as conforming to certain aims (rationally selected and discussed) and the 
experiences of the sense. Other feminists (Alcoff 1987; Fee 1985; Flax 1987; Hawkesworth 
1989; Saarinen 1988) have recently argued that, as science makes theory-choices, feminism 
must also make theory choices in the development of feminist science. It is suggested, 
however, that such choices would include rethinking definitions of truth and the legitimacy 
of scientific knowledge.
24) Similar attempts have been made to transfer the norms of domestic work to 
those of bureaucratic management (Millman and Moss Kanter, 1975). But these are now 
regarded as misguided (Ferguson 1984).
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENTIATING MODELS OF EXPLANATION, VALUE-ASSERTIONS IN 
THEORY-BUILDING, AND CANONS OF VALIDATION IN 
HUMAN AND NATURAL SCIENCES
The critical undertaking of feminists in relation to biological science owes a lot to 
a post-positivist sociology of knowledge. This sociological framework constitutes the 
background through which a critique of the natural sciences, methods and theories is made 
possible.
During the first third of this century the natural sciences were still seen as the sole 
form of scientific knowledge capable of reaching a true, objective, and context-free 
understanding of the world. But they became subjected to a sociological critique, as greater 
numbers of philosophers finally agreed, in the aftermath of unsuccessful attempts by logical 
positivists to establish foundations of a universally true knowledge (as totally based on an 
observational verification independent of the prejudices or representations of the world of 
the knowing subject), that any scientific theory was "empirically underdetermined" 
(Chalmers 1982; Habermas 1974, 1976; Halfpenny 1982; Harding 1976; Hesse 1980a, 
1980b; Hodson 1982).
It was believed that sociological factors, pertaining either to the micro-system of 
scientific institutions, or to the macro-system of social structures, could partly explain not 
only why a given theory or hypothesis would come into existence, but also how *a 
rationale’ for the establishment of norms of justification of scientific theories was settled.
In this chapter we will be concerned in large part with questions relating to the 
legitimation of knowledge and the justification of theories, but also to the logic of discovery 
(or origins of scientific hypotheses). We will refer to the latter in chapter 4 as we discuss 
biology proper and suggest that some epistemological features of human biology might
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invite more readily to the idea of a ’feminist biology’ based on ’women’s shared life 
experiences’. With respect to feminist critiques of biology, this chapter will address the 
following issues: first, is it reasonable to assume that among societal factors affecting the 
production of scientific knowledge, all are patriarchy-laden, that is, reflecting the values and 
norms of a patriarchal power structure? Alternately, can some of these values and 
conditions also be applicable to a feminist biology? In brief, are there any scientific norms 
and epistemological canons which could predicate the production and validation of both 
"patriarchal" and "feminist" biological theories?
Secondly, is it sound to apply indiscriminately a socio-ciitical blueprint to all 
disciplines, be they part of the social, physical or life sciences? Rather, should one assume 
that the different types of objects found in these diverse disciplines (e.g. animateAnanimate; 
living/non-living, human/non-human) lend themselves to different models of explanation 
which do not bear directly on social and political ideologies and conflicts? Is it not more 
legitimate and sound to seek to distinguish these models on the ground that each involves 
more or less immediately controversial social values and evaluative judgements relating to 
sex and gender roles, for example? Is it not so that the objects of study in diverse 
disciplines might require different methods and conceptual approaches in order to be 
properly explained?
All these questions do not seem to be properly examined or even addressed in the 
feminist literature about scientific knowledge. I shall suggest, however, that some useful 
insights into the analysis of the "sociological dynamics of change" in the natural sciences, 
as reflected in the emergence of a feminist biology, are likely to derive from the works of 
philosophers with an interest for a sociology of scientific knowledge such as Habermas, 
Hesse, and Gellner. In their attempts to undercut the strongly discursive and intersubjective 
perspectives on science of numbers of feminists, these authors might have reinstated the 
sociological and epistemological bases needed to explain (on grounds other than merely 
political) why certain feminist biological theories have gained (and might gain more) credit
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in the views of "mainstream biologists".
Sociologies of Scientific Knowledge
Early sociologies of knowledge, like those of, for instance, Comte, Marx, Dilthey, 
Durkheim, Gramsci and Mannheim, seemed to be committed to the idea of an objective 
method for the social sciences. They were all seeking an universal point of view on the 
social world (in Bauman 1978; Bernstein 1983; Bleicher 1982; Giddens 1976; Hamilton 
1974; Hekman 1986; Larrain 1983; Mannheim 1952; Outhwaite 1975) capable of freeing 
itself from social biases, and emulating methods of the natural sciences. For several, the 
method produced in the natural sciences eschewed the influence of social ideologies, 
generating universally true knowledge, and could thus provide objective foundations for a 
study of society. Marxist historical and dialectical materialism looms large in that 
connection. They had much trouble however, in reconciling a framework of causal 
determination with the principle of historical changes (see also Jay 1986; Popper 1957). 
For this reason, they seemed to have turned to teleological models in their explanations of 
social changes.
On the other hand, hermeneuticians endeavoured to develop a distinctive method for 
human and social studies. They suggested that, as humans were animate creatures, endowed 
with volition, motivation and symbolic expressions, they presented a peculiar problem for 
knowledge, in comparison to objects in the natural sciences. Human beings cannot be 
"explained", as hermeneuticians would say. They can only be "understood" with reference 
to the cultural context in which they live and communicate; their meaningful expressions 
can only be "interpreted" in their context. Having made a point for the specificity of human 
and cultural objects however, the idea of establishing an objective method for the study of 
context-bound action and intersubjective communication was to remain the source of heated 
debate among phenomenologists and hermeneuticians.
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The sociologies of knowledge developed more recently have addressed the 
questions of how knowledge is constituted not only in the social sciences, but also in the 
observational and experimental-based disciplines of the natural sciences. The aftermath of 
the failed project of logical positivists was to provide epistemological conditions for what 
was to be called in the 1970s the "strong programme in the sociology of knowledge" 
(Barnes 1974; Bloor 1976), setting out analyses of the substantive content of "true" 
knowledge in the natural sciences. Yet there is great diversity in the frameworks of a 
"social construction" of scientific knowledge being developed on this basis.
Sociologists of science, therefore, began to criticize the natural sciences directly^ 
but several philosophers of science, like Popper (1959, 1969, 1970, 1972), Lakatos (1970) 
and Hempel (1966) (to name only the most renowned) were still committed to the idea of 
a progress of scientific knowledge. They subscribed to a form of empiricism as the 
epistemological conditions of true knowledge, which, although weaker than in logical positi­
vism, remained crucial as part of the conditions of possibility for the validation of theories. 
They were, however, challenged by both philosophers and sociologists of science like Kuhn 
(1970a, 1970b), Habermas (1970, 1974) and Feyerabend (1975). (See also in Lakatos and 
Musgrave 1970.)
Among the sociologists conceiving of science as primarily discursive, there are those 
inspired directly by Wittgenstein (in Winch 1958; Wilson 1970) such as the social 
constructionist Gergen (1982); but like Gergen’s views, these seem, however, to apply more 
directly to behavioural studies. Other sociologists, like Schütz (1962) and Berger and 
Luckmann (1967), were influenced more specifically by the phenomenology of Scheler 
(1980) (see also Gurvitch 1966). Schütz for instance, developed a theory of types of 
knowledge ("cognitive styles") where people construct their representations of reality 
intersubjectively, and where the influence of the context at hand and the psychological 
pressures of peers ("inner group attitudes") are of prime importance in the production and 
legitimation of knowledge.
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This perspective, in turn, seems to have influenced social constructionists interested 
in the analysis of how the social context shapes the production of knowledge in natural 
sciences as such. Among the sociologists representative of this approach, are Barnes (1974, 
1985), Collins (1985), Mulkay (1979), Knorr-Cetina (1981), and Latour & Woolgar (1979). 
This approach was however criticized for not accommodating in its logic, a significant role 
for the empirical rules of justification (Hesse 1986; Harré 1983; Lukes 1982). Also 
inspired by phenomenology, ethnomethodologists were far more radical, adopting a lin­
guistically-oriented approach to scientific practice (Garfinkel 1967; Lynch 1982,1988). All 
these perspectives seem to vindicate a "strong programme in the sociology of knowledge", 
that is to say a programme of sociological analysis of knowledge produced in the natural 
sciences which states that sociology does not have to be confined to the investigation of 
scientific errors alone, but can also analyze how scientific truths and criteria of justification 
are established (see Barnes 1974; Barnes and Bloor 1982; Bloor 1976).
The inspiration of three other traditions in the sociology of knowledge seem to 
emerge more strongly in the works of feminist critics of science. First, one should notice 
the intellectual inheritance of Marxism and the Frankfurt School. One of the main ideas 
propounded by the School is that facts are never separated from values (hence from 
ideologies or social beliefs) epistemologically (Habermas 1974; Malherbe 1976; Ray 1979). 
Such an idea is reflected clearly not only in the feminist criticisms of "patriarchal biology", 
but also in the appeal for a feminist science as "more humane", "aware of its own biases" 
and "publicly committed" to feminist goals.
Secondly, there is a marked influence of Foucault’s deconstructionism. The stance 
in which feminists have undertaken to challenge the authority of "patriarchal and androcen­
tric science" reflects this. Foucault defended a view (although more especially for social and 
clinical sciences) which posits knowledge as the end-product of social practices oriented 
towards power and control (Foucault 1972, 1980)\
Finally, the Kuhnian outlook on scientific paradigms looms large in the works of
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early feminist critics of science. This outlook, less connected to the social system as a 
whole than to the scientific system as such (thus, much less radical than Feyerabend’s 
views, for example), posited that concepts, instruments and knowledge are all theory-laden 
(Kuhn 1970a, 1970b). As a result, one ought to get out of a "paradigm" (like the "andro­
centric" paradigm of biology) in order to introduce new scientific questions and to vindicate 
new theories.
Inspired by these intellectual traditions, feminists embarked on their critique of 
science on the principle that neither science or epistemology are secured against sociolo­
gical investigation. As we have shown earlier, this means that from a feminist view, it was 
possible to scrutinize the basis of validity of biological theories on the premise that these 
had been developed within a patriarchal society and an androcentric science. Feminists 
believed that biological theories were sexist and flawed with respect to women in particular, 
and with respect to human beings and living forms in general. But they did not limit their 
critique to the unveiling of patriarchal and androcentric biases; they also endeavoured to 
eradicate these biases from the process of validation of theories, thus renewing biology 
as a whole -  its approach and its canons of scientific proof. In other words, a renewal of 
the research agenda, the conceptual framework, the method, and the epistemology, were all 
necessary.
As useful as they may be, sociologies of knowledge have often been criticized for 
creating more problems than solutions. Studies conducted in terms of a relativism (or 
"relationism", to use Mannheim’s terminology (1936)) between forms of knowledge, for 
instance, were seen as rich in empirical content (see in Wilson 1970; and Hollis and Lukes 
1982). It was also argued, however, that relativism generated more problems (for a 
legitimate analysis of the social aspects of knowledge) than solutions with regard to the 
inescapable social embeddedness of human knowledge, as Gellner insisted (Gellner 1974, 
1982). Moreover, relativism was seen as dismissing too hastily the utility of certain 
"quasi-universai" notions (like principles of logic such as identity and contradiction).
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notions which made it possible to distinguish, rationally, valid from invalid inferences 
(Lukes 1970, 1982; Hollis and Lukes 1982).
Discourse analysis and Foucauldian deconstructionism, were considered useful for 
highlighting the presence of covert ideologies or power struggles in the sanction of 
metaphors, assumptions, models, hypotheses, and conclusive evidence. They also led, 
however, to an overstating of the power of language on our representations of reality 
(Mortensen 1986; Hawkesworth 1989).
Finally, phenomenology, as useful as it may be for identifying the agents and social 
pressures involved in the construction of knowledge, tended to blur the demarcation 
between common-sense, metaphysical knowledge and science — or other types of 
knowledge produced by means of rational argumentation and validation.
Feminists (as we noticed in Part I) have used the critical categories of analysis 
provided by the three foregoing schools of thought; but these traditions did not seem to 
serve them well, as far as empirical science was concerned. Not only did feminists think 
their own argument for a "better" and "truer" biology was somewhat self-defeating; it did 
even not render justice to the view that women’s oppression was real, and feminist theories 
of women’s biology, a "truer" understanding of social reality. While I agree, to an extent, 
with the powerful insight secured by "feminine inter-subjectivities", the caring approach, 
or "empathie listening" as methods of investigation in the social sciences, on the other hand, 
I am reluctant to subscribe to the notion of a new epistemology based on the "subjective" 
and the "caring" for both the social and the biological sciences.
It, thus, seems worthwhile to have a look at the works of authors like Habermas, 
Hesse, and Gellner, in order to isolate the analytical flaws and contradictions, and also the 
promising avenues of action, in the feminist critiques of biology and natural science. For 
Habermas, Hesse and Gellner have all been interested in understanding how the social 
context shapes the representations which individuals or larger groups have of the world they 
inhabit, and also in the investigation of the social norms sustaining diverse types of
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’cognitive interests’, and rational procedures of validation of knowledge.
We shall address the following questions which are problematic in the feminist 
attempts to build a new biology. First, was it necessary to aim at renewing epistemology 
altogether in order to vindicate feminist biological theories? Or was it enough to use the 
Popperian model of the critical attitude^? Here Habermas will help us qualify our answer. 
Secondly, is it appropriate to use discourse analysis for both the critique of "androcentric" 
and "patriarchal" knowledge and the construction of new knowledge? Similarly, is it 
appropriate to use discourse analysis to the same extent for both social and natural 
sciences? Here there seem to be two qualifications, with which Hesse provides us\ On the 
one hand, social values do not enter theory-building as directly in the social and the natural 
sciences, and these values should be criticized individually rather than indiscriminately. On 
the other hand, but in the same regard, biology seems to lie astride the social and the 
physical sciences; sometimes it raises social controversies similar to those in the human 
and social sciences, but at other times, similar to those in the physical sciences. Thirdly, 
is it necessary to reject determinist or structural models of explanation in human biology, 
in favour of historical or teleological models? Is it necessary to abandon the reductionist 
method in favour of hermeneutics or a socio-critique? On this point, Hesse and Gellner 
shed light on the epistemological status of biological theories enabling us to draw a 
comparison with the status of feminist biological theories.
We shall argue in the rest of chapter 3 that the influence of sociological factors on 
the production and validation of scientific theories does not extend uniformly to all the 
physical and human sciences. In chapter 4, we will pay special attention to biology. We 
will try to illustrate its specificity among the sciences, through a brief examination of its 
epistemological, historical and sociological dimensions. This should help us put forward the 
idea that biology is a corpus of theories which borrows from both the natural 
(empirico-analytical) sciences and the human (hermeneutic and discursive) studies 
methodological and conceptual tools which lend themselves to internal disputes relating to
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methods of testing hypotheses and theoretical models of explanations. As a consequence 
one should be cautious of the way one cites examples from some biological disciplines and 
then generalizes those examples to a critique of biology as a whole. The sociological and 
epistemological grounds for the critical study of feminist biology will thereby be laid out; 
thus we shall be ready to examine the empirical studies in Part IE of this thesis.
Some Elements which Differentiate Models of 
Explanation and Canons of Validation 
in the Human and Physical sciences
Exercising a "critical attitude" in science may suggest different courses of action: 
a discussion of scientific discourse and research agendas in terms of their moral facets, their 
technical value, or even of their aesthetic content, or could revolve around the question of 
the logical "fitness" of structural, teleological, or interpretative explanations vis-à-vis 
empirical observations. In turn, possibly one should be able to delimit the potency of these 
’critical judgements’ by assessing if they describe the objects and are more or less relevant 
to the issue of which type of understanding one wishes to attain about these objects. In 
short, it is necessary, for purpose of a rational and critical argumentation about science to 
discern which types of "value goals" (of the social and the natural sciences), to use Hesse’s 
terminology, are discussed. In this regard, Habermas and Hesse will suggest that there are 
certain substantial differences in the approaches to theory-building of the human and the 
natural sciences, even though the two are predicated by social values and ’cognitive 
interests’ in the first instance.
The natural sciences deal with inert objects. It is reasonable to construe inert objects 
as if they were stripped from intentions underlying a structure which determines the process 
by which "they work". This stance on knowledge is suited to the purposes of discerning 
the factors responsible for the repetitive pattern displayed by certain phenomena and objects 
in nature. In this sense, objective knowledge is attained by means of a consensus about the
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type of cause-effect structures identified through observation and control, and ultimately 
through repeatable occurrences of the same pattern in given conditions. Criteria of empirical 
validation can thus be used pragmatically according to technical success. Yet the use of 
technologies implemented by physical science, for example, remains a normative issue 
which cannot be validated by the criteria of technical or experimental success (Habermas 
1970, 1974).
In the social sciences no such distinction between technical success and social — or 
moral — norms seems appropriate^. Unless human beings really become totally coerced by 
social norms, automatons, or, worse, completely alienated^, understanding of other human 
beings is believed to lie in a different dynamic altogether. Human beings are posited to be 
"conditioned" rather than determined by structural factors. Human behaviours are 
occurrences which seem more singular than repeatable, under "normal conditions". "Being" 
and "becoming" are two features of human phenomena which should never allow science 
to objectify "human" subject matters in terms of biological determinism or mechanistic 
metaphors of behaviour. If so, explanations may not only lose in richness but also in 
accuracy.
Both types of subject matters in the natural and the social sciences underline 
different sorts of representations about the patterns observed, which fit (more or less) that 
with which we endow them. Yet, this implies that observation constitutes the arbiter 
between true and false representations of the world; and this is where Gellner’s reflection 
is most helpful. It distinguishes between two "planes", or stages, in scientific thought: 
selecting information and modelling explanation. It also implies that certain norms or values 
(like "experiences" and sensations) are very fruitful as selectors of information but empty 
as explanations, while others convey a limited view of the world and at the same time, 
manageable new explanatory insights (like the machine metaphor).
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Habermas's Framework of Three Epistemologies
The contribution of Habermas to epistemology and to the sociology of knowledge 
is considerable. Habermas has, since the early 1960s, been developing a critique of the 
conditions of possibility of rational argumentation in the construction of human welfare. His 
endeavour is to establish links between cognitive, linguistic, social, and moral conditions 
of knowledge and human interaction in order to lay the grounds for universal pragmatics 
(Habermas 1976, 1978; also in Bernstein 1983, 1986; Giddens 1976; Mortensen 1986; 
Thompson 1984).
Modem Society, Rationality, 
and Instrumental Knowledge
Habermas is concerned with the evolution of social trends and their relation to 
knowledge and science. His main interest is to understand how and why contemporary 
social life has been unfolding towards the rationalization of values, as Weber (1968; also 
in Bauman 1978) had foreseen. He is also concerned with the dehumanization and 
alienation of humanity, which seems to have lost a genuine understanding of itself and of 
its destiny.
Habermas suggests that it is not so much the implementation of natural sciences and 
technologies which are endangering the quality of modem life. What is far more dangerous 
is the collapse of critical judgment about social decisions and norms, a degeneration to 
criteria of technical success®. In modem industrial societies, for example, technical progress 
is believed to conduce to social welfare without relying on partisan policies or social 
values. Rationality is constmed as instmmental knowledge which serves the purposes of 
decision making (Habermas 1970,1978). Paradoxically however, as political bureaucracies 
and economic systems develop, they must also allocate more resources to restrain the 
release of artistic, creative, and communicative forces of social movements which are
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developing within the cultural system. This produces a crisis of legitimacy and rationality, 
which shows that instrumentality remains dominant but does not altogether stifle social cri­
ticism. In other words, scientific instrumentality and technologies uniquely foster critical 
movements within their own technocratic culture and language.
Human Interests and Forms of Knowledge
It is in Knowledge and Human Interests (1976) that Habermas developed his 
framework of three epistemologies. These correspond to three types of human interests: in­
strumental, hermeneutic, and critical (or emancipatory). The three epistemologies refer to 
three usages of language: descriptive (of facts), postulatory (of rules of procedure), and 
critical (justifying decisions) (Habermas 1974,216). The necessary conditions of social life 
cannot escape any of the following: technical production, a social project, and rationality 
by means of free communication ("universal pragmatics").
Habermas first defines the epistemology of empirical-analytical research: it is based 
on systematic observations, and underwrites the possibility of a correspondence between 
theory and experience. Cognitively, this epistemology is based on a technical interest in 
’feedback-controlled activity’: it is instrumental rather than functions as an hermeneutic. 
From this perspective, causal hypotheses are developed in anticipation of law-like 
regularity. Anticipation or decisions made in order to accept or reject basic empirical 
statements are not based on inductive logic alone however, but also on institutional rules 
focused on what is considered to be a reasonable explanation and an acceptable inductive 
inference. This type of epistemology applies to the natural and physical sciences, but it 
applies also to a large part of the human sciences and psychology.
Hermeneutics forms the second epistemology in Habermas’s framework. The 
guiding cognitive principle is the practical import of understanding fellow human beings, 
the meanings and motives of their action and speech. In hermeneutics, objectivity presup-
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poses that the subjects under study are speaking honestly and self-consciously (Habermas 
1976, 1984). Consensus on the terms of speech and communication is the sole guarantee 
of a successful understanding between the hermeneutician and his/her subjects. This type 
of epistemology applies generally to the human sciences and psychoanalysis. It cannot 
purport to replace the model of cognition used in empirico-analytical sciences, partly be­
cause it does not have the same goals. Habermas argues that the success of technical 
applications has falsely created the illusion that pragmatic success is "truth", and that it is 
the values of science, as only possibly interpreted by hermeneutics, which can highlight 
this fact.
Finally, a third epistemology is oriented towards criticism and emancipation. It
forms the argumentative basis for the selection of norms acting as "validation" criteria. It
thus differs from the epistemologies of empirico-analytical research and of
hermeneutically-oriented sciences inasmuch as it is "the dimension of comprehensive
rationality which, although incapable of ultimate substantiation, develops in a circle of
reflective self-justification" (Habermas 1974,212). Criticism overcomes the dualism of facts
and values by translating logical constraints into empirical constraints, and vice-versa. It
provides the cognitive continuum between technical decisions and logical deductions.
Habermas summarizes as follows.
Critical argumentation differentiates itself from deductive argumentation in 
progressing beyond the dimensions of the logical connection of statements 
and includes a moment which transcends language-outlooks. A relationship 
of implication between outlooks and statements is impossible: outlooks can­
not be deduced from statements nor, vice-versa, statements from outlooks. 
Nevertheless agreement upon a mode of procedure and the acceptance of a 
rule can be supported or weakened with arguments; at any rate, it can be 
rationally considered and judged. This is the task of critique with reference 
to both practical and metatheorctical decisions. (1974, 209-10)
Habermas has prepared the ground for an analytical distinction between technical
rules, hermeneutic rules, and socio-criticism in order to show that these three sets of rules
are entrenched in social values, but, also, ultimately, amenable to a rational discussion
from the perspective of universal pragmatics. It reinstates the ultimate importance of
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communication and speech (interaction), and technical success (work) — the two poles of 
social life and knowledge. We cannot favour technical interests at the expense of 
hermeneutic understanding, for human life is about work and interaction.
Habermas’s framework sheds some light on the positive role of values in 
knowledge, and on the adequacy of diverse testing procedures in science. Explanations in 
the natural sciences are largely tested against their technical success, juxtaposed with 
explanations in the social sciences. Habermas also warns against a dangerous collapse of 
the goals of hermeneutics and socio-critique in favour of technological success. Knowledge 
remains subjected ultimately to critical evaluation; a total separation of facts and values 
is therefore epistemologically spurious.
Habermas has been criticized primarily for his failure to refer to substantive aspects 
of power (Giddens 1976; Larrain 1983; Bernstein 1983,1986; Mortensen 1986), irrespective 
of gender or racial divisions in society. Basically he investigates the levels and conditions 
of possibility of valid knowledge but does not ultimately confront the actual clashes of 
values (Bernstein 1983, 1986). In this sense, his framework becomes too cultural and not 
sufficiently political or economic, in contrast to Foucault and the feminists.
How and when are we, in practice, to discount technical success in favour of 
hermeneutical or critical goals much as feminists have tended to do emphatically in their 
justification of a feminist biology? This is what Hesse and Gellner will help us clarify.
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Value-goals in Science: the Special Status of 
the Pragmatic Criterion in the Sciences
In her book Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Mary 
Hesse expounds the historical role of "pragmatic criterion" in the "modification of the 
traditional empirical criteria of confirmation and falsifiability" in an empiricist philosophy 
of science (Hesse 1980a, 190).
A Historical View on Scientific Epistemology and 
Empirical Knowledge: the * Success Story* of 
the Pragmatic Criterion
Hesse acknowledges that natural science has accumulated empirical knowledge. This 
should not be seen in terms of conjectures and refutations of single theories, such as the 
Popperian outlook, but rather in terms of the empirical and theoretical coherence of whole 
research programmes, such as that of Lakatos. Hesse argues that the pragmatic criterion of 
predictive success is essential to an understanding of the historical development of natural 
science. She claims three reasons for this: first, the pragmatic criterion escapes the now 
refuted traditional criteria of empirical confirmation and falsifiability; secondly, it explains 
the preference of one theory over another without resorting to any local reasons (such as 
social customs, or psychological preference); finally, it accounts for revolutionary objections 
to theories without rejecting cumulative and progressive knowledge altogether, but by 
retaining a contact with the empirical world "by means of long-term testing of theory 
complexes taken as wholes" (Hesse 1980a, 190; see also Hesse 1980b).
She qualifies the Popperian idea of the critical attitude of science by expanding the 
sources of scientific critiques. Criticism, in Hesse’s view, should be seen as both 
empirically and hermeneutically grounded. She does not, on the other hand, deny the 
existence of an hierarchy of scientific rules and conventions, themselves justified by some 
rational concepts such as space, time, identity and contradiction, causation. Rather, she
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argues that none of these rules and concepts belong to some transcendent reality (Hesse 
1980a, 1980b).
From her historical standpoint on epistemology Hesse investigates the similarities 
and differences between natural and social sciences. What is right and wrong with the 
pragmatic criterion? Does it apply equally to both the natural and social sciences? How has 
it shaped the way we conceive of science, the way we practice it, and the way we have 
criticized it?
First, Hesse suggests that there is a continuity rather than a dichotomy between 
natural and social sciences. Here she diverges from Habermas’s framework but only subse­
quent to appropriating his idea of technical and hermeneutic interests. She makes the point 
that these two types of interests are equally shared by both sciences, even though the 
natural sciences are more technically-oriented and the human sciences more 
hermeneutically-oriented.
I suggest that the crucial distinction between the social and natural sciences 
is not so much the presence or absence of evaluative ideologies, but rather 
the success or otherwise of the pragmatic criterion. In the natural sciences, 
this criterion is overriding, and enables ideologies to be filtered out in the 
historical development of a science, leaving a deposit of pragmatic or 
instrumental truth. There is no a priori guarantee, however, that the 
pragmatic criterion will be as successful in the social sciences, in other 
words there is no guarantee that these sciences will, can, or even should 
attain comprehensive and progressive theories like those of physics or 
biology. This fact, together with the admittedly evaluative character of 
adoption of the pragmatic criterion in the first place, suggests that the social 
sciences may properly adopt goals other than that of successful prediction 
and control of their domain. (Hesse 1980a, xxi)
Central in natural science is the model of a "learning machine". Hesse identifies 
three conditions for such a model to be workable and to attain the goal of successful 
learning: there must be the possibility of a detailed test to reinforce correct learning; the 
environment must be sufficiently stable for self-correcting learning processes to converge; 
there must not be strong action by the machine on its environment (Hesse 1980a, 182). The 
relevance of a model of machine-learning in the natural sciences is explained by the fact 
that their subject-matters variously fulfil its conditions of applicability. In the human scien-
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ces however, the subject matter does not fit particularly well these conditions, especially 
the third one. Nevertheless, the model of machine-leaming is not entirely irrelevant here: 
sometimes the conditions are satisfied such as in those case studies examining primary 
behaviour patterns.
One may also, in contrast, question whether the subject matter in natural science 
always fulfils the conditions of the machine-model. According to Hesse, science historiogra­
phy indicates that in disciplines like cosmology, the evidence provided towards theories 
are not verifiable; only mathematical formulae can support their validity.
Biology, Hesse notes, is another case in point. In this case, the stability of the 
environment and the absence of interaction between the "machine" and the environment are 
conditions which are far from being guaranteed. Theories of evolution, ecology, or genetics, 
embody concepts such as functionality, selection, survival, that are "infected by man’s view 
of him self (Hesse 1980a, 185). In those areas, "it is impossible ... to separate mode of 
knowledge relating to technical control from a mode relating to the self-understanding of 
man" (ibid.). Hesse contends that cosmology and biology cannot be excluded from the 
domain of the natural sciences. This makes her conclude that important areas of the natural 
sciences "seem to evoke both the analysis in terms of learning, and the hermeneutic model 
of personal dialogue" (ibid.).
In general, the development of the natural and social sciences may be explained by 
means of a sociological and historiographical model; this model is conveniently described 
in five elements (ibid., 187ff). First, all scientific theories are underdetermined by facts; 
secondly, all of these theories are subjected to revolutionary modification; thirdly, and much 
significantly, further criteria other that a correspondence to facts must exist, and these must 
be rationally discussed and include considerations of values; fourthly, the pragmatic 
criterion has deleted a priori value judgments in the development of theories in natural 
science; finally, such sifting of values has led to the universal adoption of the overriding 
value (criterion) of increasingly successful prediction and control of the environment in the
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justification of scientific knowledge in general. Comparing the extent to which such a 
model has suited the natural and social sciences, Hesse inevitably notes a discrepancy: the 
model has made natural science a powerful and paramount form of knowledge, while 
disclosing some of the weaknesses of the human sciences. Therefore, two additional 
elements should figure in the model to suit the social sciences. First, as very few social 
theories have fulfilled the pragmatic criterion in their domains, or else very inadequately, 
their results must be proven case by case instead of in general terms. In turn, the model 
of a development of scientific epistemology must be adjusted for the social sciences by the 
adding of two elements to the model employed to describe the natural sciences. The sixth 
criterion stresses, therefore, that the application of the pragmatic criterion is unable now to 
satisfy (and possibly permanently incapable of satisfying) the ontology of general social 
theories. Hesse argues nevertheless, that even though the model of machine-leaming does 
not apply successfully in social science, it has been difficult, throughout modem history, 
to find an altemative. A survey of hermeneutic studies may indeed indicate that social 
scientists rely ultimately on a prediction of behaviour and its corollary model of 
machine-like humans, in order to validate interpretive hypotheses^. The seventh criterion 
posits that it might be possible to replace the pragmatic criterion; but this would involve 
a change of value-goals, in favour of other overriding value-goals for social science. As 
Hesse contends, hermeneutics, symbolic interactionism, and Marxist historical and dialec­
tical materialism are certainly the most significant of these altematives.
In brief, the central distinction between the social and natural sciences is likely to 
lie in the relative adequacy of one or the other to "fit in" specific sets of social and 
cognitive values. Hesse distinguishes in fact, between two roles imputed to values in scien­
tific epistemology: these are the values mling over how we use scientific results and 
implement them; and the values that serve to ground theory-building.
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The Roles of Value Judgments in 
Scientific Epistemology
Value judgements in science can be discussed upon the negative or the positive 
usage of technologies or ideologies inferred from "pure research". Warfare, ecological 
imbalances, brain washing, are all examples of the way we judge negatively 
implementations of scientific theories. Technologies of production, soil fertilization, 
sanitation and immunology may be judged as positive outcomes. Social interests are directly 
involved in these discussions. However, the examples given above convey the idea that 
"usage values" of science may always, in a given time and context, be consensual rather 
than conflictual.
But there are other types of value judgments in science. Value judgments may play 
an integral role as assertions in theory construction. In this case, value judgments 
presuppose the desirability of the universe being of a particular kind, and whether the 
universe is or is not broadly as it is desired to be*. According to Hesse, the onus of value 
judgments as assertions is that they involve a transition from an "ought" judgment to an "is" 
judgment, while possibly never being demonstrated as such. These values are seen as 
descriptive statements, filtering out their evaluative content. This does not, however, 
undercut the possibility of making logical inferences, because once we agree on assertions 
about what the world "is", then we are obligated to build a normative (rather than 
universally true) system of criteria which helps to rule out ’errors*. The role of assertions, 
as Hesse puts it, is to choose only a few hypotheses among many others possible "in the 
hope that the world will be found to be as good as the accepted value system describes the 
good" (Hesse 1980a, 189).
As the reader will understand by now, it is really at the junction of value assertions 
that the social and natural sciences diverge. At this point, the natural sciences follow the 
pragmatic criterion and cease to be pluralist, whereas the social sciences remain pluralist 
all along. In this epistemological context, the specific problem of social science theories lies
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in the underdetermination of evidence which is much more fluid, problematic, and 
discordant with the value-goals which usually characterize their views of what is desirable 
in the universe.
Indeed, Hesse singles out two tvnes of value assertions: the value goals of science 
in general, and the value-ladenness of individual theories. According to her, the social 
sciences encompass diverse bodies of value-goals which are not the objects of consensus: 
historical and dialectical materialism, structuralism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
functionalism, are classic examples of such a diversity. But in addition, within any given 
social science paradigm one may say that values figure in the equation twice over. 
Evolutionary theories such as Darwinism and Lamarckism are cases in point. We may also 
add Marxist theory and the feminist theory of social relations. Within one paradigm, the 
value-goals are the same, but the value-ladenness of conflicting theories diverges 
significantly. Marxism, for instance, embodies different theories, and so does feminism. 
Phenomenology is another example of a tradition in social science which has given rise 
to bodies of theories as different as Marxism and functionalism. Hermeneutics and 
structuralism, however, seem to diverge relatively more drastically on the grounds of 
value-goals.
But more importantly perhaps, the social sciences, owing to their obvious lack of 
consensus on both value-goals and value-ladenness in their theoretical frameworks, have 
been characterized historically by an awareness of the evaluative character of all scientific 
theories. Yet Hesse reiterates that in the end the pragmatic criterion still remains our best 
guarantee of scientific validity, in both the natural and the social sciences. As a result, 
even though social theory is more like arguing a political case than an empirical 
natural-science explanation, it should nevertheless, "seek for and respect the facts when 
these are to be had" (1980a, 203).
To summarize, Hesse emphasizes the idea of a special epistemological status of the 
social sciences — and of biology -  among the sciences. In light of her arguments, we may
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suggest that biology is entrenched in between social science models and natural science 
models with respect to its suitability to the pragmatic criterion. Biology seems less 
paradigmatic and more pluralistic than the physico-chemical sciences in its theory goals and 
theory choice, but not to the extent of being considered a social science. Hesse also argues 
that hermeneutics does not replace the pragmatic criterion of successful prediction 
altogether. Finally, she emphasizes the distinction to be made between the controversies 
relating to values judgments entering theory-building, and the failure of the pragmatic 
criterion as a valuable value-goal for social science — and biological — explanations, a 
distinction which feminists have tended to neglect.
As far as feminist biology is concerned, I would now like, in light of Hesse’s 
arguments, to make some clarifications about the extent to which feminists have contributed 
to a replacement of ’traditional’ or ’patriarchal values’ of scientific research. The biological 
theories examined by feminist critics (as noted in previous chapters) are in the main part 
of the observational sciences (e.g. primatology, sociobiology, and other bio- behavioural 
studies). In these theories, value-ladenness is controversial indeed, and it has been shown 
reasonably well how these have reflected the biases of "patriarchal theory". As far as usage 
values in life and environmental sciences are concerned in general, however, feminists are 
not the first critics to urge for a more responsible politics of science in order to save the 
planet. Yet feminists have certainly been the most prominent denunciators of the 
detrimental treatment of women in biology and clinical studies. Finally, their critiques of 
the value-goals of science are not veiy different from those of "mainstream biologists" (at 
least from what the latter say in principle, as will be shown in chapter 6), and also, given 
that biology has always been fraught with internal debates about reductionism and holism, 
as will be shown in chapter 4.
Thus, even though feminists tend to reject the utility of the pragmatic criterion in 
science on the ground that "biology is not womens’ destiny", yet feminist biologists cite 
it as the basis of validation of their theories. The rejection of a determinist account of
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woman’s behaviour in favour of a more sophisticated, holistic model of explanation of 
interactions between organisms and environment should not lead automatically to a 
dismissal of the reductionist method, or of causal models, in that discipline. This is well 
indicated by an examination of Gellner’s arguments.
Gellner’s Socioloev of Cognitive Norms 
and Models of Explanation
Gellner’s contributions to epistemology, especially to the sociology and 
epistemology of the social sciences, is manifold (1959, 1964, 1970, 1974, 1982, 1987). As 
a social anthropologist and philosopher, he has drawn from cross-cultural studies to substan­
tiate his analysis of the transition between systems of knowledge. He has also paid attention 
to the functioning of these systems, including that of his own society, conceiving of them 
as bodies of "norms which are to govern and limit our cognitive behaviour" (Gellner 1974, 
31).
According to Gellner, epistemology, theories of knowledge, and systems of 
knowledge gain in plausibility when they are read as normative instead of as accounts of 
what knowledge "is really like" (Gellner 1974). But, normativeness should not be (in this 
case) linked so intimately with private, subjective, or arbitrary value judgements. Rather, 
normativeness should be construed as sociologically constructed, and fundamental for the 
legitimation of the given system of knowledge to which it relates. Socially constructed sets 
of norms of knowledge are necessary for the system to exist. They are not arbitrary and 
should be perceived as being selected from a rather small group of norms capable of suiting 
the cultural and structural conditions of the society in which they take place.
Gellner proposes that the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society was 
characterized by a crisis of cultural identity. But at the same time, as a society it needed 
a vantage point to regenerate. As a result, Gellner advances the notion that what this 
transition was concerned with was a change from an epistemology based on illusion or
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metaphysical beliefs, and not on an epistemology of ultimate truth. Rather, it highlighted 
an epistemology more characteristically based on "controlled doubt and irony" (1964). It 
is the centrality of epistemological doubt which has provided new norms of cognition, new 
value judgements. According to Gellner, these new value judgments are that certain things 
are good either because they are inevitable, or because their desirability cannot in practice 
be doubted: health and wealth, the affluent society, industry and technology obviously 
emerge as very desirable in our society, but also desirable for other non-industrial 
societies’.
Gellner makes a strong case for the rejection of the idea that cognitive norms can 
be like "emotions". If these norms actually constitute mere emotions, this would 
presuppose that norms are "given" and that they might not possibly be the objects of 
rational evaluation. In other words, it would presuppose that cognitive norms were 
preeminent, superior to any possible reasoning. Emotions are definitely not the norms to 
which Gellner refers when he speaks of theories of knowledge as being normative, 
injunctive, or prescriptive (Gellner 1974).
Gellner’s central argument with respect to the socio-history of systems of 
knowledge is that certain types of truth-claims have been more desirable at certain times 
in history (Gellner 1964). This is the basis for any explanation of the constitution or 
replacement of diverse systems of knowledge, but moreover, of the historical superiority 
of contemporary systems over others, namely Western scientific society over pre-scientific 
societies (Gellner 1964, 1974, 1982).
Gellner’s views on knowledge systems, presented in the following pages, should 
help us to clarify the position of feminist biology in a view to epistemology and biological 
explanations. First, Gellner’s distinction between cognitive endorsers and selectors in 
models of explanations should prove useful in the understanding of the bases on which 
feminist biology, with its strong critical stance on "patriarchal biases" in studies of 
behaviour, has justified itself. Secondly, Gellner’s framework should help us to disentangle
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the theoretical confusion between a holistic view and a more reductionist, mechanistic type 
of explanation, a scientific problem widely discussed but left unresolved in the feminist 
literature on biology.
Cognitive Endorsers, Cognitive Selectors, 
and Models of Explanation
In Legitimation of Beliefs (1974), Gellner argues that re-endorser theories are 
usually based on rich reflections about the strengths and gaps of grand theories. But as their 
name illustrates, they only manage to "reach the conclusion that all is well with existing 
banks of beliefs, or at least with a substantial part of it, simply by virtue of its being the 
existing bank of belief (ibid., 46).
Cognitive selectors are different in nature from re-endorser theories. Cognitive 
selectors* main function is to help building theory and explanations substantively. It also, 
by definition, "set up some criterion, some touchstone or sifter, which is to sort out the 
cognitive sheep from the goats... [and which] claims to be independent of the current and 
local set of beliefs" (ibid., 47).
There are, Gellner says, re-endorser theories of some currently dominant beliefs, but 
also negative re-endorser theories of other beliefs clashing with current beliefs. Thus, 
re-endorsers may be positive or negative. Evolutionism may be seen as a grand category 
of positive re-endorsers. These re-endorsers do not necessarily give substantive content to 
theories, but partly vindicate dominant social beliefs and norms of knowledge about 
behaviour. In contrast, negative re-endorsers are mainly concerned with revealing the distor­
tion and "big error" of a set of beliefs, but without being single-minded about specifying 
what truth could then be ascertained once the "one big error" is unmasked. According to 
Gellner, the Marxist theory of knowledge and ideology is representative of negative 
re-endorsers, for it stipulates that "once you are free of [class-interests]... truth will be easily 
available and require no institutional underpinning" (Gellner 1974, 53). Relativism is a
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particular category of negative re-endorsers in the sense that it opposes rationality (See also 
Gellner 1987; Hollis and Lukes 1982; Wilson 1970).
Selector theories require a positive specification of truth, and their substantive 
contents are open to criticism. In general, selector theories are the beliefs realized by the 
methods of the natural sciences by means of controlled observation (Gellner 1974, 53ff). 
Selectors therefore have a constructive role in ascertaining orientations and escaping 
intellectual confusion.
Gellner discerns three cognitive selection procedures: empirical, or the theory that 
knowledge is experience and sensation ("the ghost"); material, or the theory stating that the 
onus of reality is an underlying, unobservable, structure ("the machine"); logical, or the 
theory that reality is homologous to grammar ("the skeleton"). The core of Gellner’s is a 
demonstration that the alliance ghost-and-machine (or empiricism-and-materialism) inherited 
since the seventeenth century is inestimable, but such an alliance is too often confused by 
those people who want to defend or reject either the ghost or the machine in favour of the 
other.
As Gellner points out, empiricism is concerned with data, and its source. The 
ultimate picture drawn of reality is that it is manifold, qualitative, structureless. From an 
empiricist perspective therefore, determinist or causal models of explanation become mere 
conveniences: they are manageable and yet remain fictional pictures of reality.
Materialism, in contrast, is more concerned with explanation and its structure. It 
draws a picture of reality as a persisting and stable structure. From a materialist viewpoint, 
structures remain orderly even though sense-datum tends to show that matter evolves 
through time. Also, materialism hardly reconciles the idea of free-choice, of human beings 
as free agents, since determinist models of explanations underwrite materialism itself.
Gellner continues his argument by stating that empiricism (the ghost) is pervaded 
by two ideas which materialism (the machine) does not confront. Empiricism posits that 
experiences are reality. However, while it also posits that conceptualizations are the
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organizers of experiences and sensations, empiricism does not really concentrate on the 
problematic process of thought and representations. Yet on its own, as data in the pure, 
empiricism is doomed to lapse into diverse fictions. It can only reach the conclusion that 
different worlds co-exist but cannot give any independent, non-circular reasons why that 
is so. Ultimately empiricism can only state mere tautology or else truisms such as "different 
worlds exist because different people experience them" or "only experience is true and, 
therefore, it cannot deceive us".
Yet experiences and sensations are ultimately independent of our will and thought 
and therefore "attractive as cognitive arbitrators" of our concepts and theories. Episte- 
mologically therefore, empiricism enables the selection and sifting of acceptable ideas, con­
cepts, and theories from fraud; but as a source for rational explanation, it "does stand 
convicted of impurity" (Gellner 1974, 80).
Materialism, conversely, deprives the world of subjectivity. If one takes this view 
at face-value, nothing is to count as knowledge unless it has the form of an explanation in 
terms of a publicly available concept of structure. The extreme materialists, for example, 
conceive of "the mind" as genuinely formed by atoms related in a mechanic way; the mind 
is indeed reduced to atoms. Not surprisingly, such a vision disconcerts many, for it 
evidences a de-humanization of the world. Opponents of materialism would stress that 
mechanical explanations are conceived for convenience but are not true. Alternatively they 
would contend that a ’totality’ comes prior to the ’parts’, suggesting that an atomistic view 
is at best incomplete, at worse spurious. Thus as a selector set of norms, materialism is 
dehumanizing and precisely dismisses the richness of reality which it initially aims to 
explain. It is not more useful as an arbitrator set of norms, for it falls short of its pretences. 
However, it separates itself from sense-datum, which, unlike the invisible structure, is an 
observable and relatively independent criteria of validity. Therefore, in contrast to 
empiricism, it has the quality of not being tautological; for the idea of structures belongs 
to a second-level language, whereas experiences belong to a first-level, common-sense
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language.
Gellner*s conclusion is that empiricism and materialism should not be taken as 
alternative candidates, but rather as cognitive selectors, each very useful in their own ways. 
"Empiricism is concerned with selecting information, whereas mechanism selects patterns 
of explanation. This might at least avoid or minimise the collision, by making the two 
doctrines live at different levels" (1974, 83). Therefore, to his mind, even though 
empiricism and materialism appear to clash and conflict with each other, there are, 
however, some circumstances where scientists and researchers should take advantage of 
their compatibility.
With regard to the project of a ’feminist biology’, two remarks can be made at this 
point. First, it seems that even though feminist criticisms of biology appear both credible 
and indicate the relationship between explanations of women’s behaviour and patriarchal 
biases in biology, yet they do not really provide any viable norms describing what a 
feminist biology would be. In this sense, feminist biology still bears more resemblance to 
a "negative endorser" body of theory, than to a fully-fledged new biology. Secondly, it 
appears that feminists’ refusal to integrate causal or determinist accounts of behaviour was 
overstated, and that the exclusive recourse to "experiences" and "womens’ subjectivities" 
in the construction of biological theory, although worthy as cognitive selectors of data and 
also as cognitive ’arbitrators’, cannot possibly make for the need of a cognitive selectors 
of explanation ultimately. Let us look in this connection at Gellner’s discussion of holistic 
and determinist models of explanation of behaviour, an issue of great importance, yet the 
source of conflicting arguments in the scientific critiques of several feminists biologists^®.
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Explanations in Studies of Human Behaviour
Gellner sheds light on the necessity of discerning in our assessment of scientific
epistemology, between the respective virtues and limitations of holism and mechanistic
reductionism as selectors and as arbitrators (1974, 83-108).
According to him, behaviourism, as the epitome of determinist causal models of
behaviour, has taken the virtues of empiricism as a selector of information and turned it
into a trivial model, void of explanatory power, while still subsuming the
machine-metaphor". But, while the empiricist pretence of behaviourism gives a feeble
model of what will best explain intelligent behaviour, empiricism in this case may still
supply a persuasive answer to the question of what kind of evidence can in the end settle
issues about the nature of this world.
On the other hand, insisting on the complexity of human beings and their
behaviours, as posed by the empiricist insight, does not logically imply the rejection of
the machine-model. In this case, empiricism should only stand as a strong incitation to
explain behaviours as complex structures and machines. Empiricism is only relevant in our
decision about the kind and degree of sophistication of the structure which can best
represent the pattern of behaviour under study. For, as Gellner stresses, only structures can
explain in a non-tautological way. Materialism and structure-models are located on a
different plane from the experiences (or behaviours) they aim to explain. As such, they
function as a sort of second-level language, formalizing rather than experiencing.
The norm of ’structural* explanation is imposed by the very nature of 
explanation, and not specifically by the nature of the material. Whether our 
behaviour be simple or complex, whether in our linguistic competence we 
make infinite use of finite means, or merely parrot-wise use finite means for 
finite ends -  either way, onlv a structure can explain, and as it is extremely 
unlikely that the structure is already explicitly present to consciousness, it 
follows that either way we are to be explained, in that sense, mechanically 
and heteronomously. (Gellner 1974, 96)
As far as feminist biology is concerned, the argument advanced by Gellner could
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be made as a point to rebut the holistic approach as a model of explanation, yet without 
dismissing its critical virtue, especially in opposing rigid and over-simplistic causal models 
of behaviour, and more importantly, as a selector of information for the creation of better 
bio-behavioural knowledge.
The foregoing arguments and their relevance for our research purpose can be 
summed up as follows. As Gellner concludes in Legitimation of Beliefs (1974, 206ff), 
experience, even though it is not pure, still remains the least corrupted of our validation 
grounds, and therefore must be deemed as salutary. On the other hand, the 
materialist-mechanistic approach, although it presents a rather dehumanizing picture of the 
world, remains the only non-tautological model of explanation. We are therefore constrained 
to use it. Thirdly, although relativism has proved to be a genuine problem for the 
epistemology of social studies, it may be seen a good "recipe" for context-bound 
ethnographic exploration within a limited sphere of cultural activities and when no 
fundamental clashes arise regarding the evaluation of our sets of normative cognitive 
values. As a ’selector of explanation’ however, it remains ultimately a re-endorser of beliefs 
and cannot expand our knowledge of the world. Finally, thought and knowledge cannot 
dispense with sociology for it rests on norms of validation uniquely provided through cul­
ture and history.
The first three points may prove useful in showing that feminists biologists have 
misunderstood, in their elaboration of a feminist approach to biology, the logical 
consequence of a rejection of biological determinism in favour of holism, and of the 
structure metaphor or causality in favour of ’subjectivities’ and ’life experiences’. A 
feminist holistic approach to biology is not incompatible with causal or determinist models, 
providing these are complex enough to reflect our views of human behaviour. Also, while 
relativism has provided feminists with a rich and accurate analysis of "patriarchal biology", 
it could only fall short of setting the norms from which a substantive feminist biology could 
be developed and justified. Finally, as far as Gellner’s fourth argument is concerned.
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feminist biologists and critics of science have already made a powerful and convincing 
sociological analysis of the patriarchal norms and frames of mind operating in biology. But, 
as Habermas and Hesse also suggested, feminists have assumed incorrectly that rather 
than only some, of the norms that have been generated within patriarchal society need to 
be rejected and reformulated if a feminist and anti-sexist biology is to be created.
Summary
By discussing the development of cognitive norms, Habermas, Hesse and Gellner 
have helped us pose the question whether the alternative norms of biological research which 
feminist have proposed are adaptable to current "patriarchal" science, or whether feminist 
and mainstream biology constitute incompatible systems of knowledge^^.
It is my view that feminists, in spite of their strong commitments to values like 
harmony, ecology, and respect for people and nature, are, like ’mainstream biologists’, 
committed to the utilitarian values of instrumental knowledge. They do so, however, in the 
interests of women and for the improvement of their social conditions, which imply, if not 
a drastic change in the value-goals of biology, at least alterations in value-laden theories. 
The argument of Habermas is relevant to this. Technical interests and causal models in 
science cannot logically be rejected by feminists since the two have played a crucial role 
in the development of health and social welfare and will likely continue to do so. Having 
said this, feminists severely question the cogency of using simplistic (’unidimensional’) 
rather than sophisticated (’interactive’ and ’holistic’) models to explain human behaviour. 
The issue remains, ultimately, a matter of rational debate concerning the value-ladenness 
of theories, and is particularly seminal within the social and the life sciences, as Hesse 
would suggest. I would therefore argue that feminists have a strong and legitimate voice 
in critiques of scientific knowledge. But these critiques do not entail, as Gellner would 
argue, a rejection of the utility of traditional norms of justification, such as those of empiri­
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cism, or of models of explanation based on causal determination, to judge among competing 
theories those which are valid and those which are not.
We shall therefore close Part II of this thesis by re-examining biology specifically 
in order to locate, within biological explanations, the locus of the problem of social values. 
We should be able to ascertain the type of scientific value-judgements (value-goals/ 
value-laden theories) feminist critics have challenged in their critiques of mainstream bio­
logy, and the kind of contribution these critiques might lead to in the development of 
projects of feminist biology.
Endnotes
1) Indeed, as early as the turn of the century, the idea that natural science was the 
sole bearer of true knowledge, and its method, the sole guarantee of objectivity, was 
challenged by Duhem (in Harding 1976) and Bachelard (1934), to name but a few. They 
were both well aware of "built-in" conventions in theories, instruments, and observational 
statements.
2) For the natural sciences as such, Feyerabend (although feminists do not pay as 
much attention to his works) also held a radical standpoint, suggesting that knowledge, 
since it is empirically underdetermined, is justified ultimately on social beliefs and coerced 
consensus (Feyerabend 1975).
3) Popper sees the critical attitude as one of the three most important criteria which 
demarcate science from pseudo-science. These are: the falsificationist epistemology, justi­
fying the idea of a progression in scientific knowledge via empirical testings; the degrees 
of corroboration, which are the canons on which the selection of the best out of several 
hypotheses are to be made; and the critical attitude, (including permanent doubt and bold 
conjectures) which discriminates scientific reflection from common sense or dogmatism 
(Popper 1969, 1972).
4) This does not mean that it is impossible, or even inappropriate, to explain human 
behaviour by external factors exercising a constraint on the individual. Weber, Durkheim 
and Parsons’s works adumbrate this. Hermeneutics also implies such a logic of expla­
nation. Hesse gives some examples borrowed from psychology and social studies which 
also confirm this. Habermas provides the historical and sociological conditions of possibility 
for such a framework to exist.
5) The works of sociologists and philosophers of the Frankfurt School are 
particularly germane in that respect. See Adorno and Horkheimer (1973); Habermas (1970,
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1978); also in Jay (1973), Connerton (1976) and Larrain (1983).
6) In a collection of short essays entitled Towards a Rational Society (1970), 
Habermas discusses modem social trends such as "the scientization of politics and public 
opinion", technical progress and social life, "technology and science as ideology". In 
Legitimation Crisis (1978) he draws a diagnosis of current social crises. He finds that the 
roots of these crises lie in the realization of contradictions between the development of the 
cultural system, the political system, and the productive system.
7) Hesse remarks:
Traditionally various versions of the Verstehen [i.e., interpretative tradition] 
thesis have been appealed to provide alternative goals, but it seems that in 
any attempt to understand a person’s behaviour, one is seeking to fulfil one’s 
expectations about his future behaviour. Indeed, all human interaction 
depends on the success of some such predictions about mutual responsive­
ness, and this seems not unlike an application of the pragmatic criterion.
This is surely correct, and it is not surprising to find successful fulfilment 
of expectations as a criterion in all reasoning about the world, including all 
lowest level inductive generalizations, whether about objects or persons".
(Hesse 1980a, 201)
8) In order to rationally evaluate the soundness of value-assertions in paradigms and 
individual theories, one may ask questions such as (in the area of neuro-psychology for 
instance), is it desirable or not that the mind be conceived of as a "natural" machine, or (in 
the field of sociology) is it desirable that the proletariat be freed and the class system be 
overturned?
9) Indeed, Gellner’s perspective on systems of knowledge resembles that of Mary 
Hesse. Both conclude that scientific society is cognitively more powerful compared to its 
predecessors because it has created a cognitively useful separation between symbolic ideas 
and effective knowledge. They also agree that the science system of cognitive norms (or 
value goals) has lost the overview of a humanist pre-scientific society which referred to 
moral and social values as important components in the production of knowledge.
10) Gellner deals more precisely with the dispute between Chomsky and Skinner 
about verbal behaviour (Gellner 1974, 83ff). See Chomsky’s review of Verbal Behaviour 
by B.F. Skinner in Language, vol. 135. January-March 1959.
11) As mentioned before, Gellner argues that the empiricist explanatory model of 
behaviour does not prove much. Moreover, as a model of explanation of behaviour, it is 
tautological. He says, for instance, that the mentalistic model of Chomsky can only answer 
to a question like ’why does an individual do this?’ with a statement such as ’because that 
individual intended it for he/she is a complex being’. Conversely, the behaviourist model 
of Skinner can only make a trivial statement about that same question by answering 
’because he/she received a stimulus from outside’.
12) It may be argued that Gellner does not really want to anticipate the possible
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transitions of systems of knowledge, and that his reflection is basically historical and ex 
post facto. Yet the future is precisely what feminists, in contrast to the social anthropologist 
Gellner, have been mainly interested in as critics of science: the foreseeable transformation 
of the oppressive patriarchal system of knowledge. As an anthropologist, Gellner has 
possibly paid too much attention to ’remote* foreign cultures, and not enough to the 
control of ’foreign cultures’ within his ’own society’.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SCIENTIFIC DEBATES IN BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE
It is believed that a clarification of the epistemological arguments in favour of 
biological determinism or, alternatively, in favour of biological holism, will illustrate more 
directly the arguments made in previous chapters in relation to the strengths and limitations 
of feminist projects of biology. In this chapter references to internal debates in biology will 
be made in this connection. A discussion of the arguments raised by Radical Scientists and 
dialectical biologists in the 1970s and 1980s will substantiate our viewpoint on the 
importance of certain categories and models of explanation in biology with a view to the 
analysis of feminist biology. I suggest that feminist biologists cannot dispense with these 
categories as models, even though they criticize severely how and why these are currently 
being utilized in the ’biological method’.
The example of Radical Scientists indeed adumbrates what are, at present, the points 
of rupture and convergence between the norms of research practice defended by mainstream 
and non-conventional biologists. This should provide a blueprint for the comparative ana­
lyses of mainstream and feminist biologies which will be effected in Part III.
First, let us examine the epistemological questions induced by the scientific debates 
characteristic of biology. In doing so, we may recognise the extent to which some research 
problems biology borrows interchangeably from both the human sciences and the physical 
sciences; this is particularly the case in human biology. It also borrows, more 
fundamentally, some of its most important explanatory categories, such as teleological 
inferences which serve to hypothesize living systems, and functional causality which serves 
to represent the relations between the individual components in these systems. By the same 
token, we should come to understand more completely how and why biologists have so
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often become involved in controversies about the ontology of biological objects, the 
theoretical frameworks most appropriate to capture their complexity, the values entering 
theory-building, and finally, the politics of science and research agenda in human biology.
Historical and Epistemological Background to 
Scientific Controversies in Bioloev
A brief examination of historical accounts of the development of biology^ indicates 
a great divide between two biological approaches, natural history and experimental biology. 
This divide corresponds partly to the epistemological debate nurtured by the opposition of 
teleological explanations on the one hand, and cause-effect explanatory models on the other.
The great divide in biology was resolved, in principle, in the 1940s, when the bases 
of an unificatory approach to the study of living forms, the "evolutionary synthesis", were 
finally laid out^. In practice however, the traditionally separated approaches seem to have 
pursued their own theoretical orientations irrespectively of the idea of an integration of 
biological disciplines. The approach of natural history, more observational, descriptive, and 
holistic, still seems to greatly influence ecologists’, botanists’, and development biologists’ 
frames of mind; the experimental approach, leaning towards a reductionist model of ex­
planation (and the idea of mechanistic causation) has been sustained since the nineteenth 
century, first in the field of physiology and, later, in biochemistry and molecular biology 
(Allen 1975; Capra 1983; Mayr 1982. See also the results of interviews with British 
biologists in chapter 6).
As several philosophers of biology have maintained (Grene 1974; Hull 1974; Nagel 
1979; Rosenberg 1985; Ruse 1981, 1988; Zumbach 1984), the issues of teleology and 
reductionism loom large in the scientific debates relating to the question of what should 
be the nature of a biological approach.
The question of teleology refers to the necessity of adopting a means-to-an-end logic 
in order to fully understand biological phenomena and to make sense of them. Since the
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theoretical integration of biological disciplines of the 1940s, it has been assumed that all 
living organisms embody both the information carried over by history of their development 
("ultimate" characteristics), and the observable features and motions associated more 
directly with their organic functions ("proximate" characteristics) (Mayr 1982)^. Teleological 
explanations are more often related to evolutionary theory (and to notions such as 
adaptation, fimess, selection pressures, or survival) than to any other theories (Hull, 1974). 
Yet, even though biologists might not be aware of it, the use of teleological principles in 
biological language extends beyond the boundaries of natural history and emerges in other 
biological disciplines such as physiology, embryology, and microbiology (Canguilhem 1977; 
Grene 1974; Rosenberg 1985).
The notion of teleology is often opposed to causality. Causal models hold a central 
place within the reductionist approach to biology. The reductionist approach is usually asso­
ciated with experimentalism and the concerns of modem theorists and researchers working 
in the fields of biochemistry, molecular biology, and genetic engineering. In general, 
reductionism in biology presupposes the idea that atoms and molecules are the basic units 
of life. Such an assumption, in turn, predicates a corpus of analytical concepts and 
mechanistic theories. These concepts and theories aim at ascertaining the elementary causes 
of all biological ’events’, from enzymes, proteins and cells, to tissues or organs, and finally, 
to illnesses, mental defects, and certain "adaptive" behaviours, as in the case of sociobio- 
logy^. In a strict epistemological sense, the problem of reductionism refers to a reducibility 
of all the necessary and sufficient conditions of explanations of biological phenomena into 
physico-chemical descriptions and laws^.
The questions of teleology and reductionism however, neither are nor should be 
totally dissociated. As Grene puts it.
What is needed for the adequate philosophical foundation of biological 
thought is neither to get rid of teleology, nor to rely on it as the 
self-sufficient partner of causality, but to supplement cause-and-effect 
thinking and means-end thinking by reference to the still more basic concept 
of standards or norms (1974, 37).
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In fact, according to many philosophers such as Nagel (1979), Ruse (1981), Zumbach 
(1984) and Hull (1974), the clash between the reductionist biologists and non-reductionist 
is not fundamentally ontological, for the main reason that biology, like physics and 
chemistry, is first and foremost concerned with molecules®. The clash is rather methodo­
logical. As Hull explains causal reductionism in biology refers to explanations of the 
"structure and events at one level of organization [in terms of] those of lower levels" (Hull 
1974,132). In contrast, teleological explanations are those in terms of "the adaptive useful­
ness of structures and processes to the whole organism", or in terms of the "ecological 
function in the communities in which the species occurs" (ibid.)
In biology, he continues, molecular biologists may emphasize the causal ascriptions 
in biological systems, and organicist biologists, teleological ascriptions (Hull 1974, 132). 
The only difference apparent between molecular biology (or physics and chemistry at that) 
on the one hand, and evolution theory, ecology or developmental biology on the other is 
that the latter may more frequently require a model of synthesis, similar to that provided 
by teleological models, because of the existence of highly organized systems, and of 
various levels of organization in the systems they investigate. It seems, therefore, that 
looking at the history of biological sciences (and as far as scientific explanations and 
method are concerned) teleology and causal reductionism are in fact not opposites, but two 
sides of the same coin. The specificity of biology does not lie in the fact that its objects are 
ontologically different from those in physics or chemistry; rather, biological explanations, 
as Hull would argue, resort more often to teleological systems for heuristic models, than 
physico-chemical explanations because the subject matters in biology will more frequently 
be better represented scientifically as open systems conditioned by the environment, than 
the objects in physics’.
But this methodological peculiarity of biology also appears to involve much more 
consequence from the perspective of a sociology of biological knowledge. It points to the 
fact that, as biological systems become more complex, as in human biology, evolutionary
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theory, or developmental biology, the values figuring in teleological model-building and 
causal model-building become more conspicuously sociologized.
Epistemologically, Hull maintains, causal explanations, like teleological explanations, 
are made against the background of a theory. In the former, background theory determines 
which items are to be considered in the causal network and how each is to be related to the 
others. In the latter the background theory determines what counts as the system, its parts, 
and its preferred states. Indeed, Hull continues, both causal and teleological explanations 
are based on considerable background knowledge. Yet it is the explanations rather than the 
background knowledge that biologists assume to be conveying all the informative power 
(Hull 1974, 122ff).
The situations to which causal descriptions apply are open in the sense that a causal 
ascription explicitly focuses on one strand of all those possible in the causal net, this strand 
being selected because it is believed to be more important. Everything else in the causal 
net is assumed as background knowledge. Hence, in such a scheme the specification of 
necessary conditions is implicit, assumed to be true a priori, and yet it contributes 
importantly to the explanatory power of the causal model. In contrast, situations lending 
themselves to teleological ascriptions are open "because the organization of teleological 
systems is maintained by a continual exchange of energy and modifications in the parts of 
the system" (ibid., 123). In these situations, the background knowledge is explicit, expressed 
in the teleological statements direct, while the additional explanatory-content (which may 
be causal as such) seems less informative. In sum, teleological explanations seem obvious, 
almost tautological, and as such, are believed to be less explanatory than causal models.
Epistemological opposition between teleology and reductionism, has had (as 
mentioned at the beginning of this section) long-term effects on the internal scientific de­
bates of biology. The divide has been expressed under diverse forms, for instance between 
mechanistic biologists and vitalists in the mid 1800s* (Allen 1975; Capra 1983; 
CoUingwood 1945; Mendelsohn 1977), or morphologists and physiologists in the late
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1800s’ (Allen 1975). Other debates emerged between organicists and mechanists in the 
early 19(X)s^ ® (Allen 1975; Caron 1988; CoUingwood 1945; Haldane 1931), and in the 
1930s and 1940s between diverse schools of thought concerned with the reorientation of 
biological explanations and approaches in the wake of the evolutionary synthesis of modem 
genetics” (Abir-Am 1987; Ayalla and Dobzhansky 1974; Fuerst 1982; Mayr 1982; Olby 
1974; Waddington 1969, 1974).
Since the 1960s, holists and dialecticians, on the one hand, emphasizing the idea of 
"emerging properties" of biological components and "interaction" between "levels of 
biological system", and, on the other hand, biologists leaning towards theoretical 
reductionism and determinism, seem to have taken on the debate (Chargaff 1978; Koestler 
and Smythies 1969; Maynard-Smith 1986; Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984; Rose 1982a, 
1982b). This last debate reflects to a great extent, the ambivalence between a conceptual 
framework integrating simultaneously the ideas of both holism and causality in biology. 
Since the discovery of the properties of DNA in the 1950s, and with the ensuing spreading 
of the idea of the "central dogma"^\ genetic determinism and biological reductionism have 
increased their influence, becoming both theoretically and methodologically dominant 
research guidelines. During the 1960s, however, several weU-known biologists, and 
psychologists, decided to reimpose both the ideas of holism, and of teleological explana­
tions, in the elaboration of a more complete framework for the understanding of living 
forms. At a Symposium held in 1968, in Alpbach, Austria, Weiss, Bertalanffy, Koestler and 
Waddington, among others, discussed the principles of "new perspectives in the Ufe 
sciences" which would extend "beyond reductionism" (Koestler and Smythies 1969).
During the course of the Alpbach Symposium, Weiss argued that the reductionist 
method neglects the study of levels of organization and the "emerging properties" of 
organic elements as they move from one organic level to the other. The approach of genetic 
determinism, for instance, glosses over the problem of multi-levelled organized living 
forms. Hence it is necessary in biology to rely on the system concept, and on an approach
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in terms of "stratified levels of determinism" (Weiss 1969, 15). There is, Weiss admitted 
however, a major difficulty with an approach of holism and systems: the gist of this 
approach reflects empirically the existence of genuine organic processes and tran­
sformations, but their properties are not tangible objects. The holistic approach is indeed 
concerned with the information content (i.e. the governing rules of equilibrium and 
coordination between organic parts and systems) of biological processes. In contrast, 
reductionism directly operates firom observations of tangible organic forms and motions. 
And this implies that the theories developed firom a holistic or systems approach arc much 
more difficult to handle and to test experimentally than those developed fi*om a reductionist 
approach.
In the same vein, Waddington sought to adapt the genetic theory of evolution to the 
perspective of a multi-layered system of spaces and selective pressures. He contended that 
the study of the impact of the environment on the actualization of genetic potentialities is 
a more sound line of research than genetic determinism. He believed that genetic theory 
needed to be expanded via an approach concerned with how the genetic information (the 
genotype) actually translates into characters (the phenotypes) which are active and 
interactive with their environment, rather than assuming that these arc permanently fixed 
biologically.
All the arguments presented at the Alpbach Symposium manifested the need to 
reintroduce into biological thinking a firamework of hierarchical systems of biological 
interactions between organic components. But one may ask: ’what was really the rationale 
underlying the defense of the non-rcducibility of biological processes to physico-chemical 
concepts and laws’? Was it simply developed in order to construct a new methodological 
stance, including a theoretical approach and experimental models better suited to the idea 
of biological systems and interactions? Or was it to adduce the evidence of biological forms 
as indeterminate; as constantly transforming themselves?
Two epistemological arguments, previously discussed in chapter 3, might be raised
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at this stage in order to shed light on these questions. The first argument concerns the 
utility, in the production of knowledge, of the idea of mechanistic determinism and of 
causal models. Causal models, as we saw above, have not been, and cannot be, avoided 
in biological explanations, even though, empirically, a synthesis of results in terms of 
holism, interaction, and information, seems to be more complete. This position on biology 
would lean towards that of Gellner who argued that the machine-metaphor, even though 
it may sound inhumane (especially in studies of human behaviour), cannot be dispensed 
with in the explanation of complex phenomena.
The second argument explored the extent to which teleological references and 
assumptions enter theory-building in biology, and more importantly, the likelihood that 
social controversies might arise in biology over the utilization of certain teleological 
references. As we have seen, the value-assertions defining the ’preferred states’ of living 
systems in biological theories may, in several instances, refer directly to political and social 
ideologies about ’the preferred states’ of the social behaviours and the gender structure". 
This position concurs with the argument of Hesse.
This second argument might also give an idea of the scope of hermeneutical 
reflection and the more encompassing socio-critique underlying feminist criticisms of 
science and biology, more especially of studies of sex-gender behaviour and sexual 
dimorphism. This means that the controversy about ’the preferred state of the patriarchal 
system’ as highlighted in feminist critiques seems to have an impact not merely on one but 
on two aspects of theory-building in biology. There seems to be an impact on the 
value-assertions of theories about women, and more profoundly, on the ontological 
property of subject matters in human bioloev. That is to say, the feminist critiques appear 
to affect more dramatically the conventional ’methodological’ position of biologists: it 
directly challenges both the teleological status (or properties) ascribed to biological ’objects’ 
and systems (more especially to womens’ physiology and behaviour and their link with 
womens’ life conditions in society), and the methodological and theoretical tools
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traditionally used to investigate these.
Teleological systems indeed can be used to represent diverse systems oriented 
towards a goal, all of which do not necessarily predicate the ideas of intentions in human 
action and of cultural plasticity of behaviour. The principle of teleology in biology may 
refer, as several scholars have shown (see for example Ruse (1981), Rosenberg (1985), 
Mayr (1982)), to diverse objects or systems and, in turn, diverse strategies of equilibrium 
for these systems to maintain themselves. For instance, the same set of goals and adaptive 
strategies might not apply equally to physiological functions or to animal behaviour*^. 
Similarly, the social sciences, biology, and, to some extent, physics lend themselves to theo­
ries or models of self-regulated systems in which individuals or particles interact rather than 
being determined unidirectionally by a cause. But this may well be where the analogy 
between biology, sociology and physics ends. The systems described in sociology, biology, 
and physics are intuitively and empirically distinguishable.
The systems described in biology and psycho-sociology are separated for one main 
reason. As Ruse (1981) points out, in biology, teleology is only heuristic, and refers to 
systems which appear as if they were designed towards a goal. In psychology and 
sociology, the teleology of intentional behaviour in humans is not a mere functional arte­
fact, but really is "telic". In comparison, evolutionary genetics, population genetics, 
paleontology, physiology, embryology or ethology deal with objects which lend themselves 
more or less easily to teleological explanations, or else do not underline ontologically 
similar types of teleological references. Teleological references therefore, may have various 
substantive contents depending on the subject matter or the discipline from which they are 
being examined.
Teleology always refers, in the last analysis, to "the preferred state of the systems". 
As Schaffner (1977), for instance, argues, the definition of the boundary conditions and 
preferred states of teleological systems in biology is always of central importance. When 
it comes to human behaviour or human phenotypes, teleological models may always end
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up being overly sociologized. Thus, causal models in human biology are never too remotely 
situated from these teleological models of interactions and equilibrium which, as feminists 
have rightly pointed out, have been elaborated on the basis of androcentric and patriarchal 
beliefs about the social order and division of gender roles.
As a result, and as far as feminist critiques of biology are concerned, I would 
suggest that it is more an hermeneutical reflection about theory (and the preferred state of 
systems) and a socio-critique of the ontological status of biological "objects" in human 
biology and in studies of sexual dimoiphism, than a strict rejection of causal models which 
are involved. I would further suggest that in their critiques, feminists do not necessarily 
reject the idea of causation in biology; they basically challenge the kind of properties 
ascribed to "objects" in human biology and studies of sexual dimorphism, and the links 
between these objects as they are construed in the teleological systems operating in 
biological theories. Feminists indeed criticize both the tangible content and the intangible 
properties (intentional, interactive, causal) of the links described in the teleological system 
elaborated in traditional biological theories. But they do not reject altogether the idea of 
causal models of explanation. They, rather, reject the rigidity of certain causal models and 
the teleological systems to which these belong.
In sum, on the basis of an epistemological and historical examination, ’mainstream* 
research in biology may be described sociologically as follows. On the one hand, all 
branches of biology with a few exceptions, from ecology to ethology and behavioural 
biology, through molecular biology and physiology, have become converging areas of 
research, if not already adjacent within the whole subject of evolutionary biology. This 
reality obtains in principle only however; for the exceptional success of genetic engineering 
and molecular biology, combined with the impulse of biomedical research, bear heavily on 
biological practice. This accords prime importance to experimental research and reductionist 
models of explanation, both pre-empting the holistic model and the ontology of living 
forms as highly interactive with their environment^^.
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Debates between biological determinists, environmentalists, and interactionists have 
been going on for some time. The feminist critiques of sociobiology and sex-gender beha­
vioural studies have, similarly, called into question long-lasting biological controversies. 
Feminists have, like several other groups of biologists, confronted the ontological and 
theoretical underpinnings of traditional research in human biology; but, more specitically, 
they also have unveiled the patriarchal nature of certain theoretical assumptions. Very 
importantly as well, these scientific controversies seem to have had (in contrast to physics 
or chemistry) a non-negligible resonance in social debates outside the strict confines of the 
biological sciences themselves. Applications of biological theories to medicine, psychiatry, 
pharmacology, reproductive technologies, and industrial production, have stirred the 
criticism of large segments of the public not only with respect to the abuse of biological 
discourse in the political arena but also with respect to the truth-content of certain theories 
about human biology and behaviour (Arditti and others 1980; Goodfield 1977)^ ®.
Epistemological insight into biological thinking is particularly interesting for 
sociologists for it reveals that the patterns of explanation used in biology are not ’closed 
systems’ as in physics, but somehow ’open patterns’ of thought closely related to social 
ideologies. These patterns always involve references to the ’preferred states of nature’, 
including organs, individuals, species, and social organization; to the "normal" and the 
"abnormal" state of nature, as Canguilhem puts it (1977).
In fact, at the core of the bio-behavioural models used in ethology and evolutionary 
theory, and in other studies of the biological determinants of phenotypes and human 
characters, dominant ideologies are directly involved in the scientific reflection about 
biology’s explanatory models. As a result, in societies where social control is largely 
effected through the diffusion of patriarchal myths and ideology, the definition of 
(teleological) norms of behaviour within biology itself emerges as a fundamental 
sociological issue* .^ As such, both scientific and social issues may interfere directly in the 
choice of value-assertions ascertaining research questions and individual theories concerned
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with human biology.
Bearing this in mind, we shall, in the rest of this thesis, explore the norms of 
research practice and models of explanation used by mainstream and feminist biologists. 
This should enable us to see the extent to which representatives of these two groups 
reproduce or else confront certain dominant beliefs and, as such, repress or activate both 
scientific and socio-political debates within biology.
Radical Scientists and Dialectical Bioloev
The case of Radical Scientists appears as prima facie evidence of how tightly 
intertwined can be the biological and socio-political value-assertions entering theory-buil­
ding in biology. This, in turn, displays the extent to which in the process of justification 
of biological theories, biologists are often forced to use arguments borrowed from the ’soft*, 
observational sciences; yet always they return in the last instance, to the canons of 
justification of ’hard’, experimental sciences. The attempts of Radical Scientists to 
elaborate the approach of a ’dialectics of biology’ is a good example of this.
Preliminary to the comparative study of the practices of biologists in Part IB, the 
examination of Radical Scientists’ critique of biology is very useful for two reasons. First, 
since the bulk of our empirical material is British in provenance, it appears appropriate to 
examine the works of British Radical Scientists, particularly those of the neuro-chemist 
Steven Rose. Secondly, since the feminist biologist Lynda Birke has herself been a militant 
Radical Scientist, the parallel with Rose is likely to be uniquely informative.
140
The Historical Background
Radical Scientists inherited their political militancy from the National Union of 
Scientific Workers (NUSW) and from its most prominent leader, the socialist scientist LD. 
Bernal (Rose and Rose 1969). Bemalism, bearing the concerns of its time, of the inter-war 
years, was mainly concerned with the abuse of a science practice constrained by capitalist 
interests and military purposes (Bernal 1939). It never reached, however, the stage of a 
hardcore critique of the intrinsic philosophy and theoretical value-assertions of modem sci­
entific activity which Radical Scientists would undertake in the 1960s and 1970s (Rose and 
Rose 1969, 1976a, 1976b).
The reflections and activities of Radical Scientists in the 1960s and 1970s were 
geared to the use and abuse of capitalist science. They denounced science when it cautioned 
the goals and interests of a capitalist system of production and the oppression of minority 
groups. And they made an effort to democratize science for the benefit of all, pointing to 
the scientific flaws of certain research programmes, and participating in the diffusion of a 
"science for the people" thereof.
The works of the sociologist and biologist Hilary and Steven Rose are, in Britain, 
paramount in this connection. Both have been involved in the movement British Society 
for Social Responsibility in Science; both have contributed to the left-wing periodical Scie­
nce for People: both have published or collaborated in several collections of essays on 
science and society.
As Marxist socialists, Radical Scientists consider that science is linked to, rather 
than autonomous from, politics and the economy. They also borrow from Engels the idea 
of dialectics of nature: as society evolves upon its internal contradictions, so science chan­
ges upon its own, and so nature constantly transforms itself (Levins and Lewontin 1985; 
Rose 1982a, 1987; Rose and Rose 1976a, 1976b).
According to Radical Scientists, biological science uses the methodology of
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reductionism (i.e. experimentalism) for the wrong ends. That is to say, even though they 
consider the methodological tools provided by reductionism as crucial for the development 
of scientific knowledge and technologies in the interest of all, as a philosophy, they 
perceive it as flawed. Biological reductionism "explains away" people; it focuses on 
individuals instead of pointing to external factors; it blames the very victims of unequal 
social conditions instead of revealing social injustice.
Under the guise of biological determinism of mental behaviour (or "biologism"), the 
philosophy of biological reductionism has become the tool of a policing State hiding its real 
colours behind the pretence of scientific objectivity. It represses the consciousness-raising 
of oppressed minorities such as women, blacks, deviants and convicts, themselves the 
targets of reductionist biological theories of behavioural disorders or intellectual inferio­
rity**.
In sum, Radical Scientists conceive reductionism as flawed in three respects. As a 
research programme, it uses its scientific authority to justify a theory of social life rooted 
in the ideology of dominant social groups and maintaining the oppression of social 
minorities. As a methodological (and experimental) standpoint, it must be seen as limited, 
especially relative to theories of behaviour. As a philosophy (or epistemology), it posits 
incorrectly that causal determinism and the machine metaphor reflect the real nature of 
living forms. Rose and Rose have indeed commented that biological reductionism is a 
"poor science experimentally", but moreover, as a theory of social life and a philosophy of 
nature, it is "bad science ideologically" (Rose and Rose 1976c).
Steven Rose has advanced a more systematic argument. As an epistemology, he 
points out, reductionism contains four flaws which "are far from being trivial" (1987, 28ff). 
First, reductionism incorrectly assumes an ontological priority of lower-level biological 
components (such as genes); secondly, reductionism operates a reification tantamount to the 
"localization fallacy" in the investigation of brain and behaviour*’; thirdly, reductionism 
leads to the arbitrary quantification of human characters (such as aggression or intelligence).
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and moreover, to the separation of these human properties from the social context in which 
they take shape; finally, reductionism projects human qualities onto those of animals and 
then uses the animal behaviours thereby identified to reify the idea of "a human nature" as 
biologically determined once and for all.
Radical Scientists have in fact elaborated their critique of science with a view to 
biological science more particularly. Under its form of biologism (or biological reductio­
nism) modem biology appears as the epitome of a science bearing the imprint of dominant 
ideologies, and this at all levels, institutional, theoretical, methodological, and 
epistemological (Birke 1984a; Birke and Silvertown 1984; Rose 1982a; Rose and Rose 
1976a; Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984).
Yet, not content with criticising current biological science and its bedfellow, 
biological reductionism. Radical Scientists have in the 1980s, embarked on the elaboration 
of a new approach, the "dialectics of biology". Steven Rose with his colleagues at the 
Open University, among them Lynda Birke and Patrick Bateson, and also Leo Kamin, 
Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, and Ruth Hubbard in the United States, have been the 
main proponents of this new approach to biology. This undertaking culminated in the 
convening of a conference in Bressanone, Italy, in March 1980.
The Bressanone Conference was rather informal, attended by roughly fifty scientists, 
mostly biologists but also including sociologists, psychologists and mathematicians. The 
majority came from Britain and America, and some from Europe and Australia. During this 
conference, participants in the "Dialectics of Biology Group" (as they would call themsel­
ves) discussed the limitations of the "philosophy of biological reductionism", more 
specifically in relation to neurobiology and human behaviour (Rose 1982a, 1982b). The idea 
of a dialectics of biology was referred in the main, to the dialectical nature of "the 
relationships between biology and society" in the production of beliefs and of behaviour 
(see also Birke and Best 1980a).
One of the conclusions of the conference was that neither "environmental"
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reductionism nor "biological" reductionism constituted sound approaches to biology. For 
"dialectical biologists’ the existence of a material basis of bio-behavioural phenomena did 
simply not allow for a view of biology as totally determined by external, non-organic, 
factors. Still, their main concern was to find a replacement for the idea of an ’allegedly 
fixed biological basis’ of living matters, since, in human biology more particularly, that idea 
literally meant to divorce biological development of phenotypes and patterns of behaviour 
from a series of factors which might precisely explain these (e.g., familial, cultural, social 
factors) (Birke and Best 1980a)“ . Biology, they argued, definitely needed a new theory of 
’human nature’ and this theory could only be based on a dialectics between biology and 
environment. (Some dialecticians were even more radical, arguing that the idea of an 
’human nature’ itself is intrinsically oppressive and must therefore be avoided (ibid.)).
More recently, the idea of a dialectics of biology has been expounded at greater 
length in the works of Rose, Levins, Lewontin, and Kamin (Levins and Lewontin 1985; 
Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984; Rose 1987). The approach in terms of a "translation 
relationship between correspondents" was believed to change biologists’ frame of mind, and 
to lead biology beyond the philosophy of reductionism. Let us thus examine the extent to 
which this approach has extended beyond the parameters of conventional debates in biology 
and might contribute to an improvement of scientific knowledge of human life and nature.
The Dialectics of Biology: Theoretical, 
Ontological and Methodological Tenets
A dialectics of biology would replace reductionism with a view of nature in which 
organisms and the environment are not separated, but, rather, influence one another in a 
dialectical movement, and might even alter their respective ’natures’. In their writings. 
Rose, Kamin, Levins and Lewontin give several examples showing that nature actually is 
heterogeneous, and that natural objects are highly interactive and constantly transforming 
themselves. For these biologists, the need is urgent for biology to develop new concepts
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and a new methodological programme in order to capture the real character of life and 
nature^\
As an alternative approach, the dialectics of biology would assume that properties 
of 'parts* (e.g., genes or neurochemical pathways in the brain; human behaviours and 
phenotypes) do not exist outside of their environmental context, outside the 'whole*. 
Likewise, it would not assume that properties of the 'whole* account totally for the pro­
perties of the 'part'; but, rather, that 'whole* and 'part* would contribute to shape and alter 
one another. In short, a dialectics of biology entails both an ontological and a theoretical 
renewal of biological thought.
In fact, dialectical biologists are much more sophisticated, if not eclectic, in their 
scientific enterprise. A genuine understanding of biology, they argue, should concentrate 
on the ever-changing form of natural objects rather than on the idea of their constancy and 
permanent form. Heterogeneity and contradictions between components of a living system, 
they contend, are normal rather than exceptional conditions of nature (Levins and Lewontin 
1985)“ .
In their view, a holistic approach to biology is not radical enough; for it neglects 
the presence of contradictions and the ensuing transformations of living objects. As they 
write.
For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, it is ontological in 
the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, 
not only in human social institutions. (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 279)
For dialecticians, change is the "normal condition" of life and nature, while "constancy"
is only apparent, a scientific artefact (ibid., 277). Biological objects are heterogeneous; they
bear their own contradictions and self-negation, and these are the reasons why a sound
approach to biology ought to lean "toward the explanation of change in terms of the
opposing processes united within that object" (ibid., 278). By the same token, and from
an epistemological viewpoint, dialectical biologists wish to warn "mainstream" biologists
to be more modest in their scientific claims. Since nature and human biology are constantly
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transforming themselves in interaction with the environment, then no one, they contend, can 
predict with certainty the development of living forms^.
Several arguments in favour of dialectics of biology however, present logical 
inconsistency. It is, also, not entirely clear how the conceptual tenets the authors propose 
may be implemented; in fact, in the present context of experimental research and 
methodological rules in the empirico-analytical sciences, the conceptual edifice of a 
dialectics of biology seems to collapse. The position of dialectical biologists and the 
credibility of dialectics as a fully-fledged approach or methodology are thereby weakened.
Several times also, animal or plant ’behaviour* is cited in order to buttress the 
dialectical problematic of a biology of human behaviour. It is surprising that, being 
themselves aware of the ontological difference between human behaviours (i.e., teleological 
systems based on agency or rational action) and non-human behaviours (i.e., teleological 
systems of cell physiology, internal metabolism, or selective behaviour)^, dialecticians 
nevertheless seek recourse to such examples.
One of their weakest arguments in this respect is, in our view, symptomatic of their 
political discourse about the biological basis of behaviour. The example, drawn from Not 
in Our Genes (Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984, 286-7), reproduced in The Dialectical 
Biologist (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 273) runs as follows: no one can fly individually or 
in a crowd, yet technological advances in a society (i.e. property of the whole) give indi­
viduals the property of flying^. It seems fairly obvious to us that the latter example is a 
spurious illustration of the interactive properties of objects predicating the dialectical 
approach. Evidently it is not individuals which fly; it is airplanes! In this instance, the flaw 
in the argument stems from unwarranted logical leaps between symbolic representations 
("we fly" because of aircrafts), linguistic conventions ("we fly"), and properties of things 
in themselves (human beings can decidedly not fly; human anatomy militates against this).
Although the above example ought not to be taken as a disproof of dialectical 
biology, one may suspect the rhetoric underlying some of the arguments of dialectical
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biologists. One might be led to suspect, in fact, that as far as human biology is concerned, 
the discourse of dialecticians aims primarily at the political rhetoric relating to a biological 
determination of behaviours, and only secondarily to the scientific debate about biological 
determinism as a methodology. One might, therefore, wish to examine further the extent 
to which a ’dialectics of biology* really imposes itself as a scientific alternative to reduc- 
tionism.
In this respect, it is important to remember that as was posited at Bressanone, the 
reformulation of scientific tenets of human biology and study of the mind does not consist 
in the rejection of reductionism cum biological constraints altogether. Rather, it involves 
considering a fairer balance of biological constraints, "reaction norms" (i.e., social 
determinants), and "human freedom" and synthesize all these under a single framework of 
analysis of human behaviour (Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984). An idea such as that of 
’dialectical determinisms’ may in fact be the answer to the practical difficulties entailed in 
the dialectical approach to biology. For this reason it seems, dialecticians have introduced 
the notions "hierarchy of determinations", environmental feedback, and more importantly, 
"epistemology of translation" (Rose 1987, 5; Rose, Kamin, Lewontin 1984, 87)“ .
But what does it mean, in practical terms, to have a "translation epistemology" of 
different levels of "determinations"? Does it help to sustain the explanatory power of a 
dialectics of biology; or does it only try to expand the theories developed within 
conventional biological methods? Does it really provide a new epistemology for biology? 
Is it revolutionary with respect to holism or to biological determinism? These questions are 
particularly important to address for they would help to test whether a "dialectics of 
biology" can be considered as a fully-fledged alternative approach to current reductionism 
or if it only stands as a dogmatic position within the biological sciences.
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Translation Epistemology in the Dialectics of Biology: 
a Failed Attempt to Ground an Hermeneutical 
Analysis in Biological Empiricism
In their attempt to develop a multi-level analysis transcending the conventional 
descriptions of biological reductionism, dialectical biologists have proposed a "translation 
epistemology". This principle posits that descriptions of objects at one level of the 
biological system are not reducible to those of other levels, but, rather, that they may be 
"translated". On the basis on this principle, it is argued, biology should be able to generate 
a more complete picture of reality. Biological explanations, dialecticians maintain, are 
partial, because the philosophy of reductionism forces scientists to focus the explanation 
on certain objects or functions alone. In contrast, according to a translation epistemology, 
biologists would produce a more accurate understanding of living objects, looking at the 
"whole" rather than at parts alone, thereby shedding light on the relationships between 
different levels of biological phenomena.
Let us examine another example revealing the rationale behind the "translation 
epistemology". This example is drawn from Rose’s Molecules and Mind (1987), and deals 
with memory formation^.
Memory, Rose says, includes at least two processes: learning something about the 
surrounding world; and recalling (or remembering) that thing at some later date. What lies 
between the learning and the remembering is assumed to be some permanent record, a 
"memory trace" or "engram" within the brain. Biochemical "engrams" on the one hand, and 
the behaviour reproduced by memorising on the other, can both be subjected, according to 
Rose, to a translation epistemology of "biological correspondents" since they both describe 
the same phenomenon, memory formation, but at different levels.
In Rose’s experiment, two groups of chicks are trained to peck at beads: some beads 
are water-coated, some others are bitter, methylanthranilate-coated. It is expected that the 
first group will peck at dry beads later but not the second group. In other terms it is
148
assumed that the chicks will have learned "not to peck" at the bitter beads.
Standard neurochemical techniques were used to measure whether the amount of 
glucose utilized by the brain cells of the two groups of chicks was significantly different 
in three specific regions of the cortex associated neuroanatomically with different 
behavioural responses. Six experimental criteria were formulated in order to test whether 
memory indeed corresponded to the metabolic biochemistry of "engrams"^.
Does the "epistemology of translation" in the above example represent a new 
epistemology? Does it vindicate the approach of dialectics? Does it even stand as a new 
research programme for the biological sciences?
First I do not see what is so uniquely novel about a description in terms of 
"corresponding levels of language" in comparison with a conventional description of the 
biochemical and behavioural manifestations of memory formation. The effect appears purely 
an artefact of language.
I would even contend that the term "translation" is actually a misnomer in the 
present case; is it not, in fact, two different objects that Rose has described here, the 
chemical reactions on the one hand, and bodily movements on the other? If so, then the 
example does not qualify either logically or empirically, as a dismissal of reductionist 
models of explanations^. One would need a different kind of argument to sustain the 
irreducibility of chick’s behaviour to biochemical markers.
My second counter-argument is borrowed from Arbib and Hesse’s discussion of the 
link between brain theory (or cognitive science) and a psychology or sociology of mental 
behaviour (Arbib and Hesse 1986). Arbib and Hesse maintain that neurons descriptions and 
mental descriptions are complementary, yet neither identical nor interchangeable^. 
Neuro-chemical pathways form the material basis necessary for mental behaviour to occur. 
But mental activity (and behaviour at that) can only be properly understood in terms of 
human volition, representations of objects in everyday life, and social norms or expec­
tations.
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For Arbib and Hesse, it seems that the idea of a reductive science, incorporating 
the results of both neurochemistry and psychosociology is not as ’dangerous* as Radical 
Scientists would allege. For them, reductionism in this case would indeed help for a 
rapprochement between the sciences (or levels of analysis) concerned with cognition and 
mental behaviour. Reductionism ought not to be construed as a reduction of the concepts 
of one science into those of another. Empirically, even a fine microanalysis of lower level 
neurochemistry will never provide the additional information or predictive accuracy of a 
theory of mental representations for instance. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view, 
Arbib and Hesse maintain that the "scientific study of the brain will need both the 
’high-level’ language of [schema] theory to describe mental states and behavior... and 
’low-level’ language to describe the anatomy and physiology of neurons" (1986, 71). This 
does not seem to diverge drastically from the point of view of dialectical biologists: Arbib 
and Hesse simply do not refrain from using the word ’reductionism’ to mean a 
’rapprochement’ of the levels of analysis of brain functions and mental representations, 
while dialectical biologists prefer to use the term ’translation’ to mean the same thing!
As a result, I would contend that Rose’ s "translation epistemology" does not differ 
so much from the views of Arbib and Hesse or of any biologist proponent of a realist 
epistemology. They would all certainly agree with the idea that a progress of scientific 
knowledge about human biology and human action lies in the impetus to produce "a 
bridging theory that can provide a coherent level of description", to use Arbib and Hesse’s 
formulation, between cognitive studies of the brain and social studies of behaviour (ibid., 
71). In brief, scientists and philosophers who claim a materialist and realist epistemology, 
would conceive of organic and mental phenomena as interconnected spatio-temporarily, but 
this would not prevent them from distinguishing organic components and mental compo­
nents for purposes of explanation (i.e., methodological), for ontological reasons, and, in the 
case of Radical Scientists more specifically, for political reasons. It is true, however, that 
Radical Scientists seem to be among those few scientists who aim at dismantling the
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institutional barriers preventing the very integration of social studies and the natural 
sciences, and who are prepared to fight for the creation of the organizational conditions 
favourable to the elaboration of a genuinely new research agenda for biology.
In the last analysis, therefore, Rose’s "translation epistemology” appears to simply 
be a discursive strategy challenging crude biologically reductionist interpretations of human 
phenomena. His actual investigation of the different levels of biological phenomena lies 
entirely within the confines of conventional realism and the methodology of biology as an 
empirico-analytical science. As far as this is concerned, I see in Rose’s views essentially 
a reemergence of the scientific problematics discussed at the Alpbach Conference.
In fact, Rose’s interpretation of animal behaviour allegedly justifying his "dialectical 
framework" to human biology and behaviour seemed to me less unconvincing, than readily 
mischosen. I can only see a dogmatic (or political) rationale behind his adamant opposition 
to biological reductionism as an explanation of chicks pecking or not pecking at beads
As for his proof that dialectics and translation stand as sound alternative approaches 
to human biology of the mind, I do not believe that his arguments are strong. In fact I 
would argue that if there is a place for a defense of dialectics in biology, it is not to be 
found in Rose’s experiment on chicks, but rather in a good hermeneutical argument about 
the ’real nature’ of organic and non-organic determinations on human biology and beha­
viour.
Summarv
In this chapter, we have highlighted the parallels between some important scientific 
issues addressed within the history of ’mainstream’ biology on the one hand, and 
’dialectical biology’ on the other, with a view to the analysis of feminist biology. We have 
noticed some contradictions in the scientific discourse of dialectical biologists. We showed, 
for instance, that they tend to gloss over heterogeneous examples relating to human
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behaviour and plants or insects, but also, at the same time, to emphasize the specificity of 
human biology and action with respect to sociopolitical factors. We observed that to 
presuppose constancy and determinations of biological forms is a methodological 
pre-requisite for experimental biology, even though, theoretically and ontologically, living 
forms, and more importantly, human beings, appear, in reality, to be interactive and 
permanently self-transforming "objects". Thus we would qualify dialecticians* opposition 
to the theory of biological reductionism as a rejection of rigid determinations but not of 
biological determinations in general. Indeed, dialectical biologists, like scientists in general, 
have a minimal faith in scientific realism: they believe that the methods of empiri­
co-analytical science may help in the discovery of better explanations about nature and 
human biology.
I would like to suggest, therefore, that from a sociology of scientific knowledge, the 
position of dialectical biologists towards biological reductionism does not diverge so much 
from that of a great many mainstream biologists. For if the former make a strong stand in 
favour of a dialectical and interactive ontology (or view of the intrinsic characters) of 
biological objects and processes, the latter also accept this view to a great extent, as will 
be shown in chapter 6. Also, even though Radical Scientists emphasize the limitations of 
methodological reductionism, namely experimentalism, they are far from dispensing with 
it. Likewise, many mainstream biologists will interpret very cautiously laboratory results 
which, as they admit, do not replicate well what is actually going on in nature. They only 
continue with experimentalism because it is more manageable and is the surest way for a 
biological explanation to earn (at least partly) credibility.
Having made these clarifications, I would argue, on the other hand, that dialectical 
biologists and mainstream biologists diverge on the issue of militancy and research orienta­
tions. That is, from a sociological (or institutional) viewpoint, dialecticians* critique is an 
impetus to transform the norms of practice both scientifically and politically. Dialecticians 
are very critical of the research agenda of biology, which, they believe, is less oriented
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towards human welfare and the unveiling of the social sources of human diseases, than to 
industrial pay-offs or institutionally organized social control. Also, with regards to the 
politics of science, the former are openly socialists'^ and politically active. The latter would, 
in contrast, generally abide by the institutional rules of practice, notwithstanding the 
criticisms they make in private circles.
Since the current research agenda of biology tends, according to dialecticians and 
Radical Scientists, to exploit the flawed philosophy of biological reductionism and to 
maintain public beliefs in the authority of scientists on knowledge; the former consequently 
feel prompted to voice their disagreements. In sum, their dialectical viewpoint makes 
Radical Scientists feel especially concerned with the powerful authority of biology in the 
sphere of behavioural studies on the one hand, and, not least importantly, in sociopolitical 
debates and on commonsense beliefs. In contrast, mainstream biologists do not seem to 
think that these social concerns are matters of professional responsibility.
In brief. Radical Scientists’ critique of reductionism is motivated partly on 
methodological and theoretical arguments (and these are justified scientifically but do not 
resolve, in the last analysis, the fundamental problems of biological epistemology), and 
also partly on political grounds, this time with a view to the social responsibility of the 
scientific milieu in the social arena, and, lastly, to the opening up of disciplinary barriers 
in biology and social studies. From a strictly scientific viewpoint they argue for a 
reinstatement of the concepts of holism and dialectics at the levels of experimental design, 
observation protocols, and the interpretation of results^^. But they make such a strong case 
against the political abuse of biological reductionism as a model of explanation of social 
(i.e., class, sexual or racial) differences that this tends to overstate the real scope of biologi­
cal dialectics as an alternative to methodological reductionism. As such, this accords more 
weight to the idea that Radical Scientists and dialectical biologists diverge from mainstream 
biologists much less on scientific matters proper (their disagreements relate to rather "con­
ventional" debates in biology) than on political matters such as research priorities and
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disciplinary jurisdictions.
Finally we saw that dialectical biologists have not convincingly come to terms with 
the epistemological dualism relating to studies of human biology and action. For their 
dialectics of biology is not, in the last analysis, a genuinely new epistemology; it remains 
basically the realist epistemology of empirico-analytical science.
It is undeniable, however, that the root of their opposition to biological reductionism 
lies in the bluired epistemological space occupied by biological studies of human action, 
a space where social values enter directly theory-building and models of *the preferred 
states of human systems*. It is also in this epistemological * niche* that feminist biologists 
have contributed most originally to certain specific areas in the field of biology and may 
continue to do so, as our forthcoming comparative study will endeavour to show.
Endnotes
1) Obviously, this sketchy review is not exhaustive, neither in terms of the 
disciplines covered nor of the scientific debates discussed; on the other hand it highlights 
the major scientific and epistemological problems encountered in the development of 
biology, problems of major interest with respect to the sociology of knowledge and the 
feminist critiques of biology.
2) During the first third of the twentieth century a deep gulf still existed between 
experimental geneticists and naturalists. They were talking different languages, using diffe­
rent concepts, asking different questions. It was believed that in order to unite the two 
camps, geneticists had to accept the limitations of their explanatory framework and laws 
of heredity, and become interested in parameters relating to evolution, natural selection, and 
systematics. On the other hand, naturalists had to integrate the idea of genetic mutations 
into their interpretation of evolution. The unification of the two approaches came about in 
1947 after a dozen years of scientific exchanges between the two camps, under the 
designation of "the evolutionary synthesis". The term refers to J. Huxley*s book of 1942, 
Evolution: the Modem Svnthesis. See Allen 1975; Mayr 1982; Webster 1981.
3) These two broad categories of characteristics point to the root of the opposition 
between teleologists and reductionists. Having said this, and as several biologists and 
philosophers would suggest, biological objects can be examined from more than two 
different perspectives: one can focus, for example, on the function, on the structure, or on 
the phylogénie transformation of these objects. See Grene 1974; Rose 1987; Rosenberg 
1985; Ruse 1981 (see also note 21).
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4) As shown in chapter 1, sociobiology posits that selected behaviour is to be 
explained by the possession of certain genes. This is the epitome of a ’reduction* of the 
adaptive behaviour of species (usually construed in terms of teleology) to the survival of 
the best genes. This logic of explanation may, however, be easily turned upside down (as 
in Wilsonian sociobiology) and mistaken for a causal model in which behaviours and 
organisms are ’caused* by genes.
5) Ayalla and Dobzhansky (1974) distinguish the three different domains to which 
a discussion of reductionism in biology may pertain: ontological, methodological, and epis­
temological (or theoretical). Epistemological reductionism is the domain most often 
discussed by philosophers: it refers to the issues of derivability and connectability of 
biological theories from the laws of physics and chemistry.
6) Dealing with the question of teleological explanations, organic systems, and 
reductionism, Maijorie Grene (1974) comes to a different conclusion. She holds that 
biology is ontologically, as well as methodologically specific.
7) As an example of this, we can imagine at least five instances in which the notion 
of teleology emerges. First, it appears in studies of evolution of organisms, from simple 
forms to complex ones, from phyla to species. Teleology is mere speculation in this case. 
In the second instance however, the theory of natural selection, speculation is limited by 
some conditions and ’laws’ that govern the evolution of certain species and rule over our 
interpretation of paleontological data: these ’laws’ are, for example, those of "fimess", 
"adaptation" and "survival". Teleology may refer, in a third instance, to the explanation of 
regulation mechanisms and organic functions of certain living forms and organs. Fourthly, 
teleology may refer to a ’multi-tiered’ system. As cells become tissues, then organs, then 
organ-systems, the cell develops in a hierarchical order of sub-systems and is activated 
according to different equilibrium strategies. Finally, and as natural historians and evolutio­
nists have pointed out, a teleological system may contain contradictory forces: for instance, 
in some theories of natural selection, for instance, individuals and species are defined as 
having distinct needs and reacting with different strategies of survival (e.g. what is good 
for the survival of the group is not automatically good for the individual).
8) Vitalism was a perspective on biology which assumed the presence of some ’vital 
force’ intrinsic to living organisms and not reducible to the categories of physics and 
chemistry. Driesch and Bergson held this view, until it eventually faded into oblivion in 
scientific circles. As for the main proponents of a mechanistic view of living forms, there 
were von Helmholtz, Brucke and the Berlin School of "medical materialists" in the mid- 
1800s, and, at the turn of the century, the embryologist Roux and the physiologist Loeb.
9) At the end of the nineteenth century, morphologists, who were mainly interested 
in speculating about the origin of specimens and species, were harshly criticized by physio­
logists who defended the experimental approach in the name of scientific objectivity.
10) The scientific authority of mechanistic biologists was seriously eroded in the 
1920s and 1930s when Sherrington, Speeman and Haldane (to name a few) developed the 
conceptual bases of an approach in terms of holism, directed to capturing the highly 
interactive character of living forms. The notions of "emerging properties" and "hierarchical
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system" of organic components in nature resurfaced, but in a less metaphysical fashion than 
vitalists would have argued.
11) The major debate in those days arose in molecular biology between the 
structural school (with Pauling, Bernal, Perutz, Hodgkin, Bragg and Astbury), and the infor­
mational school (with Schroedinger, Bohr, Delbruck, Luria, and the "Phage Group").
12) In the production of DNA, the process of translating nucleic acids into peptides 
and proteins was proved to be uni-directional rather than bi-directional. This discovery is 
commonly referred to as the "central dogma" in molecular genetics.
13) We are borrowing the terminology of "goals and preferable states of the system" 
from P. Machamer. "Teleology and Selective Processes" in Loeic. Laws, and Life. R.G. 
Colodny, ed., 129-42 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
14) We should like to mention, here, that Ruse (1978, 1981,1987) and Rosenberg 
(1980) also argue, rather surprisingly, that human sociobiology is a fully authoritative 
scientific discipline.
15) The debates revolving around the priorization of bio-medical research and 
molecular biology have indeed extended into the public domain. Every week, newspapers 
publish articles in this regard. See for instance, the debate between S. Rose and D. 
Weatherall in "Free Speech: Does medical research focus on the real cause of disease?" in 
The Independent. 17 February 1990; and N. Russel "Biology and Politics" in The 
Independent. 26 February 1990. See also the comments of biologists on this issue in chapter 
6.
16) With reference to genetic engineering and the resurgence of eugenics, we would 
especially refer to the critiques of Radical Scientists presented in the next section. See also 
Arditti and others (1980), Goodfield (1977), Roll-Hansen (1988), Wright (1986).
17) As the paleontologist S.J. Gould wrote, "Evolution is one of the half-dozen 
shattering ideas science has developed to overturn past hopes and assumptions, and to 
enlighten current thoughts" (1985, 14). The notion of evolution, indeed, has a personal 
appeal for individuals, for it speaks directly to us: how did we arise; why do we differ as 
human beings? In this sense the value-assertions entering theory-building in evolution 
theory and human biology are likely to remain at the core of many political controversies, 
both within circles of biologists and among the lay public.
18) In their introduction to the collection of essays The Radical!zation of Science 
(1976e), Rose and Rose propounded the five tenets of a programme of Radical Science. 
First, a Radical Science should explore the ideological components of Capitalist science, 
and complementarily, ask what a socialist science would be. Secondly, the goal of breaking 
down the barriers between expert and non-expert should remain paramount. Yet Radical 
Scientists should remain cautious with projects such as "Science for People", for within 
bourgeois society, popularisation of science often carries more emotional charge than 
substance; that forms a third tenet. Fourthly, it is crucial that Radical Science raises the 
consciousness of all scientists, in order to make them realize the dual role of science, rather
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than let them perpetuate the sense that scientific knowledge is objective, salutary and 
"above ideology". Finally, Radical Science should seek to achieve a less sexist practice. 
This, it is held, has the valuable property of stimulating self-reflexivity within the move­
ment of Radical Science itself. It also constitutes a new angle from which to analyse the 
political implications and forms of social control via science.
19) For instance, the source of "aggressiveness" should not be seen in individuals, 
in their genes or in some area of their brains. In Not in Our Genes (1984, 145-46), Rose, 
Kamin and Lewontin contended that, despite the fact that particular brain regions can be 
associated with certain behaviours, none of these areas is sufficient as an explanation of 
these behaviours, referring to the "localization fallacy" of biological reductionism in studies 
of behaviour.
20) Indeed, since dialectical biologists argue for an integration of nature and 
culture, this raises a problem in terminology. Unwilling to separate ’biology* from its ’en­
vironment’, the qualifier ’biological’ itself becomes blurred.
21) It might be useful at this point to present the classification of Kamminga who 
suggested distinguishing the approaches of five groups of biologists according to three 
parameters: ontological, epistemological and methodological. Those five groups are: the 
Classical Mechanists (Helmholtz, Loeb); the Classical Vitalists (Driesh, Bergson); the Re­
ductionists (Crick, Watson, Monod); the Materialist Holists (Pasteur, Waddington, Levins, 
Lewontin); the Idealist Holists (Kant, Bernard, Woodger, Polanyi). According to 
Kamminga, the Materialist Holists differ, for instance, from the other groups because they 
do not believe in the discontinuity between the living and the non-living domains; they ^  
not believe that it needs explanatory principles fundamentally different from those used in 
the physical sciences; they do not believe that the behaviour of living things should be 
investigated and explained solely with reference to the properties and structural relations 
of their constituent parts (my stress). Dr. Harmke Kamminga, Public Lecture on "Whole, 
Parts and Aims of Explanation in Biology", Kings College, London, 2 March 1988.
22) Two instances of this are given: the metabolic process and ecological system, 
in both of which the ’whole’ may be construed as constantly oscillating and rarely in 
equilibrium.
23) As such, they seem to stand for a ’negative-endorser’ epistemology, to use 
Gellner’s terminology: they do argue for a realist epistemology in biology, but reject any 
form of predictive theories. It is noteworthy that Rose decided to use a mere foomote to 
stress his rejection not only reductionism but holism as well (1987, 32: footnote 1). This, 
it seems to me, reveals a negative-endorsement of dialectical biology.
24) They maintain that biological determinism is indeed "the essence of the 
differences between human biology and that of other organisms. Our brains, hands, and 
tongues have made us independent of many single major features of the external world" 
(Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984, 289-90).
25) They write further,
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Only an individual can think, but only society can have a class structure. At 
the same time, what makes the relation between society and the individual 
dialectical is that individuals acquire from the society produced by them 
individual properties, like flying, that they did not possess in isolation"
(Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984, 287).
26) But dialecticians avoid the concept of hierarchy. So they prefer to speak in 
terms of "wholes", "processes" and "structures" (Rose, Kamin and Lewontin 1984,277-78).
27) Rose gives a first indication of the principle of translation by referring to the 
twitch of a frog’s leg. There are at least five ways of explaining the contraction of a muscle 
in a frog's leg: phylogenetics (i.e. the selective behaviour of the frog "to flee predators"), 
ontogeny (i.e. development of the frog embryo), biochemistry (the action of actin and myo­
sin), holism (i.e. of the type "because the frog wanted to jump"), or chronological sequence 
of events. These five levels of analysis are neither contradictory nor reducible to one of 
those levels. Rose contends.
28) The criteria run as follows:
1. The process or metabolite must show neuroanatomically localised changes in level or rate 
during memory formation;
2. The time course of the change in biochemistry must match the time course of the 
specific phase of memory formation of which it is the correspondent;
3. Stress, motor activity, or other necessary but not sufficient predispositions or 
concomitants of learning, must not in themselves, and in the absence of memory formation, 
result in changes in Criterion 1;
4. If the cellular/biochemical changes of Criterion 1 are inhibited during the period over 
which memory formation should occur, the memory formation should be inhibited, and vice 
versa;
5. Removal of the anatomical locus (or loci) at which the changes of Criterion 1 occur 
should interfere with the process of memory formation and/or recall, depending on when, 
in relation to the training, the region is removed;
6. Neurophysiological recording from the locus (or loci) of the changes of Criterion 1 and 
5 should detect altered cellular responses during and/or as a consequence of memory 
formation.
These criteria should form. Rose hopes, an approach which "combines a respect for 
reductionist methodology with a commitment to a non-reductionist, dialectical (or integra- 
tionist) philosophical standpoint" (Rose 1987, 127).
29) C. Sinha ("Negotiating Boundaries: Psychology, Biology and Society" in 
Towards a Liberatorv Bioloev. ed. S. Rose, 26-39. London: Allison and Busby, 1982) 
argues that Rose’s translation thesis is "reductionism reintroduced by the back door". For 
his translations of level-descriptions presuppose an "isomorphism" of theories in diverse 
disciplines rather than a real irreducible complementarity.
30) Arbib and Hesse’s reductionism is nothing to do with Wilsonian biology, for 
instance, or with Chomskian "mentalism" (see note 10, chapter 3), or with the notion of 
"emergent properties" in the works of Sherrington (see note 10) or Weiss (infra).
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31) It seemed to us that the reductionist model could convey very high explanatory 
content without distorting excessively the ’real nature* of these animals* behaviours. 
Equally we are not convinced when Rose writes as his ultimate justification: "even so 
simple a memory as a chick’s avoiding a bead it has once experienced as tasting bitter, 
can(not) be reduced to molecules"; "memory does not lie in the molecules at all, but in 
some sense in the reorganised cellular networks that the molecules form" (Rose 1987,136).
32) Interestingly, the majority of British, Canadian and American feminist biologists 
interviewed in this research also are socialists.
33) Rose in fact wrote as part of his discussion of models of explanation in biology 
in On Molecules and Mind:
I am critical but I am not trying to be negative ... A unitary materialist 
understanding of mind/ brain relationships, of the sort for which I argue, 
must reject [the] dichotomy [between social and medical models of mental 
behaviours and disorder]. (1987, 111)
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CHAPTERS
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FIELDWORK WITH 
BRITISH AND CANADIAN BIOLOGISTS
This brief chapter will discuss the research design, type of material, and method 
of analysis of the empirical studies presented in Part HI of the thesis.*
Among the various methods available in sociology, and the approaches more 
common to the sociology of scientific knowledge, it became obvious very early in my 
research that certain avenues were inaccessible while others remained manageable. I chose 
to conduct a small scale survey of ’mainstream biologists’ and to contrast the results with 
data from two ’case studies’ of practising feminist biologists. These two methods are fairly 
standard in sociology (Festinger et Katz 1953; Bryman 1988). However, the singular 
fashion in which I utilized these methods, especially in view of the methodological and 
epistemological debate in recent sociology of scientific knowledge, seems to be in need of 
further justifications.
In this chapter, I shall assume that the choice of a method may rest on large 
epistemological considerations, or may result more directly from technical assessment of 
the options available for elucidating a research question, given the kinds of data at hand 
(see Bryman 1988). In the first section, I shall discuss the approaches commonly offered 
in sociology and their advantages and limitations from the point of view of my research 
problems. In the second section, I shall attempt to justify, on a theoretical basis, my choice 
of a small scale survey of academic biologists in London and two ’case studies’ of feminist 
biologists, British and Canadian, including survey of their published material, interviews, 
and direct observation, while leaving out the option of conducting participant observation 
of scientific work or examining cases of feminists who, in contrast, have abandoned 
biological research as such. Finally, I shall discuss the practical decisions I had to make
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throughout the research process, and the compromises involved, with respect to the quality 
and quantity of my sample of interviewees and two cases of practising feminist biologists.
General Approaches to Empirical Investigation 
in Sociologv in General and in the Socioloev 
of Scientific Knowledge in Particular
As we shall see shortly, the epistemological issue of methodology is most 
problematic in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Yet it is also true that more pragmatic 
considerations have played a role in the choice of research designs and methods in this 
discipline. The usual reliance on written texts documenting ’bodies of knowledge* of the 
past, or on formal and informal oral and published material related to breakthroughs in 
scientific research are cases in point. Documents and human recollections are the only 
means to recapture phenomena of the past, remote or recent.
Similarly, taking account of the resources at my disposal and the kind of issues I 
wanted to investigate empirically, I had to make decisions about the material I would gather 
in terms of the validity of this material to the problems being studied.
In the sociology of knowledge, the debate between qualitative and quantitative 
research does not emerge as a major methodological feature. The constitution of the 
sociology of knowledge as a discipline has in fact been sustained by the defence of 
qualitative research methods alone, primarily phenomenological and interpretative 
(Outhwaite 1975; Winch 1958; Bleicher 1982). Thus, the question as to which qualitative 
method offered by sociology is the most suitable for the purpose of understanding the 
process of production of knowledge is more crucial than the common debate between the 
respective virtues of the quantitative, ’scientistic* method and the qualitative, ’descriptive* 
method.
Having said that, one can use survey methods for studies of opinions or attitudes, 
for these permit the study of recurrences of opinions, widespread patterns of thought, and
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collective ’frames of mind’. More often than not, however, in the present day the object of 
study of sociologists of knowledge is not the search for this or that pattern of ideas. It is 
more a search for deep structures of thought and homologies with the material structure 
of social life. The focus of attention will very often also be a major piece of work in 
literature or in science for which a content analysis or ’context-bound’, hermeneutical 
reflexion are more suited (Goldmann 1964; Bloor 1976). In the sociologv of scientific 
knowledge such macro-analyses of large or smaller bodies of knowledge rank high on the 
research agenda of the ’Strong Programme’.
Thus, the preference of sociologists of knowledge for content-oriented (e.g., archival 
analysis, interview, content analysis) or process-oriented (e.g., participant or non-participant 
observation, ethnomethodology, ethnography) methods for understanding the relationship 
between social conditions and cognitive products remains paramount. This does not mean 
that more standardized quantitative methods are irrelevant, or that statistical data are of no 
use. For instance, in studies of macro-structures of science, figures of investment in R&D 
come to complement and document more accurately the context in which ’systems’ of 
knowledge evolve and interact (Sklair 1973; Ravetz 1971; Rose & Rose 1969). But the 
focus on micro-processes is now more stringent and prescriptive on the agenda of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. And to pursue Bryman’s dichotomy, this has more to do 
with ’epistemological’ motives than with ’technical’ reasons. Such a shift of focus has 
brought about what Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay call ’methodological intemalism’ (1983, 6).
The accrued influence of this ’new’ version of the internalist approach in the field 
of the sociology of scientific knowledge can be explained by two sets of reasons. Firstly, 
in epistemology, there is a consensus regarding the empirical underdetermination of 
theories. As a result, the investigation of how the ’missing links’ between scientific claims 
and reality are being ’constructed’ leads directly to the minute, qualitative field studies of 
laboratory work and scientific networks (Latour & Wool gar 1979; Collins 1985; Lynch 
1982; Knorr-Cetina 1981).
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Secondly, the emergence of ’methodological intemalism’ is concerned with the 
empirical re-enforcement of theories in the sociology of knowledge. The sociologists who 
favour an internalist approach do so because they acknowledge that previous studies 
assumed too roundly what precisely needs to be studied in order to understand the link 
between the social and the intellectual (or technical) components of science. Thus, 
’methodological intemalism’ endeavours to establish satisfactorily the weight of social 
constraints on the technical rationalisations of scientific claims. The sociology of science 
of the past fifteen years has markedly embarked on the task of documenting properly that 
"knowledge is socially or existentially conditioned... and to work out in what sense and to 
what degree we can speak coherently of knowledge as being rooted in social life (Knorr- 
Cetina & Mulkay 1983, 6). The sociology of scientific knowledge has therefore taken an 
’empirical tum’. That is, it is now far less concemed than before with macro-sociological 
parameters affecting social knowledge or with the question of whv these bodies of 
knowledge take place. It now prefers to focus on the question of how scientific claims are 
produced, gain legitimacy, and finally assert their validity (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983; 
Latour & Woolgar 1979; Collins 1985).^
The sociology of knowledge intended to become a sort of ’self-reflexive’ 
methodology for the whole discipline of sociology, paying particular attention to the process 
by which it produces its own validity-claims^. In the same vein, the methodological 
question is particularly important for the sociology of scientific knowledge.
In this respect, discussions about the ’scientific’ or ’objective’ character of the 
hermeneutic method has raised particular problems (Outhwaite 1975; Habermas 1976; 
Bemstein 1983; Hekman 1986). The notions of contextualism, meaningfulness, and 
representation are at the forefront of social studies in human knowledge. The question of 
the role played by language in the production of knowledge has manifestly impregnated the 
whole field of study (Gergen 1982; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983; Schütz 1962; Berger & 
Luckmann 1967; Barnes & Bloor 1982). While the quantitative and more formal methods
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of enquiry tend to take discourse at its face value and to overlook the deep structures of 
social knowledge, qualitative research offers more insight into the processes creating those 
very bodies of knowledge and discourses (Bryman 1988). Be it historiography, content 
analysis of archival work, ethnography, participant observation of laboratory work, in-depth 
interviewing, phenomenological analysis of discourse, or epistemological reflexion, the 
specificity of the sociology of scientific knowledge lies in its aim to understand bodies of 
knowledge in their social context as individual cases, rather than describe large-scale 
patterns of conduct or opinions — although one does not exclude the other.
Surprisingly however, feminist studies of knowledge have tended to emulate the 
earlier traditions of the sociology of knowledge. That is to say, they have tried to elicit whv 
science and technology came to be shaped as ’void of emotions’, oblivious of ’subjectivity’, 
oriented towards ’control and domination of nature’, ’reductionist’, ’patriarchal’.
The explanations feminists have proposed are sensible and some of their ideas are 
empirically justified. But often feminists will tend to overstate the causal relationship 
between patriarchy and epistemology, or bluntly assimilate ’patriarchal’ and ’male-biased’ 
interests with ’scientific motives’ with which feminist themselves, in their own research 
practice, do not dispense -  such as canons of ’objectivity’, ’experimental control’, 
’causality’, and so on. Overall, the empirical investigation of how patriarchal and 
androcentric biases came to shape the ’scientific method and endeavour’ and to maintain 
themselves as ’epistemologically mandatory’ remains unsatisfactory in feminist studies of 
science. The actual outcome of the qualitative empirical investigation conducted by 
feminists has shed light solely on the question of the gendered division of labour in 
scientific practice (Homans 1989; Rose 1986; Kahle 1985; Rosser 1985, 1988a; Reskin 
1978). It has not yet enlightened our understanding of the actual process of producing 
scientific claims and legitimating them through the ’institutional’ channels of the ’scientific 
community’. Field studies focusing on the key notions of inteipretation of evidence, 
negotiation of meanings, and persuasion are yet to come^.
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This trend is especially unfortunate since the core of the arguments in feminist 
theories of knowledge concentrate on how the notions of 'womens* interests* and *feminine 
values* can play a revolutionary role in the negotiation of new meanings and challenge the 
predominantly patriarchal and male biased research designs and interpretive statements 
’built-in’ in scientific theories.
Feminist studies of science are also, first and foremost critical rather than empirical. 
Several works of feminists, for instance, address established corpuses of knowledge from 
a critical, feminist standpoint, akin to postmodernist examination of text and discourse 
(Bleier 1984,1988; Fausto-Sterling 1985,1987; Hubbard 1979,1982). The historiographical 
type of method is also common. Several feminist historians deal with the role and status 
of ’knowledgeable women’ in history (Abir-Am & Outram 1987; Alic 1986; Rossiter 1982; 
Rosenberg 1982). Obviously, a great number of these studies have shown that men have 
dominated science while women were literally refused access to it. But the precise process 
of how patriarchal statements come to be validated, at the expense of opposing claims, 
proposed by feminists for example, remains as yet unexplored.
True, there are very few examples permitting the study of such process, certainly 
due to the fact that the principal creators of challenger claims are mainly women and 
feminists and there are still very few of them in science. But this is not a good reason for 
resorting to circular arguments and contend that feminist science will be vindicated only 
when we live in a feminist world. It is high time to explore critically what the few cases 
of feminist biological practice can tell us about the form and content of feminist natural 
science, and possibly recast the feminist theory of scientific knowledge on these grounds.
However, as will be shown in the next section, the option of following 
’methodological intemalism’ to study these cases was hampered by the necessity of 
comparing two ’trends’ (namely, mainstream and feminist) in biological practice, thus 
augmenting the number of settings to be observed. Also, since one of our hypotheses 
involves distinguishing between biological specialties and subject matters, this generated
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logistic complications for the implementation of the otherwise insightful ’internal approach*. 
I decided, therefore, not to go ahead with the ’internal approach’. As noted above, my 
methodological choice does not denigrate this approach. I simply believed that, all things 
being considered, a question such as ’how do feminist biologists "construct" scientific facts’ 
could begin to be addressed by means of more normative questions such as, ’how far does 
the handful of feminist biologists challenge traditional biological practice’ or ’to what 
extent have they renewed the norms of research in biology, both in terms of organization 
and of "scientific" method’?
How the Methods Chosen AppIv to mv Research Question
Why were the methods of survey, interviews and observation, and documentary 
analysis adopted in my research? Why did I conduct a ’purposive sample’ of interviews 
with ’mainstream biologists’ rather than a case study; why semi-structured interviews rather 
than a participant observation? Why did I choose to carry out ’case studies’ of feminist 
biologists instead of interviews as well? Why did I focus on them alone and not on their 
departmental ’mainstream colleagues’ as well, and draw a contrast? Why did I focus on 
their publications rather than on the records of granting committees or departmental boards? 
Why did I choose not to investigate the cases of feminists who have abandoned biological 
practice, as a contrasting example?
In my fieldwork, I used a combination of qualitative methods in line with my 
theoretical aims. I was looking for elaborate arguments on the part of ’mainstream’ and 
’feminist’ biologists and believed that face-to-face interviews would be preferable than 
questionnaires in seizing important aspects of their views on their discipline. It was believed 
that the choice of typical cases would better document my central arguments regarding the 
inconsistencies in the discourse of feminists about ’conventional’ biology and its 
procedures. Although the responses from my survey could not be taken as statistically
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representative of the larger population of British biologists, the hope of drawing 
generalizations from my material was sustained.
My decision to conduct fieldwork with ^mainstream* biologists was based on two 
theoretical reasons. First, I believed that the relevance of ’feminine* values in biological 
production could only be assessed by looking at how, within *non-feminist* settings, the 
stvle of practice and research interests of women would emerge. Second, my main goal was 
not to look at feminist practice alone, but to evaluate the harsh criticisms of feminist 
theoreticians of ’mainstream biology’. On this second count, I was able to obtain interesting 
insights into the so-called ’revisionary’ views of mainstream biologists on their discipline 
and to test the soundness of the feminist criticisms.
Surprisingly enough, my first research design only included ’mainstream biologists’, 
and aimed at comparing their positions with those of feminist theoreticians. But I faced two 
problems. My training as a sociologist did not equip me for even a basic understanding of 
their published material. In the same vein, I could not critically evaluate all the scientific 
writings relevant to feminist critiques, which dealt with various disciplines and topics. In 
any event, it is a common point of methodology for sociologists of science not to rely 
solely on published material of scientists, because such material depicts only partly the real 
features of the scientific ’world’. Publications are often believed to ’filter’ the results of a 
process of formal and informal activities giving rise to scientific claims (Medawar 1985; 
Collins 1985; Latour & Woolgar 1979; Ziman 1968).
The idea of case studies of feminist practitioners arose from the results of the pilot 
survey of mainstream biologists. These pointed to an aspect of biological practice, namely 
its practical and ’cognitive’ constraints, that has been overlooked by feminists theoreticians 
in their evaluation of the limitations of ’reductionist biology’, but acknowledged in the 
writings of practising feminist biologists like Lynda Birke.
One could rightly argue that well-chosen participant observations in two different 
settings (i.e. ’mainstream’ and feminist) would have conveyed a good picture of ’real’.
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’hard core’ discrepancies between two trends of biological practice. Notwithstanding the 
costs in time and nuisance for all the people involved, I preferred to examine more varied 
settings and examples of biological discourse than to carry out in-depth interviews or long­
term participant observation in only one or two laboratories. Also, all kinds of permissions 
must be sought when one wants to do participant observation. In the biological field for 
instance, there are some fast moving -  and rather secretive -  sectors where it is not easy 
for a sociologist to gain access. Lastly, while it is common in qualitative research not to 
have a strong observational framework at the onset of a participant observation, this 
approach is often thought of as a ’loose* and ’soft’ by scientists and this may make them 
reluctant to cooperate. In one instance of my research, I actually had to submit a written 
project to the head of department, before I finally had the green light to conduct interviews 
in her department
It became obvious to me quite early in the process therefore, that it was not possible 
to carry out long-term participant observation of ’mainstream biologists’ for at least two 
reasons: time scale of my study, and the nature of my theoretical aim. First I did not want 
to confine myself to one laboratory because I needed to control for the specialty of the 
biologists being studied. I saw it very time-consuming to devote time and effort to conduct 
a reasonable study of preferably two settings (if not more), taking into account the time to 
make myself familiar with the jargon, experiment techniques and scientific agenda of the 
laboratories before I could even begin my investigation proper. Second, because my aim 
was not to compare in details two ’wavs’ of ’building scientific facts’, i.e. the ’patriarchal’ 
and the ’feminist’ way, I did not see the necessity of doing an ’ethnographical’ type of 
participant observation. I merely wanted to get data at a first-level of discourse, on the 
topics being criticized by feminist theoreticians.
Notwithstanding their limitations, semi-structured interviews would help to discern 
the ’deeper’, ’implicit’ activities of scientific production, and give a ’wider’ insight into the 
biological norms of research provided I had access to several settings rather than one alone.
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They would enable me to address directly matters that are not usually discussed by 
practising biologists (and less so in their publications!) such as their political views on 
research structure and funding, institutionalized competition, quality of and impediments 
on research, and of course, feminism.
Obviously, interviews can only give a second-hand set of indicators, a range of 
’opinions* that do not always reflect accurately ’real practice’. But as mentioned earlier, my 
aim to collect data on a variety of disciplines, research areas, and ’social’ settings had 
priority. Hence, the goal of ’controlling for’ a number of variables (e.g. sex, discipline) for 
purpose of comparing views on issues relevant to feminism in biology took priority over 
that of composing a detailed ’reconstruction’ of only one or two cases of laboratory 
practice.
It is worth mentioning that many questions on the agenda did not elicit any proper 
answers and needed either to be reformulated or simply dropped. This was noted in the 
pilot survey where I interviewed fourteen female biologists, and this was particularly 
noticeable when I brought up issues related to the role of women and ’feminine values’ in 
biology. But the method of surveying was flexible enough to accommodate adjustments in 
the final set of interviews.
I was led to revise my design and to include men in my survey. I thought it 
important to weigh the thesis of feminine values in biological knowledge against an account 
of the power of negotiations of women in ’male-dominated’ fields of practice. Interviewing 
both men and women would provide an insight into how men and women act on the 
structuration of power in the biological institution at large or at the level of team work. 
Obviously, a participant observation in any of these labs would have conveyed relevant, 
first-hand information, on such a prescient process. But it is our main argument that the 
discipline was a factor, an epistemological factor, qualifying the thesis of the ’feminine’ in 
scientific knowledge, and we wanted to pay less attention to the political factors that may 
affect it. We think that the material gathered from the interviews would reflect the existence
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and scale of power relations between the sexes in many labs. Indeed, women of diverse 
disciplines did not give the same amount of weight to the idea of feminine values, and our 
use of a semi-structured interview framework provided the flexibility to enable interviewees 
to elaborate or qualify their views on the matter.
The age structure, the sector (industry, health system, academia, and school 
education), and the discipline were posited as important theoretical variables. The age 
structure was denoted by the respondents* academic status. We have already mentioned the 
importance of the discipline variable. The disciplines (zoology, genetics and bio-medical 
research) were chosen in accordance with their theoretical relevance to the issues addressed 
by feminists. The sector variable was finally dropped, and interviews were confined to the 
academic sector, although medical/clinical and purely academic units were distinguished 
in the survey. The problem with this design is that the actual mapping out of two *mega 
disciplines’ does not correspond to how feminist writings usually describe them, or to our 
common-sense view of how modem biology is structured. As will be understood more 
clearly when results are discussed in chapter 6, zoology, for instance, encompasses studies 
of the genetic, physiological and neuro-chemistry of animal specimens, from brain cells to 
neurones, from genes to embryonic tissues, from mammals to insects, and is not necessarily 
typical of an observational discipline. Nor is genetics strictly experimental, for it may also 
involve long field trips and observations, mathematics, computations, and a lot of ’pushing 
of the pencil’, such as in the discipline of population genetics.
It must be acknowledged at this point that our analysis of mainstream biologists did 
not convey a ’thoroughly critical’ view of their practice, as we merely relied on their 
perceptions and opinions of what they do or ought to do. But in accordance to our 
theoretical goal, we only aimed at detecting recurrent patterns of opinions in order to test 
whether these opinions were partly shared by feminist practitioners and came to contradict 
claims of feminist theoreticians.
The study of feminist practitioners was similarly justified in terms of the
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discrepancies between how theoreticians portray feminist science and what feminist 
practitioners really do. A first-hand interview with feminist biologists would possibly reveal 
some of these differences. It was assumed that practitioners would not necessarily conceal 
their disagreements with theorists, and this presumption was based on the actual writings 
of the former. The interview would also be a good way to confront the contradictions 
between ’feminist’ discourse and ’scientific’ writings of these biologists. We therefore 
conducted an analysis of their scientific publications. This helped to document the 
convergences and divergences among mainstream biologists, feminist theoreticians and 
feminist practitioners.
As mentioned earlier, my training as a sociologist made it very difficult for me to 
analyze ’mainstream’ scientific publications, most of which were densely filled with 
mathematical and bio-chemical formulas and jargon. With the publications of feminist 
biologists, this exercise was less difficult because the bulk of feminist work in biology deals 
with the ’social sources’ of illnesses and development of the human body. The interview 
material in our two case studies of feminist biologists could therefore be cross-checked by 
external sources, something which could not be done in a similar fashion with our survey 
of ’mainstream’ biologists.
I did not undertake case studies of feminists who tried unsuccessfully to implement 
’feminist projects of biology’ for two main reasons. First, my goal was to assess the weight 
of cognitive constraints on the viability of feminist projects. I believed that if I had relied 
on the evidence stemming from feminists who had abandoned biological practice, this might 
have lessened the weight of cognitive constraints and overstated that of political and 
organizational obstacles or overtly hostile attitudes vis-à-vis feminists within the biological 
institution.
Second, the number of feminists actually trained in biology and interested in the 
sociology of science is small. With respect to the development of projects of feminist 
biology per se. the number of feminists who actually have tried to implement them
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concretely is even smaller. Many authors have claimed that a feminist biology could not 
emerge in the present context of science for either political or epistemological reasons. But 
these feminist critiques of biology have been primarily the accomplishment of historians, 
sociologists and philosophers. My opinion was that these reasons needed to be re-examined 
upon further epistemological (or analytical) reflexion and relevant empirical material 
regarding the actual practice of feminist biologists.
An interesting aspect to investigate as part of this question concerns the ways 
departmental committees or funding agencies deal with ’feminist biologists’ and their 
’feminist research projects’. This could be an important sociological contribution to the 
understanding of the dynamics of change in science. Although I acknowledge the necessity 
of such enquiries, these should not, in my view, be carried out at the expense of studies 
about the cognitive (or epistemological) factors, or the normative procedures by which 
biologists, mainstream or feminist, seem to abide.
This is precisely why I decided to focus on those feminists who had succeeded in 
practising feminist biology, rather than those who had ’failed’ or simply abandoned for 
various reasons. In brief, it is not so much because of a lack of interest in a question such 
as ’why have feminist biologists so far failed or abandoned the project of implementing a 
feminist science’ that I decided not to study such cases. Rather, it is because of the urgent 
necessity to clarify the theories about ’how’ and ’in what kind of epistemological and 
normative conditions’ can genuine projects of feminist biology be viable and sustained.
Points of Detail and Critical Evaluation 
of Methodological Choices
In this section we shall look in some detail at the three sets of data collected. The 
procedures followed in the collection of material and the practical difficulties encountered 
will be highlighted. A discussion of the quality of data and the ways the material was 
analyzed will close our examination of the strengths and limitations of our fieldwork.
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I shall explain now the steps I took to carry out my survey of mainstream biologists. 
Chapter 6 and the Appendix carry details on the structure of the interview protocol and the 
characteristics of my ’purposive* survey sample.
Having determined the importance of assessing the relevancy of the ’feminine* thesis 
of knowledge put forward in feminist writings, it seemed to be most appropriate to find 
some answers to this question by going to the practitioners themselves and to ask women 
biologists direct whether their actual experience gave credit to the idea of a ’feminine style’ 
of doing biology. I thus embarked on a pilot survey of fourteen women biologists, to 
whom I was referred either by word of mouth or via a list of academic staff in a directory 
of the University of London.
At that point, the design of my research was sketched in a somewhat quantitative 
fashion. I wanted to highlight patterns of responses from various settings rather than to 
contextualize more consciously the views of my respondents in, say, a theoretical 
framework of patriarchal or ’professional’ and institutional normative constraints. I gathered 
information on the motivations of respondents to enter biology, their previous academic 
grades and their ambition, and their experience of discrimination. One third of the questions 
in the protocol directly concerned the notion of feminist biology and related issues.
But it became obvious that I would not obtain a lot of useful information on this last 
topic since the respondents did not understand the questions, or that they thought out their 
answers very carefully and emphasizing the need for some ’hard evidence*. The inclusion 
of teachers in the pilot survey (on the hunch that they would be more conscious of, or 
informed about feminist issues in science) did very little to enhance the relevancy of my 
material at that point. The information I wanted to collect was elusive because the issue of 
feminism in the scientific organization is somewhat politically loaded and compromising, 
or the potential for a ’feminine style’ or ’feminist-oriented’ type of knowledge in biology 
remains entirely speculative, or else the issue is squarely anti-scientific, to ’mainstream 
biologists’.
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This first survey shed light on my research strategy in a number of ways. There 
were differences between older and younger women with regards to topics such as 
discrimination and professional difficulties, which was expected if one takes into account 
the variability of opinions during one’s ’life cycle’. I found that the views of men needed 
to be included in order to balance the portrait that women gave of their male colleagues 
(which was not always complimentary!). I had to focus on some biological specialties that 
were more directly concerned with -  or exposed to — feminist critiques of knowledge (such 
as human and animal genetics). I needed to treat my empirical material as ’opinions’ and 
’patterns of discourse’ rather than as reflecting ’real practice’. I finally realized that under 
present methodological conditions, my data would be considered valid if I followed certain 
procedures. These are a careful selection of interviewees with an awareness of possible 
auto-selection, the possibility of checking interviewees’ responses with those of their 
colleagues, by addressing similar problems from different angles and formulated in different 
ways during the course of interview (’internal triangulation’), and a minimal awareness of 
the context of a given departmental life (’external triangulation’).
Under such conditions, the analysis of my survey material could be done according 
to canons of quantitative analysis, i.e. by ’tabulating’ answers upon ’emerging’ categories 
or patterns of response, ’counting numbers’ in each of these categories and ’illustrating’ 
patterns of responses by means of representative quotations. But given the small size of my 
sample, and the ’noise’ factors I was able to take into account thereof, the analysis of data 
resembled that of a combination of ’standardized categories’ applied by the observer and 
’interpretive analysis’ grounded in the context described by the ’interviewee’ and re-created 
ex post facto by the observer. This mixture of both qualitative and quantitative methods is 
by no means new in sociology (Bryman 1988). A judicious overlap of methodological tools 
often pays off and fully accounts for the richness of empirical material. This in no way 
contravenes the epistemological differences between those two traditions of social enquiry 
but rather takes into account their respective perspectives on social objects (Bryman 1988;
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see also our discussion on these matters in chapter 3).
The options envisaged for the second stage of my survey were the following. I could 
embark on a specific participant observation to see for myself if the ’feminine thesis’ would 
hold, and there is a need for this sort of enquiry in the feminist research agenda about 
science. But I decided to continue with the survey approach because of the importance of 
getting data from various settings and disciplines. I could focus on biologists’ personal 
experiences, providing data from which I could try later to generate more general 
conclusions. Finally I could simply switch my investigation, from the question of the 
’feminine thesis’ in particular, to other aspects related to the conditions of possibility of 
projects of feminist biology as spelled out by feminist theoreticians.
I carried on with the interview approach, but this time focused my attention on the 
self-representations of men and women as ’good scientists’, the difficulties they personally 
encountered in scientific work, and their views on ’scientific’ problems relevant to feminist 
criticisms, such as sociobiology and biological determinism of behaviour and ’disorders’. 
My sample for this second stage was chosen according to those three main ’criteria’, 
selecting biologists of both sexes, of two different academic status (students and teaching 
staff), and in three different disciplines: genetics, bio-medical research, and zoology.
During the summer of 1988,1 attempted to contact some biological associations in 
England to obtain a sample of interviewees. Six were contacted but they could or would 
not provide me with a list of their members. I was therefore decided that I would go for 
a ’snowball strategy’ and deal with a statistically non-representative sample.
My ’puiposive’ sample was mainly based on a directory of the University of 
London. I also used different channels to enhance my chance of contacting more 
respondents. Six departments were contacted through their directors (one declined) who 
either advised me on who might be available or worthwhile to interview, or simply gave 
me a list of their staff. Personal letters explaining the aim and procedure of the interview 
were sent off to a same number of men and women, students and staff, chosen at random.
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One head of department was more stringent and asked me for a written research proposal 
which she would circulate herself.
All in all, the access to respondents was not too difficult. But I must stress that half 
of the selected biologists in my sample did not acknowledge my request for an interview. 
(Only three individuals wrote me to apologize for not being free for an interview.) In one 
instance I made a special effort to get an interview. She was referred to me as being a 
feminist by several of her colleagues, which was unusual. She did not reply to my first 
request for an interview so I sent her a second one which she did acknowledge. She 
appeared better able than any of her colleagues to discuss knowledgeably the issue of 
’feminist biology’, sociobiology and reductionism.
The interviews generally ran smoothly and took place at times and venues chosen 
by the respondents. Some informal remarks were common. For instance, a great number 
asked me how I would analyze my material. Several also asked how far I was in my 
research and ’how many interviews I would do’, perhaps showing some apprehension about 
being chosen to represent the ’whole community’ of biologists. More importantly however, 
it was a common feature that controversial questions (e.g. are women more careful, ’better’ 
scientists than men; are they more conscientious; is there any discrimination in your 
department?), were dodged on the allegation that they needed to be ’better defined’, or 
backed up by ’more facts’ and ’figures’ to be properly answered. This contrasted with the 
relative ease with which respondents seemed to comment on ’non-controversial’ issues such 
as: is biology a competitive sector; is molecular biology unduly fashionable; are women in 
general less confident than men?
All in all, respondents were co-operative which reflected the fact that they accepted 
to participate in my research without being forced. With very few exceptions of ’bouts of 
hostility’ (I recall three women in particular), dismissiveness (mainly from the men) or 
obligation (the case of one woman), they were attracted by the topic and the refreshing idea 
of having a ’pleasant pause’ from work. As a matter of fact, I had the feeling that several
176
men seemed to take the interview agenda casually, while most of the women seemed 
enthusiastic to discuss ideas about the place of women in science, and to *air* some of their 
grievances. A study of the motivations leading scientists to participate in sociological 
research could merit an investigation in itself, I thought.
The decision to end the survey was taken when I started getting the same types of 
answers and discerning some patterns. Obviously, my material would be treated carefully 
and as a ’reasonably sound* source of information only. I figured that for the purpose of 
comparing ’the views’ of mainstream biologists about their disciplines with the discourse 
of feminists, some 70 hours of interview with 45 biologists was a reasonable basis to start 
assessing the claims of feminists about ’patriarchal’ and ’male-biased biology’.
My attention was first drawn to Lynda Birke after a discussion with a sociologist 
at the LSE who suggested I should rather study feminist biologists, than interview 
’mainstream’ scientists. After I read her book on ’Feminism and Biology’, I contacted 
Birke, first by letter, and then a week later by telephone. She agreed to an interview to 
discuss her views on feminist biology. The interview took place in her office at the Open 
University in July 1988.
It was a long informal and quite relaxed discussion that lasted roughly three hours. 
No tape recorder was used and notes were taken by hand throughout. Like many feminists 
I was to interview afterwards, Birke suggested that I not study mainstream biologists but 
concentrate on feminists alone. Though the suggestion seemed sensible, given the position 
of a majority of biologists towards feminist biology, I remained convinced that I needed 
my other set of data in order to weigh the criticisms put forward by feminists and the 
viability of their own projects of biological practice.
I embarked on an extensive reading of Birke’s publications on biology, especially 
her sociological critiques of biology. I had previously arranged a discussion with Steven 
Rose^, a colleague of Birke and head of the department where she was based. This 
interview with Rose helped me to qualify Birke’s views on the potential role of women in
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biology, on the potentialities of feminist biology, on the state of equal opportunities within 
biological institutions, and on the relatively favourable environment for feminist research 
at the Open University. He also emphasized that Birke was a rare case of feminist 
practising biology and that she had probably had difficult times in the course of doing so.
At this point, I realized I needed to interview more feminist biologists since Birke’s 
discourse departed from feminist critics in their appraisal of reductionism and the biological 
bases of behaviour. I contacted Birke for possible references to other feminist biologists, 
but she could only think of non-biologists. After unsuccessful attempts to contact feminist 
biologists in South-east England (I was constantly referred to feminists interested in science 
and technology but none of them were practising biologists, and one ’liberal’ woman 
biologist referred to me by Birke never did reply to me), I decided to interview Birke a 
second time in order to document one case study and perhaps gain access to her laboratory 
work. This was in March 1989.
Unfortunately, she was about to leave her post and abandon biological research 
altogether in order to invest her time in writing and teaching womens’ studies. On the other 
hand, she had indicated, as Steven Rose did, that her work was very solitary and did not 
compare with big, competitive science®. Her style of practice was hardly a case of ’team 
work dynamics’, worthy of sociological observation. She nevertheless agreed to a second 
interview. This time however, the ambience was not so relaxed and Birke was more hostile 
but she allowed me a two-hour interview which I taped.
By then, I knew I would have to focus on a content analysis of Birke’s published 
works and asked her if she could provide me with a complete bibliography. She said she 
did not have one at hand but would send it by mail. She never did, even though I reiterated 
my request in a subsequent letter. My case study was therefore jeopardized, for I had to 
rely on disparate bibliographical resources and would certainly not be able to ’face’ Birke 
again.
I should like to try to explain Birke’s attitudes by putting them in their context.
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Birke was on the verge of having to leave the Open University. She was quite apprehensive 
about unemployment given her age (late thirties) and the covert hostility of employers 
towards feminists. She had been quite lonely as a biologist, and my own research was very 
critical of the endeavour of feminist biology which, she must have felt, certainly reflected 
in my questions about her work as well.
All these factors certainly undermined my opportunities to have her as a ’better* 
respondent and not least, to secure a rich case study for the understanding of how feminist 
biology can — or cannot — operate and develop in ’mainstream institutions’. This first case 
study in my thesis, therefore, has its limitations. The institutional context and professional 
relations in which Birke’s activities took place cannot be ascertained. It came as a surprise 
when she acknowledged that her scientific work never was the object of blatant resistance, 
and that she had been fairly well treated as a woman and active feminist in her scientific 
circles^. Nevertheless, it was still necessary to include her as a ’case study’ in the thesis, 
as it represented one of the few examples of feminist biological practice.
My attention was also drawn to a woman geneticist from Montreal whose work, as 
she put it, was ’to do science in order to change things’. Karen Messing’s scientific work 
was tightly linked with her feminist engagements, both outside and within the academic 
circles. In the fall of 1988 I contacted her and we planned to meet in December during on 
of my trips home. We had our first encounter at her home. She was easygoing and 
enthusiastic about the fact that I was a sociologist interested in her work in occupational 
health and her research group. She invited me to visit her laboratory (which actually was 
a series of office space in the department of biological sciences at Université du Québec 
à Montréal, with laboratories located in the basement) and held an informal round table 
over lunch with her students and senior research assistants. This first meeting helped me 
to focus on the internal dynamics of the group and the relative lack of feminist 
commitments of the members, especially the young ones, in contrast with the involvement 
of their director.
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GRABIT, as the group was called, therefore emerged as one possible venue to be 
explored in order to document feminist biological practice. After my failure to contact 
British feminist biologists, I felt pressed to contact Messing in the early spring of 1989 and 
we agreed on the practical airangements for my field study in Montreal. It included 
interviews, analysis of published documents, and some ’observation* of daily work.
The fieldwork was held in May 1989. Although this is a period busy with correction 
work and preparation for the annual national conference at the Association canadienne- 
francaise pour l’avancement des sciences (I myself attended conferences given by members 
of the group), this was also the best time to have everybody present, just before the summer 
holiday.
Messing and her co-director Mergler were kind enough to provide me with a desk 
in a room which I shared with other students. (The actual office space, computer and 
secretarial facilities at GRABIT would surely be the envy of many sociologists!). Suzanne 
Bélanger, a senior researcher, introduced me to everybody and explained the structure of 
the research group and its status within the university. I started my field study right away 
and on a very positive note.
I began scheduling individual interviews and to read the impressive publications of 
the group available in the reading room. During a typical day, I would also conduct 
informal discussion with one or several members of the group, and be present at lunch time 
when they would all get together. Discussions and comments about trade unions, granting 
agencies and progress of research work — done mostly in plants and workshops — were 
common. I soon became part of their group, and was invited on different occasions to join 
some of them for a meal or drink after work. (I was even invited to replace a speaker who 
cancelled at the last minute and gave a paper about my research.)
I stayed a month at GRABIT. I had gathered a lot of published material at GRABIT, 
information about the institutional context, the background of researchers and the dynamics 
between members of the group, men and women, students and staff, non-feminists and
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’avowed feminists*. Talking to different people in the laboratory also helped me to secure 
some kind of ’internal validation’ of my research material. I felt I had collected enough 
data in Montreal in order to compare this material with my survey and the other case study 
of Birke. Although the study of GRABIT was more sophisticated than the one with Birke, 
it did not allow me to ’reconstruct’ the way feminists ’build biological facts’; for I had only 
mustered indirect oral and written material relevant to this issue. Finally, I did not carry out 
interviews with officers of larger institutions such as the department of biological sciences, 
the university, or a crucial granting agency like the Institut de recherche en santé et sécurité 
au travail, although such interviews could have helped to validate my material ’externally’ 
and given me an idea of the ’macro-institutional dynamics’ within which feminist biology 
is bound to develop. This aspect of feminist biology definitely needs to be examined more 
thoroughly in future sociological studies*.
In the summer and fall of 1989,1 analyzed all my material and produced drafts of 
the three chapters that will follow. In December 1989,1 returned to Montreal and discussed 
my results and the chapter I wrote on GRABIT with Messing. (I also had feedback from 
Mergler and Brabant, a Ph.D. student with a relatively long experience with the group.) 
This helped once again to validate my material, especially the institutional and biographical 
facts, and my depiction of how the directors and members of GRABIT viewed their own 
research endeavour.
I would like finally to add two other components of my empirical material. First, 
in addition to my two ’case studies’ of feminist biologists, I interviewed key informants in 
New England and in London during the summer of 1989. Phyllis Robinson (referred to me 
by Birke), Ruth Hubbard (introduced to me by Messing), Anne Fausto-Sterling (with whom 
I arranged an interview by phone from Montreal), and Judith Masters and Dick Rayner 
(referred to me by Hubbard), all trained biologists and feminists, discussed some of my 
results and analyses. They helped me to appraise the strengths and limitations of my 
material, the latter of which they especially remarked by pointing to the political constraints
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induced through larger institutional channels affecting feminist activities. But they also gave 
additional credibility to my analysis of the scientific and cognitive factors constraining the 
development of feminist biology.
Second, in order to put the survey material of mainstream biologists in context, I 
spent some time reviewing statistics, historical accounts, and the coverage of professional 
matters in the journal of the Institute of Biologv (mainly oriented towards education and 
the career market). This material will be presented at the beginning of chapter 6. This 
obviously cannot make up for a first-hand field study of the biological institution per se and 
its decision-making instances, but it could reasonably act as a substitute for contextual 
factors from which our analysis of the interview material could benefit.
Endnotes
1) I would like to thank my good friend and colleague Wilma Mangabeira for her 
advice in the writing of this chapter on methodology. She helped me to find a way of 
combining intellectual standards and personal satisfaction in the writing of very often 
tedious methodological discussions. Although I am far from reaching her meticulousness 
and narrative skill, I gained a lot in doing the exercise. My thanks also go to Drs S. Walby 
and H. Collins for pointing out the utility of revising ’self-consciously* one’s research 
strategy.
2) Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay warn that this in no way entails the inevitability of 
’judgmental relativism’, or that all bodies of knowledge are equally valid, given specific 
cognitive or practical goals. It entails rather, an ’epistemic relativism’. That is to say, since 
knowledge is rooted in time and culture, "scientific knowledge does not merelv replicate 
nature" (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983, 6) but is produced via the mediation of social 
influences. I would call this perspective a ’weak version’ of the realist account of 
knowledge. See on this point, Manicas & Rosenberg (1988) who discern insightfully 
between ’double-barrelled’ and ’single-barrelled’ realisms.
3) Choosing the best method possible for this purpose has always been a central 
problem on the agenda of the sociology of knowledge (Bauman 1978; Outwaite 1975; 
Abercrombie 1980; Law 1986; Hamilton 1974).
4) The only type of works that lean towards this problem are those about gender and 
technology, primarily in the sociology of labour but also in the new reproductive 
technologies in medical sociology. The works of C. Cockbum, for instance, Machinerv of 
dominance. Women, men and technical know-how (London: Pluto. 1985), are worth
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mentioning. See also the works of R. Klein on reproductive technologies, especially her 
recent article with R. Rowlands entitled, ’Hormonal cocktails: Women as test-sites for 
fertility drugs’ in Womens’ Studies International Forum. 12 (3): 333-48.
5) Interview of Steven Rose by the author, London, 14 April 1988.
6) This is also what Ruth Hubbard and Anne Fausto-Sterling pointed out in their 
interviews with the author: the rare cases of feminist biology are alternatives to ’little 
science’ rather than alternatives to ’big science’.
7) Birke’s statement must be qualified on three grounds. First, she admitted that it 
has been "extremely difficult" to be a feminist biologist, even though she could not really 
tell the extent to which this had impeded her scientific work. She said "Most institutions 
claim they don’t discriminate, but to prove that is actually very hard. It is hard to pin down 
instances of overt discrimination. But I ’m sure it has been a factor in my life, why I don’t 
have a permanent job." Second, she suggested that she has had more problems being a 
lesbian than being a feminist. This is probably "because men don’t know how to interact 
with women if there is no flirting involved", she said. Finally she declared she could not 
recall that her colleagues or peers had ever deliberately put down her scientific work, 
adding that all things considered, there was usually no blatant resistance to the works of 
"99 percent of all scientists".
8) Messing was slightly disappointed to realise that I did not intend to look at the 
policy and action of granting bodies proper. It became obvious however, that ’the political 
games’ of granting agencies were of a major concern for people at GRABIT. Messing and 
Mergler had several adverse experiences and stories to tell on the subject.
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CHAPTER 6
ASPECTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ETHOS OF ’MAINSTREAM* BIOLOGISTS
The goal of the present chapter is to investigate the extent to which the ’scientific 
ethos’ of ’mainstream’ biologists is coloured by the conventions of scientific practice criti­
cized by feminist and Radical Scientists. Relevant data was collected by way of interviews 
with male and female British biologists working in the University of London during 1987 
and 1988. In this chapter we shall examine the opinions of biologists with respect to 
feminism in biology from different angles: from the perspectives of individuals’ attitudes, 
the organisation of research work, and the current norms of scientific production.
In the foregoing chapters, we made several assertions concerning the manners in 
which male biases afflict theory-building in biology and, on the other hand, the extent to 
which epistemological constraints affect the production of biological knowledge.
In our consideration of the first of these two issues, we suggested that there were 
certain ’blurred spots’ in feminist theories of science which had led, unfortunately, to 
overstating the adequacy of ’feminine values’ in the replacement of ’male-biased’ 
epistemological canons and methodological procedures in biology.
We contented that feminine values cum loving and caring relations with nature and 
people were cognitively inappropriate for developing biological explanations, to the 
exception, perhaps, of pointing to moral and ethical issues of importance to scientific 
questions. The early feminist Marxists who defended the notion of ’feminine values’ as 
having the potential to replace ’male values’ did not, in our view, contribute to build a new 
epistemology on these bases. Certain points made by feminist Marxists certainly paved the 
way, however, for an increased participation of women in decision-making in scientific 
research. Although the assistance of feminists more actively involved in the process would
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always be emphasized by these authors. These points, we believed, pointed to the 
possibility of increasing, via the idea of ’feminine values’, the numbers of researches of 
direct interest to women, their health and living conditions, and to successfully achieve of 
the avowed goal of feminist critics of science.
Second, we hypothesized that there was, in theory, a potential for ’feminine values’ 
cum subjective experiences, direct knowledge of women’s life conditions, and accessibility 
to women’s bodies and physical symptoms. For the idea that ’feminine values’ could be 
activated as a platform to produce changes in theory-building was justified 
epistemologically, although only for some areas in biology. We demonstrated the similitude 
of biological knowledge (in human biology more particularly) with hermeneutics and 
interpretive methods in the human sciences. On this basis, we acknowledged that 
researchers’ interests could, in the case of women biologists, be manifested differently from 
those of men, esoeciallv in clinical and behavioural research. This argument would apply 
to theory-building, particularly in fields closely related to human behaviour and its 
’disorders’. We admitted, however, that, yet again, for this process to take place, some 
degree of political awareness about sexism in behavioural studies needed to be raised.
Third, we granted credit to feminist research promoting the role of women in 
science. We stressed especially the historical and sociological studies showing how the 
institutionalization of science has been conducive to a deprecation of women’s role in 
scientific work, studies which contributed to a sound theory of gender and the science 
system. In this type of theory, patriarchal strategies are identified as the main obstacles to 
the full deployment of female resources in the scientific domain. The empirical content of 
historical and sociological studies, in turn, supported the view that men have kept 
dominating the field via both macro-institutional tactics (e.g. hiring practices, funding 
procedures, work facilities and provisions for child care) and micro-organizational 
operations (e.g. networking, team work relations, division of labour in the laboratory). We 
inferred from this that a ’feminine style of working’ and ’female research priorities’ were
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not given their fair chance or fair share, and that the make-up of day-to-day scientific 
activities was not yet congenial to the fully-fledged integration of women scientists and 
’feminine values’ thereof.
With respect to the issue of epistemological constraints as such, we went at length 
on the inaccuracies of feminist theories and criticisms of biology. We suggested, on one 
count, that the limitations of biological reductionism as a theoretical paradigm were real, 
but that nonetheless, methodological reductionism was to be safeguarded as such, provided 
an increase in sophistication of experimental designs and biological explanations. We also 
criticized the apparent virtues of holism, especially in terms of the ’inseparability’ of 
biology and environment, and the neglect of biological constraints and determinisms. We 
finally contented that the logic of biological knowledge always inevitably generates 
theoretical controversies about what is a good balance between the reality of ’vital 
processes’ and the ’inhumane’, compelling necessity of having to apply mechanical or 
causal explanatory models in order to produce new knowledge. Never did we, however, 
coalesce the ’nature’ of these epistemological constraints with the presence of ’male’ and 
’patriarchal biases’. For we assumed that formal categories of explanation were not so much 
local, ’male-laden’, but rather that it was their substantive content which was subject to 
’male’ or ’patriarchal’ ideology in the first place. From this we suggested that it is primarily 
in human biology that concepts, explanations, and interpretation of data may lend 
themselves to ’patriarchal’ prejudices and ’male biases’. And that these might, therefore, 
be replaced by more adequate ’feminist-oriented’ schemas or ’feminine interests’ when 
dealing with certain subjects in biology.
We shall now, in this first segment of our empirical study, consider the above issues 
upon the responses of a survey with ’mainstream biologists’.
We shall first examine the viewpoints of informants concerning career barriers and 
discrimination against women scientists. The differences in the opinions of men and women 
will be highlighted. This should enable us to see if feminism, as a political force, is being
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judged more or less positively within the confines of the biological profession by the two 
groups.
We shall then, examine the perceptions of biologists in relation to scientific skills. 
This will suggest how far the actual workstyles of men and women and also the gendered 
images they have of themselves as scientists invite biologists to conceive of men and 
women as two groups which may contribute differently to the development of norms of 
biological practice and perhaps also to the production of new biological knowledge. The 
comparison between the responses of men and women should therefore suggest ways in 
which the variable gender contributes to shade the ’biological ethos*. This forms an 
empirical basis against which a key aspect of the feminist projects of biology, that which 
presumes women to have a particular role to play in the construction of new biological 
knowledge, might be tested. Among the other variables which may affect this, we shall 
examine the discipline (e.g. genetics and molecular biology, zoology and ecology) and the 
age of the respondents in order to ’control for’ their effects. As mentioned previously, the 
idea of a feminist biology based on ’feminine values’ looms large in feminist thought; and 
if this idea is being called into question in both theory and practice, it is nevertheless far 
from being dismissed altogether. This is why we shall be examining the gender variable in 
the present empirical study. Our own line of argument is that a ’feminine/feminist’ biology 
may possibly be generated by women, but only contingent on certain epistemological con­
ditions. One of these conditions has simply to do with the subject matters in biology, that 
is, whether the objects of study are gendered, and more importantly, whether they are 
human individuals.
We shall also explore the discourse of biologists concerning the strengths and 
limitations of reductionism in biological practice. This is a contentious issue in biology, and 
it has been the target of the critiques of Radical Scientists and feminists. We shall explore 
this in light of the rationale of mainstream biologists relating to the possibility that 
scientific errors and sexist biases may be creeping into the production of biological
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knowledge.
We shall finally close our analysis on a more encompassing discussion of the issue 
of feminism in biology, comprising the gendered structure of biological practice, the social 
biases in the biological knowledge produced, and the politics of biological research. These 
three series of aspects of ’mainstream’ biological practice (i.e., individuals’ attitudes 
towards women’s work and feminist politics in science; the rationale of biology as valid 
knowledge with respect to the issue of holism versus reductionism; social critique of the 
biological agenda with particular attention to the idea of a feminist biology) will form the 
axes of our comparative analysis with feminist biologists. These should also form a 
threefold background against which the criticisms of feminists theoreticians of science and 
the originality of feminist projects of biological practice will be tested. The material in this 
chapter will thus provide part of the documentation needed to explore the points of conve­
rgence and the discrepancies between mainstream and feminist biological practices, and the 
actual sources of resistance of mainstream biologists towards the idea of a feminist 
biology.
The Institution of Biological 
Science in Great Britain
A brief presentation of the process of institutionalisation of biological science in 
Great Britain, with special respect to the insertion of women in that process, should help 
to put the interview material analyzed into its sociological context We shall look at the 
development of the biology curriculum and at the expansion of the role of biologists in 
society.
The historical data and statistics to which we refer in this section relate to Great 
Britain. But it is reasonable to think that the tendencies hereby presented apply to other 
Western industrialized countries, more specially Canada which is the source of the second 
of two forthcoming case studies of feminist biologists.
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Compared with the other natural sciences, biology has striven harder to get its 
credentials into the science curriculum. During the initial decades of the century, several 
areas of biology were considered descriptive or concerned with the observation of natural 
specimens, rather than based on experimental trials subjected to objective methods of 
testing and amenable to scientific ’laws’ of explanations. Biology was not considered a 
full-fledged scientific subject until it showed, as physics or chemistry did, its utilitarian 
potential for industry and medicine (Goodson 1987). Indeed, it was believed that botany and 
zoology, the two main biological subjects at the time, lacked practical applications (ibid.).
In the 1930s however, biology became, in Great Britain, more directly geared to 
social policies. Its application to social health and domestic hygiene were recognized more 
widely. This partly explains why it increased its importance in the school curriculum 
during the first half of this century (Gordon and Lawton 1978; Jenkins 1979).
Jenkins (1979) reports that from the mid-eighteenth century to the early 1930s, 
botany was, by and large, the only biological subject taught in schools. Botany was then 
joined by zoology, and by courses in general biology aimed at the education of the citizens 
and their welfare. The 1930s were years which witnessed the establishment of biology in 
the science curriculum at the secondary level. During the 1940s and 1950s, the medical 
curriculum was separated from general biology. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, ’hard 
science’ biology appeared. Disciplines such as molecular biology and biochemistry, 
comprised aspects of sciences like chemistry and physics. As of the 1960s, three main divi­
sions emerged within the structure of biology: ecology, cellular, and molecular biology; and 
this, at the expense of traditional subdivisions of zoology and botany (Jenkins 1979).
But the rapid development of molecular biology and biochemistry in the last two 
decades, and the increasing disciplinary specialisation within biological science far from 
obliterated criticisms. There was a cry for the integration of diverse subjects within the 
biological curriculum (Chalmers, Crawley and Rose 1971; Giordan et al. 1986; Levins and 
Lewontin 1985; Sapiro 1985). This did not merely seek for the scientific recognition of the
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complexity of living phenomena. It also appealed for more interdisciplinary studies within 
the life sciences, and for a recognition of the sociological ramiOcations of biological 
phenomena in the manner of Radical Scientists and the dialectical biologists. This last issue 
has certainly coloured the debates about biology over the last two decades*.
Also characteristic of biology, and more importantly botany, was its predominance 
as a girls* subject in school science. In 1951, the ratios of girls to boys among O-level 
entrants in botany, zoology, and biology were of 7.84,1.33, and 3.18 respectively. Among 
A-level entrants however, the ratios were lower, falling to around 0.6 in the first two sub­
jects and to 0.53 for biology; in 1962 however, they increased to 0.87 in botany, 0.84 in 
zoology and 0.64 in biology^.
The gender division in the science curriculum between physics and chemistry for 
boys, and biology (or botany) for girls, is "a strange heritage" (Gordon and Lawton 1978). 
Girls’ schools were not equipped to engage in laboratory work in physics and chemistry: 
they did not have the material nor the teaching staff required. The resources necessary for 
teaching chemistry and physics were, by and large, endowed to boy’s schools (Jenkins 
1979). Jenkins suggests that the way biology was taught in schools has always been more 
relevant to the personal and domestic interests of girls, and in direct line with the social 
dimension of biological knowledge as girls were expected to become nurses, midwives, or 
housewives (ibid.). Jenkins offers more evidence of the gender delineation in the 
development of school science. In the early 1900s, he reports, the Board of Education stated 
that the socially widespread deterioration in the health and material state of British 
households was to be addressed by providing pupils "destined to be mothers and fathers" 
of our future generation with elements of "domestic science" (ibid., 173). The changes in 
the curriculum actually affected mainly girls, and was also to lower the levels of science 
education in girls’ schools. The Thompson Committee of 1918 acknowledged the lack of 
teaching resources in physics in girls’ schools, but this did not seem to drastically change 
the orientations taken in girls’ science education, writes Jenkins.
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During the inter-war years, biology and general science gradually replaced botany 
in girls’ secondary schools. But due to a lack of teachers in physics, chemistry and mathe­
matics, biological science consolidated its domination in the girls’ school science, which 
resulted, in the early 1960s, with very few girls’ grammar schools offering physical or 
general science in their curriculum. Yet, Jenkins also reports, in single sex schools, more 
than in mixed schools, the resources available for science tended to be similar to boy’s 
schools, and this was reflected by the higher tendency of girls to choose physical science 
in the former type of schools.
Currently, there are more girls than boys in biology. The figures for 1985 show that 
the percentages of girls’ entrants and passes for GCE ’A’ levels in biology were slightly 
over 60%. ’Hard’ sciences such as physics and chemistry were still male-dominated. The 
percentages of female entrants and passes in those subjects were roughly 40% in chemistry 
and 20% in physics^.
At the university level also, the percentages of women in biological sciences have 
always been higher than in other sciences. Women even outnumbered men in botany and 
zoology between the two World Wars. During the year 1931-32 the percentages of women 
among Honours graduates in botany and zoology were 57.5 and 51.9 respectively; 11.6 in 
physics, 14.9 in chemistry. But it should be stressed that botany counted four times less 
graduates than chemistry and half of the physics graduates; zoology counting even fewer 
degrees awarded (Jenkins 1979, 188). In 1948-49, the differences had not changed 
appreciably: 55.5 of women in botany, 45.8 in zoology compared to 5.7 in physics and 9.7 
in chemistry (ibid.).
The figures of 1971 for full-time undergraduates in biological science disciplines^ 
show that 37.8 % were women, compared to only 27.2% of women in all the sciences. The 
figures for 1980 show an increase to 43.1% and 31.7% respectively. The figures for 
1986-87 show a more important increase in biology, this time up to 54.1%. This increase 
is partly due to the inclusion of psychology (a subject in which women’s participation has
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always been important) within the biological disciplines, but it also reflects a real increase 
of women entrants in disciplines such as general biology, zoology, biochemistry, and 
biological subjects combined with physics, mathematics or chemistry^.
These statistics show that biological subjects such as botany and to a lesser extent, 
zoology, have always been favoured by women interested in science. They show the trend 
of a significant increase in the participation of women in biological sciences over the past 
two decades, and challenge us to reflect on the sociological impact of the presence of 
women in biology.
These figures hide the phenomenon of attrition of women scientists between the 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels. In 1971, there was a loss of roughly 15% of female 
full-time entrants in the passage from undergraduate to postgraduate studies: down to 21.5% 
of female postgraduates in biology, and to 12.5% for all sciences combined. In 1980-81, 
the loss was reduced to roughly 11%: down to 32.7% of female postgraduates in biology 
and to 20.6% in all sciences combined. Finally, in 1986-87, the loss was 13%, down to 
41.9% of female postgraduates in biological disciplines (including psychology)®.
Finally, women are still poorly represented at the higher levels of academia^. In 
1966, they formed 13.4% of the staff in the group of disciplines formed by physics, 
chemistry, biology and mathematics, of which 14.6% in the higher echelons (i.e. 
professorship, readership and senior lectureship) in the academic hierarchy. In 1980, they 
formed 9% of the staff in biological and physical sciences, of which 8.4% in the three 
higher echelons. In 1986-87, they formed 12.4% of the staff in mathematics, biological and 
physical sciences, and 5.0% in the three higher echelons.
It seems therefore that consistently, biology has been considered the science subject 
of preference towards which women scientists were directed. But it did not affect the fact 
that biology was dominated by men for they are still occupying most of the higher posts 
within the academic and scientific institutions. If the trend is to an increasing number of 
women in biology in general, their representation is still minimal in top ranks*. As Rossiter
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(1982) has contended, there has been a ’proletarianization’ of women’s work in biology 
which is reflected in their low numbers in high status posts, and their high numbers in jobs 
of technicians and teachers (see also Murphy 1980; Rose 1986; Kahle 1985). Even the 
president of the prestigious American Association for the Advancement of Science recently 
pointed out that the attitudes of the males who largely dominate science could have acted 
as a possible deterrent on the careers of promising women students’.
At another level, a survey of the official journal of the Institute of Biologv*’ may 
help to highlight the progressive professionalization of biology, and more importantly its 
increasing function for industry, while giving an idea of the mode of insertion of women 
in the professional openings since the 1950s.
In the late 1950s, the demand for biologists was much lower than that for chemists 
and physicists (Journal of the Institute of Biology. February 1957, 33). In 1956, there were 
roughly 5,(X)0 posts for biologists, compared to 10,(XX) posts for physicists and 20,(X)0 for 
chemists. The demand for 1959 was expected to continue to favour chemists and physicists 
with an increase of 22% and 23% in the numbers of new openings, compared to an increase 
of only 12% in the number of new jobs for biologists (ibid.). In the early 1960s, the main 
outlet for biology graduates was teaching (roughly half of the population), while graduates 
in chemistry were mainly oriented towards industry (Institute of Biology Journal (IBJ), 
April 1960, 46-48). In that period, biology was still not totally constituted as a profession, 
which was especially well reflected in the school and university curricula.
In the second half of the 1960s however, the need of industry for biologists became 
more pronounced. Advertisements for jobs in biology in the IBJ became more numerous 
during the period, and the Institute of Biology placed an emphasis on industrial employment 
for new graduates. In 1966, 10% of biologists were in employment in industry, compared 
with 41% in schools and 20% in universities (IBJ. May 1966,40). In the subsequent years, 
the demands for biochemists, geneticists, pharmacologists, microbiologists, bacteriologists, 
toxicologists and immunologists increased, all these disciplines being relatively
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industry-oriented; while the demand for botanists, zoologists and general biologists dimi­
nished (IBJ. November 1966, 13ff; and The Biologist. November 1969,141ff, and January 
1970, 40-41).
In 1976, the destination of new graduates in biology was still a major concern, for 
only 13.7% of them (509 out of 3726) were employed in biology-related sectors: among 
these, 31% went into hospitals, 22% into universities, and only 19% into industry (The 
Biologist. August 1976, 142-43). In 1979,14.7% (678/4620) of new graduates had jobs in 
related scientific sectors: of these, 31% were in the health service, 27% in non-teaching 
posts at universities, and 20% in industry (The Biologist. November 1980, 248).
Overall, between the years 1965-66 and 1978-79, the granting of degrees in biology 
more than doubled (2,027 degrees were granted in 1965-65 compared with 4,682 in 
1978-79), while it relatively stabilized in physics (1,659 compared with 1,789) and in chem­
istry (1,967 compared with 1,937). But the average budget of biology departments was still 
half of that in physics departments (The Biologist. January 1981, 139ff).
How have women integrated the labour market along those same trends? It seems 
that in this case too, the thesis of a proletarianization suits the statistical portrait. Female 
biologists have tended to go into school science education in greater proportion than their 
male counterparts; also, they have not entered industry as much. Among new graduates of 
1972, 35% of the men (866 out of 2,456 male graduates) chose academic research or fur­
ther studies compared to 23% of the women (352 out of 1,508 female graduates). In that 
same year, 10% of the men (246 individuals) compared to 24% of the women (366 
individuals) decided to proceed with ’teacher training*. Finally, among the graduates who 
obtained their first employment, 20% of the men (78/400) compared with 31% of the 
women (111/359) found employment in hospitals or joined local health services, while 
44% of the men (174 individuals) compared to 23% of the women (84 individuals) ended 
up working in industry (The Biologist May 1974, 76). In 1979, 28% of the 2693 new male 
graduates compared with 22% of the 1989 new female graduates entered research, while
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6% of the former and 12% of the latter decided to follow teaching careers (The Biologist 
June 1981, 140). It is interesting to note that during the 1950s and 1960s, a major concern 
of the Institute of Biology was the loss of women biologists due to marriage. As women 
had always formed over one third of all biological graduates, this was an important issue. 
At the onset of the 1970s, the only mention of women biologists in a study of "biological 
manpower" Isicl was indeed "the early retirement of women to raise a family" as a "source 
of wastage" Isicl (The Biologist 1971, November 1971,175). In that same period, however, 
the Institute established a programme of allowances for their female members who were 
married in order to help them to participate more fully in the profession (The Biologist. 
November 1975, 171). In the early 1980s, the problem of women who were leaving 
employment was still being acknowledged but not to the extent of being alarmist.
At another level, regarding the increasing role of biology in the social economy, the 
1970s witnessed both great optimism and the germs of a latent social back-lash for the 
profession. A reading of The Biologist over that period illustrates the extent to which the 
Institute of Biologv considered the preceding thirty years as remarkable for the profession. 
British biology developed important knowledge in disciplines like immunology, 
microbiology, cell physiology, and agriculture, both in relation to domestic and developing 
countries’ social needs (The Biologist, special issue of February 1980, 6-8). In 1979, after 
years of negotiation, a Royal Charter was granted to the Institute. It was held that this 
would accord biologists a professional status on the same grounds as physicists and 
chemists who had already had their own Charter for several decades (ibid., 31-33). With 
the onset of the decade, the conservation of the environment emerged as a growing social 
concern and as a major responsibility for the profession. In the mid-seventies, debates over 
the hazards and benefits of research in genetic engineering gave rise, in 1975, to the Ashbv 
report which proposed that "subject to rigorous safeguards... such work should continue 
because of great potential benefits" (The Biologist. May 1975, 71). But the social 
controversies about genetic engineering were to survive several years the publication of the
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report (see Goodfield 1978; Wright 1986).
It is common at the turn of the 1990s to read of research advances in biology 
(especially in medical research) in newspapers and popular magazines. Research on the 
human genome and genetically related diseases is fast moving and highly competitive. But 
as biology becomes more conspicuously oriented towards industrial manufacturing, 
agricultural production, and clinical medicine, it is also the source of several social and 
ethical debates". In relation to reproductive technologies and research on embryos more 
particularly, feminist groups are joined by several other groups in the political 
confrontations over ethical issues and projects of legislation*^. Genetic engineering still 
precipitates political controversy, even though it now seems to be arousing the hopes of 
large parts of the lay public*^. Molecular biology and research on DNA have indeed become 
the most prestigious scientific fields of the 1970s and 1980s, superseding physics*^.
In the present context, how can the ’professional’ ethos of biologists be defined? 
How do biologists see their professional role in society? Do they still see their science as 
socially neutral; in their opinion, what is the impact of politics on biological science? What 
is their viewpoint on the situation of women in biological science? Do they see any 
possibility for a particular contribution of women as a group to the practice of biological 
research? How do they judge the present state of biological research? What has been or 
could be the specific impact of feminism in biology? What do they think of the feminist 
critiques of biology; of the projects of a feminist biology? The findings of recent interviews 
with British biologists should now help to answer these questions.
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Organization of empirical study
The central aim of our empirical study is to marshall data illustrating the scientific 
beliefs, norms of practice, and socio-political attitudes of biologists towards feminism, 
rather than to have a statistically representative portrait of the whole population of 
biologists in Great Britain. Given this, it was decided that a purposive sample of informants 
should be used. This purposive sample, as its name indicates, was selected according to 
certain parameters relevant to our central research questions. It was therefore chosen so 
as to include three key variables theoretically justified, but also empirically motivated by 
the results of our pilot study: gender, age, and discipline.
Since our study aimed at a substantive set of data concerning the scientific and 
political discourse of biologists, the use of an interview protocol was required, in 
preference to a questionnaire. The form of the interview protocol provided flexibility and 
the possibility to develop the discussion on some issues if necessary.
Finally, based on the range of viewpoints displayed by respondents in the pilot 
study, it was believed that a small sample would be sufficient with respect to the purposes 
of our main study. A sample of thirty-one male and female respondents provided an array 
of responses reasonably exhaustive on each of the issues discussed in the study. Since we 
could not obtain statistical representation from our sample, the two "control” variables of 
age and discipline could not offer as such the possibility to make definite comparisons; it 
was assumed that they might, however, suggest whether generations and disciplines are 
important factors for an analysis of differentiations in biological discourse. It was, in fact, 
according to the results of our pilot study, that some issues (e.g. political attitudes in gene­
ral or towards feminism) were believed to differ more importantly on generational and 
gender grounds than on disciplinary grounds, while scientific beliefs might differ more on 
generational and disciplinary lines than across genders. The differences expected among 
these cross-sections of respondents on specific questions were believed to be reflected to
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an extent in a sample of roughly thirty respondents.
Two preliminary versions of the interview protocol were piloted before it was 
decided to embark on the study proper. The possibility of distinguishing the impact of 
disciplinary backgrounds on the respondents’ scientific views was explored thereof. But 
more than anything else, the pilot study tested the clarity and relevancy of questions dealing 
more specifically with issues like objectivity in biological science, biological reductionism, 
and feminist biology. It was also decided that the main study should include male 
respondents. Since most of the women in the pilot study were only able to discuss 
superficially the idea of a feminist bioloev. it became relevant to explore if there were 
noticeable differences between men and women on the role of feminism in biology in more 
general terms.
There were two series of interviews in the pilot study. A first series was carried out 
with ten female respondents, four doctoral students (aged 23 to 30) and six faculty members 
(in their late forties or fifties), between November 8, 1987, and January 18, 1988. They 
were all involved in research in medical schools or in colleges attached to the University 
of London at the time of the interview. Respondents were selected through the directory 
of the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the Commonwealth Universities 
Yearbook 1987. personal contacts, and lists provided by departments. A second series of 
interviews was carried out with four women teachers of biology (all in their thirties) 
between April 18 and June 20, 1988.
The main study included thirty-one respondents, eighteen women and thirteen men^ ,^ 
doing research at the University of London, and interviewed between October 25,1988 and 
January 13, 1989^ .^ Five different departments (including three MRC research units) and 
one medical school are represented in the sample. The disciplinary and age representations 
of the sample is presented in the Appendix^^. The sample of respondents is not statistically 
representative, but rather selected along the parameters of gender, age, and disciplines in 
relation to the purposes of our research.
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For all pilot and main studies, a semi-structured interview protocol was utilized. 
Each interview was carried out by the author and tape-recorded". Each was transcribed 
non-verbatim for analysis".
The data were analyzed so that we could discern patterns of response and 
occurrences, and ’count* them. Thus, our method bore some similarities with quantitative 
analysis. We also managed, however, to take account of some contextual factors, which 
enabled to qualify the responses of our interviewees when needed. This will come out more 
clearly in our presentation of the data in the next sections. Having said that, the 
construction of patterns of biological discourse focused primarily on the three main 
variables of sex, discipline, and age, and according to the three-fold thematic of individual 
attitudes, political views, and scientific judgments, with a view to a comparison with 
feminist biologists.
The pilot studv protocol put an emphasis on the issue of discrimination against 
women biologists. The study showed indeed that the * double-bind* of women scientists was 
considered as important by nearly all the respondents. The section discussing the impacts 
of politics and gendered styles of practice on the scientific process was modified, focusing 
on scientific issues more commonly referred to in biology (e.g., the strengths and 
limitations of reductionism in one’s field of research; the scientific relevance of Dawkins’s 
"selfish gene" thesis, of Wilson’s sociobiology, and, more generally, of biological explana­
tions of human behaviour; the actual or potential impact of the skills, workstyles and 
professional views of women biologists on the norms of scientific practice). This section 
was crucial, for it formed the grounds on which the identification of diverse types of 
’biological discourses’ was carried out, with special reference to issues such as a biological 
explanations of gendered behaviour and the neutrality of biological science. (In the analysis 
of data, it was borne in mind that the actual experiences of informants on the one hand, and 
their speculative remarks, on the other, ought to be differentiated.) Finally, and as 
mentioned above, the pilot study suggested modifications for the final sample of res­
199
pondents, insisting on the disciplinary variable (with regard to their scientific views, 
especially of holism and reductionism), the age variable (with respect to individuals* 
attitudes towards the politics of science and sexism in the scientific milieu), and the utility 
of introducing the gender variable (to explore further differentiations in biologists’ views 
of feminism in biology).
The elements retained for the final version of the interview protocol were the 
following. First, special attention was given to the issue of reductionism versus holism, and 
the biological explanations of behaviour. General questions were formulated in order to 
capture the imagination of biologists and to elicit their viewpoints on the role of science 
in society, the scientific status of biology compared to ’soft* and ’hard’ sciences, and the 
importance and limitations of biological science in an understanding of human life. These 
questions were believed to help document more substantially the ’scientific ethos’ of 
biologists. Secondly, with respect to feminism in science, a reworking of the questions in 
terms of personal experience vis-à-vis discrimination at work, and in terms of the 
perceptions of the differentials in verbal, intellectual and manual skills between men and 
women and their actual impact on research work was more likely to elicit relevant answers. 
In this connection, it also appeared helpful to ask respondents to position themselves 
relative to feminism in general, rather than feminist biology more particularly, by asking 
them to define how the feminist politics applies to the scientific milieu.
The final version of the interview protocol therefore contained six parts; 1) 
socio-demographic and curricular background; 2) personal motivations to become a biolo­
gist; 3) self-appraisal of scientific work; opinions on the importance of certain professional 
assets for biologists; 4) discrimination in the workplace; 5) feminism in the workplace and 
differential aspects of men and women’s work in biology: 6) opinions on general scientific 
issues regarding biology, focusing on the reconciliation of holism with reductionism; the 
main functions of biological science in society; relevancy of sociobiology as a model of 
explanation of human behaviour, major criticisms about the current structure of biological
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research.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the forthcoming results were 
primarily based on the interview material of thirty-one female and male biologists. But the 
findings of the two pilot studies (fourteen additional women) were integrated in some ap­
propriate occasions, as will be specified in the text.
The analysis of results will be organized in four sections: discrimination against 
women at work; differentials in skills and workstyles between men and women; the 
scientific issues relating to reductionism, holism, and explanations of behaviour in 
biological knowledge; and finally the impact of feminism in biological research.
Segregation and Discrimination at Work: How Female 
and Male Biologists Perceive the Situation
Respondents were asked if discrimination against women was still prevalent in the 
scientific milieu, taking their own personal experience or that of acquaintances as a referen­
ce. Overall men and women thought that discrimination did not handicap scientific 
institutions any longer. But the perceptions of women and men differed inasmuch as wo­
mens’ opinions were more elaborate, more qualified. In comparison, men did not — or 
could not — elaborate on the subject. The age factor also seems to affect the perceptions 
of respondents. The following quotes^ illustrate these differences. A middle-aged woman 
lecturer said:
As far as I know it’s equal opportunity [in industry] and that’s fairly well 
up here [in the university] too. I do happen to know that when I was 
considered for a particular grant, the fact that I was a woman and married 
was raised and whether I would stick it out. Fortunately I had somebody to 
speak up for me and say, ’Yes, I would stick it out’, and *I was O.K. as a 
woman’. But that was twenty years ago. I think it’s much more equitable 
now and there isn’t very much discrimination. Although I think probably in 
promotions. There are very few women professors. In fact I don’t know of 
any women professors in biology at the moment... And I think even if 
[women] apply, it’s more difficult for them [to be promoted] against their 
male colleagues. Because it’s generally male colleagues that are appointing 
them and they have slightly built-in prejudice that women can’t do the job
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as well. (il7)
In comparison, a male senior lecturer said,
I believe there is no discrimination... in careers and promotions, not at all, 
not at all, I am sure; but [my experience] is based on a small sample. The 
[women] I have known have done very well... but... there was something 
which might be called discrimination. When I first came here, there was a 
man-only common-room. Although there was a female room as well. But 
now they’re all mixed. So there’s a slight change. I don’t know if you can 
call it discrimination since women had their own room as well... Sexual 
harassment no doubt has occurred... there is some occasional harassment; it 
is deplorable... so there’s a slight disadvantage for women. (ilOl)
Two younger respondents, both single, had different opinions. A young female Ph.D.
student (who had previously studied arts and humanities at university) said.
Yes, I do think so actually [that being a woman affected the judgment of 
male academics on my value as a scientist]. But it wasn’t something that 
bothered me too much, except at one particular interview when the guy said,
’You know, you’re obviously an extremely fickle female’, which I think had 
I been a man he wouldn’t have said to me. I think they Isicl would have just 
admired the fact that he had changed his mind and changed drastically... In 
this [present] place, it’s not so much that you are discriminated against [as 
a woman]... But there was a recent article in Science magazine on 
self-visions of female Ph.D. students and how you do have to supervise them 
slightly differently ...I do not think it’s so much that [my supervisor] talks 
down to me. It’s just that he doesn’t discuss results with me; he doesn’t 
explain ideas so much. (i9)
Her young male colleague, for his part, said,
I think [discrimination] is the other way around here: a lot of women are 
employed, but for sexist reasons [because the head of department is 
pro-females]... [as far as sexual harassment is concerned] there is nothing 
direct, but certainly the kind of teasing of a sexual nature, but that occurred 
between the men and the men, so [laughter] ... (il 10)
As a matter of fact, one third of the women indicated that, in general, men do not 
seem to understand the scope of the impediments their female colleagues might have, as 
mothers or simply as women, to face in their daily routine and career. It seemed that 
although most male respondents were aware of the problems experienced by women 
colleagues (especially the double-duty of women with children), they obviously had a
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limited view of the importance of these problems, or else, were very cautious or defensive 
in their comments on that matter.
The issue of discrimination also raised various opinions among the women 
respondents themselves. There was a noticeable variation across generations. For instance, 
younger respondents generally realized they have never had to suffer the experience of 
being the token woman in their departments. In contrast, a majority of the older respondents 
(including four of the five women over 45 in the pilot study) said they had personally 
experienced such difficulties. On the other hand, younger female respondents seemed more 
sensitive to — or less tolerant of — the various forms of gender segregation and discrimina­
tion in the work milieu. But those who manifested more acutely their irritation towards 
segregation were mostly in their thirties and forties, and mothers of young children. This 
is not surprising since most of these women are at crucial stages in their scientific careers.
Not surprisingly either, our results show that biologists consider that the main source 
of discrimination against women is related to motherhood. A majority of respondents, male 
and female, believed that infant care and the emotional bonds between mothers and children 
remain the outstanding hindrances for women who seek professional advancement in 
science. In the main, women argued that since there is a prejudice against them (employers, 
so they said, will frequently assume that at one stage in their careers women will take a 
break to bear and raise children); that employers tend to choose males instead, presuming 
that women would not be totally committed to their jobs^\ Yet a majority of the mothers 
in our sample (five out of seven in the main study, and equal numbers in the pilot study) 
firmly believed that having children would considerably reduce their chances of making 
an outstanding contribution to biology. Five of the eleven childless women (five out of 
seven in the pilot study) expected this would have (or would have had) such an impact on 
their careers. As this young biochemist said.
At the moment, certainly, I would not like to have a child and give it to 
somebody else to bring it up. That’s how I feel. I would not have enough 
left for science [if I had to raise a child]... I mean there are some people 
here who manage [to do both] and seem to be very good about it. But
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they’re not getting anywhere in science. And that’s how it is... I t ’s so 
important, achievements [sic], in science. (i#9)
Indeed, three of the four women with young children (two out of the four women 
in the pilot study) indicated that they preferred to have a good balance between career and 
family rather than make the sacrifice of one option in favour of the other. These results 
ought, however, to be interpreted bearing in mind that a woman’s moral commitment is 
expected to be towards her family first, and only secondarily to paid labour, and that these 
expectations might have produced certain ’artefacts’ in our respondents’ answers^.
Five out of eighteen women (ten out of thirty-two, including the pilot study) 
mentioned spontaneously that the most difficult moments in their careers were precipitated 
by the additional stress of family responsibilities encroaching on work commitments. These 
respondents were all in their mid-thirties or older. (One of the respondents (il4), single, 
said that although she had to take care of her father, she thought it was easier for her than 
for married women to handle professional and domestic duties simultaneously.)
Three women (seven including the pilot study) maintained that the worst moments 
in their careers were when they suffered from discriminatory hiring practices or from sexist 
attitudes, usually on the part of older male biologists. Although it did not force them to quit 
their jobs (except for one), it hampered their scientific productivity to a significant extent 
and for an extended period of time.
Not surprisingly, among the six youngest female respondents under thirty-five years 
of age (twelve including the pilot study) three women (and three more in the pilot study) 
mentioned that the doctorate itself was the most difficult experience they had had as 
scientists. They did not seem to consider that segregatory behaviours of supervisors could 
represent difficulties, although they generally agreed that sexist remarks and patronising was 
still very common, especially among the older generations of male scientists.
Several women believed that there was still a lot to do before women could get 
equal opportunities in paidwork in general and in science in particular, but only a few be­
lieved that discrimination was still prevalent in the scientific milieu. The majority seemed
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to think that discrimination was an isolated practice, more common in the old days than 
now. Indeed female respondents preferred to use terms such as * sexist* or ’patronizing* 
attitudes rather than discrimination per se. It was generally believed that although conscious 
discrimination still seemed to exist in hiring practices, attitudes and behaviours were 
considered currently to be the main predicaments in women biologists* careers. Moreover, 
women respondents seemed to think that in general segregation was practised 
unconsciously, and that as such manifested more commonly in the behaviours and attitudes 
of scientists, usually of older males. In sum, the majority of women indicated that sexist 
attitudes still prevailed, and some even suggested that this was somehow ’inevitable*. Only 
one female respondent said that the scientific milieu was different from other professional 
sectors in this regard. She argued that scientists were usually exceptionally progressive 
people compared to other professionals, and that this was reflected in their attitudes towards 
women biologists.
Women respondents were generally concerned by the fact that there were still few 
women at the top of the academic hierarchy. In general, they believed that this was due 
mainly to the remnants of the ’old boy network mentality*. A third of our female respon­
dents, nearly all past forty years of age, said that it indeed precluded the full integration 
of women into relevant information networks, discussion groups, or the ’inner circles* of 
decision-making in the biology milieu. Younger women, as noted earlier, complained more 
particularly about the patronizing attitudes of their male supervisors or superiors.
Women generally agreed that discrimination was currently minimal in the scientific 
milieu, but that, on the other hand, male "patronising" was still pervasive and affected 
women who did not always feel men took them seriously as scientists. A mature research 
student in mycology pointed out how cross she gets when people made jokes about her 
job: "Oh! you mean you cook mushrooms at work?" (i6). A woman lecturer in her late 
forties contended that the "biggest problem women face at everv level of the academic 
hierarchy is that men do not take them seriously" (il6) [my emphasis].
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Seven of the eight oldest female informants (mid-forties or over) said that they had
to be twice as good as the men in order to be accepted at university or to get a job. (The
same applied for the pilot study). It seemed to have been especially the case for those
women who wanted to do medicine in the first place — before they finally opted for
biology. On the other hand, some of these respondents suggested that, compared to
medicine and other sciences (such as physics), biology was a field where women did not
necessarily have to be that much better than the men in order to be promoted, since there
has always been traditionally so many women in the field. A good number of women
biologists have observed, however, that discrimination in hiring practices still existed to a
significant extent, and that it was especially hard for women to get long-term jobs after
the Ph.D. It was especially apprehended by young postgraduates. The following quotation
illustrates this state of mind:
[Although it was more difficult for the previous generation of women] who 
had to fight every inch of the way; at the same time, I think we’re going 
through a phase where it’s going to be much more difficult again. Because 
everything is on grant money, I think there is this attitude of, ’We’ve got 
this money. It is for a two or three-year project. If we take on this married 
female, will she produce at this time; will she be having days off sick every 
time her kids are off sick?’... We [women] have had a very short phase 
where it has been slightly easier, but not equal. (i#8)
What do women do when they are facing sexist or discriminatory behaviours? A few 
respondents said women should take a stand to abolish discrimination; but that this was 
risky because their jobs and reputations might thereby be jeopardized. A good number of 
our female informants said they simply became angry. But a lot of them also said they 
preferred to remain passively angry rather than to retaliate. Several of the older female 
informants believed that younger women were more forceful opponents of sexism. But, 
according to our results, it was not necessarily the case.
A great number of women, mostly students and young lecturers, said that they 
sometimes took advantage of "playing the game" of the ingenuous female with the 
patronizing male boss, in order to benefit from the situation if possible. These women
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biologists were not proud of themselves however, nor did they condone the usage of such 
a tactics. They admitted that it just helped to perpetuate sexist attitudes towards women in 
science. A young respondent (ilO) even contended that women were their own worst ene­
mies since "sometimes [they] behave as stupid feminine females".
These features of the biology milieu finally made several respondents conclude that, 
first, the milieu tended to attract women that were as strong, ambitious, and as "ruthless" 
as men (especially in the fast moving and competitive research sectors of molecular biology 
and medical genetics); or on the contrary, women who would let themselves be treated 
as non-serious professionals, or worse, sex objects. Secondly, it implied that, for women 
with children, the possibility of having an outstanding scientific career was likely to be out 
of the question. The idea that a scientist ought to be dedicated to her/his job was indeed 
still strongly entrenched in the minds of a great many women who felt condemned to 
choose between "the two worlds". As a result, women generally tended to minimise the 
weight of discrimination as a factor explaining the relative absence of female biologists 
in high rank positions. Only two respondents, both in their forties, suggested that the 
absence of women in top level jobs or on elective committees was still greatly due to the 
’old boy network* ethos of the biological institution.
In a parallel with women, men were asked what have been the most difficult 
moments in their careers. In contrast with the women, there was not any significant varia­
tion in the responses of different age groups who, in the main, whether students or 
lecturers, seemed to have always had the same difficulties throughout their ’careers’. Not 
too surprisingly, men generally experienced difficulties that contrasted with the difficulties 
that were most important to overcome for women. Five out of the thirteen male respon­
dents, aged in their thirties or so, said they have had great problems during their doctoral 
studies, a time when they had to build their confidence as scientific researchers. Three other 
respondents, the two youngest and the oldest respondents, more specifically pointed to 
anxiety, wasting time over experiments that proved to be unuseful, and running out of
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ideas. Three other respondents discussed organisational drawbacks in research, rather than 
personal problems as such. For instance one stressed that grant applications, teaching duties, 
and administrative commitments were "continuously demanding"; the others argued that to 
be pressured by the competition for funding and promotion was a constant source of stress.
Regarding the issues of discrimination against women and sexism, six male 
respondents maintained that, compared to other scientific fields, biology had always had a 
lot of women and that, therefore, discrimination was rather absent from it. As one 
post-doctoral student remarked, "University is more open to them [women] than before... 
There are a few women at high levels, [but] there is no reason why there should be so few" 
(il03). Several respondents shared his opinion. This tends to confirm the fact that men 
generally minimize the problem of discrimination against women in science, and seem to 
believe that if a women is scientifically gifted, nothing but personal reasons would interfere 
with her professional advancement in science.
It is worth noticing however that, among both the younger and the older male 
informants, several men believed that a majority of the women who have succeeded in 
science are relatively more assertive, if not aggressive, than the average woman. They 
acknowledged the fact that these women, namely the older female biologists, had to fight 
prejudices and to handle domestic duties and career commitments simultaneously.
Some of these men also added that they have become more aware of discrimination 
against women since they got married to scientists. But their awareness did precisely not 
transcend the level of discourse. One of the three male respondents with children was very 
defensive, and insisted that not only his wife, but he himself as well had sometimes had 
to take time off work to care for the children. The other two men simply acknowledged the 
fact that their wives had to bear familial responsibilities and to strive with the additional 
obstacles thereby imposed on their careers, although without mentioning anything about 
their own involvement in family care. Of the other four married men, only one criticized 
severely the prejudice of employers against married women. Taking his wife as an
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example, he rejected the idea that women could not be as committed as men to their jobs 
if they had children.
In fact, for a majority of male respondents, discrimination no longer overtly existed. 
For them, remnants of sexism and segregation were more to do with "self-imposed" dis­
crimination or "subconscious" attitudes on the part of women and men, than on outright 
sexist practices. For instance, according to some men, the lack of assertiveness and 
confidence of women, and also their preference for only some of the biological disciplines 
form the very barriers that women impose on themselves. The following quotation speaks 
for itself: "There are quite a lot of women in this department. There is no reason why 
women should not come into biology..." (il03; my emphasis). In other instances several 
respondents maintained that subconscious attitudes were "hard to change". Likewise, the 
"secretary syndrome", as one respondent observed (il06), was still strong, producing uncon­
scious self-discrimination and perpetuating the obstacles for a more full participation of 
women in scientific meetings and discussions.
Many male respondents considered the issue of discrimination against women in 
biology as tantamount to "self-discrimination". They believed that discriminatory practices 
no longer existed, and suggested instead that women were hindering their own scientific 
careers by deciding to have children and spend more time at home with them. They also 
maintained that their general lack of confidence and shyness greatly hindered their chances 
of promotion. Finally a great number of them argued that sexism at work came from both 
sides, from men as well as women themselves.
To summarize, the majority of men and women respondents believed that the 
segregatory attitudes of both women and men were inevitable, and also that discrimination 
was somehow self-imposed. Some women respondents even argued that it would be 
impossible to change the attitudes of men overnight or to transform the family structure 
within the next generation. However, a majority of women held that still very few men 
understood the extent to which women have to bear the double duty of being a housewife
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and a scientist, or to suffer sexual prejudices. Finally, women noted that younger male 
biologists were more aware of sexism than older biologists.
Differentials in Skills and Abilities 
Among Women and Men Biologists
Do women biologists have any specific skills or shortcomings which are more 
common to them than to their male counterparts? This question received affirmative 
response from both female and male respondents; there were few differences between the 
opinions of the two groups. The differences resided in the fact that women reported certain 
aspects of a job to which men did not necessarily pay attention. More importantly however, 
the differences in the skills and abilities of men and women biologists (as reported by our 
informants) somehow reflected the differences between what are considered to be more or 
less important assets to succeed in biology.
Roughly half of the respondents, male and female, observed that women biologists 
were more meticulous, better at manipulating specimens and more careful in conducting 
experiments. A male botanist stressed, for instance, that women were "remarkably good 
with compounds" (il02). The other half of the respondents, however, suggested that this 
was not necessarily true; that there were also women who were as "sloppy" as men; that 
feminine meticulousness is just a "stereotype".
Several female respondents contended that women were more perfectionist than the 
men, especially in technical work; but they also suggested that this did not change the 
scientific results much at the end of the day. In fact, most believed that this might be, on 
the contrary, more time-consuming than really beneficial. Hence, on the one hand, a good 
number of respondents considered meticulousness as commendable, on the other, believed 
that it was more time-consuming than really beneficial. However, according to some of the 
female geneticists interviewed (in both pilot and main studies), meticulousness was crucial, 
for it made all the difference between a failed experiment and a successful one. Here again
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however, the respondents did not really consider that womens* meticulousness could 
possibly be the source of an outstanding and specific contribution of women to biological 
science in terms of a production of new knowledge. On the contrary, most respondents 
suggested that if male biologists were less methodical or punctilious than the women, on 
the other hand, men were on average more imaginative and innovative. Moreover, 
imagination was considered by the majority of both male and female respondents to be of 
greater scientific value, for it is of key importance in the interpretation of results and the 
initiation of new scientific hypotheses^^.
It was largely agreed that, in general, women are not as prone to present papers, 
put forward new ideas and stand out as the men. Women were seen as lacking confidence, 
more tentative in suggesting their ideas, and more worried about doing their job well. One 
male respondent, for instance, said he had often observed that women were not as prompt 
as the men in using new pieces of apparatus (il04). At another level, one female respondent 
remarked, "Girls fsicl are more sensitive to criticism. It is easier to criticize the men Isicl" 
(il). In several other instances, mainly raised by women respondents, men were said to be 
more prone to voice their opinion, to "sell" ideas, and to write grant proposals with more 
confidence. Some respondents stressed, on the other hand, that women were better than men 
at communicating, giving explanations, and teaching. In general, informants considered 
being single-minded as very important for a scientist, especially if he/she had the ambition 
to succeed and to contribute outstandingly to his/her field; and as a number of women 
thought, women did not seem to be as single-minded as the men. Many of them said, 
however, that employers were generally overly prejudiced in this regard and that, sadly e- 
nough, as one young woman said (i#8), they often rejected "good female biologists" in 
favour of "careless young men".
Several respondents suggested that men’s attitudes might explain part of why women 
are, in general, less confident and do not put themselves forward as much as their male 
counterparts. As one middle-aged female informant suggested, "Women are more defensive
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because of residual bias" (i2). Also according to some female respondents, women are
expected to be supportive wives and caring mothers in the first place, and this might affect
their productivity at work, but also their relative lack of ambition and lower confidence.
For example, as this young lecturer said,
I think what happens to male colleagues is that oftentimes their girlfiiends 
are doing things, or are trained, or believe that they should be totally suppor­
tive of their boyfriends or husbands. So they don’t make such a big fuss 
about things... Basically [my boyfriend] didn’t like me talk about science; 
he didn’t like the people I worked with in my department... ’What every 
good scientist needs is a good wife’, my boss used to say... (i4)
And she continued,
I enjoyed doing work in my Ph.D.... I like doing the work, I like solving 
problems. But I’m not the kind of person who sort of thinks, ’Oh! that’s 
something we should really be working on. It’s a good idea; we should be 
doing this and that’, which is what more ambitious male or female scientists 
do ... In the world of science today, you need a certain type of personality 
to actually succeed; it’s not just ability, it’s having a persevering and 
ambitious personality.
Another woman, a mother of two, thought that
It is more difficult to be single-minded if you’re a woman in that you’ve got 
responsibilities at home which are different to a man’s however one equates 
male and female in the home. For example I find it quite difficult to go 
away for conferences because my daughter hates it when I go away. Now 
I either choose to go away and be a scientist... or I choose to be a mother 
and not go away. Whereas I don’t think any of my male colleagues would 
hesitate to go away to a conference... I don’t know any of them who would 
stay at home for family reasons... which is a bit restricting I think because 
I prefer not to go away. So I think one has a drawback in that you’re not 
part of the scientific community as you might be because you ’le effectively 
not fully in. Plus the fact that if you’ve got something going on you can’t 
stick around in the lab until eight o’clock, whereas several of my colleagues 
can. They just phone up, ’Well I’m not coming home until...’. But I can’t 
deal with it... emotionally, ( il7)
A number of female respondents criticized severely the behaviour of some of their male 
colleagues who, they believed, were single-minded at the expense of their wives, collabora­
tors and assistants. The most revealing remark however, came from a middle-aged woman 
lecturer ( il6) whose position illustrated how several other women felt — that they were 
being treated differently, and, sometimes, not even seriously as scientists. She argued that
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patronizing attitudes affected greatly the professional drives and personal self-worth of 
women biologists.
The attitude [of academics towards male and female students] is different: 
the attitude towards the woman is patronizing, towards the male it should be 
aggressive -  you 'have' to put a young man in his place. You feel, as you 
hear this, that it is like a ritual for the boy: he'll reach manhood once he's 
gone through this; but the woman, she will internalise that she can stay there 
as long as she remains silent... The main problem [for women] is to get the 
men to take them seriously.
At another level, a great number of female respondents pointed out that female
biologists were, in general, better organized, and that they were able to handle different
things at the same time. This was, according to many respondents, possibly due to the fact
that women are used to having double duties. A few female respondents even argued that
women were better at coping with deadlines and that they could bear psychological stress
more easily than men. Finally, a majority of women said that the men would not be
bothered with cleaning up the laboratory after a day's work. Although several female
respondents admitted that women could be 'sloppy' too, it was generally agreed that it is
the women who are expected to do the washing-up at the end of the day. Several women
maintained that men needed, most of the time, to be reminded to clean up their laboratories.
Surprisingly enough, none of the male informants pointed out that being tidy and keeping
the laboratory clean was worth mentioning. The following quotation of one of our male
informants (il07) illustrates the chasm between men and women on this matter:
The only long-term collaboration I've ever carried out with a woman is 
with my colleague... I saw her as too careful and too obsessive; she saw me 
as sloppy. But I think that's the sort of things that happen with collabo­
rators, period Isicl.
The great majority of male respondents expressed the view that a relative lack of 
assertiveness and of confidence was characteristic of female biologists. The following quo­
tations illustrate this:
Yes, there might be a difference there [between men and women]. Quite a 
lot of female students here seem to talk less about their work... (il 12).
1 think, but 1 might be wrong, that there’s a lot of self-discrimination, of fear
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[on the part of girls]; a lack of self-confidence of girls. I like ambitious 
people, whether they are male or female it doesn’t bother me... but I think 
a lot of [womens’] timidness is due to lack of self-confidence. I don’t think 
there is any difference in ability or intellect. This is the social constraints 
rsicl which are often self-imposed, due to how they got treated as younger 
people; you know, ’girls ought to do so, and boys something else’. That’s 
the sort of thing which polarizes [womens’] own impatience about 
themselves... [Women] are repressed from speaking their mind. They are 
not assertive, (il 13)
In general, and, I mean, it is a generalisation — there arc exceptions both 
ways [coming from both my male and female colleagues], self-confidence 
seems to me to be one [difference between male and female colleagues] that 
I find a bit bemusing sometimes. I noticed it among our students as well... 
female students have less confidence in themselves. They are much more 
tentative, they worry about things... But I don’t think in later parts of careers 
[it is so much the case]; either you acquire self-esteem or you hang yourself!
(il06)
Overall, male and female respondents observed that men and women generally dis­
play the same scientific potential and abilities as biologists. They believed that differentials 
of skills and abilities among biologists had more to do with individuals than with gender. 
The only exception to this point was referred to as a general lack of confidence on the part 
of women biologists. This, it was believed, might have more seriously limited womens’ full 
contribution to the field of biology.
In another segment of the interview, a list of twelve job characteristics was 
presented^ to the respondents who were asked to rank them in order of importance and to 
picture an ’ideal-type’ of biologist. Each respondent was then asked to do the same thing 
with his or her own strong and weaker points. The results give some indication of how men 
and women biologists value their own work and evaluate their potential contribution to their 
profession. Several respondents said that it was hard to tell which characteristics were more 
important than the others, that they were all important and that every good biologist 
needed to have a good balance of all of them. What is most interesting is not so much the 
variations between men and women, or across generations, but the similarities and points 
of consensus. Respondents generally favoured two assets: innovation and imagination on 
the one hand, and self-criticism on the other. These assets were singled out as being the
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first two most important assets by either group of men and women. Theoretical skills, 
practical skills, meticulousness, and being open to criticism came, on average, in a second 
group of assets. Surprisingly enough, being confident or being hard working did not emerge 
as particularly important assets.
These results, sketchy as it were, confirm the strong impression that biologists 
consider intellectual ability and ’lateral thinking* as more valuable than practical skills or 
meticulousness in laboratory manipulations. If one compares these results with what 
respondents believed to be the strongest points of each sex, one might ascertain additional 
explanations of why women have generally tended to undervalue their scientific 
contribution as good experimentalists. We shall explore the meaning of these findings fur­
ther in the last section of this chapter. Let us now look at more substantive issues relating 
to the scientific views of mainstream biologists.
Reductionism and Holism in Biological 
Research Practice
In this section, we enter the heart of the matter. Where do biologists, be they 
molecular biologists or ecologists, working in zoology or human biology, doing clinical 
studies or not, stand on the issues of reductionism and holism? How does this affect their 
views on the scientific value of sociobiology, for instance; or on the objectivity of biolo­
gical knowledge in general, and on explanations of behaviour in particular?
Our results suggest that, in the main, biologists lean towards a Popperian viewpoint 
on biological science. That is, they believe in the idea of a progress of biological 
knowledge, and in the epistemology of critical realism and falsificationism. They consider 
biology a fully-fledged science. They seem, however, to admit that biology, in comparison 
to physics or chemistry, does not offer the empirical evidence of general theories that 
would satisfactorily vindicate the rules of falsificationism and the pragmatic criterion. The 
reason implicit in this is that biology comprises objects and phenomena which are relatively
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more complex and very sensible to forces in their environment. As a result, they do not 
lend themselves easily to scientific experimentalism, mathematical formulae, or scientific 
’laws’ of causation.
Our results indeed suggest that biologists are not reductionists in the strong 
epistemological sense, as the Radical Scientists’ critique suggested. They do not generally 
endorse the ’ontological’ or ’philosophical’ strands in which biological forms are assumed 
to be reducible to molecules and chemical properties. They are also far from subscribing 
to a reductionist view on human biology and behaviour. In fact, they would shy away from 
any attempt to explain human or animal behaviour, with some exceptions which will be 
identified later in this section.
Instead, biologists generally lean towards methodological reductionism; they claim 
practical reasons to do so. These reasons are mainly dictated by the state of development 
of biology as a ’hard’ experimental science. Of course, this could be explained partly by 
the fact that molecular biology and biochemistry have somewhat ’shrunk’ the scope of 
biological questions being addressed within the current biological research agenda. This is 
not denied by either critics of biology or mainstream biologists. In fact many biologists 
think that the current domination of molecular research is susceptible to a "fashion". Hence, 
they foresee a return of the pendulum in favour of traditionally well established disciplines, 
such as physiology and genetics (or of promising branches of study such as ecology), or 
at least, expect a better equilibrium between biological disciplines, inviting to a better integ­
ration of the life sciences.
On the other hand, our results suggested that biologists differ on the degrees to 
which they adhere to the reductionist approach. Molecular biologists and biochemists, for 
instance, appear "more committed to reductionism" (as one of our respondents (il 12) put 
it), than evolutionists, botanists, or even geneticists. Botanists and ecologists regard holism 
as a most fruitful framework for biological studies. For them, the notion of environment 
evokes the fact that living phenomena are constituted by, and react to, a wide array of
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’conditioning* factors, and, as a result, lend themselves more readily to interactive and 
holistic explanations. Results indeed suggest that there are variations in the opinions of 
biologists about reductionism, and that these are related to both disciplines and research 
subjects. In addition these variations tended to reflect the age structure of our sample, for 
younger respondents appeared to lean towards a stronger reductionist stance. This might, 
however, suggest that the differences between age groups simply reflect work experience 
and training tradition.
In general, however, respondents believed that holism and reductionism were two 
necessary ways of looking at biological organisms in order to attain a complete under­
standing of life processes. They also seemed to think that, in daily practice, biologists must 
choose one approach rather than the other, and that this choice is dependent on research 
goals. The majority of ’mainstream’ biologists does not reject holism in favour of 
reductionism as an approach. Rather, they consider that experimentalism is the only way 
of separating erroneous explanations from valid ones. In short, they believe first, that 
methodological reductionism is preferable to systematic observation; and secondly, that 
mathematical coefficients and ’mechanical’ laws are preferable to "descriptive" results and 
"woolly" interpretations. But a preference for methodological reductionism does not entail 
a dismissal of holism or interactionism altogether. These latter notions are, on the contrary, 
considered especially important in biological theory. Consequently, ’mainstream’ biologists 
do not differ very much from the scientific position of Radical Scientists on this question.
With regard to explanations of human behaviour, however, our results suggest that 
biologists hold fairly common-sensical, even relatively cautious, opinions. This offers a real 
contrast with the arguments for a biology of human mind and behaviour developed by 
Radical Scientists. The fact that mainstream biologists do not want to make any strong 
scientific claims concerning human behaviour is not so surprising if analyzed in the light 
of two factors. First, the majority of our respondents did not seem to be interested in 
studies of human behaviour on a scientific basis. As they suggested, modem biology (in
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contrast to psychology) is not so much concerned with the understanding of human 
behaviour as with minute bio-chemical processes and elements in living organisms and the 
human body. Secondly, none of our informants opposed the idea that upbringing and culture 
have far more importance than biological factors in explanations of human behaviours, and 
of gendered behaviours in particular.
All the above results appear especially interesting in view of the criticisms made by 
feminist critics and Radical Scientists. They tend to show first that, empirically, the feminist 
critiques of the biological method and of theory building are not totally justified. But they 
also strongly suggest that the institutional setting (or disciplinary structure) of biology 
does not offer the sociological condition for a vindication of a project of feminist biology, 
simply because, as shown in chapter 1, feminist critiques focus on human biology and 
behaviour rather than embrace the whole array of biological disciplines.
Our results suggest that there is a genuine challenge of molecular reductionism 
within mainstream biology itself. For instance, non-molecular biologists strongly criticized 
molecular biologists for an excess of confidence in reductionism, scientific short-sighte­
dness, and professional arrogance; as well, a number of molecular biologists and geneticists 
are beginning to question the research agenda of their own disciplines. Some of them 
suggested that it is only a matter of time before a better balance between molecular 
reductionism and holistic-oriented biological disciplines is re-established. Subsequent to 
a frantic period of gene mapping, multidisciplinarity will resurface in order to fully address 
all the new questions molecular biology will have left unanswered.
Despite all the qualifications mentioned above, results also tend to show that 
self-criticism does not extend beyond a virtuous discourse in favour of interdisciplinarity 
in biology. Respondents did quite often, it is true, overstate the importance of 
methodological reductionism, to the extent of neglecting alternative methods and sparing 
the effort of testing holistic explanations. One of the consequences of this might well be, 
as dialectical biologists have said, that biologists tend to resort to an "additive model" rather
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than to a genuine holistic and dialectical model of explanation capturing the gist of the 
dynamic process between organic and environmental components in biological phenomena.
As the current structure of biological science encourages strongly-focused research and 
applied biology, efforts in the direction of multidisciplinarity and basic research are 
minimized, as many of our respondents admitted. In a nutshell, there is little evidence of 
a shift towards multidisciplinarity, and literally none that suggests the emergence of a 
dialectical paradigm as propounded by Radical Scientists, or, as proposed in feminist 
projects of biology, interdisciplinarity between biology, psychology and sociology in the 
understanding of human behaviour.
In the same vein, many respondents approved of some form of social responsibility 
for scientists. But their political stance appeared rather timid compared with that of Radical 
Scientists. For example, our respondents were aware of the new social problems arising 
from their field (e.g. in terms of human ethics, protection against environmental hazards, 
priorities in the biological research agenda). But, according to them, ideology and politics 
did not and could not contaminate scientific knowledge per se. In fact, although several 
informants suggested that the * freedom* of biological science was dangerously constrained 
by the financial structure of research, none claimed that this could affect the actual 
’truth-content’ of good biological research.
It appears reasonable to think, therefore, that even though ’mainstream’ biologists 
are critical of their discipline and institution in general, their criticisms remain rather 
low-profile. Obviously, it is one thing to be critical of biology; it is quite another to reject 
it or abandon it altogether. The position of our respondents is a clear evidence of this. 
Mainstream biologists are mainly critical of the ’abuse’ of biology rather than its ’use’. On 
the whole, they defend the instrumental value of biological research, both as a value-goal 
(i.e. the epistemological tenets of biology as an empirico-analytical science governed by the 
pragmatic criterion), and as the basis of value-laden explanations (i.e. more or less 
sophisticated determinist models of explanation). As such, they tend to refrain from scruti­
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nizing the intrinsic limitations of biology as a form of understanding human life and human 
behaviour.
Let us now look in more detail at the interview results. We shall present these under 
four headings: reductionism, holism, and interdisciplinarity; truth and objectivity in biology; 
sociobiology and the explanation of human behaviour, and finally, criticisms of the current 
structure of biological research.
Reductionism, holism, and disciplinary 
perspectives
Nearly all the respondents indicated that they did not have any scientific exchanges 
with colleagues in other disciplines of biology. The reasons given had generally to do with 
the discrepancy between research projects, combined with lack of time and interest. 
Comments such as: "It’s a waste of time [to discuss with colleagues in other disciplines]" 
(il09); or "I have lost touch with other biologists" ( il06), or "Biologists do not discuss with 
each other unless it is about the same research" (il04) illustrate this. It is only a minority 
of respondents who suggested that biological disciplines were in fact integrated. In spite of 
this, the majority seemed to accommodate itself well to the lack of interdisciplinary 
dialogue and the institutional divisions between specialities.
There seemed to be an exception to this rule however. In the main, biologists were 
very critical of the inflexibility and single-mindedness of molecular biologists. The domina­
tion of molecular biology of the life sciences has even begun to engender confrontations 
within the group of disciplines most closely surrounding molecular genetics. As one 
molecular biologist ( ill)  contended, physiologists, and even geneticists, have become very 
angry at molecular biologists because the latter are quasi oblivious of their work. Another 
geneticist ( il5) concurred with that statement, saying that the findings in molecular biology 
are now begging a tremendous number of questions that will need to be answered with the 
collaboration of other disciplines. Among the nine biologists working in the research area
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of human genetics, those two biologists expressed the more critical views. At the other 
extreme, only the three youngest molecular biologists seemed to hold strict reductionist 
views. The other four respondents claimed to have reservations on the explanatory scope 
of molecular genetics, and were especially careful in their claims regarding mental illness 
more especially.
Among our respondents, there seemed to be very few ’strong’ reductionists in the
theoretical sense. If it were the case, they tended to come from molecular biology or
genetics; and the younger they were, the more reductionist they seemed to be. A
comparison between the comments of two geneticists engaged in medical research
illustrates this more clearly. Asked about how generic or molecular reducrionism could
explain a complex human phenotype or a behavioural pattern in higher organisms, a young
molecular biologist said:
You reduce it; you reduce it to the basics which is chemistry... or something 
like molecular biology. Or you have to classify things. You have to work 
down from a gross scale right down to what’s basically going on. It depends 
what you want to look at too... The environmental interactions are causing 
changes at the fundamental level. You reduce it to a chemical interaction... 
[Biologists] are trying to pinpoint a gene for schizophrenia, so even 
something like that, which is totally mental manifestation of a defect, is 
reducible to, maybe, a gene that has a wrong coding sequence... Yes, there 
are other factors that act on it, yes certainly, but the primary defect is 
something physical, tangible. (ilO)
In comparison, this geneticist in her mid-forties said.
Geneticists are getting ... to be respectable in inherited behavioural traits, but 
only just... I think these sort of terms [holism and reducrionism] that people 
exercise their mind over and write articles about are not relevant to my 
day-to-day life... You use the approach if you like, that is more relevant to 
the particular problems you are asking. You may say you reduce down to 
the elements, but you may want to go back the way and consider the 
relationship with the whole. I must say I haven’t read much on it [the debate 
between holism and reducrionism] because I find it... [is] a lot of talk that 
is not going anywhere very much... Although we are homy with small 
elements when we study genetics, our interests... I mean, human behaviour 
is something that people get nervous about in my particular field. But more 
tangible things like human diseases or human phenotypes in general, is 
really what interests us... Well, I suppose some people do think that they can 
pick their way to the final sequence of nuclear type and that will be all the
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answer... But I suspect that when we come to think about things as complex 
as human behaviour, I mean I find it hard to imagine really how that will 
best be approached. I think there is no doubt you’ll be able to identify 
genes... which will explain why Joe Blocke’s family has, you know, a 
certain amount of manic-depressives; but that’s not really telling you very 
much, I mean, it’s a great step forward but it’s not telling you much about 
the whole of human behaviour and how the brain functions and all the rest 
of i t  (il5)
The botanists, more particularly, were fairly harsh critics of molecular biology.
Without dismissing methodological reductionism or biochemistry altogether, they warned
against the single-mindedness of molecular biology. Four respondents mentioned this, while
the other three seemed to be quite happy with laboratory trials.
For instance, a botanist identifying herself as an ecologist, argued that
[Molecular biologists] have lost sight of the organism. I think they should 
know their organisms. The most important thing is not to allow people to 
specialise too early in education. We should make sure that they all have a 
broad background. Because if you become a reductionist very, very early, 
you become incredibly blinkered; so you may know a lot about one gene or 
chromosome, but you probably don’t know a thing about the environment 
that that organism lives in; how the environment affecting the genome 
evolves in response to the environment becomes what it is; the sort of 
pressures that affect the genome. They’re working in a vacuum on just one 
single abstract thing. It ceases to be biology; it becomes chemical. So I feel 
quite strongly that it has its place — reductionism— but it has to be supported 
by people who have a broad knowledge, ( il2)
Two other botanists also worried about the fact that young biologists tended to join the 
crowd, "the wizzy sector" of molecular biology, without knowing much about "their speci­
mens", and forgetting easily that biology is first and foremost about "whole organisms". In 
contrast, their colleague, interested in the genetics of plants, explored the paradox of 
breaking down objects into their minute elements for the purpose of experimentation, and 
then interpreting the results back from the original point of view about the whole (i4). 
Laboratory experiments, she said, do not reproduce phenomena in vivo well. Yet all living 
forms are, in the last instance, reducible to ultimate forms like genes, molecules, and 
proteins. She believed that although living forms were very complex, biological 
determinism was the key to biological explanation.
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But is holism the answer to the problem? It does not seem to be. In fact there are
criticisms that biologists are levelling at both reductionism and holism. What are they?
One zoologist said that he saw a lot of virtues in holism; but he did not mean that
reductionism was "doomed to failure" ( il08). He said that reductionism was rather a limited
way of approaching biological phenomena:
A reductionist approach that is trying to explain the central nervous system 
for instance is not doomed to failure... In biology, [the debate between 
reductionism and holism] is a very powerful stimulus for research... But if 
you take a reductionist point of view, it limits your perception; youVe 
already got a preconceived idea as to what you’re going to find out... 
reductionism is quite high on precision; but it may be quite low on 
innovation and driving force for throwing up hypotheses... holism is much 
more difficult to handle; it is intellectually more difficult to come to terms 
with, to formulate your hypotheses and test them adequately. I think they’re 
probably the two ends of the spectrum, the two extremist views, I ’m quite 
happy with the continuum to be unresolved.
One of the ecologists interviewed was more severe. She first stressed that she had
never herself been very much interested in biochemistry and preferred the observation of
specimens in their natural environment, and that this might have been beneficial from a
scientific point of view. Her criticisms of reductionism were, however, mainly oriented
towards molecular biology. She considered that this discipline was unimaginative and
represented the epitome of routine work. As she put it:
Oh! I feel sorry for [molecular geneticists]! Because their subject is so bo­
ring, as far as I’m concerned. They’d come and say, ’I’ve cut this 
chromosome here, and I’ve stuck it in there, and I’ve put it in that. Wow!’
... I don’t argue with [molecular geneticists]; I just feel sorry for them. I ’ve 
learned some genetical technique [for my work] and I must admit that after 
a while I said to myself, ’what is the fuss about this? This is absolute 
cookeiy!...’ It is absolutely simple, it is high-bound jargon, you can’t 
become a member of the club unless you learn the right word to say... They 
have a sort of mystique about what they’re doing. In fact it’s far less 
demanding than designing a good ecology project, ( il2)
But one of her fellow ecologists was less radical. He agreed that biology was, in general,
too reductionist. Yet he considered a reductionist discipline such as biochemistry is
primordial for the whole field; "biology cannot survive without biochemistry" he said
( il02). (Not too surprisingly, this male respondent had been trained in physics before he
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entered into a ’second career’ as an ecologist.)
The majority of respondents tended to agree with the suggestion that biological 
objects were more complex than physical objects and that, as such, they might lend them­
selves more readily to holistic interpretations. Yet they observed that holism was hard to 
handle experimentally and usually did not produce any conclusive results. In contrast, it was 
argued that the reductionist method used in biochemistry and molecular biology, for 
instance, was a formidable way to produce results amenable to scientific generalizations and 
biological laws. As an evolutionist argued, "all biologists talk holism but practice reductio­
nism" (il07); or as another respondent, an insect physiologist, said:
The problem is that with a reductionist approach you just look at this here, 
this here, this here, you know; you’re not seeing any sort of synergisms, or 
what kind of effects they have on each other... Really, this is the difference 
between theoretical and experimental, isn’t it? You have to use the two 
together. I’m quite interested in theoretical stuff really. But I like the two.
I don’t think biology is theoretical enough really, ( il09)
It must be stressed at this point that not all the respondents felt at ease with the 
question of reductionism. Among the younger informants especially, a good number were 
not acquainted with the debate between reductionism and holism. Several of our informants 
indeed considered this debate as irrelevant to the actual practice, or else, ill-founded, since 
as they mentioned, biologists generally use both approaches. Indeed, the reconciliation 
between the two approaches did not seem to pose a major problem for biological re­
searchers. Only five out of the thirty-one respondents thought that this problem was a 
genuine one for biology. For the majority, however, the tension between these two approa­
ches constituted the driving force of biological research. Or as illustrated earlier, most 
respondents, be they pathologists, geneticists, plant biochemists, or population geneticists, 
argued that biologists merely choose the approach which is best suited for the research 
problem at hand.
It has been possible to identify four types of biological discourse relating to the 
issues of holism, reductionism, and explanation in biology^. There were biologists who 
favoured a strong reductionist view (that is, a quasi-ontological reduction of living pheno-
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mena to bio-chemistry, proteins, and cellular matter). Five respondents did so. The second 
and third types seemed to be the two sides of the same coin. That is, they either 
emphasized the methodological importance of reductionism, or the theoretical power and 
comprehensiveness of holism. Eight respondents, for example, approved of scientific reduc­
tionism, insofar as reductionism was best suited as a method to carry out scientific proof, 
even though reductionist models only approximated reality. On the other hand, ten respon­
dents leaned towards holism inasmuch as it seemed to be the best theoretical framework 
for the interpretation of evidence in experimental trials or in observations of nature. Finally, 
a fourth group of six respondents stressed that holism (and interactionism) was a valuable 
approach in its own right, especially suited for the study of evolution, ecology and some 
heterogeneous diseases. Those biologists were mainly interested in observational studies 
rather than in experimental work per se.
Indeed, very few respondents had a strong belief in theoretical reductionism. Only 
four respondents leaned towards this view, among them three molecular geneticists. Overall, 
our study indicated that biologists tended to favour methodological reductionism combined 
with some weaker or stronger belief in holism, depending on the subject matter of their 
research project. The reservations against reductionism, we would suggest, seem to stem 
from an interdisciplinary conflict, as it has been the scientific ’tradition’ within biology 
itself, rather than from strictly external criticisms.
It seems therefore, that all biologists are not equally committed to strong and 
’ruthless’ reductionist views of biology, as some critics have contended. But then, what do 
these visions imply in terms of scientific truth and objectivity, and more specially with 
regard to explanations of complex behaviours? These questions seem more likely to 
highlight the stronger divergences between mainstream biologists on the one hand, and 
Radical Scientists and feminist biologists on the other.
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Truth and objectivity in biology
A strong emphasis on holism may not be specific to biology alone, but it 
nevertheless entails a problem for objective knowledge in biology. As has been shown, 
biologists believe that reductionism is their best guarantee for correct and conclusive results. 
How do biologists reconcile their views about true knowledge and at the same time accept 
the thesis that reductionism is somewhat limited as a form of explanation which, therefore, 
must rely to an extent on holistic explanations and interpretations? Not so surprisingly, a 
majority of the biologists interviewed did not pay attention to this particular epistemological 
problem. Several of them, especially the younger ones, contended that the experimental 
method would achieve if not totally, at least partially, true knowledge.
The great majority of our respondents believed that the elimination of errors in 
biological interpretations was secured by the scientific method of a replication of expe­
rimental trials. The suggestion that biological knowledge could be built on a streak of
wrong theories was rejected on those grounds. The possibility that ideologies or social
biases could contaminate interpretations of biological evidence was eliminated, based on 
the same type of justification. Only "bad" biology, it was argued, could be contaminated 
by social ideologies or personal biases. Even among respondents who seemed to be the 
harshest critics of their discipline, this zoologist noted
There are mistaken ideas about the role of hormones, let say, in personality 
changes of women. I suspect that a lot of the so-called evidence is actually 
folklore, and it will be shown to be wrong in due course. But what can I or
what should I do as a biologist, as a feminist? All I can do is point it out,
when I get hold of the data, that this is not a scientifically valid way of 
reasoning... The best thing I can do is to totally ignore it and let it die its 
death, which it will in due course... For instance, what do you think in 
sociobiology has been used to the detriment of women? Actually, I’ve never 
heard anyone serious say anything, based on sociobiology, which is to the 
detriment of women, ( il6)
A few respondents, however, felt it necessary to explain their viewpoints. They 
acknowledged the limitations of experimentalism in the production of conclusive results.
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and isolated frequent uncertainties and disagreements in the interpretations of biological
evidence. In that respect, a plant biochemist ( il04) suggested that the Popperian stance on
scientific progress was the most reasonable way of looking at biological knowledge. He
stressed the necessity of having public exchanges in order to ascertain certain ambiguous
theories. He endorsed the idea that scientific knowledge was only an approximation of the
truth. But he also believed in falsificationism and realism.
On the every day level... people contribute [to increase] the existing body of 
evidence... Some people won’t believe that evidence, and they’ll do more 
experiments and see what happens... In the end this will put the balance one 
way or the other. (il04)
Only one woman out of all the respondents reasoned on slightly different grounds.
She claimed that, in the production of biological knowledge, the political authority of
medical doctors might be much more crucial than biologists want to believe:
You have to look at a much more conventional mode of classification [in 
order to appreciate fully the process of scientific production in biology]; of 
who’s going to treat [biological defects] and be in charge. Take for instance 
the GP who will use very outdated methods of classification of 
normal/abnormal and refer patients to a certain number of people [to treat 
them], discarding many others, ( ill)
Interestingly, this biologist was the only respondent also trained as a psychologist. Yet in
spite of her strong reservations, she believed in the possibility of advancing knowledge by
way of scientific research.
But overall, biologists appeared to believe that the scientific method can secure both
objectivity and true knowledge. In this sense, biological theories are deemed exempt from
social or gendered biases once they have undergone scientific trials successfully. On these
accounts, several respondents took the example of the ’laws’ developed in molecular
biology to justify their belief in the objectivity and truth-value of biological theories. These
were confirmations that biology was not doomed to remain forever a ’soft’ science; that
biology was indeed on its way to become a fully-fledged ’hard’, objective science. One
paleontologist summed it up by observing that although biology is often dealing with
sophisticated objects and may sometimes wander into speculations, on the other hand it
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is also quite often about "nuts and bolts" (il06). Other respondents remarked, along these
lines, that biology in fact comprises both research areas where findings are more likely to
lend themselves to applied knowledge, and types of studies in which evidence may only
give rise to speculative interpretations. Interestingly, three respondents, one, zoologist and
two, ecologists, suggested that biologists had to be "more objective" than other scientists
since biological research requires more intellectual discipline in the inteipretation of results.
Thus, the relative ’complexity* of living phenomena did not mitigate the belief that good
biologists have the means to discern erroneous from valid interpretations of biological data.
The nature of biological objects, our informants said, might perhaps limit the range
of lawlike explanations in biology compared to physics or chemistry. But this does not
diminish the objective character of results and the validity of results obtained by means of
the scientific method in biology. As an ecologist said.
Maybe ’softer’ is a pejorative term [to qualify biology]. It certainly is a 
different science [from physics or chemistry], because in biology there are 
no definite answers... When you do an experiment in biology, the normal 
thing is that you can eliminate the impossible, you cannot eliminate the 
possibles... In that sense it is a slightly unsatisfactory science to work in 
because you can never get a definitive answer, there can always be another 
experiment... I think [biologists] can mentally cope with maybes, 
possibilities; the subtleties of inteipretation ...It’s very hard to prove things 
in biology...There are no laws that really apply in biology [like they do in 
physics or chemistry]...Science tries to approach truth, but in biology we’re 
maybe just a long way behind, ( il2)
Finally, literally all our informants (in both pilot and main studies) claimed that it 
was not biologists who propagated spurious interpretations of biological data. It was more 
likely to be the politicians, the media and the public these inform, and even the medical 
practitioners who might distort scientists’ claims. These remarks introduce us to our next 
section, which examines the scientific. legitimacy of sociobiology as a model of 
explanations of behaviour and the controversies it has aroused.
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On sociobiology and the explanation
of human behaviour
Among the forty-five respondents in the pilot and main studies, very few were more
than casually acquainted with the field of sociobiology or by the debate spurred by E.G.
Wilson’s book in the 1970s. Only two evolutionary geneticists, in addition to one
paleontologist and two ecologists interested in animal behaviour, elaborated on the subject.
These five respondents agreed that sociobiology was useful to biology inasmuch as it was
restricted to the fields of animal behaviour and evolutionary genetics. As one of them
pointed out, "Apart from birds and mammals, all animal behaviour is inherited" (il06).
This tends to show that if biologists accept sociobiology as a full-fledged scientific
discipline, they nevertheless prefer to shy away from explanations of behaviour in humans
and higher organisms. This also explains why, on the one hand, they may criticize severely
Wilson’s human sociobiology, and, on the other, defend his studies in insect behaviour. One
of the ecologists ( il8) can be quoted as expressing relatively well the views shared by her
colleagues with respect to the scientific value of sociobiology. She maintained that
"sociobiology is not bad as such"; rather, it has been "badly applied, especially by the
media, and especially in relation to sexual differences". She added,
[Sociobiology] is best taught within a department of biology [than a 
department of sociology] because it’s related not just to humans. I mean all 
the example come from animal examples [sicl and then one builds on that 
to say, ’Well, maybe human societies have been moulded by the same sorts 
of pressures’... We teach [sociobiology] here, in a limited way, looking at 
different strategies, mating strategies, feeding strategies, behavioural ecology, 
how you behave with your neighbour as an animal, as a territorial or 
non-territorial animal, how it affects your defense strategies. But I think it 
has very limited interpretation as far as human populations are concerned.
The two evolutionary biologists were, however, more severe towards the
sociobiology debate spurred by Wilson. They both held that this debate was a thing of the
past, at least within the field of biology, for Wilson’s thesis soon proved to be theoretically
short-sighted and vacuous from a biological viewpoint. "It is surely oversimplistic; too
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polarized between arch-reductionist and anti-biologists" one of the ecologists contended
(il05). Even more radical was his colleague:
I think the whole field of sociobiology, of human sociobiology, is rotten at 
its core... What the critics of human sociobiology in the early days said has 
tended to be dead right I mean [sociobiology] has been misused... This has 
nothing to do with ... animal sociobiology or what used to be called beha­
vioural genetics... which is a perfectly respectable science... I was amazed 
when [Wilson’s] book on sociobiology came out, and in chapter 27, to see 
him carrying out what I call a pathetic fallacy, to draw human analogies 
from animal trials, ( il07)
In addition to these five respondents, other informants argued that sociobiology and
the biology of behaviour were "unfortunately" taken on by non-biologists who did not know
much about genetics, physiology, or neurochemistry. This was, according to them, the most
deplorable aspect of the debate concerning sociobiology and human behaviour. It is worth
repeating here what one of the zoologists, otherwise very critical of her discipline, said
about the sociobiology debate:
What do you think in sociobiology has been used to the detriment of 
women? Actually, I’ve never heard anyone serious say anything, based on 
socio-biology, which is to the detriment of women, ( il6)
Our results showed that biologists tended, to some degree to admit that biology, as 
in the case of sociobiology, could be "misused" for political purposes. Their defense 
however, was such as to let biological research remain as free as possible from political 
regulations, instead of augmenting the means of public control over it. This kind of 
reasoning was expressed more clearly in light of the opinions reported on Dawkins’s theory 
of the "selfish gene". The argument developed generally runs as follows: The thesis of the 
selfish gene is scientifically too narrow, perhaps even erroneous; yet it is provocative and 
in that sense it is worthwhile; it does not explain human behaviour well, and perhaps does 
not aim at explaining human behaviour as such^^ but it is true that in some instances, 
political groupings have used human sociobiological theses to attack minority groups; yet, 
in the end, biologists should not be blamed for the misuse, by politicians or the lay public, 
of some of their ideas. As this zoologist said:
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I think [Dawkins’s] contribution has been one to stimulate discussion. And 
I think that’s often the major contribution of a lot of controversial ideas 
...And I think most of the reading public now also realize that ... there is 
enough discussion in the media, on the television, to show that he is not 
always unflawed... [He] cannot explain behaviour fully... But I don’t know 
if he sets out to do that... He doesn’t explain behaviour anymore than 
anybody else does. But he has got some ideas... But behaviour is so 
complicated... (il7)
Interestingly, only four respondents in our main study admitted to being concerned 
by the problematic relationship between expert knowledge and its diffusion throughout so­
ciety. They argued that solutions to these questions would only find satisfactory answers 
in a careful analysis of the present conditions of biological research and of a dialogue 
between social groups concerned. They admitted that, at present, the structure congenial to 
such a dialogue was not in place. Biologists, they contended, ought to be socially 
accountable, but they are too busy doing research to be bothered. In fact, and surprisingly, 
our results suggested that, on the whole, biologists do not claim significant scientific 
interest in the question of human behaviour, even though personally, they might be 
interested by this question. In the main, respondents agreed that human behaviour and 
intelligence are prim arilv determined by social factors and that biology plays a necessary, 
yet only secondary, role in explanations of behaviour. Some suggested that genes might 
influence certain behaviours, but only in combination with other sociological factors. 
Finally, they clearly contended that animal models of behaviour in sociobiology were 
extremely limited as a yardstick for the study of human beings.
It is therefore reasonable to think that biologists are, in general, ’weak biological 
determinists’ as far as human behaviour is concerned. This does not necessarily imply, on 
the other hand, that biologists recognize psychology or sociology as fully-fledged sciences. 
Several respondents retorted, that they were not willing to surrender to ’softer sciences’ the 
entire jurisdiction over explanations of human behaviour and, perhaps more importantly, 
of mental ’defects’. On this matter, they refrained from positing any definite boundaries 
between biology, psychology, or sociology, regarding the explanation of human behaviour
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and clinical disorders. Having said that however, they did not seem inclined to engage in 
a serious dialogue on this matter with the ’softer* human sciences. In fact, they did not 
seem to consider that institutional disputes might bar the way to a full and equitable 
dialogue between the disciplines concerned with the study of human behaviours and 
’disorders’.
Main criticisms of the institution of biology
There was consensus as to what constituted the main criticism of biology. It did not 
have to do with biological knowledge per se. It had more to do with the scientific 
organisation of biological research. In other terms, respondents readily answered that the 
main current problem in biology is institutional and political, and that it can be summed 
up in one word: the lack of money!
For nearly all our respondents, the present structure of research funding has brought 
about psychological stress, work pressures, excessive competition, and restraints on 
research. A great many respondents said that biologists tended to succumb to the pressures 
of grant applications in order to be funded. As a result, too much applied research was 
being proposed at the expense of fundamental research, and originality in research program­
mes. As one lecturer (15) stated, the lack of funding "holds back fascinating areas to be 
explored". Three respondents even argued that the present short-sightedness of biological 
research projects would jeopardize the future of human beings on this planet. Finally a few 
respondents contended that research was too much oriented towards medical applications 
and that, in some instances, it was literally succumbing to popular whims. One of the 
harshest criticisms came from a clinical neurobiologist (ill) . She said that what she found 
the most difficult to accept was the scientific ’prostitution’ of biologists. She did not 
exempt herself from the criticism either:
The level of dishonesty... You get grants by influencing people and it
doesn’t matter whether the claims you’re making are true or not, or even
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whether they’ re appropriate; that you know if you’re going to say 
something you’re going to get money. And it’s a rat race... because if you 
don’t [get money] you can’t survive basically.
Indeed, she was not the only respondent to suggest this. Others agreed that in medical
research especially, biologists are often tempted to mislead the public in order to collect
public funds for their research.
In the same vein, some respondents felt that the biological research agenda lacked
imagination; that research was now more than ever dictated by sponsors and funding
institutions. In this connection, the "rat race" in certain fields of research was denounced.
Other respondents noted a decrease in the self-criticism of biologists working ’against the
clock’. They also deplored the fact that young biologists tended to overcrowd the fast
moving sectors of biology, and to internalise the ’unhealthy’ rationale of biologists
competing one against another.
Several biologists believed that the quantity and the quality of biological research
had diminished as a result of bad funding. Others argued that repeated grant applications
which are being turned down were a waste of time, and likely to dangerously lower the
motivations of good researchers; but these opinions were not shared by all the respondents.
In fact, a few biologists said that a compression of research funds had forced biologists to
be more efficient with resources and instruments, and to seek collaboration rather than
duplicate research projects. As one senior lecturer said
I think that some of the restrictions are a good idea, because in the sixties, 
so much money was flushed around to people with no accountability. We 
were dreadfully spoiled really. And I think there was a need to tighten up.
But it’s probably gone too far now. It’s discouraged a lot of people from 
going into basic research. (i#6)
This biologist also argued however, like a few other female respondents, that the women
would ’lose out’ more than the men in these conditions. She said financial constraints were
likely to jeopardize the careers of many women as they form the bulk of part-time
researchers who do not have the time to write grant applications and to lobby for more
money.
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Finally and as discussed earlier, some respondents admitted that science could be 
misused because of financial pressures; but they did not think this could affect the validity 
of scientific results as such. Only three biologists agreed that ideology and biases, whether 
political, racial, or sexual, could infiltrate the research process. But none of these 
informants thought that these social biases would survive good scientific reasoning and 
testing.
At another level, respondents were asked to identify the most important goals of 
modem biology. The vast majority of answers suggested that biology could first and 
foremost contribute to human welfare by, for example, reducing the incidence of hunger 
and disease. Almost as many suggested that a better understanding of biological mecha­
nisms, especially in genetics and in neurobiology, were high on their list. (Respondents did 
not necessarily suggest that the sub-discipline in which they were researching was more 
important than others.)
It might in fact be argued that, in the main, biologists consider their discipline as 
an instrumental form of knowledge. This opinion is certainly rooted in the wave of 
successes of applied genetics and biomedical research over the past decade, and as a 
response to the growing concern over ecological disasters and wastage of natural resources 
since the early 1970s. Generally, they distinguished between medically-related research and 
biological research per se. and between applied research (again in medicine, but also in 
agriculture and ecology) and ’the quest for pure knowledge'. Among the most conspicuous 
concerns reported, the ecological crisis stood out. As a good number of biologists believed, 
their science ought to increase its research effort towards this matter. It is noteworthy 
however that, with few exceptions, very few of the respondents questioned the role of 
political authorities in the success of ecological policies and agricultural reform. Only one 
respondent raised a totally different issue. She pressed for an integration of biological 
knowledge which, she said, was becoming a huge mass of information lacking in unity 
(il6).
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To summarize, respondents considered that biology was instrumental in the arenas 
of medicine, agriculture and ecology, and that it should engage in contributing to human 
welfare; yet they also believed that biology should be committed to researching fundamen­
tal questions, in genetics, neurobiology, or developmental biology, and also to the ’quest 
for pure knowledge’ like the understanding of species differentiation and the mechanisms 
of evolution; finally, with respect to studies of human behaviour proper, very few 
respondents thought biology could undertake a fully-fledged research programme, at least 
at present.
Feminism in Biologv
This chapter concludes with the results which directly concern the issue of 
feminism in biology. The data collected in the pilot and main studies suggested that the 
notion of feminism in biology has found some echo in the field of biology, but that, 
unsurprisingly, it does not transcend the idea of institutional reforms for equal opportunities. 
Women respondents had various opinions about how feminism ought to contribute to biolo­
gical science and what it might encourage with respect to professional advancement. Their 
opinions ranged from a strict instrumental role of feminism (in terms of lobbying for equal 
opportunities), to a total re-evaluation of the institutional rules and cultural norms relating 
to a full integration of women scientists. We shall see below that, in comparison, male 
biologists have a different — if not ’indifferent’ — stand on these questions. But neither men 
nor women, excepting isolated individuals, expressed the view that the role of feminism 
could also comprise changes in the methodology of biology or in the type of results being 
produced.
The closest views to the idea of a ’feminist biology’ were those of women who 
suggested that, in genetics namely, women’s style of practice, skills and research interests, 
might help to renew the battery of research questions being asked and, perhaps also, might
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marshall significantly new evidence. This position conforms with one of the versions of the 
’feminine values’ problematic developed in the feminist theory of knowledge. Among the 
thirty-two women interviewed (in both pilot and main studies), eleven respondents agreed 
that women, especially in medically-related sectors, could possibly appropriate different 
research orientations than those traditionally followed by men. But this presumption was 
mitigated by several factors: first, it was suggested that childless women may share less 
with women who have children for certain research questions than might the men having 
children themselves. Secondly, that the institution or sponsor which employs one restricts 
one’s freedom to decide on a research agenda. Thirdly, that no sociological evidence seems 
to vindicate this presumption. Indeed, respondents, male and female, generally believed that 
inter-individual differences, more than gender, could explain variations in terms of research 
interests or levels of ’biological imagination’. We shall return to this later.
Who are the feminist biologists?
A way to begin examining biologists’ conceptions of the impact of feminism in
biology is to assess whether they know of, or identify with, feminist biologists. Male and
female respondents were asked if they had worked with, or knew, ’feminist biologists’ and
to assess how their own views on feminism might have been reflected in their work.
In general, respondents indicated they did not know any feminist biologists, but that
they had feminist friends or acquaintances outside of science. In the main, women
respondents who knew feminists, inside or outside biology, mentioned that those people
were, in general, politically active, and relatively more assertive than themselves or the
average biologists. For instance, this middle-aged neurobiologist said
Well, at one point I think I would have said that [I am a feminist]. But the 
word implies something active to me. I guess I don’t do anything very 
active. (i2)
Similarly, this microbiologist replied,
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No, not really.... because I don’t actually belong to any organizations. I don’t 
believe that some of the things feminists do are right... I believe that women 
should have equal opportunities, but I don’t think we have them at all at the 
moment. (i5)
On the other hand, the male respondents were prone to refer readily to some of the women 
biologists they knew in terms of: "strong characters", "tough women" , "assertive", or even 
as "aggressive with men" and "hostile to men". They also tended to readily identify these 
women as feminists. For instance, a postdoctoral student, argued that in comparison with 
a woman of his department he would likely identify as a feminist, he would not make "a 
fuss [like] that woman when things go wrong between men and women" ( il03). In contrast 
to this however, another male student of the same department indicated that "she is more 
assertive than other women, but not aggressive" (il09).
In sum, women respondents linked feminism more immediately with political action 
than with attitudes, while men generally based their judgments of feminism on the latter 
alone. In slight contrast, only a few suggested that some women biologists they knew 
were "feminist in a way" or else "probably not feminists because too individualistic". These 
remarks are more similar to the qualifications generally given by women respondents.
Surprisingly enough, the only female respondent who was designated by her 
colleagues as a feminist declared that she was herself "a failed feminist", for feminism was 
"not the cause closest to her heart" ( il6). Several of her male colleagues in contrast referred 
to her as a rather strong feminist. It is also noteworthy that among the female respondents 
of the same department, the opinions about her diverged from those of men: the women did 
not necessarily think she was overly aggressive.
Our results suggest that for women biologists, the identification with feminism 
necessitates some political qualifications, and this seems to make allowances for whether 
one considers herself a feminist or not. For the men, in comparison, it appeared more 
important to show some degree of approval for diverse feminist causes, like childcare 
provisions and equal opportunities at work. In fact, only two men ( il07, il 10) rebutted 
feminism decidedly. (One found some feminists "painfully boring", the other "overly hostile
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to men" at times; they both were politically more committed to the socialist cause, as they 
emphasized.)
A good number of women reacted in the same way as the men, that is by defending 
themselves as being feminists in their attitudes towards women and towards men. Roughly 
one third of the eighteen female respondents in the main study declared themselves 
feminists, qualifying their answers as follows. One middle-aged woman answered that she 
was "yes, definitely" a feminist, because "I do not make any difference between male and 
female colleagues or students. I judge them on their scientific merits, not on their sex" (i7). 
This type of qualification was replicated in two other interviews, which tends to show that 
the notion of feminism had a rather superficial connotation in the minds of some women 
respondents. That is to say, feminism had, in their opinion, a rather limited scope, implying 
simply that one does not, nor should be, prejudiced against women in science. In other 
instances, respondents identified themselves as feminists but for different reasons. A young 
doctoral student indicated that she was "feminist, but very selfishly". She said she would 
not fight for feminism herself but she appreciated the professional dividends it had provided 
her and other women scientists (ilO). Likewise, another post-doctoral researcher said she 
was feminist but not as active or as assertive as other biologists she knew (i8). Finally, a 
tenured researcher said that she "supposed" she was a feminist but "not an extreme femi­
nist" pointing to the fact that, compared to other women, she has always realized belatedly 
the extent to which men were "chauvinistic" (il4).
In contrast to these respondents, seven women did not consider themselves feminist 
in the first instance. Interestingly enough, all of them seemed shrewdly aware and concer­
ned by discriminatory practices and sexist attitudes against women in their milieu. But they 
tended to consider their own positions as fairly conservative and in no way combative. All 
these respondents were in their thirties or mid-forties. One respondent, for instance, felt that 
she was not feminist but definitely "gender aware" (il). Other women said that they possib­
ly leaned towards feminism but were either "not militant" ( i2 ) , or "not [feminist] from a
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political point of view" (i4), or did "not belong to any [feminist] organizations" (i5). Yet 
all of these respondents made a strong point for the re-enforcing of ’equal opportunities’ 
programmes. A fifth respondent felt that she was not feminist "because I only think about 
[feminism] in particular instances [when I] get really cross [about men]" ( il5). Finally, two 
other respondents (i6, i l 2) thought that because they tended to ’give in’, sometimes, to 
male patronizing, and to ’play the game’ of the ingenuous female, they had never 
considered themselves as feminists. ’Real’ feminists would not consider them as such 
anyway, they thought. Among these seven women, four said that they usually overtly 
manifested their disapproval of sexist attitudes at work and often retaliated to sexist beha­
viours de facto. Finally, and interestingly enough, two of these women mentioned having 
participated in feminist meetings in the past.
The two oldest female respondents said they resented "the frills of feminism" and 
anti-men attitudes. But this position towards feminism in biology was not characteristic of 
the oldest women alone; it was also shared by many of the younger female respondents.
Among the men, apart from two respondents who showed outright hostility to 
feminists, the majority declared that they were sympathetic to feminist causes. But in the 
main, this only reflected their approval of equal opportunities reforms and their empathy 
with female colleagues who had children. In this connection, three men said that inasmuch 
as they were for equal opportunities, they would see themselves as favouring feminism. 
With regard to the position of the seven married men who ’supposed they were’ feminists, 
the following quotations are illustrative. As one of them replied ( il08), "I am rather 
supportive to women with children... because my wife had her Ph.D. studying part-time". 
A second respondent (il01) felt strongly "that women should not be forced to choose 
between a career and a family...". Finally, a third male respondent said, "I think I am 
probably not a ’good’ feminist, but I think I am [feminist]... in the sense that I am more 
aware of problems [confronting women] and prepared to discuss them" (il06). Finally a 
fourth respondent observed that he was "not really [a feminist]" but that, on second
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thought, perhaps he was in the sense that "I try to set up a non-discriminatory atmosphere 
[in the laboratory] and help women overcome their fears and other career barriers" (il04). 
Only one male informant (il02) indicated that he used to have strong positive opinions 
about feminism, but that he no longer agreed with feminists because their discourse had 
gone "way out". (This man was extremely annoyed by the kind of propaganda about, as he 
put it, "feminist classes of mathematics" or "physics classes for housewives".)
In sum, female and male respondents generally pointed out that they were opposed 
to ’strong’ feminist views, with the "frills" and the "anti-men" connotations, but that they 
also were in favour of equal opportunities. In that latter respect, women generally tended 
to think, in contrast to men, that a lot of reforms still needed to be carried out before they 
could have equal opportunities in scientific careers. This is congruent with the fact that 
women also believed that even though discrimination was almost totally eradicated from 
the scientific milieu, on the one hand the domestic division of labour was still having 
adverse effects on the careers of women scientists, and on the other hand, that sexist 
attitudes were still making it difficult for women to become fully integrated in science. 
Regarding the idea of feminism in biology, differences among the female respondents’ 
views was mainly a matter of degree in attitudes and behaviours towards sexism at work, 
but it also depended on whether they felt they had to make stronger political statements in 
favour of feminism at work.
In what ways has feminism 
contributed to biology?
On the whole, women and men respondents had different views as to the 
contribution of feminism to the improvement of the conditions of women in science. 
Informants thought generally that feminism has played a major role in the evolution of atti­
tudes about the roles of men and women and in helping to increase the participation of 
women in science. Science education and training, the sharing of domestic responsibilities,
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and the struggles for more creches were examples advanced to illustrate the positive impact
of feminism in science. Only two women respondents stated that feminism had not
significantly changed the situation of women in science, not even to a minor extent. A few
others reiterated the view that more remained to be done in order to encourage women
to enter science, not least importantly, to change men’s attitudes towards women scientists.
But where did respondents stand with regard to the issue of feminism as a critique
of biological research and biological theories as such? Results show that most respondents
were not familiar with such a critique, or else had never heard of it. This minimalised the
scope of our discussion on this matter. On the other hand, it revealed the extent to which
mainstream biologists are oblivious of the works of feminists in biology. In spite of this,
it is important to see how those who are acquainted with these works have rated their
scientific quality. It might also be useful to examine the general opinion of those who have
not heard of these works with regard to the possibility for a project of feminist biology to
be developed. This should also illustrate how the scientific disagreements and political
resistance of biologists towards feminism are articulated.
Only two out of the eighteen female respondents in the main study mentioned
having read some of the literature on feminist biology. None of them however, has been
convinced by the arguments advanced in the literature they read. One of the two ( il6),
otherwise extremely critical of the sexism prevailing in the scientific institution, observed
a chasm between the feminist discourse about biology and the reality of biological research:
that feminists do not know much about biology, and are in fact criticising the popular press’
interpretation of biology. She said this was very unfortunate for it undercut the very cause
feminists should be defending.
I have read some [of these writings on feminist biology]. There’s a book on 
my shelf, the name of which I can’t remember... which is something about 
women and biology, and it’s the biggest load of nonsense imaginable. The 
reasons for that is I think... women who don’t know much about biology are 
criticizing the popular press’ version of biology. And it’s an embarrassment 
as a biologist and as a woman. So, what do I do?... I don’t know these 
people I’m glad to say. If I was speaking with them, then I would be able
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to say to you very explicitly what I object to... But as far as I ’m concerned, 
they are people who produce a bunch of nonsense. It's such an absolute 
nonsense that no one bothers to argue with it. It's journalism of the Sun 
standard. I do know something about genetics, and I do know something 
about sociobiology, and they simply get it wrong. They get the theory 
wrong. It's like putting up something to knock it down. You know, they're 
not doing the womens' cause any good with this kind of attitude. For
Heaven's sake, if you want to do it, do it well! (il6)
The other respondent ( il3), stressing that she had read a feminist critique of medical
knowledge, said that she "partly agreed" with it, and that it was "interesting because it
certainly has some truth in it... but sometimes it goes too far". She specified, however, that
as far as biology is concerned, she "cannot imagine a biologist whose feminist views would
be reflected in his or her work... It simply does not arise".
The other sixteen respondents were "not familiar" with, or else totally oblivious to
such literature. Some of them however, mentioned having read some feminist literature. But
it was generally the classics of feminism (e.g., de Beauvoir, Greer, Friedan) or works about
women in science; nothing relating to the critiques or projects of biology put forward by
feminists. Among the thirteen male informants, only two young biologists admitted to
having read 'best-sellers' presenting the feminist critiques of primatology and biology. They
thought that the quality of these books was like that of other similar best-sellers, no better,
no worse. A third respondent said his attention was once drawn to an article in Science
about women in academic research, and that he found it informative. In sum, male
biologists seem, if not more, at least no less, oblivious than their female counterparts to the
feminist literature on biology.
In spite of their lack of acquaintance with feminist works on biology, some
respondents had their opinions about the relevance of a project of feminist biology. Their
answers varied from a total rejection, to dubiousness. No one believed that such a project
was sustainable scientifically.
Our respondents were therefore asked instead, to explore the idea that women,
because of their particular skills and "caring attitude", might, to some extent, possibly
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transform the practice of biology. One third of the women respondents in both pilot and 
main studies mentioned that it was reasonable to think that women might wish to orient 
biological research in different directions, more particularly in the areas of clinical research 
and genetically-transmitted diseases. But two of them (i#4, i#5) also argued that their male 
colleagues could certainly do likewise. On the other hand, the majority of these respondents 
indicated that the evidence of such a transformation had not yet occurred, at least in their 
research sectors. Indeed, several qualified their opinions indicating that current financial 
constraints made it difficult for individual biologists to research topics they would 
personally choose. This suggests that the institutional opportunities for women to research 
on ’new* biological questions is rather tenuous. Finally, two respondents (i#10, i2), one 
in parasitology, the other in development physiology, contended that, apart from the areas 
where the objects being researched have to do with gender, it is unlikely that women could 
contribute to biology very differently from the men.
Not too surprisingly, there was only one respondent (i#9) out of the thirty-two 
females in both pilot and main studies who sympathised with the idea of a feminist biolo­
gy as such. But her rationale for doing so was utopian, strongly motivated by her political 
opinions rather than by a sound knowledge of the feminist literature on the subject. In fact, 
and rather surprisingly, she would identify, scientifically speaking, with the group of strong 
biological reductionists. That she was a biochemist probably explains why she maintained 
such a position on biological reductionism while simultaneously holding a favourable 
opinion of feminist biology. (In sharp contrast to this respondent, one woman biologist (i7) 
was very hostile to the idea of feminist biology: "non sense, non sensible idea: how could 
it be?", she retorted forcefully and without any further qualifications.)
To sum up, men and women respondents were oblivious of the feminist literature 
about biology, or else they seriously questioned the possibility that feminism (or any politi­
cal movement for that matter) could give rise to a new type of biology. The only form of 
’feminism* with which they tended to agree, and women more than men would think so.
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was the possibility that women might develop different research questions based on their 
different social interests and life conditions as mothers or simply as women^. Hence the 
opinions of mainstream biologists towards the idea of feminism in biology diverge quite 
drastically from the positions of feminist critics of biology. The only point of convergence, 
it seemed, lay in several female respondents suggesting that women might wish to orient 
the research questions in some areas of biology differently from how they are being 
addressed at present. These research areas were mainly related to medical and health 
studies, or, as it was also suggested, addressing questions specifically related to sex and 
gender. These results should be particularly enlightening for the sociological analysis of the 
actual scientific production of some feminist biologists.
Conclusion
We have discussed the stance of ’mainstream biologists’ relative to some scientific 
issues addressed by feminist critics and Radical Scientists. We have suggested, based on 
the results of interviews with forty-five male and female British biologists working in 
mainstream research institutions, that ’the biological ethos’ of ’mainstream biologists’ is not 
a homogeneous set of beliefs or perceived norms of practice. That is to say, biological 
reductionism is not, as critics of biology have alleged, the kind of strict research approach 
on the basis of which biological research seems to be carried out, least of all with regard 
to human behaviour studies.
From an organizational point of view, however, it is reasonable to think, as critics 
have argued, that biological research is dominated at the moment by medical genetics, 
molecular biology, and biochemistry, and that these biological disciplines are more 
markedly tainted by a reductionist research approach. But these constraints were generally 
acknowledged by the biologists interviewed in the study, which, again, minimalises the 
critiques made towards them by feminist and Radical Scientists.
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Our results also indicated that the holistic approach is more potent in botany and 
ecology than in other areas of biology. That is to say, botanists and ecologists would 
generally agree that environmental factors play a great role in the evolution and 
development of living forms. There were also some significant signs to the effect that biolo­
gists involved in human biology and in medical research more particularly, were aware of 
the possible interactions between environmental and biological factors in human diseases 
and defects. Our results suggested that, if among these biologists, some tended to favour 
reductionism, while others tended to be more open to an interdisciplinary approach, this 
plainly reflected the traditional paradigmatic divide within biological science between the 
approaches of strict biological determinism on the one hand, and holism on the other. As 
illustrated in our study, as far as human behaviour is concerned, biologists estimate that 
psycho-sociological factors may be important aspects in a clinical diagnosis, but that these 
are so volatile and hard to grasp that it is preferable to put them 'in brackets' and to focus 
rather on the molecular, genetic, or physiological reactions of certain well defined 
biological 'defects' and 'disorders'. Biologists thus prefer to concentrate on more tangible 
components of diseases like organic 'markers’. Hence, although in principle biologists agree 
that psycho-sociological factors affect the release of certain diseases (and very importantly 
in some cases), in their actual research work, these factors are usually controlled, but never 
closely examined. The institutional barriers between disciplines are, thereby, strictly 
safeguarded. And this, it seems, is the locus at which mainstream biologists and their critics 
usually diverge. The latter precisely aim at opening up the disciplinary barriers between 
'hard' and 'soft' sciences, and between instrumental knowledge and socio-critical studies.
At another level of analysis, our results suggested that there were no great 
differences between the points of view of men and women on their discipline, with the 
exception of 'professional matters' and equal opportunities. But these differences could be 
easily compared to the usual worries of other women professionals.
Finally, and again with few exceptions, there were no major differences between the
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viewpoints of men and women regarding the impact of feminism on the methods and aims 
of biological research. In this connection, the integration of women in biological practice 
does not assure, even with the further improvement of their work conditions, that women 
might change the way biological research is currently being carried out. Very few women 
biologists indeed believed that women might change the way biology is currently being 
practised. If so it was more likely to occur in medical and health studies, or in areas in 
which subject matters relate specifically to sex and gender. Even the few respondents who 
seemed more politically-oriented than the others, remained far from convinced by the 
arguments of feminist critics regarding the idea of a project of feminist biology.
This leads us to the last two chapters of this thesis in which we compare the 
foregoing results with the actual scientific production of feminist biologists.
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CHAPTER?
A STUDY OF FEMINIST PRACTICE IN BIOLOGY I: 
THE CASE OF LYNDA BIRKE, FEMINIST, 
SOCIALIST AND ZOOLOGIST
In this first case study of feminist biologists, we examine the works of Lynda Birke, 
a British feminist biologist. The choice of conducting a study of Birke*s biological practice 
was guided by two motivations. First, Birke is one of the very few British feminists who 
is still practising science'; secondly, her feminism has extended beyond the notion of a 
critique of the organization of science (and the integration problems of women) into a 
reflection about biological knowledge, method and approach.
Birke has been engaged for roughly two decades in research on animal behaviour, 
more especially the influence of sex hormones and mother-offspring interactions on the 
development of sexual and behavioural differentiation. Early on in her career, she became 
critical of the scientific control over our daily lives, especially of biology and medicine on 
womens* lives, and on our commonsense beliefs; this led her to outgrow the norms of 
professional orthodoxy.
Birke is critical of biology in two ways. First, she maintains that biology, like any 
other science, is a structure enmeshed in capitalist and patriarchal social relations, and is 
therefore bound to defend and support the interests of dominant political and economic 
groups. As such, biology has a hidden politically-laden research agenda: it serves the 
interests of industry (military, pharmaceutical, or agro-chemical) before those of most needy 
people. It also helps to peipetuate the established social order by sustaining a rationale of 
oppression, as in, for instance, the policing of delinquents and the medical monitoring of 
women, homosexuals, and immigrants. Secondly, biology has progressively enhanced the 
maintenance of social dogmas such as competition, individualism, and male superiority
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through its own scientific research program, biological reductionism. Despite its 
methodological merits, Birke contends that biological reductionism is a flawed model of 
explanation of life forms, biological phenomena, and patterns of behaviour. In this 
connection, she has always openly denounced the ivory-tower attitudes of scientists, and 
has developed a more systematically severe critique of biological reductionism. This led her 
to undertake (in the last few years) the elaboration of a "successor science", of a 
"progressive science" informed by feminist and ecological movements, the principles of 
which residing in the notions of cooperation, equality, and holism at the levels of both the 
organisation of science and the approach to biology.
Through an investigation of Birke’s research work in animal behaviour, and 
reflection on the biology of ’female’ health disorders and the project of a feminist biology^, 
we shall argue, however, that Birke does not succeed in laying out the grounds for a new 
biological methodology (and epistemology) even though she claims to do so. She does, on 
the other hand, propose new lines of research in zoology and in human biology, discussing 
established biological evidence with an original set of conceptual tools and, also, producing 
new biological evidence.
In the last analysis therefore, she does not build ’her science’ on new epistemolo- 
gical rules of validation (even though both her sociological views on the structure of 
science and her theoretical insight into a topic like the development of sex and gender 
invited her to do so). The epistemology of critical realism and falsificationism still looms 
large in her scientific work. Her rejection of biological determinism in favour of holism and 
material dialectics does not imply that the new biological approach she is advancing must 
build on entirely new rules of validation, as some feminists critics of science have argued, 
as an examination of her research work in zoology will show. Finally, although her project 
of a feminist human biology however seems original conceptually, she has not, as yet, 
provided ample evidence of how it could be fully realized.
Birke has often stated that in its present form the project of a ’feminist science’
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seems utopian and practically unmanageable. (See especially the last chapter of her book 
of 1986 entitled Towards a Feminist Science’.) I would suggest however that the pre­
conditions she poses for her project to be achieved need not be so stringent. For her project 
of biology could be realized conditional to renouncing onlv some of the conventions 
(institutional and methodological) of biological practice, as the case study in this chapter 
will show.
A Biologist Inspired bv Social Movements
Lynda Birke’s involvement in several social movements over the past fifteen years 
has greatly influenced her work as a biologist. As she recalls, thinking about being feminist 
and biologist at the same time has been on her mind for no less than fifteen years. 
"Feminism came along", she says. "I was not [a feminist] as an undergraduate though... I 
suppose I was a biologist before I became a feminist"^. Birke also considers herself a 
socialist. Indeed, she is a militant in a general sense and her participation in diverse social 
movements is reflected in her work as a scientific researcher.
She has, since her graduate studies at the turn of the seventies, allied her activities 
as a militant with her academic work. She has led teaching and research activities in school 
science, at the RSPCA, at Sussex University (in biology proper and in the sociology of 
science as well) and at the Open University successively over the past two decades. She 
has also participated in the politics of liberation movements in the 1970s, collaborated with 
the (late) Brighton Women and Science Group at the turn of the eighties, was a member 
of the short-lived Dialectics of Biology Group in the early eighties, has contributed to the 
leftist periodicals New Socialist and Science for People, and is now concentrating on 
teaching, writing and collaborating with feminist groups.
Regarding her research work more specifically, she undertook a Ph.D. in animal 
behaviour, with special reference to ’female* * hormones, at Sussex University in the early
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seventies. She subsequentiy focused on women’s health subjects, directly inspired by her 
doctoral research on hormones and behaviour. This motivated her to teach womens’ health 
courses, especially the physiology of menstrual cycle (which she was still teaching in 1989), 
and to write popular books in order to give lay women access to expert knowledge in 
biology^.
It was also during the seventies that Birke recognized the dearth of research on 
female animals. She became acutely aware that the bulk of experiments had been performed 
exclusively on male animals and the results thereby obtained had been universalized to 
include both sexes. This confirmed her views that biology had a hidden research agenda 
crippled by androcentrism. In retrospect however, she thinks it did not make her change her 
approach drastically enough to animal experimentation. She believes that she ought to take 
more stringent positions on prohibiting certain types of experimentation on animals, on 
questioning the use of animal models in studies of human behaviour, or simply in defending 
animal rights. These issues, she argues, should be considered central in projects of feminist 
science the principles of which including primarily, as indicated earlier, cooperation, 
equality, and a sense of unity (’holism’) between human beings and nature. We shall 
discuss these matters later on in the chapter.
At the turn of the eighties, Birke became involved in the Brighton Women and 
Science Group which published a widely quoted book, Alice through the Microscope, with 
the subtitle of ’The Power of Science over Women’s Lives’ (1980). In this collection of 
essays, she contributed two. One is about the "tyranny of the womb" in which she unveils 
the myths and taboos underwriting the current understanding of the female hormonal cycle. 
The other discusses lesbianism where she uncovers the prejudices that doctors and biolo­
gists have inherited from their society vis-à-vis homosexuality which are displayed right 
into their professional and scientific practice^.
Her arrival at the Open University in the early 1980s, where she taught and 
researched in the biology department until 1989, was to be conducive to her changing even
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more drastically her approach to biological research. At first, she continued working on the 
role of hormones on behaviour on the basis of a distinction between a biology of sex diffe­
rences and a sociology of gender differences. But her further involvement in the Dialectics 
of Biology Group increasingly led her to shift from a dualistic to a dialectical approach to 
the role of hormones and of social learning in sex/gender differentiation.
Birke has endeavoured to apply dialectics in her experimental work with animals, 
and expounded her results in scientific journals (Birke and Sadler 1983,1984,1985; Birke, 
Holzhausen, Murphy and Sadler 1984; Holzhausen, Murphy and Birke 1984). She has also 
tried to elaborate a model for the study of the female cycle from the perspective of holism 
and dialectics (Birke and Best 1980b; Birke 1984a, 1986; Birke and Vines 1987), and has 
contributed to several feminist journals in that connection. She has collaborated, as an 
editor or as an author, in several collections of critical essays on biological determinism in 
both animal and human biology of behaviour (Birke and Archer 1983; Birke and 
Silvertown 1984; Rose 1982a). We shall examine her attempts to build a holistic and 
dialectical biology in the two fields of animal and human biology of behaviour in the next 
two sections.
But how has she developed her position towards the project of a ’feminist biology’ 
more specifically? Birke has addressed the question of feminist science more thoroughly 
in recent years in her book Women, Feminism and Biologv in which she "explore[s] some 
of the ways in which biology is relevant to feminism ... and attempts to pull together some 
of the ideas that have been expressed about creating a ’feminist science”' (1986, vii). In an 
interview with the author^, she was asked to define what ’feminist science’ is precisely 
about:
My belief in what feminist science i s ... is difficult to define... one thing that 
worries me a lot is the extent to which we actually call things feminist that 
actually are perhaps more progressive ways to look at the natural world, that 
are actually not necessarily the prerogative of women or of feminists. And 
I do know a number of people of both genders who want to do more 
non-reductionist science. And I do see this as an important part of feminist 
biology. And it is a search for that that began to inform the research I did
254
over the last few years. It came out of my feminism and it has fed back my 
feminism at the level of theory, my publishing in women’s studies journals 
and my book, at both sides of that dialectic.
Birke generally agrees with Sandra Harding’s definition of a ’successor science’, of
a science that will replace the kind of science we have now and will integrate rather than
separate* different ways of looking at the world’. Four main features of a feminist successor
science seem to emerge from her writings on the subject. First, a feminist science must be
informed by the values of ecology and feminism as social movements; secondly, it must
change the methods, subject matters and structure of decision-making in science; thirdly,
it might only be vindicated in a feminist and egalitarian society; and, fourthly, as such it
will need more than mere ideological reforms, and feminist scientists will probably be
forced to embark on political struggles. As a member of the Brighton Women and Science
Group, she defended the view that
We need to understand how biological theories contribute to our position in 
society and how supposedly liberating technological advances can in fact 
catch us in a trap... But we also need it [biological knowledge] so that we 
might build a better, and more humane, society. (1980, 13)
Moreover, she argued that only a holistic and dialectical approach to biological questions
could convey proper understanding of nature and human biology, and adequate solutions
to bio-behavioural problems. For her, the biological questions related to deviant behaviour,
physiological ailments, or gender differences should only be understood as the results of
multi-factor interactions between organic matter and lived experience mediated through
cultural learning, where the whole dynamic of organic and behavioural components is
expected to change through time (1986). Similarly, organic processes involving organs,
organelles or organ systems should only be described in relation to their environment, in
terms of a whole in which the dynamics of components is expected to change (Birke 1986;
Birke and Vines 1987).
This new approach, Birke suggests, adumbrates the recent shift in left-wing
feminism from a view entirely based on social constructs, to a view which links biological
sex determinants with social gender roles dialectically, both mutually influencing each
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other. But this shift is still in the making, and feminists are still addressing the biological 
question at the theoretical level alone, rather than at a more practical one. Thus, as a 
feminist biologist in her own right, she contends, she embarked on the project of ’realizing* 
the idea of feminist biology.
Birke’s Critique of. and Works in Zoology
It is mainly via her research on animals that Birke has tried to reconcile her 
experimental work as an ’insider’ biologist with her ideas of a new approach to biology 
informed by her involvement in ’outsider’ groups like the Radical Scientists, Dialectics of 
Biology Group and, of course, feminist groupings. What was more specifically informed 
by her feminism, she indicated during one of our interviews*®, was her approaching animal 
biology as a complement to the understanding of gender differences.
This is particularly shown in her series of papers on neonatal exposure to hormones 
in rats and pups (Birke and Sadler 1983, 1984, 1985; Birke, Holzhausen, Murphy and 
Sadler 1984: Holzhausen, Murphy and Birke 1984). In other writings on the subject, she 
contends that observations of animal behaviour and research in biological development 
ought to invite biologists to develop holistic and dialectical explanations of life phenomena 
in general (Birke and Archer 1983; Birke and Silvertown 1984), and not least importantly, 
of the relationships between sexual development (’nature’) and gender development 
(’culture’) (Birke 1986). Therefore, even though she stresses that research on animal beha­
viour should be done for its own sake, she proposes that the approach, method and 
theoretical insights she is advancing should invite a renewal of traditional ways of 
researching topics in both animal biology and human biology (Birke 1988).
In the introductory chapter of Exploration in Animals and Humans which she edited 
with John Archer (1983), Birke discusses the theoretical deficiencies of the conventional 
reductionist approach to the topic of animal "exploration behaviour". According to Birke
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and Archer, this conventional approach is unable to detect the underlying complexity of real 
behaviours. It produces biased interpretations of animal behaviours studied in laboratory and 
it underestimates the richness and wide array of behaviours displayed by animals in the 
wild. As Birke and Archer explain, ’exploration behaviour* is a generic category that in­
cludes discrete types of behaviour such as sniffing, drinking, making contact. These discrete 
sub-categories, however, are used unwarrantedly in conventional reductionist-based 
research, and as such do not greatly help to predict the behaviours of animals in more 
complex environments and over protracted periods of time in the wild. In these latter 
conditions, several factors (e.g. anxiety, habitus and boredom, extreme states of hunger) 
might contribute to alter the usual patterns of behaviour. The conditions of space and time 
of animal behaviour in the wild are thus not well reproduced in laboratory. As a result, 
Birke and Archer hold, the "ecological validity" of laboratory-controlled stimulus-response 
patterns of behaviour in animals must be severely questioned.
In response to the shortcomings of the conventional reductionist approach, they 
stress that broader distinctions between types of exploration might lay the grounds to an 
approach more attuned to the ideas of agency, novelty (of the milieu), and motivations 
changing in time and space. To justify this, they refer to authors who have discerned 
different foims of exploration for food among on the one hand, animals used to ’eating in 
meals’ and, on the other, those (usually in the wild) which have to search for food. They 
also point to similar results regarding behavioural differentiations in animals and in 
children".
Birke and Archer also levelled other types of critiques, namely in relation to the 
ascription of purposes to certain types of locomotion. They contend, for example, that some 
behaviours are often endowed with exploration purposes, in spite of not being truly explora­
tory. In conventional types of research also, exploration is often quantified by the number 
of movements, thus neglecting the fact that animals do not all need the same amount of 
manipulation or sampling in order to have a good knowledge of their surroundings. Finally
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levels of food deprivation are re-constituted artificially in experiments which diminishes the 
ecological validity of the trials. Birke and Archer state however that these flaws in 
conventional research are not insurmountable. These could in fact be avoided simply by 
designing more sophisticated experimental trials.
In other instances, Birke and Archer question the cogency of concepts like 
"unfamiliarity", "optimal behaviour" and "exploratory motivation". In this case however, 
they acknowledge that the difficulty is not as easy to overcome. For a solution to this 
problem depends essentially in defining exploration in observational terms, which is 
empirically delicate to undertake, and also subject to diverse theoretical critiques.
The problem of defining ’novelty’ and ’exploration behaviour’ in animal research 
raises similar uncertainties as studies of human action. I would suggest that as the very idea 
of ’exploration’ lends itself to a hermeneutic investigation as it is associated (at least in 
studies of humans) with meanings and purposes, it is no wonder that Birke and Archer must 
ultimately engage in the embarrassing circularity of defining the notion of novelty by that 
of exploration and vice-versa; for their critique heralds the traditional difficulties relating 
to the methodology of the ’hermeneutical circle’*^ . But since they engaged in studies of ani­
mals in the first instance, Birke and Archer are — not surprisingly — reluctant to enter a 
discussion of the ’zoological method’ in terms of the hermeneutical circle — hermeneutics 
being too closely related to human studies. They prefer, therefore, to stay within the 
epistemological arena of the empirico-analytical sciences, to use its central methodological 
tenet (i.e. the pragmatic criterion) and value-assertions (e.g. animals are analogous to 
machines). The following quotations indicate clearly their epistemological orientation, as 
they attempt to construct standard observational concepts rather than hermeneutical 
categories as such:
An animal may exhibit a variety of responses to a novel or conspicuous 
stimulus. It may show orienting responses, it might attack, it might 
scent-mark, it might run away or freeze, it might sniff at, or pick the object 
up. Much depends on the type of stimulus, the species of animal, and 
whether the animal has had prior experience with that type of object. (1983,
6)
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The behavioural outcome will depend, for instance, on the nature of the 
stimulus, the animal’s physiological or behavioural state at the time of the 
stimulus is encountered, or the context in which the novel stimulus occurs. 
Further, different types of stimulus may be expected to elicit very different 
responses from different species. (1983, 10)
Birke and Archer admit that it might be impossible to base observations of animal 
exploration on objective criteria that would not be tautological. And this undermines drasti­
cally their argument in favour of notions like "adaptive strategies", "cognitive mapping" or 
explorative "process". From their own point of view on biological epistemology however, 
these notions remain both theoretically and experimentally sterile, for they do not seem to 
add any clearer observational canons nor non-tautological explanations.
As I see it, Birke and Archer raise the debate expounded by Gellner between 
empiricism and materialism, but this time relative to animal rather than human behaviour; 
this can only add to the vacuousness of their epistemological arguments". As zoologists, 
they have a preference for the reductionist methodology of ’Skinner-inspired’ objectivism, 
but as critics of behavioural theories, they tend to lean towards a ’Chomskyian’ (mentalis- 
tic) outlook on (animal) ’action’. Gellner helped to point this out: when one thinks the latter 
(mentalism/ action) is directlv translatable into the former (reductionism/ objectivism), then 
one is expecting the impossible, the direct translatability of approaches rooted in two 
different epistemological categories — selectors of information and selectors of explanation. 
If they only tried to argue for changes in some values entering theory-building (e.g. animals 
are more like humans than like machines) without overstating their critique of 
methodological reductionism (behaviourism), their methodological position would be more 
’tolerable’, and their arguments for a new theory of animal behaviour, taken more seriously.
I should like, in the prolongation of my argument, to point to the fact that rhetorical 
discourse is not absent from Birke and Archer’s work. It is clear that in the introduction 
to their book on animal exploration, they adopt a manichean position, opposing terms like 
"mechanistic approach", "separate spheres", "end-point", "artificially constructed 
environment", "drives" and "incentives" on the one hand (none of which being congruent
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with notions of ’dialectics*, ’holism’, ’changes’, ’agency’); and, on the other, terms they 
favour, such as "environment", "not readily identifiable [types of behaviour]", "interconnec­
ted", "systems", "exploration" and "ecological validity". But these latter terms only emerge 
ultimately as sustaining an approach which remains vague, ill-defined, and empirically 
inoperational from their own point of view, although more congenial to an approach to 
nature and wildlife as complex, rich, and ’not always’ predictable. This vocabulary reflects 
what Gellner has identified as a ’negative-endorser theory’. That is, as a critique of 
traditional models of explanation, Birke and Archer’s perspective might be very powerful, 
but as a fully-fledged approach (and epistemology) it remains shaky.
It is true, however, that in their presentation, Birke and Archer provide empirically 
documented arguments against ’reductionist’ explanations of behaviour, reductionism here 
being criticized because it simplifies and misrepresents what behaviours are really like. But 
the counter-arguments they advance do not seem to transcend semantics; they are presented 
as linguistic and tautological rather than as alternative observational categories. It is 
somehow understandable for critics of crude mechanistic models of animal behaviour to be 
tempted to use theoretical anthropomorphism as an argument and rhetoric as a tool for 
challenging biological reductionism in zoology. But, as they are experimentalists 
themselves, Birke and Archer wish, first and foremost, to justify methodologicallv the 
observational design they propose. However, because they partially fail in doing so, they 
seem compelled to overstate their opposition to reductionism by use of rhetoric. As I would 
suggest, if they would accept that rational discursive arguments play a necessary role in 
scientific research, they would not feel so obliged to subject their new research programme 
to the strict epistemological conditions spelt out above.
But how does all this relate to specifically feminist science, one would ask? It 
relates to feminist science insofar as it is about grounding, epistemologically and metho­
dologically, an approach to biology which would integrate biological and environmental 
determinisms (that is based on the value-assertions of holism and material dialectics) and.
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moreover, the ideas of structural determinism and agency of animals, humans and lower life 
forms. Let us examine some other works of Birke in this connection, and ascertain if there 
is more to see in them than a shaky alternative epistemology to conventional biology.
In a series of articles published in mainstream journals such as the Journal of 
Endocrinologv. Developmental Psvchobioloev and Phvsiolorical Behaviour. Birke and her 
colleagues describe the results of their own experimental trials on young animals (Birke and 
Sadler 1983, 1984, 1985; Birke, Holzhausen, Murphy and Sadler 1984; Holzhausen, 
Murphy and Birke 1984). In these articles they make, among others, two points. First, 
natural forms and higher organisms change according to other life forms and organisms 
with which they are in contact in the environment. Secondly, and consequent to this, the 
differentiation between male and female animals is expected to be shaped by the 
interactions between hormonal make-up and environmental conditions (e.g. food supply, 
territorial space, ’natural’ constraints) including maternal behaviour towards these animals 
(and assuming that the latter is also hormonally activated differently by male and female 
pups). Whether maternal behaviour may, in turn, give rise to differentiated behaviours in 
male and female youngs is a central question in the study. In their study, Birke and her 
colleagues designed experiments in order to investigate this entire ’bio-behavioural’ process.
In one of these articles, the authors presented a study focusing on female pups 
exposed to maternal hormones via the milk-suckling of progestins-administered mothers 
(Birke, Holzhausen, Murphy and Sadler 1984). Their method is designed to control for the 
possible effects of other factors, and they use standard techniques for measuring hormonal 
secretion. Their results show that hormonal exposure via milk alters luthenizing-hormone 
(LH) cyclicity in the female pup. This, one would hold, is fairly similar to standard biology, 
with the exception that it is about female hormones (i.e. progestins) rather than, as is usual­
ly the case in animal research, about male hormones and based on all-male samples. 
Indeed, as the authors themselves indicated, their study is an attempt to expand the 
"extensive work ... carried out in an attempt to understand the effects of androgens and
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oestrogens on the mechanism of sexual differentiation in mammals" by researching 
"increasing evidence ... suggest[ing] that progestins influence sexual differentiation" (1984, 
149).
In another of this series of articles (Birke and Sadler 1985), they tried to capture 
the possible impact of a ’reverse* effect, that of hormonally treated pups on maternal 
behaviour. The experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that behavioural 
development of pups could be due to the combined effect of neonatal hormones ætd 
changes in maternal behaviour. In the first of two series of experiments, it was found that 
medroxyprogesterone acetate-administered dams increase their rate of pup licking, but not 
of the other maternal behaviours observed (i.e. grooming, feeding, exploring, nest-material 
manipulations), which is a surprising result as such. In spite of this, the authors suggested 
that "it is also possible that the effect of the steroid is not to change the stimulus 
characteristics of the pups, but to change maternal behavior per se. since the hormone was 
administered to the dam in the first instance" (ibid., 471). In the second series of 
experiments, hormonal manipulations of pups actually resulted in alterations of several 
maternal behaviours of the rat dams. However, the authors could not tell whether these 
alterations were actually due to changing pups’ stimulus or if they were directly affected 
through the ingest by the dams of the pups’ excreta and urine during licking behaviour. 
Other findings showed overall sex differences: male pups receiving more anogenital licking 
than female pups in the same observation groups. But these differences, the authors 
suggested, might be altered by cross-over effects. As a matter of fact, dams’ licking may 
persist in the absence of male pups, depending on whether a female pup presents itself to 
its mother subsequent to the dam licking a series of male pups. The authors finally con­
cluded that, however "limited support" their study gave to their prime hypothesis, "alte­
rations in the dam’s behaviour may have to be taken into account in assessing the overall 
effects of the hormones on long-term behavioural consequences" (ibid., 475).
Yet the ’limited’ support provided to Birke’s approach on hormones and behaviour
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by her studies of 1984 and 1985 was, for her, only the beginning of increasing empirical 
evidence that she was thinking in the right way. As she put it in one of our interviews, "the 
more I work with animals, the more circumspect I become about the prime role of 
hormones in the development of adult behaviour"^^.
The question of animal research in a feminist science, as Birke stressed more 
recently in a conference entitled ’Biology, Process and Gender: The Impact of Feminism’ 
(Birke 1988), has wide resonance at the level of terminology and interpretation. Referring 
to the field of sociobiology, for instance, she pointed to feminist denunciations of observa­
tional categories like ’rape’ to describe the behaviours of animals. She also gave credit to 
studies made on female animals helping to counterpose the idea that males alone have 
contributed to the evolution of social structures'^. The impact of these criticisms is now 
detectable in mainstream biology itself, as several sociobiologists and primatologists now 
take the results of these studies into genuine consideration^^
Birke’s approach to and actual research on hormones and animal behaviour is indeed 
congenial to her holistic and dialectical approach to gender development. But they also 
evidence the fact that this approach to animal behaviour is largely compatible with the 
Popperian epistemology of critical realism and methodology of falsificationism, and just fall 
short of affording hard-core credibility to the specific hypotheses Birke and her colleagues 
have advanced. In addition to this, we also see that Birke’s idea of a feminist science, a 
feminist biology namely, lies primarily in the appeal for a women-centred research agenda, 
much more than for methodological changes.
In a more radical perspective on animal biology, however, Birke thinks that a 
feminist science might be justified to be politically more confrontational and to consider 
itself epistemologically revolutionary. In More than the Parts, a book of critical essays she 
edited with J. Silvertown (1984), Birke examines the treatment of animals in biological re­
search. She judges that the current "callous disregard for the sentience and feelings of the 
individual animals" is a direct result of the dominant capitalist and patriarchal ideology; that
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animals are taken as machines and commodities serving the purposes of consumerism and 
capitalism. She argues that, as an alternative to this, a true liberatory science would 
"involve attempting to develop a different perspective on why and how we use animals" 
(Birke 1984b, 234). She argues, moreover, that scientists’ obsession with objectivity itself 
basically perpetuates this state of affairs, for it forces a separation between the realm of 
humans and that of animals which, in turn, justifies the inhumane character of research on 
animals. A science which construes liberation as the technological control and mastering 
of nature is not truly liberatory, she claims. But what is more particularly interesting in her 
argument is her suggesting, as a great number of feminists have done, that the absence of 
women is mainly responsible for the maintenance of the ’dualistic faith in nature versus 
culture’ (ibid.). For Birke and other feminists, women have been socially assigned to 
caring and nurturing behaviour, and to subjective reasoning. Therefore, Birke says, as part 
of a community of scientists seeking urgently for "respect and love for its subjects of 
study", women are likely to play a central role in the elaboration of a true liberatory 
(feminist) science.
That science may seek non-reductionist ways of understanding the world, but 
in doing so it will need to accept that animals, that are part of the world, 
may have claims to moral rights in the same way as humans do. It would 
hardly be any kind of ’liberatory’ science that was centred around an 
ideology opposed to oppression and yet maintained the present mechanistic 
view that nature is there for our exploitation. If we are to survive, then we 
are going to have to adopt -  with considerable urgency — a more holistic 
and co-operative approach to nature... We may retain the power to alter our 
environment in a way that no other species has yet been able, but if we are 
to exercise that power, we will need to do it in a way that preserves the 
integrity of the whole. (1984b, 234)
Thus, as Birke recently emphasized^^, the question of animals in research should 
become more important in the construction of a feminist science. This question, as she put 
it, is co-extensive to the woman question in biology, in the sense that "there is an overlay 
between nature and culture, between the human species and animals, and foremost because 
women are closer to nature than men". And since feminists want to prioritize research on 
women’s diseases they must start by asking, "at what cost"; and "shall we continue to use
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animals uncautiously [for this purpose]?". But these questions, Birke retorts, have not as 
yet been addressed seriously by feminists".
The elements discussed in this section give indications of Birke’s feminist thinking 
on biological science, but also of its strengths and limitations as a fully-fledged ’successor’ 
or alternative science to conventional biological reductionism. As a feminist and socialist, 
her own approach to biological thought is based on the premises that lower and higher 
organisms are highly interactive and more than the sum of their parts, and that nature 
should be in harmony with human life. One will have noticed, however, that the ideas of 
agency (or teleology) in both animals and humans, and more importantly perhaps, of a 
dialectics between individual organisms and social environment lie at the centre of her 
biological theory of behaviour. But taking this ontological stance has precipitated some se­
rious problems of justification; in the end, it is the epistemology of critical realism, 
normative in the empirico-analytical sciences, which Birke seeks to vindicate with her new 
approach. The thesis of developing a humane and caring approach to animal research on 
the basis of ’feminine values’ also seems to be, in Birke’s critique, fairly speculative. There 
is no significant sociological evidence suggesting that this is viable, with or without the 
participation of militant pacifist feminists. In brief, the idea of a ’woman-centred agenda’ 
as the platform of a ’feminist zoology’ (namely a research agenda focusing on female ani­
mals) may be justified sociologically, but from either a methodological or theoretical 
perspective, I do not see how a feminist approach to ’animal biology’ based on the 
privileged accessibility of women to the ’female body’ would provide a different insight 
from the holistic method and approach defended by dialectical biologists or even 
mainstream biologists, men and women. The next section, in which we examine Birke’s 
reflection on human biology and womens’ studies proper, is likely to be more relevant to 
a ’strong’ project of ’feminist’ biology.
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Birke*s Reflections on Biology 
and Womens* Studies
Throughout her ’career’ as a feminist biologist, Birke has grappled with the 
following questions consistently: female gender development and its relation to sexual 
hormonal make-up (Birke and Best 1980b; Birke 1982, 1984a, 1986; Birke and Vines
1987), biological determinism of lesbianism (Birke 1980, 1986), and bio-medical research 
in relation to women (Birke 1980, 1984a; Birke and Vines 1988). In this section, we shall 
focus on Birke’s approach to female gender development as a prolongation of the 
examination set out in the previous section. It is noteworthy that the questions mentioned 
above and with which Birke has dealt are all, from a social point of view, profoundly 
controversial both ethically and politically.
As mentioned earlier, Birke always approaches biological problems from the 
perspective of a two-fold dialectic — between science and politics, and between biological 
and environmental (and cultural, in the case of human beings) components of living 
experiences. In other words, the development of biological knowledge is conditioned by 
social structure and the development of living forms is conditioned by the environment.
Examining the problematic of sex and gender development more particularly, Birke 
takes into account both the impact of biology on gender, and vice-versa, the impact of 
social learning on biological identity. She does not deny, like many feminists, the existence 
and role of biological entities per se; she minimises, however, their overriding influence. 
As a result, she argues against crude forms of biological determinism, more especially in 
the study of human behaviour and development, and favours a view based on the notions 
of "constraints on the system" and of "process"'^. Her biological approach to the subject 
matter always takes into account the impact of social expectations and meanings on the 
actual physical or biological experiences undergone by men and women, but also by people 
of different cultures. Thus, human biological phenomena should always, in her mind, have 
to be understood as mediated by the cultural context in which they arise^.
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In her book Women. Feminism and Biology (1986), Birke dismisses both the 
bio-reductionism of mainstream biology and the constructionist (or culturalist) approach to 
women’s biology advanced by some feminists. These views are rooted in a separation 
between the biological and the social domains which she precisely aims to integrate. She 
admits that reductionism has proved useful in the life sciences, especially in areas like 
toxicology, immunology, virology; however, she remarks that for the study of some 
phenomena (such as premenstrual tension or adult homosexuality), the integrated approach 
she proposes is much more cogent. The reductionist view is merely "additive", exploring 
the effects of social factors only once the biological components are ’controlled for’. It does 
not capture the biological alterations of living forms as they happen, in interplay with the 
forces in their environment. The constructionist view, on the other hand, totally denies the 
biological reality of women’s and men’s bodies, construing biology as mere scientific con­
struct and the body as a linguistic abstraction, which, as such, contravenes any hard-core 
empirical evidence of biological facts. Birke’s own approach to biology states that biologi­
cal constraints exist but that these are experienced differently in different contexts: they are 
’experienced very differently’ for instance, "if you are living in the affluent West rather 
than in famine-torn Ethiopia" (Birke 1986, 170).
In a more recent paper (with Vines, 1987), Birke developed more systematically the 
"integrative approach". The starting point of any approach to biological development, they 
argue, should be based on processes of building rather than "processes of unfolding towards 
a definite end-points". With respect to gender development therefore, they suggest that 
feminist biological theory should fundamentally engage on this "change of emphasis" (Birke 
and Vines 1987,555), and aim to elaborate a "transformative model" (ibid., 564). They give 
evidence that in both child development and adulthood, biological functions and organic 
elements evolve rather than are ’fixed’: tissues are broken down and replaced, growth of 
parts of the body often occur, and hormone production is altered by stress or by other 
factors such as the bone structure, for example. In addition, social studies of behaviour
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accord additional credentials to the model of biological development they defend. The
transformative model gives rise, however, to some difficulties, and these are the problems
a feminist science must now begin to address.
According to them, the additive approach is, relatively speaking, much more
manageable than the integrative approach, for the main reason that the idea of interactio-
nism (between diverse components in development) implies that biological and social
factors are potentiallv separable, even though they affect each other reciprocally (Birke and
Vines 1987; also Birke 1986). Reductionism also provides useful results, even though these
remain partial in view of the complexity of the phenomena being studied. Hence, they
admit that separable biological ’objects’ (including behaviours) are often easier to study
than ’processes’ (Birke and Vines 1987, 565). Indeed, Birke and Vines are reluctant to
reject the traditional experimental norms of justifying biological results. They also have
much difficulty operationalising their own transformative approach in order to justify its
relevancy on the same experimental canons as the additive model inspired by reductionism.
The following quote illustrates this well:
Quite possibly, the very methods of science will limit how we study nature’s 
processes of interaction. Science has so far proceeded largely by using a 
kind of methodological reductionism, by means of which factors are isolated 
and controlled. This does, however, make the study of very complex 
interactive processes difficult, simply because it separates out the component 
parts in order to investigate them. In short, once we have removed ourselves 
from the level of theoretical abstraction in order to study the interactive 
processes that comprise the theory, we may have some validity, although it 
is rooted in an assumption that our present methods of science are both 
optimal and unchanging. But the methodology of science may well change 
if less reductionist questions are asked in the first place, as a feminist 
science might well do. (1987, 565)
But there is a more serious problem that Birke and Vines must deal with if they aim 
to vindicate a new feminist approach to biology. They wish to modify the epigenesis model 
developed by Waddington^* by allowing the existence of multiple end-points rather than 
pre-assigned end-points. In this new model, it is assumed that gender development may 
have more than only two end-points (that is male or female gender attributes), and this.
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Birke and Vines claim, should provide a "new line of thought", a new way of "conceptuali­
zing the nature we study" and of "thinking about it", an "alternative rhetoric [sic]" (ibid., 
568-69). However, they remain rather cautious in suggesting that they have found a new 
scientific method. Although they do not state clearly whether they aim at changing 
preconceptions and the dominant mode of thinking alone, or if they also claim to change 
the methods of biology, what they implicitly stress are the flaws of rigid conceptualizations 
of biological potentialities rather than those of the experimental method itself.
To put it briefly, Birke and Vines are well aware of the practical difficulties 
associated with the scientific (or methodological) implementation of a feminist approach 
to biology based on holism and the notion of a complex magma of interactions involved 
in the development of biological (or phenotypical) traits of the sexes. On the other hand, 
they seem reluctant to recognize that the current procedures of science are those with which 
they cannot dispense in order to justify their own feminist stance^.
It is on these grounds, however, that Birke has endeavoured to develop an approach 
to women’s biology. According to this approach, female development is to be explained in 
terms of a conjunction of biological traits and social meanings — of an integration rather 
than addition of these two series of factors (Birke 1986, 1988). She has used the terms 
"lived experience of our biology", "woman’s identity of herself as a woman", "constantly 
reconstructed sense of gender" without refraining, however, from using notions such as 
"biological se lf  and "biological experiences" in order to express that class of phenomena 
— sex/gender development. She writes.
Thus adult gender identity, as woman or man, can only be understood as the 
present, dynamic point in a continually evolving process which, I would 
argue, includes the real lived experience of our biological selves as well as 
the social meaning and economic context of our lives. (Birke 1986, 104)
As mentioned earlier, Birke’s commitment to dialectics is not only scientific in the
theoretical or methodological senses of the term; it is always scientific and political. Hence,
in addition to developing a ’less rigid’ approach to biological development of gender
differentiations, she has always made a strong defense for a less prejudicial research
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agenda on the subject of women’s biology and for more research on menstrual cycle,
menopause and mental distress (Birke and Best 1980a; Birke 1984a). It is crucial for Birke
to emphasize the value of a subject matter like that of woman and biology for its own sake
in future research. But it is even more important to show that from a scientific and
biological viewpoint, ’woman’ is not a fixed, unalterable form, and to stress that even
though ’woman’ is a specific biological category different from that of ’man’, it
nevertheless bears in itself a potential for changes and for internal differentiation. Women
are bom women, and their further biological development is a hybrid product of social and
biological interactions. And as much as biology is simply not womens’ destiny; so gender
is something which is not fixed. Birke contends:
A woman’s biology, and her experience of it, do not exist in a social and 
political vacuum, but in a society which is criss-crossed by social divisions 
of all kinds in addition to that of ’gender’. These in turn can affect women’s 
experiences of biological events, and can possibly affect components of the 
biology itself. It is at the level of the lived experience of our biology that 
both the similarities and the differences between women become manifest.
(Birke 1986, 105)
Human beings constantly reconstruct [themselves] throughout their lives, 
both with respect to themselves and to other people around them. That is, 
gender is itself part of the interactive processes, rather than being a fixed 
property of individuals, (ibid., 103)
But there is more to say about Birke’s commitment to the context-bound view of 
biology and gender. First, it is indissociable from her commitment to a biology of 
collectivities in general (rather than of individuals alone); and secondly, it is equally so 
with regard to women as a group in particular. As a participant in the Brighton Women and 
Science Group and the Dialectics of Biology Group, Birke has alternately insisted on 
holism and dialectics. A more dialectical biology, she argues, would secure three important 
theoretical principles: first, a view of the real links between sex and gender, these being 
interactive rather than in a crude cause-effect relationship; secondly, that gendered roles are 
largely historically-grounded and not biologically irreversible; finally, and epistemologica­
lly, a constant questioning of fundamental categories of explanation, these being shaped by
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the social ideologies of the time and, consequently, contingent rather than universal (Birke 
1982).
An example of this is her position in "The Tyrannical Womb" (Birke and Best 
1980b). In this article, Birke rebut scientific explanations proposing the universality of men­
strual symptoms and of a decrease of intellectual activities during the menses, and she 
documents and strengthens her point with the results of studies carried out on the subject. 
Rather than this being a refutation of her biological approach to women in terms of a 
’collective category’, it instead is employed to support her approach. She points out, for 
instance, that if one takes women in diverse cultures, they will report diverse menstrual 
symptoms, but this precisely implies that differences might be due to culturally-bound 
anticipations of menstrual discomfort and social taboos associated with menses in different 
classes, ethnic groups, and countries. Birke therefore suggests that biological and 
psychological elements should be taken into account in order to explain a variety of 
symptoms related to menstruations^^. Birke recognizes, for example, that the occurrence of 
hot flushes, as the oestrogens decline during menopause, is validated empirically; for the 
symptoms of tiredness, dizziness, insomnia, or depression "are real enough to the woman 
herself (Birke and Best 1980b, 104). She also notices however, that some of these 
symptoms do not occur in other cultures and that "the severity of the symptoms may be due 
to how women feel about menopause, and how they see themselves" (ibid.) -  as culturally 
conditioned.
Birke also denounces the hormonal theories implemented in medical treatments and 
in the pharmaceutical industry, all of which foster the idea that the social inferiority and 
irritability of women are ’naturally’ unalterable. In the same vein, she contests the 
reductionist rationale of women’s inferiority and irritability being rooted in their biology, 
on the grounds that women’s alleged ’nature’ is in fact largely the result of social learning 
and oppression^. This stand must be made strongly, Birke argues, for if not, then reduc- 
tionism will continue to pervade biological knowledge about women and, as a result, the
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ideology of patriarchy and individualism will remain unchallenged. In this connection, Birke 
has, for instance, questioned the studies focusing on the ’negative’ behavioural changes due 
to menstruations, rather than those which might reveal the energetic and creative impulses 
of females at mid-cycle. As she has often argued, several dominant groups indeed have 
vested interests in maintaining deterministic theories of women’s biology and behaviour. 
And this makes her contend that changes in scientiric and commonsense ways of thinking 
about gender will not be achieved easily. Rather, this will need political struggles and 
stringent reforms (Birke 1980, 1982, 1986)^.
This is also why, as a Radical Scientist, she has been a regular contributor to the 
magazine Science for People. She believes the popularising of biology would prepare the 
path to genuinely democratic solutions to the social and ethical issues involved in biological 
research. As a feminist, moreover, her commitment to a democratization of science would 
be aimed at defending the worth of women’s knowledge, of themselves and of the world 
around them, whether introspective (as highlighted in consciousness-raising groups, and data 
produced on the basis of qualitative research and life stories) or practical (as that of 
midwifery).
To summarize, Birke’s contributions of the early 1980s were an attempt to 
systematically criticize scientific statements about women’s health (namely the effect of 
genes and hormones on female behaviour and the medical treatments of women developed 
thereof), and to demonstrate their mythical content and taboos. The domination of 
biological reductionism within biology, she would argue, and the authority of science on 
the lay public have contributed to maintain, for instance, the existence of patriarchal biases 
in the understanding of women’s behaviour and health, especially in clinical diagnoses and 
in medical treatments. Also, the low participation of women in biological research may 
have contributed to maintaining theories about women’s biology and behaviour which are 
spurious, or else incomplete. These political and theoretical critiques of biology constitute, 
I would argue, the greatest strength of Birke’s feminist biology.
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Indeed, Birke has, in her more recent reflections, argued that methodologically, 
biology is far from implementing a holistic and dialectical view of human biology: it still 
upholds an additive model in which, in the last instance, genes and hormones are 
considered the most important factors to study in biology. As she has implicitly admitted 
however, she has not convincingly developed the transformative model which would 
scientifically justify her integrative approach of developmental human biology. This leads 
us directly to the last sections of this chapter in which we shall discuss why Birke only 
partially succeeds in generating a fully-fledged feminist ’successor* biology.
Birke’s Idea of a Feminist Science
It is not, strictly speaking, a feminist science that is being addressed, but the 
question of how science might look like in a more ’feminist* and egalitarian 
society, a society in which notions of gender did not imply notions of hierar­
chy. I shall continue to refer to ’feminist science’... but it should be borne 
in mind that no such thing is possible within our present society. (Birke 
1986, 143)
As Birke puts it, the concerns of feminist science are utopian, for the reason that it 
is not possible to remake science in the absence of more general social changes. She retains 
the principles of the Radical Science movement in the elaboration of a socialist and 
feminist science: to defend human needs rather than corporate greed; to be socially 
accountable rather than elitist and mystifying; to seek harmony with nature rather than its 
exploitation for military and industrial purposes. More specifically, however, a feminist 
science would not, in contrast to a socialist science, perpetuate in any way the subordination 
and oppression of women (Birke 1986). All these elements are congruent with a politics 
of science. But what is, on might ask, the relationship of these principles with the consti­
tution of a new scientific platform for biological explanation per se: or of a new biological 
method?
In my view, and as suggested earlier, the tenets of a feminist biology as expounded 
by Birke are first and foremost conceptual, relating essentially to how biology ought to
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represent nature and human life. But she does not go as far as laying the grounds for a new 
biological method, let alone a new scientific epistemology. By and large, biologists seem 
to hold quite similar views on human biology, and, like Birke, accept the methodological 
tenets of biological reductionism but only with qualification. As far as a biology of human 
behaviour is concerned however, mainstream biologists seem to hold these views in princip­
le but not in practice. Institutionally and normatively, biologists do not address the problem 
of human behaviour in a strict sense; they would rather leave that to psychologists. In their 
laboratory at any rate, biologists aim to ’control for* environmental factors, and to isolate 
biological causes per se. It is true, however, that some biologists are committed to finding 
’ultimate’ biological causes, even in cases of patterns of human phenotypical traits (e.g., 
of finding genes or chemical reactions which would determine ’everything else’ in life 
forms); but these biologists seem to represent a minority among mainstream biologists.
At the methodological level, Birke appears to develop her approach and theories on 
the same rules of validation and justification as mainstream biologists. It might be 
suggested here that her ’integrative’ approach to biology and her ’dialectical’ viewpoint on 
the production of scientific knowledge could have lent themselves to a hard-core 
epistemological revolution of biological thought. Yet between traditional empiricism (or, 
more accurately, critical realism) and the sort of epistemological vacuum with which 
relativism and deconstructionism theories of knowledge have left natural scientists, Birke 
definitely opts for the former. Her rejection of biological determinism in favour of holism 
and dialectics does not transcend the conventional rules of scientific validation: these are 
still those of sense-data and experimental replication. Her critique of reductionism might 
have invited a challenge of strict empiricist epistemology (as in social studies) in favour 
of a more argumentative and discursive set of procedures of justification. Indeed this 
challenge seems to be the only ’scientifically acceptable’ way in which her genuine effort 
to introduce a new body of concepts, hypotheses and explanations of human behaviour in 
biology, could be vindicated. In lieu of this, Birke appeared to believe, ultimately, that the
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only way a ’successor* feminist biology could be fully developed was on the basis of a 
politics of science.
What does it imply epistemologically, conceptually and organizationally (or 
institutionally) to ’remake* the science of biology on feminist tenets? Does it guarantee a 
continuity between traditional (or mainstream) biology and feminist biology or a complete 
epistemic rupture? Will it still be question of science; or else of another other form of 
knowledge altogether? What precisely would be different in a new feminist science and 
what would remain the same as in mainstream biology? To all those questions, Birke would 
fundamentally respond that what she has in mind is a ’successor science*.
The notion of a ’successor science’ implies, as Birke puts it, that a given ’new’ 
science "would build on what we have got, changing what needs changing and retaining 
what needs retaining". And she also argues that a feminist deconstructionist perspective on 
science is not incompatible with continuity: "the process of building a feminist science 
involves the process of deconstructioning if you like... but I don’t believe [biology] will not 
be any longer science if we change it"“ . A feminist successor science would more parti­
cularly, Birke adds, be socialist, less authoritarian and profit-oriented than current science, 
and last, but not least importantly, it would be:
A science that does not denigrate and ignore women’s experiences, but that 
emerges from what we now have while retaining its epistemological unity...
It would probably ask different questions, addressing real human needs, and 
embody a different worldview. (Birke 1988, 308-9).
As we noted earlier, Birke mainly endeavours to simultaneously develop a political 
analysis of science (i.e. its incorporation into a larger social context, its process of 
decision-making, its research agenda) and an approach to biological explanations as the 
two fold platform on which a successor feminist science would build. How is this actually 
achieved and with what degree of success?
In her book Women. Feminism and Biologv. Birke launches a systematic 
comparison of the characteristics of current science and those of a potential successor 
feminist science. She sets this out on a discussion of three main issues of scientific practice:
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the social role of expert knowledge in society, subject matters and research priorities in 
modem science, and critical evaluation of the scientific method.
On the first issue, it seems that her arguments in favour of a democratization of 
scientific policies are rather sketchy and do not explore thoroughly the practical difficulties 
of implementing such a political platform. Indeed, the democratic control of expert 
knowledge is problem-ridden, as a century of reflection and attempts to rule over 
technocrats and to share decision-making indicates^. But moreover, Birke’s defense of the 
potential benefits of a democratization of biology sounds more dogmatic than supported by 
a sound sociological or political analysis of decision-making and negotiating processes: it 
seems merely motivated by the dogma of Radical Science.
With respect to the subject matters of science, Birke makes a strong challenge of 
the present research agenda of biology and medical research; but it mainly relates to the 
political agenda of the larger feminist movement and does not truly contribute original 
concepts in terms of a new cognitive approach to knowledge on reproduction. She discus­
ses, for example, the issues of in vitro fertilization and reproduction (Birke and Vines
1988). The clinical, ethical, and social problems of *in vitro* technologies she raises are 
commonplace among current controversies. Moreover, her position on these matters does 
not seem to invite political compromise. In another instance, her arguments in favour of 
womens* freedom of choice to have an abortion and her strong stand against potentially 
increasing medical and legal control of women’s bodies on this issue relate to a politics 
of science, and is, here again, parallel to the political agenda of the feminist movement at 
large. Her rhetoric on ’real human needs’ does not examine exhaustively, as she herself 
admits, the substantive issues related to reproduction and research on embryos (ibid.)
Finally, regarding the methods of science, Birke appears invariably to equivocate 
consistently between a discussion of method, ideology, organization, scientific policy, and 
social structure. This does not help to pin down what she understands by the term 
scientific methodology^. In spite of these weaknesses, her reflection on science methods
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in a feminist successor science has a prominent place in her argument. She links the 
epistemological issue of the biological ’method’ with those more readily political, of 
fundings, research priorities, the dependence of scientific research on industry, the State 
and, more particularly, medical practice and public health care. As she explains, the social 
system which supports these research activities affects, in turn, the content of biological 
theories themselves: as such, politically powerful groups may have a clout on the subjects 
being researched and control the diffusion of results at their convenience; and doctors, 
psychiatrists and biologists, mostly males but also females, will recapitulate received ideas, 
cultural prejudices or even myths about women’s biology and behaviour, without feeling 
constrained (from within the scientific community) to question the validity of biological 
judgments based on these ideas, prejudices and myths.
But the angle from which Birke examines the interplay between power groups, 
dominant ideology and science seems rather narrow. Even though she often admits that 
social relations are, in practice, more complex than how they are defined in theory, it is a 
fact that her views of the social relations giving rise to a feminist science are not only 
speculative, but also bear the same superficiality as her background analysis of the current 
social relations in scientific practice.
Birke’s three-fold comparison between mainstream biology and feminist successor 
science is therefore relatively weak. She raises a great many issues which she does not fully 
investigate; moreover, her analysis is not always predicated with clearly defined concepts: 
this undercuts its viability as a blueprint for the implementation of a feminist successor 
science. It is not surprising that she tends to speak in terms of a feminist ’utopia’ rather 
than of a fully-fledged ’project’ of feminist biology. In the last instance, therefore, her 
greatest achievement as a feminist biologist is not the elaboration of a new method, but 
rather (and valuable) as it is, a condemnation of the scientific activities having direct adver­
se effects on the quality of life of women. Mainly, she urges feminists to enter science and 
to challenge it from within by setting up a new research agenda. But in the last analysis.
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ideological rhetoric appears to dominate her discussion at the expense of a more cogent 
analysis of the relations between society and scientific knowledge.
In fact, Birke urging feminists to enter science in greater numbers appears, although 
somewhat self-fulfilling, a more cogent argument for the idea of a feminist biology. Her 
views on this seem also relatively original within feminist literature, as she does not defend 
the notion of ’feminist biology’ on the ground that the caring attitude of women will 
change biology; rather, she conceives of the project of a feminist biology as a political 
challenge for feminists. It is true, however, that feminists ought, according to her, to seek 
concrete action to "look for more cooperative, and generally non-invasive, ways of under­
standing nature" (Birke 1986: 150), which, in a sense, retains the gist of the ’feminine 
values’ premise in the feminist theory of knowledge. But, here again, her understanding of 
this premise seems more political than epistemological; that is, in the elaboration of a new 
science, feminists would make a strong political defense of the ways women have 
traditionally related to nature, people, and human life. This indeed buttresses her claim that 
only feminist scientists can start building a successor science. For they are likely to be the 
only people who would think of — and are committed to — starting a reform from within 
current science and engaging in a challenge of the conventional biological approach to 
gender differences and woman’s biology. This would mean to promote a view of biological 
organisms and ’events’ as more complex and dialectically related to the environment — 
natural and social. Thus, as such, Birke’s idea of a feminist successor biology lies in the 
construction of institutional structures which would enable feminists to advance new 
descriptions of ’nature’, new perspectives on human biology, and, ultimately, biological 
explanations which would be "more representative of the social and natural world" (Birke 
1988,311)*.
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Conclusion: Towards a Feminist Paradigm 
in Bio-behavioural Studies
In one sense then, science does not have to change its commitments, as 
change the balance between them; commitment to the kind of relationship 
with nature that feminists have envisaged are already there in the history of 
science — even if this is hard to see in the face of current scientific 
orthodoxy. But the question still remains; what does it mean for science to 
change... and still be considered science? (...) I assume, however, that we 
would still call [the kind of feminist commitments in a project of biology] 
’science’ in the sense that it would still be about the discovery of the ways 
in which the natural world works. (Birke 1986, 146)
Birke’s project of a feminist biology, as the above quotation illustrates, primarily 
posits a contrast between patriarchal and feminist interpretations of human biology. But 
these feminist interpretations must always ultimately be justified on empirical grounds. 
Indeed, this quotation clearly highlights two separate levels in Birke’s feminist project of 
biology. First, there is the level of the historical representations of ’nature’ and ’life’ that 
human beings make of their world by ways of deciding which sort of ’relationship with 
nature’ and of communal life they wish to undertake. This involves, as Mary Hesse would 
suggest, a decision on the values entering theory-building and underlying the kind of model 
for knowledge of nature and humans best suited to our representations of the world. They 
partake of deep-rooted yet historically and culturally contingent ideologies. Secondly, when 
Birke refers to ’the discovery of the ways the natural world works’, she speaks at the level 
of value-goals, and as a consequence refers to rules governing how theories should be 
justified. We have seen that in Birke’s works as a zoologist, her discussion of the 
justification of biological theories is basically constrained by logical rules rather than by 
political ones. Birke’s feminist ’zoology’ is established on the grounds of the epistemology 
of critical realism and falsificationism. Within this epistemology, it is believed that 
scientific procedures of validation assist in separating facts from values — though never 
completely, and that nature and animals may be observed objectively -  as objects existing 
independently from our subjective representations of them.
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In Birke’s biology, the idea that life forms change and evolve is precisely a 
discovery of mainstream biology and is grounded in critical realism: these changes are 
intrinsic to the object studied, to nature, but epistemologically independent of biologists’ 
political will. I would therefore suggest that it is the subject matter of Birke’s biological 
work, namely animals, which prevents her from more readily challenging the idea of 
empirical falsificationism as part of her biological epistemology. When she begins to 
address the specific question of human behaviour with her proposition of an integrative 
approach, she must engage more directly in the question of whether the epistemology, 
value-goals and theory-building of the natural sciences may apply to the social sciences. 
And this would have constituted, I contend, a great impetus to challenge the epistemology 
of falsificationism in human biology and questions about women, rather than stopping at 
the level of biological concepts and interpretations in her attempt to elaborate a 
fully-fledged new approach to biology based on feminist values and political aims.
Birke makes the claim that science should be accountable to society for the 
validation of its theories. There are indeed several levels at which ’society’ could validate 
scientific theories, but these levels are primarily moral and political. These involve, for 
instance, decisions about research priorities, trials for and implementation of new 
technologies of reproduction, and debates about the importance of studying ’sex differences’ 
rather than ’similarities’, to repeat some of Birke’s examples. At other levels however, like 
the activities of experimental testing and theoretical thinking, to name but two crucial facets 
of the scientific process, "the participation of a variety of people" and "of the community", 
as Birke suggests, does not make much sense. I would contend, therefore, that given these 
qualifications, the concept of ’social validation’ of scientific theories is a gross 
simplification of the substantive processes involved in producing valid scientific knowledge. 
I would also add that this claim is simply not consistent with Birke’s epistemological views. 
She seems to agree that biological explanations ought to be justified under the rules of 
falsificationism. Thence, ’social’ validation cannot be an appropriate social channel for
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validation, unless the lay public is relatively well aware of the experimental and theoretical 
intricacies of the problem at hand, which is unlikely.
The social conditions of validation might be different for the human studies 
however. First, because there might not be any experimental data available (to either 
experts or lay public), and, secondly, because theory-building in human science is often 
grounded on immediate personal experience of, or familiarity with, the subject matter under 
study. The acceptance of the hermeneutic method for human and social studies precisely 
underlines, I would suggest, this possibility^. Indeed, and in my opinion, there may be 
cases for which ’social’ validation would be welcome. These would have to be concerned 
with types of explanations which lend themselves precisely to the hermeneutic method. 
This implies that data relevant to the research problems under investigation are likely to be 
familiar to both the ’observer’ and the subject being ’observed’ (e.g. in biological research 
associated with clinical and health studies, research problems may stem from the symptoms 
reported by the subject and the environmental factors to which she/he has been exposed), 
both of whom are entitled to engage in a dialogue oriented towards an understanding of 
those very ’problems’. Having said that however, as far as human biology, health and 
behaviour are concerned, the hermeneutic method has its limitations. In human biology, one 
faces a hybrid type of epistemology rather than hermeneutics stricto sensu. That is, both 
experimental sense-data (regarding non-directly observable matter) and argumentative 
discourse about self-knowledge (regarding individuals’ life conditions, intentions and 
actions) must be accounted for in the adoption of cogent epistemological rules justifying 
the explanations and theories developed thereof.
We saw in chapter 4 that teleology has been the object of constant controversy 
within biology. This is not to say that the notion of teleology is of any use in biological 
explanations; the reason for it being controversial is rather because it always directly raises 
debate in terms of social values and meanings -  and it does this more conspicuously in 
studies of animal and human behaviour, and in evolutionary theory. The meaning of natural
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selection in evolution, for example, is tainted with moral overtones, and the teleological 
systems underwritten by sociobiology seem tainted with political conservatism. The 
substantive content of the notion of teleology, without which no explanation exists, is 
likely to be laden with cultural meanings. Yet the notion of teleology, as philosophers have 
suggested, remains extremely useful as an epistemological category of explanation in 
biology (and, similarly, in the social sciences).
In the case of lower organisms, however, and also of animals, the specifications of 
the teleological systems do not directly relate to socially controversial issues and might, 
therefore, be accepted more readily. The value-assertions entering model-building are 
likely to be assessed on whether the model reflects reasonably (and ontologically) well our 
representations of lower organisms. The observational concepts these models would, in turn, 
predicate are likely to obey the validation rules relative to the pragmatic criterion. The 
gene-centred paradigm in evolution theory, for instance, is based on the idea of the indivi­
dual selfishness of higher organisms which, it is argued. Tits* the evolutionary dynamics 
of the ecological system^\
In the case of higher organisms however, teleology tends to lose its predictive (or 
pragmatic) explanatory power because agreements on which specifications of the human 
(or social) system fit most adequately reality are far from being agreed upon. Indeed, goals 
and preferred states of social systems, which are the values that must precisely enter 
theory-building in disciplines dealing with human action and behaviour, are almost 
invariably the subjects of evaluative debates among scientific experts (and also 
non-experts). It is reasonable to think that on these matters, the content-value of teleological 
references will more directly reflect the power struggle about what social norms and order 
should ideally be. As the social norms are being challenged (by feminists or other social 
groups on the grounds that human beings are free agents and morally accountable to 
society), so are the teleological categories used in studies of human evolution, sociobiology, 
and the * biology of behaviour*.
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Thus, I would argue that, although all scientific judgements are conditioned by
cultural representations, in animal biology (as this is mainly the case for Birke’s work),
theoretical divergences may more readily be resolved under the umbrella of the pragmatic
criterion, whereas this might not be the case at all in studies of humans in which
teleological values more directly refiect dominant social ideologies”  Indeed, this argument
appeared implicitly in Birke’s discourse:
There is only a practical way to circumvent [ideology]: it is to minimise 
reductionism and its assumptions of objectivity as much as possible; for in 
a society based on reductionism, it is hard to imagine experiments done in 
a different way altogether: I cannot do without it, nor imagine using 
something else. It’s a practical response to a problem we’re aware of; it’s 
a pragmatic approach. I think that this is exactly what it is. It’s a practical 
response rather than saying, ’Well, there is no ideology’.”
In fact, right from the onset of her ’crusade’ for a feminist successor biology, Birke’s main
goal has been to isolate the limitations of sociobiology as an explanation of behaviour, but
without ever making any strong claim in favour of a revolutionary epistemology. In this
regard, she wrote with her colleagues in the Brighton Women and Science Group that
The claim that none of our singular causal statements about particular 
reasons and actions (including the true ones) is justified must be 
distinguished from the claim that the denial of each of them (again including 
the true ones) is justified. (Brighton Women and Science Group 1980, ix)
In other terms, Birke’s representation of human life and biology is different from that of
mainstream biologists. But although one might wish to consider this as adumbrating a
conceptual shift (say, from biological reductionism to holism or dialectics), or a
paradigmatic shift (say, from additive to integrative model of human biology), it is not
convincingly implemented in a research practice. What is evident however, is that it does
not predicate an epistemological shift (in terms of a new set of rules of justification for
biological theories). In the end, Birke has always made sure she was following the same
methodological and epistemological rules as mainstream biologists.
In closing this chapter, I should like to highlight one last aspect of Birke’s project
for a feminist biology: her argument in favour of the integration of other forms of
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knowledge in biological studies of women. As we shall see in our next case study, this 
claim is also being made by biologists in the feminist research group GRABIT. We noted 
earlier that Birke believes in the utility of alternative forms of knowledge such as individual 
introspection and collective consciousness-raising. I would suggest however, that her 
intention was mainly to defend these types of knowledge as being worthy of the attention 
of scientists, rather than to take them at their face-value and as valid explanations de facto. 
Birke would construe womens’ partial knowledge (i.e. immediate knowledge of the senses) 
of their bodies and of their living experiences as biological facts to be explained at a deeper 
level. More precisely, she would see womens’ partial knowledge of themselves as a 
’bundle’ of data to be reintroduced into a theoretical approach (the ’integrative approach’) 
in which the interplay between both subjective experiences and biological processes would 
need to be explored, and about which only trained biologists are likely to understand, 
synthesise, and theorize. Unfortunately, having done most of her actual biological research 
in animal biology, Birke has not been able to put into practice these aspects of a feminist 
biology. But the research group GRABIT has made such an attempt, and rather 
successfully. We shall turn thus to an examination of its scientific work in the final chapter 
of this thesis.
Endnotes
1) Birke worked as a zoologist at the Open University from 1980 until 1989. She 
has since devoted her time to writing and teaching feminist studies in different 
establishments of higher education. It is a characteristic of the feminists advancing the idea 
of a feminist biology to be either non-scientists or else, to have abandoned scientific 
research per se. Until recently, Birke was still among the few feminist biologists attempting 
to introduce a feminist approach into biological research practice.
2) This review of Birke’s scientific and parascientific works is selective rather than 
exhaustive. It has been difficult, in fact, to gather full details on her scientific and 
parascientific activities and publications. Apart from two long interviews conducted with 
the author (in July 1988 and March 1989), Birke seemed reluctant to give further 
information on her work.
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3) Dr. Lynda Birke, interview by the author, tape recording, Milton Keynes, 30 
March 1989.
4) As often mentioned by feminists, the terminology ’female’ and ’male’ hormones 
gives the impression of a deep gulf between the hormonal make-up of both sexes. This, it 
is argued, perpetuates segregation and the ideology of discrimination. Birke uses the term 
’female’ hormones with the same reservations.
5) As a Radical Scientist, Birke is aware of the authority she may, as an expert, 
have on the lay public. But she thinks her way of pursuing science is more likely to benefit 
than to hamper womens’ interests or those of minority groups.
6) Herself a lesbian, Birke said she has never been the target of outright derogatory 
remarks from her colleagues.
7) See note 3.
8) Birke refers here to the divide between approaches within biology, but also to the 
lack of dialogue between biologists and non-biologists who do not hold the same views on 
life and nature.
9) As she indicated in an interview (see note 3). See also Birke (1988).
10) See note 3.
11) Birke and Archer also retain the categories of passive and active, intrinsic and 
extrinsic, and specific and diverse forms of exploration. Passive exploration and active 
exploration refer respectively to attentional changes and active investigation. Intrinsic 
exploration and extrinsic exploration refer respectively to motivations of curiosity and to 
some other external drives. They also retain the notions of ’absolute novelty’, where the 
environment is totally unfamiliar, and ’relative novelty’, where a mix of familiar and 
unfamiliar stimuli are present. The former type of novelty would induce ’diversive’ 
exploration while the latter would entail ’specific’ exploration.
12) I should refer here to the idea developed by Dilthey suggesting that hermeneutic 
understanding is the result of a constant re-interpretation (a ’hermeutical circle’) of 
individual propositions (’parts’) in view of the larger cultural context (’wholes’) in which 
they take place. See Bauman (1978), Giddens (1976) and Outhwaite (1975).
13) As a matter of fact, for several ethologists and psychologists, and Birke and 
Archer alike, the problem of novelty (and for that matter, agency) lies at the heart of the 
question of animal exploration. This makes me conclude that Birke and Archer’s criticisms 
of the old stimulus-response approach are fairly standard and that, rather unsurprisingly, 
they fall short of solving the difficulties which lie ahead in the elaboration of a new 
research programme (or paradigm).
14) See note 3.
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15) I should refer to chapter 1, especially to the books of Fisher (1980) and Reiter
(1975).
16) But there is no consensus about the rightness of these new interpretations. A 
thesis like that of Hrdy (1981), for instance, although it may have found legitimacy within 
mainstream biology, does not, however, foster a consensus on either its substantive content 
nor its underlying assumptions. In an interview with the author (Cambridge, Massachussets, 
8 May 1989), Ruth Hubbard, for instance, rejected the entire enterprise of sociobiology. See 
also her views in chapters 1 and 2.
17) See note 3.
18) See note 3.
19) In this vein, Birke draws, for instance, a parallel between organic development 
and a snowball rolling down a hill:
As development proceeds... its ’choices* become more and more determined 
until it lands up in one specific location at the bottom. The hills in between 
the valleys comprise constraints on the system, such as physical constraints...
I would argue that the development of an organism represents processes of 
complex interaction, processes in which the interacting parts become 
changed. But, at the same time, there are constraints upon those processes; 
it is quite clear that not all outcomes are possible. (Birke 1986, 101-3)
20) For this reason, when Birke claims that "our biology, however, does not 
determine anything" (Birke 1986, 106 ; my emphasis), one must link this readily with her 
political opposition to biological determinism (and its connotations with patriarchal and 
racist ideologies) rather than a scientific rejection of the existence of biological 
determinations of human behaviours altogether.
21) Epigenesis refers to explanations and models of evolutionary development 
Waddington has proposed new models of epigenesis, more environmentally-oriented than 
strictly genetically-oriented. See chapter 4. Also Waddington (1969, 1974) and 
Maynard-Smith (1986).
22) I should also like to stress, as in chapter 4, that process-oriented biology has 
always been an important theoretical stance within the epistemology of biology, but that 
it has never successfully replaced reductionism and experimentalism as a method. It is 
reasonable to think that the approaches of holism and interactionism have highlighted the 
specific problems associated with the truth-content and validation of theories in the life 
sciences.
23) But she is not saying that symptoms may not be directly related to changes in 
the body’s functions occurring during the cycle, as she writes:
Brain waves (as measured by the electro- encephalogram) are affected by 
the cycle, so that epileptic fits are least likely between ovulation and
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premenstruum, and most likely just before a period. Various other functions
change, such as carbohydrate metabolism, thyroid function, mineral and
water balance, resting temperature and sensitivity to smells. (Birke and Best
1980b, 98).
24) Birke (1984a) gives a powerful argument in this connection, relating to 
psychiatric treatment of women. Birke has also addressed the issue of lesbianism in the 
BWSG collective. In her reflection ’From Zero to Infinity. Scientific Views of Lesbians’ 
(1980c) Birke again makes an anti-reductionist and anti-determinist stance against current 
biological knowledge. She disputes the idea of the ’unnaturalness’ of lesbian preferences, 
on similar grounds as the case of the ’natural inferiority of women’. She denounces the 
ill-founded, though widely prescribed in medical practice, hormonal treatment of homose­
xuality. She stresses that Lesbians are doubly oppressed: because they are women, and 
because they represent a political weapon against men’s control and access to women’s 
bodies. Finally she warns against future backlash and the alternative answers that science 
will find to maintain lesbians under ideological and technological control.
25) This is consistent with the three other tenets of her project of feminist science: 
it ought to embark on understanding the role of cooperation rather than competition in 
evolution, a socialist issue; it ought to substantiate the idea that biology is experienced 
differently by different peoples, an upshot of the biological paradigm of dialectics 
biology-social meanings; and it ought to reconsider the use of animals in biology and foster 
harmony with nature.
26) See note 3.
27) See Passmore (1978), Medawar (1985), Barnes (1985), and also the debate 
between the biologists S. Rose and J. Watson in Rose and Appignanesi (1986).
28) I am not sure that assuming that science and society are linked, or that ideology 
and scientific thought are dialectically intertwined, exonerates the analyst from the 
obligation of clarifying conceptual lines and examining thoroughly into the magma of 
reality!
29) In a brief conversation (7 April 1989), Birke expressed her disappointments as 
regards the dearth of feminist trained in science or who have dropped out of it. She also 
said unabashedly that she was -  until recently -  the only ’feminist biologist’ left in Britain, 
whereas most feminists who criticize science are "definitely not scientists".
30) I would refer to chapter 3 for a discussion on this matter, especially to the 
works of Habermas (1970, 1979), Hesse (1980a), Bernstein (1983), and Hekman (1986).
31) See Maynard-Smith (1986) who has written extensively on the subject. It must 
be stressed, however, that a great many biologists do not even agree that gene-centred 
theories fit the data. I should like to thank Dr. J. Masters, evolutionist, for pointing this out. 
Interview by the author, London, 4 August 1989.
32) I should also like to add that the machine metaphor (or ’structure’ metaphor)
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when it comes to explain, determine, and predict human behaviour, always makes our 
theories harsh and inhumane in face of our ideal of human nature, as noted by Gellner 
(1974). The problem with biology, and for that matter the human and social sciences, is 
precisely that: the ontology of the objects being studied in the life and human sciences 
seems to be quite alien with respect to the ideal cognitive theories these very disciplines 
invite researchers to take. In the same manner, one may find that, in feminist writings, 
there is also, in the last analysis, this kind of utilitarian hard-core faith in modem science 
and reliance on the pragmatic standpoint on knowledge so well described by Gellner and 
the philosopher Hesse (1980a).
33) See note 3.
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CHAPTER 8
A STUDY OF FEMINIST PRACTICE IN BIOLOGY II: THE GROUPE 
DE RECHERCHE-ACTION EN BIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL
The Groupe de recherche-action en biologie du travail (Group for Research-Action 
on Human Biology and Work, referred to as GRABIT hereafter) is representative of a 
biological practice oriented by feminism, but this time in human rather than animal biology. 
In contrast to Lynda Birke, whose scientific research was about animal behaviours, 
GRABIT is concerned with the health problems of workers. It is a relatively unique 
mainly-female group of biologists whose research agenda and approach to biology are 
inspired by feminist critiques. In fact, its scientific production is extensive, involving 
research in genetics, neurophysiology and ergonomics in connection with risk factors for 
industrial diseases. GRABIT advances an approach to human biology inspired by both the 
feminist critiques of science and the research-action approach to occupational health. These 
two concerns are central to the scientific agenda of the group.
Based on an examination of the conceptual framework and method GRABIT has 
developed over the past ten years, and of its research results, this chapter will assess in 
what ways the scientific approach of the group constitutes an original contribution of 
feminism to biology, and why it has succeeded in gaining some legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
scientific milieu.
We shall compare the research agendas, methods, and theoretical standpoints of 
GRABIT and of mainstream biologists, in order to highlight the chasms and points of conv­
ergence between the two approaches. This comparison will be followed by a discussion of 
what needs to be modified, epistemologically and politically, in order to apply the feminist 
critiques of science into real scientific practice. Two questions will be surveyed more 
particularly: the relationship between being a woman and doing feminist biology, and the
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scientific roles of listening and subjectivity. These questions have always been relevant to 
the issue of developing ’feminist biology* as a full-fledged scientific approach, and have 
also been salient features in the construction of a feminist approach at GRABIT.
In this chapter we shall defend the idea that GRABIT’s practice of biology is 
original with respect to the conventional norms of investigation in biology and occupational 
health. Certain aspects of GRABIT*s method of investigation may appear rather 
conventional if one examines them from the perspective of the sociology of labour. Yet 
GRABIT deserves the great credit of having successfully bridged the gaps between the 
research agendas and methods of two areas separated institutionally: the biological and the 
social sciences.
At the conceptual level, GRABIT has gained an understanding of the risk factors 
specific to women workers in the context of the sexual division of labour, rarely attained 
in the field of occupational health. The body of theories GRABIT works with is not entirely 
alien to the sociology and economy of labour of the past decade. Feminists had already 
made several renowned contributions to those two fields. But such a body of theories 
remains rather new in the biological sciences.
Finally, in conU'ast to mainstream scientists, GRABIT’s directors consider as part 
of their tasks the extension of the benefits of their knowledge to the workers directly. They 
organize training programmes for the unions and are involved directly in the promotion of 
changes in working conditions.
Having said that however, the approach of GRABIT is not outstandingly 
revolutionary from the point of view of epistemologv. It relies heavily on the usual methods 
of scientific proof in the empirical sciences — including both the social and the natural 
sciences -  to gain its scientific legitimacy. Thus, in comparison to the extensive feminist 
literature about scientific knowledge, feminist biologists have made their contribution from 
within the confines of current epistemological canons rather than on entirely new cognitive 
bases.
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Yet GRABIT deserves credit for having entrenched certain social concerns (about 
political minorities like women and workers) and concepts of social theory within a discip­
line which has, paradoxically, striven hard to become a ’hard science* producing results the 
truth-content of which is defended by is ’mainstream practitioners’ as being free from social 
values. In this sense, GRABIT is certainly contributing -  but perhaps only half-wittingly 
— to the development of a science more self-conscious of the function of values in human 
cognition in general, and in biological science in particular. In brief, GRABIT may be 
participating in the reassessment of the epistemological differences between the social and 
the natural sciences, doing so from inside the empirico-analytical sciences themselves, 
rather than from outside, in the usual manner of feminist social critics and hermeneuticians. 
Indeed, GRABIT has given evidence that an approach to biology and work acknowledging 
publicly its feminist goals and woman-centred standpoint — i.e., acknowledging openly its 
value-ladenness — is able to secure its legitimacy on the same epistemological canons of 
proof as any other empirical science.
This case study is based on one month’s worth of direct observation among the 
members of GRABIT at UQAM (Université du Québec à Montréal) in May 1989*. In 
addition, individual interviews were set up with five women staff of the group: the two 
directors, the geneticist Karen Messing and the neurophysiologist Donna Mergler, and three 
principal researchers^. Several research students (all females) were also interviewed on an 
individual basis. Finally, a survey of the publications of the group completed the enquiry, 
including articles published in trade union periodicals, in feminist and other scientific 
journals, research reports, and published communications.
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The Group and its Members: Social. Political 
and Institutional Affiliations
In a parallel with the case study of Lynda Birke, we shall introduce briefly the 
directors and other members of GRABIT. By doing so, it will be evidenced that the five 
women staff of the group may be considered as individuals who are, in general, politically 
and socially active. Even before they formed or joined the group, these women were milita­
ting in social groups. This gives weight to the argument that feminist biology is, first and 
foremost, the practice of scientists who are militant, of ’feminist biologists’, rather than of 
women in general, the mere product of a ’feminine’ style of practice and of ’feminine 
values’.
Without rejecting the argument that the spreading of feminist biology is benefitting 
from the increasing participation of women biologists — an idea that feminists have always 
propounded —, the case study of GRABIT strongly suggests that feminist biology is 
historically rooted in the participation of politically-oriented women biologists. True, most 
women are practising biology along conventional norms. Some are even opposed 
vehemently to feminist biology, as shown in a previous chapter. In contrast,there are some 
men who are feminists and tend to practice biology along the same principles as feminists. 
All these aspects have been acknowledged in the feminist literature. Yet I shall suggest that 
it would be an error to dismiss the strong sociological and cognitive relationship between 
the gender of biologists and their contributions to feminist biology and the development of 
new scientific knowledge.
The case for being a woman and pursuing ’feminist biology’ still holds strong. For 
instance, according to Messing, women have a more direct interest in promoting a better 
understanding of women’s health problems; moreover, they have an edge on men because 
they have an immediate empirical understanding of women’s bodies and living conditions.
The case of GRABIT tends to show that women biologists are more responsive than 
men to the problems and hypotheses addressed by feminist biology. Let us thus present the
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principal members of GRABIT and analyze their attitudes towards women’s occupational 
health and feminist issues with a view to the question of the relationship between being a 
woman and engaging in feminist biology.
Karen Messing was bom in Massachussets in 1943, in a middle-class family^. In the 
1960s she went to Harvard and earned a bachelor degree in psychology. During that period 
she became uneasy with theories about woman’s psychology and was influenced by new 
feminist writings. In 1969 she became a member of the Front de libération des femmes 
(Front of Liberation of Women). She decided to challenge the idea that women were scared 
of doing science by shifting from psychology to biology. She completed her graduate 
studies at McGill University in Montreal, specialising in genetics, and was awarded a Ph.D. 
in 1975. She returned to the United States for a year, pursuing post-doctoral research in 
plant genetics. Since 1976, she has held the position of professo/ in the department of 
biological sciences at UQAM, to which she was attracted by her close friend, Donna 
Mergler. Her position in the professors’ union of UQAM led her to involve herself as a 
member of the committee on women’s working conditions in one of the major trade unions 
in Québec. With Dr. Mergler, she also set up (in the late 1970s) a new course in the 
department. Biologie et condition féminine (biology and woman’s condition), which was 
well attended by women biologists and social scientists. In 1982, with Dr. Mergler, she 
founded GRABIT. Since the late 1960s Karen Messing has served as a resource person for 
women’s groups, and also as a ’token feminist’ on committees in trade unions, on public 
boards, and at UQAM.
Donna Mergler was bom in Montreal in 1944. She studied physiology as an 
undergraduate and earned a Ph.D. in neuro-physiology from McGill University in 1973\ 
She taught biology and physiology in different colleges in Montreal until she was offered 
a post of physiologist in the department of biological sciences at UQAM in 1970, which 
she has held since. From 1982 to 1984 she was head of her department. In the late 1970s, 
she was asked to set up training courses for workers in occupational health. Since then.
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she has committed herself to gear her science to the condition of the working class. Donna 
Mergler has, from an early age, followed the example of her father who was a leading 
lawyer for trade unions. She has always been engaged in trade-unionism. She is a militant 
socialist herself.
The two directors of GRABIT lead "two careers" simultaneously: as social activists 
and as scientists. Politically and scientifically they have influenced each other over the 
years. As social militants and scientists, they are both very much involved in popularising 
biology and explaining its applications to women and workers. They have lobbied 
(successfully) for the entrance of more women in the department of biology. Also, with 
other women colleagues at UQAM, they founded, in 1976, the Groupe interdisciplinaire 
d'enseignement et de recherche féministes (Interdisciplinary Group for Feminist Education 
and Research). Their research projects evidence their strong commitment to the welfare of 
women and workers. Finally, they publish extensively in scientific journals and participate 
in international and national conferences.
Dr. Nicole Vézina was bom in Montreal in 1953. She grew up in a working class 
family. Early on, she decided she wanted to do research on the occupational diseases and 
working conditions of women^. She studied ecology as an undergraduate at UQAM. She 
then embarked on a Masters' degree in physiology under the supervision of Dr. Mergler, 
which she completed in 1982. Her research on workers in a slaughterhouse was to launch 
a long and successful series of studies by GRABIT. She went to France in the mid-eighties 
and worked on a Doctorate in ergonomics at the Laboratoire de physiologie du travail et 
ergonomie, affiliated to the Université de Paris Nord. In 1987 she came back to Montreal 
where she has been working as a senior researcher for GRABIT since. Dr. Vézina has 
played a particularly important role in GRABIT. As an ergonomist closely related to the 
trade unions milieu, she has contributed to the elaboration of several research projects on 
trade unions' requests.
Suzanne Bélanger and Ana-Maria Seifert are the other two senior researchers at
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GRABIT^. Ms. Bélanger was trained as a nurse in the early sixties. As a practising nurse, 
she has always been an active member of her trade union, organizing training sessions and 
sitting on committees of women’s conditions. She met Dr. Messing while working as a 
union officer on a project for screening genetic mutations in women hospital workers. She 
joined GRABIT in the mid-eighties, and took the opportunity to undertake a Master’s 
degree in physiology under the supervision of Dr. Mergler. Since 1987, she has worked 
closely with Dr. Mergler on her projects on the effects of solvent exposure in factories.
Ms. Seifert was bom in Bolivia. As a student she was very active in social 
movements and politics. She entered medical school, but never finished her course. When 
she was still in her early twenties, she was imprisoned, then forced to leave her country. 
She arrived in Montreal in 1973 as a political refugee. She enrolled in biology at UQAM 
in the second half of the 1970s. There, she met Nicole Vézina. They participated in 
attempts to reform the biology curriculum. With other students, they initiated "La semaine 
de biologie" as an attempt to entrench societal concerns within the biological program. At 
about the same time, she started working with Dr. Messing and earned a Masters’ degree 
in genetics under her supervision. Since 1987, she has worked closely with Dr. Messing on 
her human genetics projects, particularly on effects of exposure to ionizing radiation in 
hospitals.
In comparison with the five women staff, the graduate students at GRABIT do not 
show as strong a commitment to feminism or trade unionism. However, they share a 
scientific interest for workers’ occupational health, and they also recognize the value of 
the biological approach developed within GRABIT.
Carole Brabant is in her late twenties. She is one of the two doctoral students at 
GRABIT* -  along with a young medical doctor who specialises in epidemiology. Brabant 
did her undergraduate studies and Masters’s degree at UQAM, where she became interested 
in the courses on women and biology given by Drs. Messing and Mergler. Brabant 
considers herself committed to doing research on the working conditions of women. She
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has a good grasp of the underlying rationale of the approach developed at GRABIT. She 
is, according to many members of the group, very imaginative, articulate and 
single-minded. She has initiated, with her friend and colleague Sylvie Bédard, a study of 
the cardiac and physiological strains in women laundry workers. She has also collaborated 
on publications about the theoretical aspects of GRABU’s approach to women’s biology 
and work. She appears to have been directly inspired by the approach of her directors at 
GRABIT.
Sylvie Bédard completed her Masters’ degree in 1988 on the subject of thermal 
discomfort among women laundry workers’. She then enrolled in a course in occupational 
health at McGill University. But, as she recalls, the course was taught in the traditional way 
of doing biology: it was not connected enough to the reality of working conditions. Bédard 
has, like Brabant and Julie Courville also, a more feminist orientation than the other 
students at GRABIT.
As an undergraduate student, Julie Courville participated in a study of the working 
conditions in a clothing shop where there was only one female for ten male workers*®. This 
study, under the supervision of Drs. Vézina and Messing, aimed at adapting the tasks of 
leather cutter, traditionally done by men, to the musculo-skeletal characteristics of the 
average woman. For her Master’s degree, Courville has been doing similar kinds of field 
work in a garage of mechanical engineers. Courville has been very much influenced by the 
social and scientific concerns of Dr. Vézina. Yet when she was asked if, as a member of 
GRABIT, she also considered herself a feminist, Courville answered, after several 
hesitations, that she was not. Nevertheless, her director Messing believes that she 
understands very well the rationale of GRABIT’s approach, and that she sees clearly the 
’political games’ of science that GRABIT is forced to confront head-on.
Ginette Plouffe is a mature student and was doing her Masters’ degree on laboratory 
workers and backaches’*. Her decision to join GRABIT in the early 1980s was in direct 
relation to her work experience. In the 1970s she was involved in the unionization of a
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laboratory where she was working as a technician. Like the majority of members at 
GRABIT, she recognizes the important social role that biologists can play.
Isabel Fortier is among the youngest students at GRABIT and was also working on 
a Masters* degree at the time of the study. She did not really considered herself feminist'^. 
Nonetheless, her research work undeniably made her realize the valuable applications of 
biology to the conditions of workers in industry. She was convinced that the results 
produced by GRABIT’s approach were not only as valid, but even better than other studies 
in the same area. Fortier recalled vividly a particular episode of her field work in a factory. 
She said she was totally shattered when she saw how rapid was the deterioration of the 
health of workers exposed to solvents in industry. This gave her a new perspective on the 
social problems her laboratory work was directly tackling. She did not fully acknowledge 
the political dimension of her research work however, mainly because she never had the 
chance to familiarise herself with the harsh negotiations between employers, trade unions, 
and researchers. Like Plouffe, her work did not put her in contact with the specific problem 
of women’s biology and work.
There are several other students and associate members at GRABIT. Messing and 
Mergler suggested that several of them did not fully share their social commitment and 
social goals* .^ For instance. Messing said that one of her students who was inclined towards 
feminism before she joined the group, has not been able to integrate her feminist views 
with her scientific work. In contrast, she maintained that another of her students, reserved 
about her opinions on feminist issues, had nevertheless a much stronger view on both her 
scientific and social commitments within GRABIT.
Mergler for her part doubted that her students would be combative outside the 
group and without its immediate support. She wondered whether they would keep 
challenging traditional biology, occupational health, or epidemiology once they move on 
to other professional settings. Yet she believed that their passage will not have been 
worthless, giving them the tools and critical thinking of a research-action approach to
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occupational health.
One last point is worth mentioning before closing this section: the relative absence 
of men at GRABIT. At the time of the study, GRABIT numbered fifteen women, including 
research students; but only four men: an epidemiologist (the only male senior researcher 
of the group), two post-graduate students, and a contractual worker doing statistical work. 
There has been only one male student, Daniel Tierney, the only one at GRABIT to our 
knowledge, involved in a study of women’s health problems. He studied the effects on low 
birth weight of hospital workers during pregnancy, and completed his Master’s degree in 
1988'".
As Bélanger mentioned, it is not necessarily because of a conscious discrimination 
against males that there are so few men at GRABIT. She suggested that the strong feminist 
stance of the directors might have dissuaded men from joining the group in the first place, 
especially the young male students.
All the above remarks give weight to the thesis that women are more prone than 
men to get involved in projects about women’s health occupation. However, the 
participation of some women -  and men — biologists in GRABIT can be explained by the 
fact that the directors of the group have always had strong scientific credentials within their 
professional milieu, rather than in terms of the personal combativity of these individuals 
as feminists.
A Comparison Between Traditional Models and Research-Action 
Models in Biologv and Occupational Health
The research-action model tries to fill the gaps in the medical model of 
occupational health. In the history of GRABIT, the research-action model has adumbrated 
the development of a feminist approach specific to the problems of women’s biology and 
work. This approach challenges the traditional model of investigation in occupational health, 
the ’male-centred’ model. In its request to become a WHO (World Health Organisation)
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collaborating centre for women’s occupational health, the group wrote:
The name GRABIT is derived from the group’s research and training 
activities in occupational health: BIOLOGY and WORK refers to our 
research priorities, which center around biological alterations resulting from 
workplace situations. This emphasis on early biological changes stems from 
a preventive approach to workplace risks, focusing on indicators which 
reflect diminished well-being and constitute potential warning signs of 
developing illness. The RESEARCH-ACTION component refers to that 
aspect of our methodology whose objective is to respond to workers’ needs 
and concerns by involving them in the entire research process, from problem 
formulation to workplace recommendations. This is facilitated through 
agreements between our university and the two major Quebec unions and 
womens’ groups.*^
This section will highlight the differences between, on the one hand, the 
research-action models developed at GRABIT and, on the other hand, the traditional models 
the former aim to replace.
Institutional background
As a research group affiliated to UQAM, a young french-speaking university totally 
supported by public funds, GRABIT subscribes to the special mandate (or "protocol") of 
the university to serve the people, set up programmes of teaching and research in 
community services, and assist social groups in a very direct way. A first cooperative 
programme was established with the two umbrella associations of labour organizations in 
Québec in 1976, the Protocole d ’entente UOAM-CSN-FTQ. This programme gave the 
unions access to the human and physical resources of the university. It also enabled them 
to submit requests to the university involving training courses and research about health at 
work. Finally, it gave them some control over the elaboration and implementation of 
research projects. The university has more recently established programmes in conjunction 
with a federation of women’s organizations. GRABIT contributes directly to those two 
programmes.
The association between scientists, workers, and women’s groups forms the concrete
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infrastructure for the implementation of the research-action model developed at GRABIT. 
GRABIT has also had an important financial aid from the IRSST (Institut de Recherche en 
Santé et Sécurité du Travaifi. a research division of the Worker’s Compensation Board 
where representatives of employers, workers and the government are sitting in equal 
numbers. These two alliances helped GRABIT to anchor more firmly within the 
institutional structure its research programme about health and security problems of women 
and workers.
One of the first requests the trade unions made to biologists at UQAM was for them 
to participate as resource persons in union-organized workshops. As Mergler put it, "It was 
through these workshops that we began learning to combine our academic knowledge with 
workers’ concrete knowledge of their workplace and their health. It is here that we are 
becoming familiar with the working milieu". (1987a, 154)
The research-action model versus 
the medical model in occupational health
The research-action model was first considered in the early 1980s by Drs. Mergler 
and Messing, and their colleague. Dr. Luc Desnoyers. The model had already been 
developed in different forms by "progressive scientists" in different countries, most notably 
in Italy at the turn of the 1980s (Mergler 1987a). In 1982, Mergler and her colleagues were 
granted $75,000 for one year in order to develop a "biological approach adapted to the 
workplace" and to create a research team* .^ Mergler has since published several papers in 
trade union periodicals and in scientific journals expounding the research-action model^^.
The research-action model in occupational health is based on three main 
assumptions. First, research should aim at social change rather than being strictly academic; 
secondly, the workers should be integrated as active participants in all stages of research 
rather than being the passive objects of study; finally, the scientists should be conscious of, 
and acknowledge fully, their partiality in the process (Mergler 1987a)**.
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The underpinnings of the research-action model appear congenial to the WHO’s 
definition of health -  released in 1975. This definition stresses that health is not only 
related to the innate abilities of individuals but also depends on their environment. 
Moreover, health should not only refer to the absence of illness but first and foremost to 
the well-being of individuals and to the conditions favourable to it. In those two respects, 
the medical model presents some flaws as a preventive approach to occupational health 
(1987b).
Mergler isolates several shortcomings of the medical model which the 
research-action may correct. She maintains that its fundamental shortcomings reside in the 
fact that it takes as its starting point individuals rather than the collectivity, and the notion 
of illness rather than that of well-being. Thereby, the medical model is only able to monitor 
the evolution of a disease ex post facto. That is to say, it only applies when a worker shows 
clear signs and symptoms of illness or invalidity, or when the onset of an ailment is 
obviously related to a specific cause or event. As a result, Mergler notes, for several cases 
of occupational diseases, the medical model will neglect prevention and interventions will 
come too late.
When risk factors are defined ex post facto, the probability that an individual can 
be cured of his or her disease is low. But more importantly, the investigation of the 
problem at its source is undermined. Mergler contends that the medical model rather than 
pointing to the work environment as the source of biological defects, tends to focus on 
and blame the victim (i.e. his or her genetic, physiological, or psycho-social defects). 
Mergler acknowledges that illnesses with a late onset are hard to monitor at an early stage 
and, therefore, to prevent — especially when the factors that cause them are diffuse. But she 
argues that her research-action approach to occupational health, since it emphasizes 
prevention, could at least minimize some of the costs that the workers are paying for with 
their health.
The scientific rationale of her approach is the following: from the point of view of
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physiology, the organism of a worker in industry who is exposed daily to various stressors 
and substances, progressively lowers his level of resistance to further aggressors, even 
though there are not as yet any clear clinical signs of illness -  detected empirically by the 
observing analyst. It is the early svmptoms (expressed subjectively by the worker) of a 
deterioration of the well-being of the workers that a research-action approach will be 
examining. It will work on developing experimental tests (with workers or in laboratory) 
relating biological signs (physiological, genetic, neurological) to the symptoms of a 
deterioration in the worker’s health. These signs may not be linked to any specific 
pathologies in the first place and yet they are the likely precursors of more serious damage 
or illness.
A third shortcoming of the medical model is that it relies on expert knowledge 
alone. It does not attempt to integrate the knowledge of workers and to make good use of 
it. Workers are often the best judges of their own state of health and well-being, as Mergler 
says. They also are in a very good position to recognize the hazards in the plant or the 
factory. In this sense, they may contribute fruitfully to the screening of risk factors for their 
health. The research-action approach, in contrast to the medical model, makes a valuable 
use of the workers’ knowledge in the screening of precursor symptoms and signs of illness.
Another disadvantage of the medical model is that it relies on expensive methods 
and measurement techniques, and on laboratory set-ups that bear no resemblance to the real 
setting of a factory. Even when measurements are taken in the factory, the analysis is 
usually done in a laboratory. It is reasonable to think, as the researchers of GRABIT argue, 
that the environmental samples collected on the shopfloor do not necessarily give a good 
indication of the variations in temperature, noise, or dust to which workers are exposed 
during a whole day shift. They also point out that experiments carried out in the laboratory 
are often based on ’normal’ healthy subjects who have not suffered the stress of several 
hours on a conveyor belt, in an uncomfortable position, or under abnormal temperatures.
The research-action approach can make valuable use of several sophisticated
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measurement techniques: neuro-physiological tests which lasts hours and HPRT (a genetic 
test synthesizing the protein HPRT in cells to detect mutants from normal genes) are two 
examples. But it also complements laboratory tests with simple techniques of data 
collection, such as questionnaires and interviews with workers. Mergler, with the assistance 
of her students, has, for instance, developed tests and samples to measure the levels of dete­
rioration in the vision and olfaction of workers exposed to neuro-toxic agents like solvents 
(de Grosbois and Mergler 1985; Fortier 1989; Mergler and de Grosbois 1984; Mergler, 
Bélanger, Blain, Vachon 1988). The information thus collected conveys a rich body of 
evidence on the real working conditions of these people.
The widespread use of questionnaires and interview protocols has enabled GRABIT 
to adjust certain of its research designs in accordance with the workers’ better knowledge 
of the workplace. It has also permitted the introduction of variables concerning risk factors 
that would have been neglected if workers had not participated fully in the elaboration of 
the research design*’.
Finally, Mergler maintains that the medical model has missed out on the specific 
problems of women at work. She argues that the medical model has focused solely on the 
reproductive risks during pregnancy, which constitute a very small part of all the problems 
which women suffer at work. It has not taken into account the fact, shown in a great many 
studies, that a great number of women work in specific jobs which involve particular risks. 
For a research-action model, this fact implies that a new set of working conditions needs 
to be investigated, and that a new series of potential ailments ought to be identified.
This leads us directly to the presentation of the feminist approach to work and 
biology developed at GRABIT.
The feminist approach versus the male-centred 
model to biology and work
In several articles and communications aimed at feminist and women’s groups, trade
303
union committees, and left-wing groupings, Messing propounds the theoretical basis of the 
feminist approach to biology and work (Bédard, Brabant, Mergler, Messing 1986; Messing 
1983b, 1984, 1986, 1990a, 1990b; Vézina and Messing 1985). In those papers she points 
out the dearth of studies dealing directly with women’s health problems at work. She 
writes:
When problems are not studied, they can’t be documented. When they aren’t 
documented, they have no official existence. Thus, workers, legislators and 
the public may think that women’s jobs are safe, because no study has 
shown otherwise. (1990b, 3).
Messing also sheds light on the ill-founded assumptions and biased orientations of the tradi­
tional male-centred model of occupational health, exposing its limited applications as far 
as the working conditions of women are concerned. Let us now turn to her arguments.
The field of occupational health is generally based on the assumption that men have 
jobs and women are housewives or mothers. Hence, model-building in the field of biology 
at work rests essentially on the image of a male worker and on the description of health 
hazards in men’s jobs (Messing 1990b). The appearance of studies about women at work 
goes back to the turn of the century, but it is only recently that a significant body of re­
search has begun to emerge. According to Messing, this is due mainly to the efforts of 
women researchers; for only a few men have been interested in this type of problem thus 
far“ . She also explains that, in the present social and scientific context, researchers must 
confront two important obstacles in order to introduce a feminist approach.
The first kind of difficulties encountered by feminist researchers is mainly scientific. 
They must convincingly argue their case for the replacement of certain analytical and 
empirical categories inferred from male-centred models, and which have been applied 
without qualification to women’s jobs. These categories and models are well entrenched in 
the field of occupational health, mainly because they are based on the strong belief that 
female jobs are not as damaging or dangerous for health as men’s jobs. In this sense, the 
introduction of feminist model-building meets the usual difficulties of having to challenge 
theoretical traditions and established paradigms.
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Challenging traditional models in science also implies in the case of GRABIT to 
justify its methodological tenets. GRABIT argues that the usual experimental designs and 
techniques of investigation of occupational health are not the most appropriate for a sound 
screening of the health problems specific to women’s jobs. For instance, health hazards in 
men’s jobs are more often very obvious and related to a very precise job characteristic: 
manipulation of heavy loads, exposure to extreme temperatures or to large amounts of 
dangerous chemical substances, manoeuvring with dangerous machinery. These job 
characteristics also fulfil the methodological conditions for testing causal models in 
epidemiological studies.
In the case of women’s jobs however, the health hazards are more heterogeneous 
(i.e., the source of an ailment or of an illness is usually manifold). For instance, in jobs like 
tellers and sewers, two "job ghettos" for women, the worker must make thousands of rapid 
and repetitive movements, in a noisy environment, and must deal with the clients or meet 
the quotas of production. These various sources of stress may not be life-threatening 
individually; but incrementally, they constitute risk factors for the mental and physical 
health of the workers. And one must also take into account the additional stress these 
women perhaps have at home caring for their respective households.
For instance, several of the grocery tellers interviewed by GRABIT manifested 
symptoms of backaches and headaches (Courville 1989; Vézina and Courville 1989); while 
sewers complained of acute pains in their shoulders, and also in their fingers, wrists and 
upper backs (Vézina, Courville, Tissot 1988). The persistence of these symptoms led to 
belief that an inflammation in the tissues of the muscles and the joints was present, thus 
indicating that the jobs of these women involved risk factors — including factors of mental 
stress — for their health. Health hazards in a typical woman’s job are not as often 
immediately life-threatening as in men’s jobs. But this should not minimize the importance 
of the risk (for both their mental and physical health) that women may expose themselves 
to in the short or long run.
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The second type of difficulty encountered by the approach to woman’s biology at 
work is related to the study of women entering traditional male jobs. Researchers have, in 
this case, to make the proper methodological and theoretical adjustments, and no less 
importantly, to justify their research programme ideologically, politically, and economically, 
to employers, employees, and fellow scientists.
For instance, one of the prime sources of resistance faced by researchers of 
GRABIT is the belief that women might never be able to occupy some of the traditional 
male jobs because those jobs require physical strength or other biological traits or 
capabilities ’normally* attributed to men. Messing and her colleagues believe that a good 
number of these differences can be minimized if one adapts the tasks, tools, equipment, and 
machines to the average body and musculo-skeletal capacities of women (Al-Aidroos 1981; 
Vézina and Messing 1985; Messing, Courville, Vézina 1989)^\ They have done several 
ergonomic studies suggesting specific modifications of the tasks involved in men’s jobs so 
as to suit the musculo-skeletal make-up of women and, by the same token, to prevent health 
problems among men. Their study of a clothing shop for instance, demonstrated that using 
the right tools and introducing adjustable equipment not only helped the female cutter to 
improve her efficiency, but also alleviated the backaches the men had developed.
As Messing often points out, a notable percentage of Canadian women are taller and 
heavier than a good number of Canadian men. Differences in strength between the sexes 
are not absolute; there is some overlap. As a consequence, if employers could bear in mind 
that they are often misled by sexual stereotypes, they might become less prone to exclude 
indiscriminately all the women from certain jobs. This might also encourage them to pay 
more attention to the specific problems of weaker and shorter workers, females and males. 
But, as Messing also emphasizes, employers usually have several other reasons, other than 
strictly ergonomic, not to hire women for certain jobs. She also stresses that, in comparison 
to women, men will often prefer not to complain about their health problems and difficul­
ties rather than to be perceived as ’weak’, thus making it more difficult to assess their real
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health problems.
One must therefore realize that the insertion of women into male jobs commands 
more than ergonomic examination of the size and shape of equipment, and of the move­
ments and postures of workers undertaking certain tasks. The success of this type of project 
also depends on coping with the social and psychological effects induced by the breaking 
of traditional male attitudes in the workplace. As GRABIT’s researchers recognize, it is 
because of their research-action approach that they are now aware of the social problems 
related to occupational health. For it is a principle of this approach to ask and allow 
workers to discuss all the potential problems at work.
Moreover, and as Messing frequently stresses, the fact that researchers at GRABIT 
are mainly female makes them more sensitive than male researchers to the problems women 
face at work.
Finally, researchers at GRABIT have become conscious that important managerial 
interests are at stake by virtue of their research programme. They know that employers 
might be most reluctant to support the type of research they are doing for they would fear 
additional requests and safety measures from the unions, or that productivity will decrease 
if a woman takes up a man’s job — and vice-versa^.
Interestingly, the experience at GRABIT seems to demonstrate that employers are 
usually reluctant to let GRABIT’s researchers enter their firm primarily because they are 
known to be supported by trade unions, rather than for anti-feminist reasons. Thus, 
GRABIT’s feminist orientations might appear less threatening than its union affiliations. 
Having said that however, the predicament of GRABIT as a feminist research group still 
exists: the arrogance of funding bodies, the hostility of fellow scientists, and last but not 
least, the impotence of the male-dominated trade unions are there to prove that point. But 
the hostility and arrogance of the scientific milieu seems to have decreased over the years^. 
This is correlated with the quality of GRABIT’s work, participation in conferences, and 
publications in national and international journals. We shall return to this issue later in the
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chapter.
Let us now examine more exhaustively the shortcomings of the ’male-centred* 
model as a framework for the examination of the safety and health problems of women at 
work.
Messing pinpoints several basic flaws. Firstly, the male-centred model is 
disconnected from the reality of a gendered division of labour and oblivious of the fact that 
a majority of women have jobs that bear little resemblance to male jobs. She contradicts 
the proponents of the traditional male-centred approach who hold that women’s jobs are 
safe and physically not demanding, and therefore do not involve any potentially acute 
health hazards. She strongly opposes the assumption that women’s frail biology is the 
explanation of their ailments (Al-Aidroos 1981; Messing 1982).
The assumptions of the male-centred model have indeed been refuted by ergonomic 
and physiological studies done by GRABIT and research groups (Messing 1990b). Those 
studies have shown that, in the industrial sector, "female jobs" generally involve constrained 
postures, sitting or standing without moving, and fast pace movements of the upper limbs 
without any time to rest. In the service sector, studies have indicated that jobs like waitres- 
sing, nursing, teaching or that of receptionist, require a response to the need of the public, 
and thus involve a significant mental load. In other types of traditionally female jobs like 
those of typists, tellers, and assembly-line workers, rapid hand movements are 
characteristic. These also involve specific musculo-skeletal demands that bear no 
resemblance to male jobs.
A feminist research-action model would take into account all the traits typical of 
women’s jobs in an investigation of women’s occupational health. In addition, it would take 
into account all the ’environmental’ aspects (such as mental stress of fast pace work, client 
pressure, routine work; in addition to specific conditions such as low salary, temporary 
employment, and sexual harassment) affecting the well-being of women at work. Finally, 
it would draw attention to household responsibilities that might add their adverse effects
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on health to those of the paid tasks. The feminist approach thus gives rise to a new array 
of issues for empirical investigation, hitherto unexplored in surveys based on the 
male-centred model.
On the methodological level however, there is some trouble with the woman-centred 
model. Messing fully acknowledges this kind of predicament. She admits that it is not easy 
to assess a "decrease” in the "well-being" of female workers by means of conventional 
diagnostic tools.
For example, to this day, studies of "collective" symptoms of discomfort, ailments 
and depression, observed more frequently among women workers in women-dominated mi­
lieu, have usually been explained in terms of a mass hvsteria (Brabant, Mergler and 
Messing 1990). In general, diagnosis of ill-health starts with the symptoms, which are then 
tested against signs observed on the patient and may also be followed up by laboratory 
tests. But diagnosis rarely relies on the subjective reports of workers alone. It was pointed 
out earlier that in several cases of ailments associated with typical women’s jobs, individual 
signs cannot be detected as such. The symptoms reported by the workers as a group thus 
become the best indications of a (latent) reduction in the well-being of the individuals. 
Moreover, these reports happen to be most fruitful in the screening of aggressors, sources 
of stress and risk factors. Indeed, Messing believes that to listen to these workers is 
fundamental both methodologically and heuristically.
In a recent essay (1990a), Messing defended her woman-centred approach by 
arguing that as a scientist and feminist committed to research-action, she has benefitted 
scientifically not only from listening to women workers, but also from listening to them 
’with empathv*. Her study of the effects on health of ionizing radiation in hospital work 
has evidenced that listening to the women technicians made her pay attention to certain as­
pects of their work that she would have neglected otherwise (e.g., taking into account their 
workload, the descriptions of their tasks, and the specific times when additional exposure 
to ionizing radiation occurred, instead of taking dosimeter measurements at certain times
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only), to sensibly modify her observation design, and to interpret some of her data. She 
wrote.
We think a place should be found in occupational health research for 
documentation and for statistical description of workers* perceptions. So we 
find ourselves making such obvious statements as, ’Workers report that they 
work too quickly, and that the more quickly they work, the more they feel 
exhausted* ... We think that when a large number of women are exhausted, 
scientists should listen to them. We also know that it’s obvious that women 
shouldn’t work so hard because they’ll get tired has no influence on work 
schedules in factories or hospitals. When scientists say the same thing, it 
may have a greater chance of resulting in a change in working conditions. 
(Messing 1990a)
As Messing stresses, in general, scientists opt for a conventional clinical model of 
detection of ill-health, rather than for controversial methods bearing controversial 
interpretation and yet more appropriate to pinpoint the complexity of the problem under 
study. She says.
Researchers are often asked to examine health symptoms. Scientific 
problems arise from the fact that symptoms are so often detected first by the 
worker herself, and the most reliable, inexpensive and efficient measures are 
subjective. The science of doing research on subjectively-perceived sym­
ptoms is not yet well-developed. Many people do not have confidence that 
the worker with symptoms will not, for example, over-report previous 
exposures to dangerous working conditions. (1990b, 10)
She also contends that symptoms like the mental workload reported by women
workers are often neglected by researchers on the grounds of prejudice: "it’s all in the
mind", as their male-centred model would assume. And this is where the male-centred
model is basically flawed. For, as Messing explains, most women occupy jobs where
various sources of mental and physical stress are at work, thus suggesting that a holistic
view on the risk factors should be favoured at the expense of simple causal models, looking
at single risk factors, and using the accepted, conventional methods of validation using
laboratory tests and focusing on observable signs. She writes.
Most women work in situations where they are more likely to suffer from 
combinations of conditions than any one aggressor. They work where there 
are small numbers of workers exposed to any one set of conditions. Relating 
working conditions to health effects may be complex and require the use 
of many techniques. It is probably reasonable to say that if many women in
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a workplace suffer from a symptom, there is likely to be a problem in the 
work environment. (1989, 11)
Mental stress is more common in women’s descriptions of their jobs than men’s. 
In typical women’s jobs, the reaction of the body to the aggressors in the workplace is 
’’global”. This makes it ’’difficult to relate working conditions to illness, unless there is a 
single, overwhelming aggressor with a well-defined effect which is not normally encoun­
tered [outside these jobs]” (Messing 1990b, 9). For instance, lifting light weights repeti­
tively when the workplace is hot might increase the strains on the heart in laundry workers. 
In the clothing industry, the effect of repetitive work at fast speed when at piecework rates 
of pay raises the psychological and physiological stress already associated with the task.
Not content to give up in face of ’methodologically controversial’ research designs. 
Messing stresses that several studies have perfected the tools and concepts measuring 
perceptions of mental aggressors in the workplace. Moreover, she maintains that the most 
reliable and reproducible existing measurements of mental workload actually are subjective 
and based on the worker’s report of their degrees of difficulty with diverse aspects of the 
job"".
To summarize, in contrast to a traditional male-centred model, a feminist approach 
would counterpoise a woman-centred model, since typical women’s jobs bear specific 
health risks that bear little resemblance to typical men’s jobs. These risks are associated 
with, for instance, speed, client pressure, and mental workload. They are not due ultimately 
to women’s alleged frail biology. As a result, a feminist approach would assume that the 
ailments reported by women in these jobs are real. Also, in contrast to a conventional 
cause-effect model of explanation, a woman-centred model would make good use of 
interview and questionnaire techniques. Finally, and not least importantly, the feminist 
approach would examine women’s occupational health from a holistic perspective rather 
than in terms of linear cause-effect relationship.
The feminist approach of GRABIT does not neglect the fact that individual traits 
may contribute to a person’s susceptibility to diseases. Personal characteristics such as age,
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smoking habit, socio-economic status and genetic make-up are all taken into account to 
predict the likelihood of an individual becoming ill. Taking this into account, one should 
however realize that the diffuse demands (and negative effects) of the workplace and of the 
tasks may combine, in a "synergic" way, with the personal traits of individuals already at 
risk, and, thus, increase the likelihood of diseases and health damages. Domestic duties, 
menses, pregnancy, smoking habits, are intervening variables which must be considered 
when discussing health risks and the evolution of symptoms.
Let us now look at three of the studies done by GRABIT in order to illustrate the 
originality of its contribution to occupational health. This should afford pragmatic validity 
to the argument that GRABIT has provided ’revolutionary* results to the field of 
occupational health by means of its feminist research-action approach.
Three Studies of GRABIT on Women’s Biologv and Work
The three studies presented in this section concern three topical issues in which 
GRABIT is interested. The first study concerns workers in abattoirs and compares the 
health problems of men and women. The second study is about laundry workers, and points 
to the typical health risks of women’s jobs which pass unnoticed when traditional models 
of occupational health are employed. The last study investigates the musculo-skeletal and 
ergonomic features of a traditionally perceived male job in order to adapt it for women 
workers.
The study in abattoirs was the first generated by the UQAM and trade unions’ 
agreement (Vézina, Mergler, Beauvais, Everell 1980). The paucity of data on the work 
conditions in slaughterhouses and their effects on health problems prompted the trade union 
to request that such a study be carried out“ .
The bulk of the study was conducted by means of self-administered questionnaires 
distributed in ten abattoirs over a period of twelve months in 1979-1980. 55.3 percent of
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the workers (276 women and 385 men) answered the questionnaire, giving a reasonably 
representative sample of the population. In spite of the fact that direct observation on the 
shopfloor was not allowed by the employer, the researchers had the opportunity to visit the 
shops a few times and to discuss and revise the research design with the workers and union 
officers at other times. The final version of the questionnaire was the result of five 
pre-tests. It was used to measure work conditions such as levels of noise and temperature, 
quality of the air and level of ammonia (in the refrigeration rooms), speed of the conveyor 
belt, worker’s movements, the levels of reported ailments, aches, sore limbs, and accidents, 
and finally the levels of problems reported by men compared to women workers, especially 
those allegedly related to menses. In the latter case, the responses of women workers were 
compared with those of the spouses of male workers who did not work in slaughterhouses.
The data of the study was computerized and analyzed. Three series of results have 
been published successively since the first general report was presented to the workers in 
1980. The first series surveyed the comparative problems reported by male and female 
workers (Mergler and Vézina 1981, 1982; Mergler, Everell, Desbiens, Geoffroy 1984; 
Mergler, Vézina, Brabant 1985; Mergler, Brabant, Vézina, Messing 1987). The second 
series concerned warts on the hands of workers manipulating poultry meat (Mergler, 
Vézina, Beauvais 1982; Vézina and Mergler 1983). The third one dealt specifically with 
dysmenorrhea and cold exposure (Mergler and Vézina 1985; Vézina, Mergler, Beauvais and 
Everell 1980).
The first series of results is particularly interesting for it aimed precisely at 
disproving the "myth that women’s occupations are not harmful to health" (Mergler, 
Vézina, Brabant 1985, 19). The analysis showed that of the eighty-three symptoms sur­
veyed, women workers reported a significantly higher preponderance for 35.5 percent of 
these, compared to only 3.9 percent by the men. However, when the results were adjusted 
to the types of jobs done by the individual (i.e., comparing men and women reporting simi­
lar sets of working conditions, such as very cold and humid exposure, standing and
313
immobile position, repetitive work with knife or scissors), the health symptoms reported in 
those groups revealed no significant — or else greatly diminished — differences between 
women and men (Mergler, Vézina, Brabant 1985; Mergler, Brabant, Vézina, Messing 1987). 
The study showed that the sharp sexual division of labour in the food-processing industry 
was a crucial factor in the explanation of the differences in symptoms reported by men and 
women. Hence, by using a woman-centred model of investigation, GRABIT*s researchers 
were led first to verify if women and men were doing similar jobs in similar working 
conditions, and secondly, to control the symptoms reported by the task descriptions and 
environmental variables. Their results showed that men and women doing similar jobs 
reported significantly similar symptoms of stress, and of pains in the upper back and in the 
upper and lower limbs. In brief, GRABIT’s feminist approach and woman-centred model 
contributed to a full assessment of the role of working conditions on the differences in 
symptoms reported by men and women. It also seriously undermined the male-centred 
model and its assumption of a ’biology of the weaker sex’“ .
The second series of results was highlighted thanks to the active participation of 
workers in the study. Meat cutters reported mild abrasions on the skin of their hands due 
to non-fitting steel-mesh protective gloves in conjunction with using blunt bladed knives 
in uncomfortable positions^. This data helped reveal one of the explanations why workers 
developed warts. Researchers were aware that the Papilloma virus responsible for warts 
could only propagate via the traces of meat-juice and fat to which workers are constantly 
exposed on the shopfloor, and that it could only develop in the sub-cutaneous layers of the 
skin. Drawing their attention to the flaws in the equipment and to superficial cuts and 
abrasions on the hands of workers was the key to a sound explanation of the problems of 
warts. Without the workers’ knowledge of their working conditions, the link between 
biological knowledge about Papilloma and clinical signs (warts) would not have been made 
(Mergler, Vézina, Beauvais 1982; Vézina and Mergler 1983).
The third series of results concerning dysmenorrhea (i.e., irregularity and abnormal
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pains during menstruations) and cold exposure in the workplace responded to a lack of 
research on the subject. GRABIT’s results disproved the idea that women are unusually 
sensitive to pain when they have their periods. The results showed, in the first place, that 
10 percent of the women exposed to cold temperatures were incapacitated by dysmenorrhea 
and took sick leave during their prior menstrual cycle; and that this proportion increased 
in correlation with increasingly cold temperature (Mergler and Vézina 1985). Secondly, 
the factors commonly known to reduce dysmenorrhea (e.g., oral contraceptive, age, regular 
cycle) did not apply in the case of the workers exposed to cold temperatures. Pain in the 
regions of the lower limbs, the stomach, the kidneys, and also headaches were widely 
reported by all the female workers exposed to cold work conditions (Vézina, Mergler, 
Beauvais, Everell 1980). Finally, it was shown that the pain was not as acute among the 
control group formed by the spouses of the male workers who did not work in the 
slaughterhouses.
In the second study, the problems of women mangle workers in the laundry industry, 
a typically female job, were investigated. As the researchers of GRABIT emphasize, despite 
the well-known fact that the relationship between ambient temperature and thermal 
discomfort varies greatly according to the situation at hand, the majority of studies on the 
subject are still done in laboratories because measurements of metabolic heat load are easier 
to make in this setting (Bédard, Brabant, Mergler 1987). GRABIT’s study therefore aimed 
at mustering information on the effects of heat exposure in the workplace. More 
specifically, it tried to provide more data on the real effects of high temperature levels 
otherwise considered normal for a type of work designated as "light’ as is the case for 
mangle workers who happened to report physical discomfort in their jobs.
The results of the women mangle workers study indicated that detailed 
measurements of all the movements, postures, and cardiac strains during a full day’s work 
suggest that mangle work ought to be classified as ’moderate’ rather than ’light’ work, and 
that the regulations governing the levels of normal temperature be lowered accordingly
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(Bédard and Brabant 1989; Brabant, Bédard, Mergler 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). 
The data for this study was collected on eleven women manglers over two periods of three 
days during the summer of 1985 and the winter of 1986, totalling 66 worker/days. (Access 
to the shopfloor was gained in spite of reluctance on the part of the management) Feelings 
of discomfort were measured by systematic questioning of the workers and were "indicative 
of a coherent pattern of physiological responses" (Bédard, Brabant, Mergler 1987). Other 
individual items of information (e.g. age, smoking habits) were also collected by means of 
a questionnaire. Descriptions of the job’s tasks were gathered by means of direct 
observation. Finally, portable sensors connected to a small computerized data storage 
apparatus were attached to the mangle workers during their whole seven hour day shift in 
order to measure their energetic output and cardiac rhythm.
The results showed that, although each item of laundry manipulated individually did 
not amount to lifting a heavy load, the accumulated weight of linen manipulated per day 
(taking into account different types of manoeuvre) amounted to 7(X) kilograms. The other 
characteristics of the jobs, such as a static posture with use of the upper limbs, torsions of 
the whole body, and speed of movement required to feed the mangles contributed to 
heighten the energetic output of the workers. Finally, the combination of this physical — 
and mental -  workload and the thermal ambience on the shopfloor increased the workers’ 
global energetic output even more. Those results were cast into a new light when readings 
of the cardiac strains were done at diverse times during the day, and in different seasons. 
The cardiac rhythm was much higher in the second half of the day shift, and in the summer 
season, even though the physical workload itself did not vary (Bédard, Brabant, Mergler 
1987; Brabant, Bédard, Mergler 1988a, 1988b).
Interestingly, early on during their study, the researchers had already pointed out that 
the observed heart rates for these women laundry workers resembled those reported for 
persons, usually males, working in heavy industries (Brabant, Bédard, Mergler 1986a). 
After several analyses, they finally concluded that the working conditions were actually
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damaging the health of these women workers in a specific way. They hoped therefore that
their results would help in ameliorating the working conditions accordingly, and stimulate
intervention in the workplace:
Identification of the most strenuous phases of the work activity will provide the 
basis for recommendations in this workplace. Long term consideration of the 
findings of this study should initiate rethinking of heat exposure standards in order 
to prevent more adequately excessive cardiac strain, which affects well-being, 
possibly accounts for discomfort, and may have long term chronic effects. (Brabant, 
Bédard, Mergler 1988b, 240).
The third type of study is an investigation of the ergonomic aspects of a typical 
male job in order to adapt it for a woman: the cases of a cutter in a clothing shop 
(Courville 1987) and of mechanics in a diesel engines shop (Courville, Vézina, Messing 
1989). The first project was developed in response to the request of the trade union’s 
"committee on woman’s working conditions" (Comité de la condition féminine!. There was 
only one woman occupying this job in the company; in fact, she was the only woman in 
the whole union. This woman, as was stressed in GRABIT’s report, wished to get the job 
in order to increase her salary^. The second project took place in a company of 1500 
workers where only three women were employed. The actual study was conducted in a shop 
where one woman and ten men were doing the same job.
The study in the clothing shop was conducted in the fall of 1987 and the first report 
presented to the union in December of the same year. The methodology included direct 
observations (including the taking of photographs for the study of the bio-mechanical 
aspects of the job’s tasks), interviews, and measurements. The results suggested that given 
a few modifications in the equipment and the positioning of pieces of equipment, the 
female worker was able to accomplish her job satisfactorily. For instance, using the scissors 
instead of a small saw increased control over and efficiency in her work. Also, the 
introduction of a platform placed in front of the table she worked at and on which she 
could stand gave her an optimum posture and rendered her work easier. It also reduced the 
strains on her upper back. Finally, a most interesting finding revealed that minor 
modifications in the equipment, such as, for example, the adjusting of the height of the
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working tables, or the introduction of adjustable platforms, could also greatly decrease the 
levels of backaches reported by the male workers.
The study conducted in the engine shop was similar in design. The work activities 
of the woman were directly compared to those of her team mates, including the "operational 
modes" (i.e., postures, manoeuvres, muscular effort). The woman accomplished the same 
manoeuvres as her team mate, in spite of being much shorter (168 centimetres v 185) and 
weighing half as much (57 kilograms v 104).
The results showed that the woman was among those workers who found the tasks 
difficult. But as researchers learned that the laying out of the working post was adjusted 
to the average height of the two teammates, they deduced that it was too high for the 
woman, and that, as a result, she was compelled to work her arms in abduction, an 
operational mode which is rather taxing. GRABIT’s researchers are now preparing to 
investigate which kind of adjustments in the tasks, the laying-out of the work post, and the 
tools would minimize the difficulties encountered by the woman mechanic and some of her 
male colleagues.
Feminist Biologv at GRABIT: Convergence with, and 
Resistance from. Mainstream Biologists
In the previous sections, it was shown that GRABIT has contributed a new 
conceptual framework to the field of occupational health. This has, in turn, made GRABIT 
opt for a set of methodological tools in order to pinpoint a number of important variables 
explaining health problems at work which conventional models and methods did not 
apprehend.
A discussion of three other types of scientific issues will help clarify the reasons 
why GRABIT’s research programme has incurred some resistance, or alternatively, earned 
the approval of some of its peers in the scientific milieu. Some of these issues are plainly 
institutional, relating to the politics of funding research. The others deal more directly with
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methodological norms of practice in biology and the epistemological canons of validation 
in the empirico-analytical sciences, and the points of rupture between ’mainstream biology* 
and ’feminist biology’.
The financial and institutional restraints
The financial situation of GRABIT has been healthy for the past five years, and 
grant money has always come in regularly. However, it is noteworthy that, within its re­
search agenda, the field studies concerned more directly with the workers has almost always 
been underfinanced by funding bodies.
Messing has compiled statistics on the rate of success of GRABIT’s grant 
applications (1988). She has pinned down two major tendencies in the policy of public 
funding towards its research-action projects. The first tendency shows that public funds 
systematically finance the laboratory aspects of GRABIT’s projects, but turn down its 
requests for sponsorship for the ’worker aspects’. She demonstrates that on a total of 
twenty-eight applications made by GRABIT since its creation, 100% of all fifteen proposals 
for laboratory studies were financed, compared to only 25% — or three out of the twelve 
proposals — for field studies with workers. The second tendency shows that when Mergler 
or Messing applied for a grant in collaboration with a male colleague, it was usually 
sponsored (i.e., eight successful applications out of nine). In contrast, when they did not put 
in the names of any male collaborators on their demands and were the sole supervisors of 
the projects being submitted, their applications were successful at a rate of only 42% (i.e., 
eight successful applications out of nineteen).
It could be argued that, because they have always openly shown their feminist 
orientations, GRABIT’s directors have had to suffer political discrimination from financing 
bodies. But this conclusion would need to be qualified by the fact that GRABIT’s ’worker- 
oriented’ research-action is much more threatening to employers and the financial
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establishment than its feminist orientation. As mentioned earlier, several senior members 
of the group have suggested that it is primarily its link with the trade unions that hampers 
GRABIT from getting research money from financing agencies and other sources of 
sponsorship.
Especially in the fields of occupational health and ergonomics where medical 
doctors and engineers are closely associated with the employers’ point of view, the 
industrial and medical establishments clearly are antagonistic to GRABIT. As Vézina men­
tioned, it has often happened to her to be sent in to court as a counter-expert having to 
confront the engineers sent in to defend management’s policy against the grievances of the 
trade union. Researchers at GRABIT have also often raised the problems of gaining access 
to shopfioors for their field studies; while several also maintained that once they gained 
access, they had to suffer systematic obstruction on the part of the management^.
It seems therefore that engaging in feminist research is, in the particular case of 
GRABIT, less damaging politically than doing worker-oriented or worse, ’socialist 
research’. As Seifert contended, the antagonism to the worker-oriented approach is espe­
cially conspicuous on the part of funding bodies or plant management, and less so against 
the worn an-centred orientation.
Yet within the scientific community itself, the feminist label seems to be highly 
resented, especially by men. Bélanger pointed out that male students are not at all attracted 
to the seminars given by Drs. Messing and Mergler about women and biology. Messing and 
Mergler also stressed that their male -  and some of their female — colleagues have either 
been oblivious to, or vehemently opposed to, any rigorous feminist research agenda in the 
biology department. In addition. Messing indicated that she has always had colleagues 
denigrating indiscriminately all the projects of GRABIT and attacking its scientific 
credentials. Thus, if one takes these events into account, the feminist commitment of 
GRABIT’s directors seems to create a climate of resentment and obstruction within the 
scientific milieu. But it also seems reasonable to think that their scientific credentials have
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not necessarily suffered a systematic rejection. On the contrary, GRAB IT seems to have 
gained respect relatively quickly, within very few years.
The methodological issues
In the arena of methodology, three issues might be raised successively in connection 
with the points of rupture and convergence between mainstream biology and GRABIT*s 
feminist biology. First, the epistemological canons of scientific proof in the field of 
epidemiology and the methodological norms of scientificity in the biological sciences more 
generally tend to undermine the value of the qualitative approach used at GRABIT. Secon­
dly, the epistemological status of "listening to the subjects" of study, known to be the nexus 
of the new method propounded in feminist biology, is not so much ’revolutionary* in 
epistemology in general as controversial in clinical research, and in the life sciences in 
particular. Having said that, it seems that the credibility of feminist social theories of labour 
in economics and sociology have given a non-negligible legitimacy to feminist occupational 
health and biology at work.
As mentioned previously, there are certain problems with the methodological tenets 
of a research-action model. Firstly, the results are often based on a small sample of data, 
usually the workers in one factory. In epidemiology, the results of a study are considered 
controversial if they rely on too small a sample, for in a small sample, control for factors 
that might potentially be responsible for the actual disease is not always possible (Fletcher 
1986; Messing 1990b).
The second difficulty with the research-action model is that it often relies on 
interviews and the subjective reports of individuals. The advantages of using this type of 
data collection were shown in previous sections. But it also bears disadvantages of which 
researchers at GRABIT are fully aware. Subjective reports of workers may, for instance, 
comprise unduly biases induced by anxiety and imperfect memory; by a lack of interest;
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by ignorance of the possible dangers. These might distort the facts, thus concurring with 
scientific misinterpretation of the results. The likelihood of self-selection of respondents in 
health-related studies is another well-known predicament menacing accurate diagnosis. 
Finally, the omission of crucial events by those subjects who have little to lose by reporting 
incompletely their personal health history is likely to distort the results of a study.
Considering that some aspects of GRABIT’s approach are genuinely controversial, 
it is not uninteresting to note that GRABIT* s students are less at ease than the senior staff 
to accept or defend the methodological tenets of a research-action model at the expense of 
the more conventional methodological norms followed by epidemiologists. Several students 
indeed admitted having problems justifying their results in the eyes of other biologists. At 
a conference attended by professionals in health research (where the author was a witness) 
for instance, a student was asked how she could justify the causal links between data based 
on two sets of subjective reports^®. The student was unable to answer satisfactorily. But 
Seifert, who was present at the conference, defended the validity of the study by arguing 
that there is a coherence in the patterns of responses obtained with current medical 
knowledge.
In brief, the logic of justification that underwrites GRABIT’s research methodology 
runs as follows. First, symptoms of discomfort and health problems should be investigated 
at their source, that is in the plant or the factory. Some of these sources may be obvious 
and easily identified. But others are manifold, constitutive of a synergic ensemble of causes. 
They are only identifiable via a holistic and contextual understanding of the work situation. 
Difficulties arising out of studies involving symptoms of mental stress should not be 
avoided because there are no obvious signs that can help orient the investigation. Reliance 
on the subjective reports of workers are even more important and worthy in these cases. 
All these arguments should justify the choice of working on a small sample rather than on 
a large-scale sample as is usually the case in epidemiology. The usage of interview 
techniques, finally, should be justified on the following grounds. This technique offers the
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possibility of detecting important information otherwise neglected by the researcher who 
is not familiar with the work conditions specific to the shopfloor under study. The 
reliability of the data collected by this technique is tested against the presence of a pattern 
of coherence in the responses obtained with accepted medical knowledge^\
I should like to suggest, at this stage, that the methodological arguments raised by 
GRABIT in favour of its techniques of investigation might sound familiar to any social 
scientists engaged in empirical research. Indeed, the interview techniques and the use of 
questionnaires are widely accepted in the social sciences and human studies. The former 
is used as a most efficient device in the exploration of new fields of research, such as in 
GRABIT’s research, the study of a new industry or a new workplace. The latter offers the 
grid for a quantifiable analysis, generally accepted in the social sciences as a reasonable 
basis for the validation of results. It seems therefore that the techniques of investigation 
used at GRABIT are not fundamentally new from the point of view of epistemology. That 
is to say, it is nothing but an accepted norm of scientific practice in the ’soft sciences’, 
although it still provokes controversies in clinical and ’hard’ sciences. It might be 
’shocking’ to the community of biologists to have to resort to a method borrowed from the 
’soft’ social sciences, because biology and epidemiology are two fields which are now 
considered more or less on a par with other ’hard sciences’ precisely because they have 
finally managed to integrate, after so many years, the ’best’ of the ’scientific method’ to 
their inquiry of human beings^^
It has often been argued by the directors of GRABIT that the method of listening 
constitutes the foundation of a new kind of research that would herald a biology more 
favourable to women (Mergler 1983; Messing 1986, 1990a). The notion of ’listening’, as 
shown previously, is not only at the nexus of the research-action model as such. It lies at 
the core of a feminist approach to knowledge that has been suggested to entrench the 
feminine — rather than the masculine — values within the scientific method and to renew, 
on this basis, scientific epistemology in the natural sciences. Although this view has now
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been revised, even by those who advanced it some years ago (see Jaggar and Bordo 1989; 
Keller 1987b; Kirkup 1986; Mura 1989; H. Rose 1987; Stacey 1988), the importance of 
’listening’ still looms large in the arguments supporting the idea of a feminist biology.
For instance, one might ask to what extent do researchers listen to people and 
workers? Are their opinions taken into consideration at all stages of the research process? 
Or else, are they only considered as input data and not really taken into account in the 
design of research and in the interpretation of results? Is the ’art of listening’ to living 
organisms only the prerogative of women biologists? Is it epistemologically reasonable to 
argue for an approach of ’listening’ when one is dealing with genes, viruses, and toxines 
rather than with human beings? Although it is not possible to answer all these questions in 
the context of this thesis, some qualifications may be made concerning the strengths and 
limitations of the method of listening for the development of feminist biology.
The idea that a "method of listening" is central to, and specific of, feminist science 
is being contended within GRABIT itself. Especially among the senior researchers, there 
have been discussions about the scope and real impact of such a method. The utility of a 
"method of listening", it is true, seems obvious in the case of studies where interviews are 
used extensively to assess the health problems and malaise of workers. However, even in 
this case, the "subjective reports" of workers are bound to be validated on other "more 
objective" grounds, such as measurements done with instruments or a "pattern of coherence 
of responses" with accepted medical knowledge. In greater contrast, as in the case of the 
investigation of the effects of the working conditions on some genetic defects, it becomes 
even more obvious that the use of "objective measurements" is more important than the 
"subjective reports" of workers, even though the latter may be, in some contexts, the only 
yardstick for "measurements" of the working conditions under study. The limitations of the 
(interactive) "method of listening" thus become clearer. In general, its utility, which is 
genuine, does not trespass the first step of the research process, at the stage of exploring 
— or measuring -  an ensemble of working conditions.
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Yet, in spite of its limited utility in certain areas of biological study, the interactive 
method and the technique of ’listening’ cannot be questioned as to its utility in the process 
of discovery. Its relevancy in the logic of discovery is not being challenged; what is being 
questioned is its relevancy at the stages of formalizing and validating results in biological 
studies. For biology is not an arena where the ontological and epistemological conditions 
of the application of the hermeneutical method are present in the first place. These are 
rather superseded by the pragmatic criterion governing the empirico-analytical sciences.
In a nutshell, the potency of the 'method' of ’listening* may be conceived of in 
terms of a renewed attempt to use various techniques of data collection in clinical studies. 
If it is still likely to be considered as a controversial yet rational methodological stance 
in human biology, it can hardly be considered as an epistemological basis for the validation 
of biological knowledge, and feminist biologist would agree to this.
In fact, it seems that the combination of technique of listening and sociological 
concepts borrowed from feminist theories of labour is truly congenial to the development 
of new research designs and hypotheses in occupational health. Moreover, this combination 
seems even more congenial to a sound understanding of women workers' health problems. 
However, the data mustered via these technique and concepts remain, in the end, subject 
to the traditional canons of validation of the emiprico-analytical sciences; and it is the 
convergence towards these scientific rules, or 'mega-norms' of practice that might have 
helped GRABIT to justify and legitimize its feminist research programme.
I should like to suggest that the strength and originality of feminist biology at 
GRABIT lies precisely in its relatively successful attempt to establish a bridgehead between 
'methods' and concepts in the sociology of labour and the biological sciences with a view 
to the elaboration of a woman-centred research-action programme in occupational health. 
As an instance of feminist biology, GRABIT has contributed to biology in a substantive 
way. It has introduced the theoretical assumptions about gendered representations of human 
nature, behaviour, and labour in a discipline hitherto oblivious to these; and it has
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implemented new concepts, research agenda and findings to the field of occupational health.
Feminist scientists, women scientists, 
and feminist biology
The main proponent of a feminist biology at GRABIT is Dr. Messing. As the 
co-director of the group, she has the opportunity to orient its research agenda according to 
feminist concerns. She also contributes greatly to shaping the image of GRABIT within and 
outside the scientific community. This is not to say that feminist biology is just a matter 
of discourse. On the contrary, this chapter has shown clearly that GRABIT’s research 
practice really consists in an original contribution of feminism to the field of biology and 
work.
Thus, to capture in which ways women, feminists and non-feminists, might have 
contributed to the development of feminist biology, one has to examine the motivations 
underlying why the biologists at GRABIT, staff and students, have opted to follow in 
Messing and Mergler* s steps.
In this last section I should like to make some clarifications about the relationship 
between being a woman and doing feminist research, and stress that this relationship 
should not be conceived of as a synchronic causal chain but rather as a diachronic 
unfolding of scientific thinking and social interests.
Let us first try to disengage from the idea -  very controversial within feminism 
itself — that the caring attitude and the method of listening is the causal link between being 
a woman and engaging in feminist science. This argument is not only flawed 
epistemologically; it is also sociologically shallow: for it is spurious to categorize men and 
women within another rigid dichotomy that does not even represent the milieu of biological 
practitioners accurately” . Finally, as women climb higher in the scientific hierarchy, they 
tend to use their authority in no ’healthier’ a manner than the men. In this connection, 
several young female students interviewed for this research indeed commented on having
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very unpleasant relationships with their female supervisors^.
It was pointed out in the first section of this chapter that only a few members of 
GRABIT were directly involved in feminist movements. Moreover, younger students at 
GRABIT tended to avoid the feminist label, and did not necessarily consider themselves 
feminists. Nevertheless, they were all interested in doing research ABOUT women. That 
was their main motivation in coming to GRABIT. At GRABIT, these young researchers 
became familiar with feminist theories of labour and the feminist-oriented research-action 
model. Their ’socialization* as scientists was thereby built on the basis of feminist concerns. 
They worked with a Framework of feminist theoretical concepts. They utilized methods that, 
although rather conventional from the point of view of the social sciences, are not 
generally accepted within biology and epidemiology. But they were as yet unexposed to the 
politics of the institution.
What will these students do after they leave GRABIT for other more conventional 
research centres or laboratories? The answer to this question is crucial for the development 
of feminist biology. But at the moment one can only answer this question by looking at 
tendencies. In this respect, one must take into account that these young people will have 
internalized a research approach and research ’interests’ that are the basis of the future 
development of feminist biology and work. But it must be stressed also that a political 
awareness of the ideological and economic rationale of the biological institution is still, in 
the present social context, necessary for those who wish to follow the pioneers.
At present, the agenda of a feminist research-action is likely to be overshadowed 
by other research priorities of the biological, financial, and industrial establishments. If it 
seems reasonable to think that feminist research in biology and work is not the greatest 
threat to conventional biological research, although it may be menacing for the economic 
interests of industry. Certainly research on women’s health is taken into more serious 
consideration than one or two generations ago; or compared to a century ago when it was 
almost totally dismissed. Having said that, even though some important scientific battles
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have been successfully fought by feminist biologists in the past, there arc others that still 
need to be fought in order to put questions of concern to women and feminists higher on 
the biological research agenda.
As the case study of GRABIT has shown. Dr. Messing has been the main proponent 
of a feminist approach on behalf of the group. She has had the total support of Dr. Mergler 
in her undertaking. Together, they have worked on the integration of their feminist critique 
into a research-action approach to biology and work. The latter approach gave the former 
research priority a relatively legitimate scientific basis.
Nevertheless, through the years. Messing and Mergler have had to deflect the 
hostility of some of their peers and, most importantly, of the industrial establishment. As 
Messing explained, "listening" to the workers in occupational health is dangerous to the 
class system; and for this reason it may have been easier to reach a political consensus on 
the necessity of a "woman-centred" model than on a "research-action" approach.
All the above arguments suggest that the relationship between feminist biology and 
women biologists should be understood in terms of an historical unfolding rather than in 
terms of synchronic causal links. That is to say, the evidence mustered in this thesis 
suggests that a feminist biology is a full-fledged scientific practice informed by feminist 
social critiques, woman-centred analytical categories, and ’empathy* with women’s life 
experiences. This historical unfolding suggests, in turn, that other biologists will participate 
in feminist biology inasmuch as its scientific values converge minimally with the canons 
of validation of empirical knowledge, but also on the condition that practising biologists 
develop and maintain a minimum of commitment to feminist political goals. And 
throughout this historical process, the social interests and research concerns of women will 
certainly make them participate more than men to the development of feminist biology.
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Endnotes
1) The collaboration of the members of GRABIT was outstanding, given the 
circumstances: the group was busy preparing papers and organizing a special colloquium 
on women and occupational health as part of the annual Symposium of the ACFAS, the 
French Canadian association for the advancement of science. The two directors were, as 
always, very busy and could not always spare the time necessary to discuss the questions 
relevant to the present research. (A second trip to Montreal was made in January 1990 
during which several discussions with Karen Messing completed the information on this 
case study.) On the other hand, Suzanne Bélanger, Ana-Maria Seifert, and Carole Brabant, 
were very reliable informants and gave steady and valuable assistance. Overall, their 
attitude was very forthcoming.
2) GRABIT also collaborates on special projects with other staff in the department 
of biological sciences at UQAM, and a few other biologists outside the university. If we 
include these people, nearly thirty researchers (over 80% female) — including students — 
form the ’extended GRABIT’. In the present study, only the core of the group was taken 
in consideration, that is, the staff paid from a grant of the Institut de Recherche en Santé 
et Sécurité au Travail (IRSST) and the research students under the direct supervision of 
Messing or Mergler. This accounted for eighteen researchers and one full-time secretary, 
whose competence was often praised by GRABIT’s members, and whose involvement in 
the group extended beyond secretarial work.
3) For a succinct portrait of Karen Messing, see Y. Villedieu. 1988. ’Karen Messing: 
Faire de la science pour changer des choses’. In Interface. 9, 1 (janvier): 8-10.
4) In the academic hierarchy in the province of Québec, there are four categories 
of teaching staff, but each bears the title of professor.
5) For a short biography of Donna Mergler, see A. Gotheil. 1988. Les Juifs 
Progressistes du Québec. Montréal: Ed. Par Ailleurs.
6) Interview with Dr. Nicole Vézina, Montreal, 2 June 1989.
7) Interview with Suzanne L.-Bélanger, Longueil, 19 June 1989; interview with 
Ana-Maria Seifert, Montreal, 30-31 May 1989.
8) Interview with Carole Brabant, Montreal, 30 May 1989. The Ph.D. programme 
in environmental sciences was only recently instituted at UQAM, in 1988.
9) Interview with Sylvie Bédard, Montreal, 18 May 1989.
10) Interview with Julie Courville, Montreal, 2 June 1989.
11) Interview with Ginette Plouffe, Montreal, 25 May 1989.
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12) Interview with Isabel Fortier, Montreal, 25 May 1989.
13) Interview with Dr. Karen Messing, Montreal, 1 June 1989, and 4, 12 and 16 
January 1990; interview of Dr. Mergler, Montreal 16 May 1989.
14) Daniel Tierney, Karen Messing and Donna Mergler were the only three 
anglophones of the group, but were all fluent in French, which is the language of 
communication within GRABIT.
15) Application to the WHO/PAHO, April 1989. Still being negotiated in January
1990.
16) In 1985, after the departure of Dr. Desnoyers, Mergler and Messing initiated the 
GRABIT. The team was sponsored for two years by the IRSST and UQAM. In 1987 the 
IRSST gave another substantial grant covering all the functioning expenses of the group for 
a period of three years. At the time of the study, the grant had not been renewed, which 
worried several researchers.
17) D. Mergler and Q. Samak. 1987. La santé au travail: une approche médicale ou 
approche préventive? In Colloque international sur la santé du monde. Confédération des 
Syndicats Nationaux, 35p.; D. Mergler. 1981. Recherche épidémiologioue en milieu de 
travail. Colloque sur la recherche et l’action communautaire. Québec.; D. Mergler. 1987. 
Workers’ Participation in occupational health research: Theory and practice. In Journal of 
health services. 17: 151-67.
18) Mergler emphasises that scientists are not necessarily altruistic professionals. 
They too gain their fair share of benefits in the success of a research project on workers.
19) I refer here to the study of Vézina et al. presented further in this chapter about 
the development of warts on the hands of workers in poultry slaughterhouses. It was the 
workers who drew the attention of researchers to the possible source of infection. The study 
of Messing et al. on hospital workers is also quoted very often. See K. Messing et al. 1987. 
Union-initiated research in genetic effects of workplace agents. In Alternatives: Perspectives 
on technologv, environment and societv. 15: 14-18.
20) Messing points out that it is mainly women who engaged in research on 
women’s health at work. Like several feminists. Messing believes that women have a 
fundamental role to play in the promotion of feminist occupational health and biology.
21) Interestingly, Messing used to think that the problem of women not being able 
to enter traditionally male jobs was merely ideological. But she was led to think otherwise 
subsequent to several discussions with her colleague ergonomists and physiologists at 
GRABIT, and she was prompted to examine such problems in terms of the real biological 
limitations of women undertaking certain traditionally male jobs.
22) The fact that trade unions are male dominated also implies similar impediments 
for the implementation of feminist research in occupational health. The possibility that 
salaries will decrease if women are allowed in traditionally male jobs is not a small hurdle
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for feminists and women who have to face the inertia of officers in the trade union 
movements. See: H. David 1986. Inégalité en emploi. Rapport de recherche. Montreal: 
IRAT.
23) Messing recalled several episodes where her colleagues or those of Drs. Mergler 
and Vézina demonstrated blatant hostility or annoyance vis-à-vis their feminist commitment. 
In contrast, I witnessed genuine appreciation of Dr. Mergler* s approach from members of 
the ABQ, Québec*s association of biologists, during the Symposium of ACFAS in May 
1989.
24) See for instance Moray, N. 1988. Mental workload since 1979. In International 
reviews of ergonomics. 2: 123-50. See also Fletcher (1986) who examines methodological 
problems linked to the utilisation of small samples and subjective reports of patients in 
epidemiological studies.
25) That Dr. Mergler had contacted officers in the trade unions direct also played 
a role in this ’choice’ of research topic.
26) In this example, the hypothesis that women are usually less reluctant than men 
to report the same level of symptom was qualified on the grounds that women’s excess 
reporting was also correlated with their reporting of a faster work speed in the working 
conditions.
27) This example is certainly the piece of evidence most frequently quoted by the 
members of GRABIT to vindicate the utility of their research-action model.
28) Lower salaries are one of the many characteristics of female jobs ’ghettos’. At 
GRABIT this aspect of women’s jobs is often mentioned as affecting the well-being of 
workers.
29) This is without consideration of the problems dealing with the trade unions 
themselves which are sometimes unable -  or unwilling — to support GRABIT. See Mergler 
1987a; Vézina et al. 1980.
30) The study concerned hospital workers who complained of abnormal pains during 
their periods. The dissension came with reference to the causal link drawn by the researcher 
between hardship at work and levels of pains reported. The contention pertained to the 
circularity of the logic: is it not reasonable to think that the women who complained the 
most actually exaggerated the level of hardship in their work, thus inverting the actual 
causal link? The counter-argument to this would be the existence of a specific logic of pain 
associated with specific working conditions.
31) GRABIT is now developing statistical tools such as factorial and regression 
analysis (see Bédard, Brabant, Ferraris, Mergler 1989) which bear resemblance to the 
packages used by social scientists doing quantitative analysis.
32) Interestingly, we suggested to the members of GRABIT that they were actually 
using the ’soft’ methods of social science in human biology. Those to whom this was
331
suggested seemed however reluctant to accept the idea. They preferred to say that they 
were using a method which had been used in biology for a long time already. We tend to 
believe that both positions are legitimate, and prove that the so-called 'new* method of 
'listening*, for example, is not so 'new*.
33) Some might retort that it is mainly the men who do dissections and 'awful* 
experiments on animals. But this does not seem at all confirmed by empirical evidence.
34) This is based on the interviews carried out with biologists in London, but also 
according to some students at GRABIT.
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CONCLUSION
THE ORIGINALITY OF FEMINISTS’ CONTRIBUTION TO BIOLOGY
This research has analyzed the Anglo-Saxon feminist critiques of natural science 
with a view to the creation and implementation of projects of ’feminist biological practice’. 
It has assessed the sociological and epistemological arguments upon which feminists have 
justified their criticisms of biology and natural science. It has suggested that, from the 
perspective of a sociology of knowledge, the argument that biology has built on 
male-centred and patriarchal theoretical assumptions and institutionalized gender- 
segregatory norms of practice is justified. Several cases of historical evidence may be cited 
to support this, especially those relating to evolution theory, gendered behaviours and 
women’s health on the one hand, and the organization of laboratory work on the other.
From the outset, feminist critics set out to explore the natural sciences, and 
biological knowledge in particular, as representing the last (and certainly least obvious) 
bastions of patriarchy. Alternately, any of the feminist attempts to construct a new feminist 
science had to appeal to several sociological arguments. The most effective argument in that 
sense might come from an analysis of science as a system of knowledge vested with 
interests: the science system is assumed to orient the research agenda (i.e. to decide which 
research projects will be funded and realized) and to balance the methodological norms of 
testing theories in favour of certain social interests.
In this perspective, several feminists have argued that the establishment of a project 
of feminist biology would occur following political and institutional struggles for 
recognition, rather than strictly legitimized on ’scientific’ credentials. We suspected, 
however, that this logic of argument, though strategically seminal, was self-deceptive. A 
research programme for biology which, like that defended by feminists, finds its primordial
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justification on a political basis, might be said to ultimately vindicate the feminist practice 
of science on the same grounds as patriarchal science. We suggested, therefore, that, to be 
consistent, the creation of a fully-fledged project of feminist biology must either find totally 
new grounds for legitimacy, or reappropriate the conventional epistemological rules of 
validation spelled out in critical realism. Only then would it be acceptable to isolate and 
discard patriarchal theories about womens’ biology on the grounds that they are ’incorrect’ 
and ’untrue’. Having said that, however, criticisms of biological theories may be justified 
on the basis of a theory which posits that scientific knowledge is purely political, 
discursive, and institutionally controlled.
As I tried to show in this thesis, as far as the norms of practice of science are 
concerned, the ideology of patriarchy and the feminist ideology are not totally discordant. 
It seems that feminist biologists rely, in the last analysis, on a number of methodological 
and explanatory categories (or normative values) that were generated within the 
empirico-analytical sciences themselves taking place within the patriarchal system. 
Consequently, the ’grand programme’ — of feminist critics of science — of sustaining 
projects of feminist biology on a new epistemological basis has not been fulfilled. Instead, 
projects of content-oriented theory-building in some research areas of biology have been 
realized successfully by some feminist biologists as one of our case studies showed.
This thesis contended that there has been a genuine contribution of feminists to the 
development of biological research in certain areas of the discipline. Why has it been so 
that feminist biologists have so far only had a limited impact on the biological institution? 
What is the extent to which epistemological, institutional (i.e. the structure of the discipline) 
and political factors have affected the establishment of a fully-fledged feminist biology?
We suggested, first, that the project for a feminist epistemology of the natural 
sciences has relatively failed in comparison to a feminist theory-building in biology partly 
because of the special epistemological status of biology. Biological explanations may 
sometimes resemble models of explanation in social science, other times, models in
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physical science, without necessarily abandoning rational procedures of logical inference 
and canons of validation in the empirico-analytical sciences. In the same vein, debates 
regarding the role played by social values in biological theories have been more or less 
politicized depending on the research areas (for instance evolutionary theory in contrast to 
microbiology), that is to say whether theories comprise value-assertions that bear more 
resemblance with those of social science or, in contrast, with physics and chemistry. It is 
well-known that social values entering theory-building in the social sciences have spurred 
more internal controversies and public debates than the social values entering 
theory-building in the physical sciences; while the biological sciences seem to have been 
afflicted with ’normative* disputes more acutely than physics or chemistry, but less so than 
sociology or psychology, for instance.
Feminists have advanced their critique of the scientific norms of biology on the 
basis of a sociology of scientific knowledge. This standpoint assumes that both the 
epistemological canons and theoretical assumptions of science are ultimately entrenched 
within social values and norms of practice. The central argument of feminist theories of 
knowledge is that, in spite of their spurious universality and of their adverse impact on 
women, biological theories about sex and gender differences remain largely uncriticized. 
A change in the social norms of life, and in the scientific norms of practice according to 
feminist ideology and epistemology would therefore be amenable to more accurate theories 
about women, and, as a result, to the emancipation of women within society in general. A 
new feminist biology built on these premises would, however, become legitimate only as 
feminist ideology would become accepted more widely both in the public at large and by 
practising biologists.
In this thesis we have argued that the feminist criticisms of biology did not 
necessarily need a new epistemological or methodological basis to be vindicated, even 
though some of these criticisms logically invited to a redefinition of disciplinary barriers 
and methodological tenets in biology. As we have observed, ’mainstream biologists’ do
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not generally find it incongruous to have to reconcile a conceptual framework of holism and 
a methodologically reductionist perspective. Alternatively, we noted that feminist biological 
theories could be scientifically legitimized, without having recourse to entirely new types 
of ’truth-claims’, nor using radically different categories of explanation -  such as teleology, 
interactions between environment and organisms, holism, and determinism. Inasmuch as the 
new concepts and theories advanced by feminist biologists follow the epistemological rules 
for scientific proof of the empirico-analytical sciences (i.e., the criteria that demarcate 
science from pseudo-science, and the pragmatic criterion of validation), an important barrier 
of resistance to the idea of a ’feminist biology’ is being eschewed. Our comparison of 
feminist practice of biology, and conventional discourse about biology has revealed these 
aspects of the actual implantation of projects of feminist biology, highlighting also some 
of the types of resistance mainstream biologists have manifested towards it.
This has led to the second argument of this thesis. Feminist biologists have had 
problems defending their new approach within the community of biologists for three main 
reasons. First, at the institutional level, they have had to break the disciplinary boundaries 
of human biology in order to integrate concepts and methods of investigation borrowed 
from the social sciences. Secondly, at the sociological level, they have had to resist the 
anti-feminist attitudes of the majority of fellow biologists, usually male, but also female. 
Finally, at the political level, they have had, as militants and politically motivated, to 
struggle against funding bodies in order to pursue their research programme and maintain 
their credibility within the institution of biology.
In this connection, we have tried to document the mode of participation of women 
biologists, and to explore their potential or actual role in a redefinition of the norms of 
practice and disciplinary structure of biological work. Although the role of women in 
scientific changes is problematic for feminists, both in practice and in theory, our results 
did not disprove the argument that a ’feminist biology’ should be first and foremost 
grounded on the implication of women biologists and of certain forms of ’feminine
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values’. This must, however, be interpreted with three qualifications. First, the link between 
a feminist biology and feminine ’values’ ought to be appreciated as a historical unfolding 
rather than as a strong causal relationship. That is to say, feminists may be the pioneers of 
a feminist biology, but it is mainly women who are expected to follow in their steps, and 
actually are the workers in ’gender-oriented’ sectors of biological and medical research. 
Secondly, we must bear in mind that the arguments advanced in favour of a feminist 
critique of biology are primarily addressed at gender-related problems, and observational 
research with a high theoretical content, rather than at experimentally-based theories. This 
thus leaves room for the possibility that gender-based socialization might supersede 
professional-based socialization relating to the development of certain research problems, 
designs, and hypotheses. As shown in our empirical studies, the potential for women to 
develop new ’woman-centred’ ways of conceptualising problems and interpreting results 
is justified both epistemologically and sociologically. Thirdly, if we accept the notion that 
a feminist biology is a ’successor’ science (i.e. it is assumed to be in continuity rather than 
total rupture with current science), then it seems appropriate to appraise the project of a 
’feminist-feminine’ biology on the argument that biology and clinical studies may employ 
the hermeneutical method for its research purposes, and, in the last analysis, lend 
themselves to feminist reconceptualizations on the basis of women’s (social and biological) 
life experiences and intersubjective understanding.
In brief, we shall argue that the contribution of feminist biologists to the field of 
biological research is genuine, but needs to be qualified as follows. First, feminist biology 
does not ultimately reject scientific realism. It remains committed, in the last instance, to 
the traditional epistemology of empirico-analytical sciences, the rules of scientific valida­
tion, and the pragmatic criterion in model-building. Yet it does challenge successfully 
mainstream biology, primarily via new operational concepts and research designs in 
bio-behavioural studies and clinically-oriented research about women. One must stress, 
however, that these research areas are closer to the social sciences, theoretically,
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methodologically and epistemologically, than other types of biological research which are, 
in contrast, closer to the physical sciences. Granted this, the limited impact of some projects 
of feminist biology, such as that of GRABIT, might more readily be explained by the 
constraints of an institutionalized disciplinary structure, and political resistance to feminist 
militants, than by epistemological inconsistencies. Feminist biologists, because they are 
forcefully committed to the welfare of women and an approach to biology largely inspired 
by social theories, concepts, explanatory categories, and techniques of investigation in 
human biology, seem to have suffered unduly the burden of political and institutional 
restraints, and frequently also, the verbal animosity of colleague scientists.
So we shall close this thesis by suggesting, with a view to the above arguments, 
some avenues for future research in the sociology of feminist biology. The case of GRABIT 
will, again, serve as an illustration.
The principal researchers at GRABIT have suffered very negative reactions on the 
part of their colleagues at UQAM and of peer scientists. Reactions of hostility, sometimes 
accompanied by intellectual detraction, have been commonplace. Indifference seems, 
however, to have been more widely spread. In spite of this, the group has benefitted from 
the knowledge and political support of trade unions and feminist groups particularly, and 
this has been very important for a continuity of its research undertakings. What is the 
articulation between the political and the scientific viewpoints of practising biologists 
towards feminists in biology; and in which way may this feature of the biological ’norms 
of practice’ jeopardize the position of women scientists who might lean towards a ’feminist’ 
practice of human biology? These questions should help to orient further research on the 
subject of feminism in biology.
Funding bodies and private industry shared a systematic distrust of GRABIT’s 
research team: they perceived it as ’socialist’ and biased in favour of the workers. 
GRABIT has nonetheless received several important grants since its foundation in 1982. 
Perhaps this ought to be put in light of the fact that GRABIT has always been persistent
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in its requests to gain access to companies’ data and to the shopfloors, has many contacts 
in trade unions, and has constantly applied for research grants. Who are the ’allies’ of 
feminist biologists within the institution of biology; and what kind of strategy ought 
feminists to develop in order to promote their research projects? These questions may also 
serve to orient fruitfully further research.
As regards the scientific disagreements about GRABIT’s methodology, there have 
been debates both within and outside the group. Medical doctors and epidemiologists, for 
instance, seriously doubt the validity of a methodology focusing on the subjective reports 
of workers. In addition, young members of GRABIT do not necessarily understand the 
rationale of such a non-conventional method for biology. What kind of ’professional’ 
orientations and career strategies the young biologists who are now being inspired by 
feminist biologists will take in the future? This question might inspire feminist students in 
the development of new research insights into knowledge systems in general, and biological 
practice in particular.
Finally, although the politics of biological research emerges as rather antagonistic 
to a feminist-oriented, soft-method based, ’women-centred’ (and ’workers-friendly’) 
research programme like that of GRABIT, yet the group has been funded regularly and, 
on some of its studies, obtained the entire collaboration of employers. It seems therefore 
that GRABIT has gained scientific credits relatively quickly for a group of feminist 
scientists often portrayed as ’revolutionary’. A leading question in future feminist research 
might, in this regard, be: How should we interpret this evidence from the perspective of 
changes in ’systems of knowledge’?
In our opinion, the current social and scientific context offers, with qualifications, 
the space for a feminist biology to exist. As the case study of GRABIT strongly suggested, 
projects of feminist biology may be decisively non-conventional (conceptually, 
methodologically and institutionally) and develop a substantial and genuinely original 
’women-centred’ research programme in human biology, even upon a re-appropriation of
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the ’conventional’ epistemological canons of validation of the empirico-analytical sciences.
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APPENDIX
DETAILS ON RESPONDENTS IN PILOT AND MAIN STUDIES
Respondents were selected and contacted along the following procedures. A list of 
the members of staff of all biology departments (and medical schools) at the University of 
London was prepared, using the directory of the Association of Commonwealth Universi­
ties, the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1987.
Seven units were selected, and the heads of departments, contacted direct or by mail. 
Access was given in six departments. Updating of lists of members of staff was done, and 
lists of research students was requested (four departments provided such lists). Selection 
of respondents was operated with a view to a reasonable representation of disciplines (i.e., 
zoology, genetics, medical research orientated) and age-groups (taking the status of res­
pondents as an indicator); and to equal numbers of men and women.
Personalized letters were, finally, sent off — roughly to twice as many respondents 
as our study’s target number -  explaining the aims and scope of the research and 
describing the organization of the project. The percentage of positive responses was 57%.
Female Respondents in Pilot Study
No. Status Age Civil Status/ Discipline
of Interviewee n. of Children
#1 Student 30 married/2 bio/neurochemistry
#2 Student 23 single parasitology
#3 Lecturer 50 married biochemistry/neurology
#4 Sr. Lecturer 48 single physiology
#5 Sr. Lecturer 37 married/2 molecular genetics
#6 Sr. Lecturer 50 married/2 bio/neurochemistry
#7 Sr. Lecturer 48 married/2 pathology/cell biology
#8 Student 28 married immunology
#9 Student 26 single biochemistry
#10 Professor 58 married/3 parasitology
#11 Teacher 32 married/2 paleontology
#12 Teacher 31 single microbiology
#13 Teacher 30 divorced/1 marine genetics
#14 Teacher 37 married plant physiology
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n. of children 
married/1 molecular genetics
2 Res. Fellow 45 divorced/1 physio/neurobiology
3 Res. Fellow 61 married/2 zoology
4 Lecturer 32 single plant genetics
5 Lecturer 34 married/1 molecular genetics
6 Student 32 married mycology
7 Lecturer 44 single microbiology/genetics
8 Post-Doc 29 married pathology
9 Student 26 single medical genetics
10 Student 23 single molecular genetics
11 Post-Doc 34 married neuroanatomy/mol. ge
12 Lecturer 34 married/2 plant pathology
13 Res. Fellow 61 married/3 zoology/neurology
14 Res. Fellow 46 single medical genetics
15 Res. Fellow 46 married human genetics
16 Lecturer 50 single zoology/genetics
17 Lecturer 45 married/2 zoology/physiology
18 Lecturer 35 single zoology/ecology
Male Respondents in Main Study




n. of Children 
married/2 microbiology
102 Student 45 married plant physio./ecology
103 Post-Doc 34 married insect physiology
104 Lecturer 35 married biochemistry/botany
105 Lecturer 33 single population genetics
106 Lecturer 41 married zoology/paleontology
107 Reader 44 single population genetics
108 Lecturer 40 married/2 zoology
109 Student 32 single insect physiology
110 Post-Doc 25 single molecular genetics
111 Lecturer 36 married/2 biochemistry/genetics
112 Sr. Lecturer 57 single animal behaviour
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